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Foreign Press Centers > Briefings > -- By Date > 2002 Foreign Press Center Briefings > April 

NATO Enlargement: The Road to Prague


Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
April 29, 2002

Photo of Marc Grossman

10:17 A.M. (EDT)

 Real Audio of Briefing

Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045, USA.   For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202) 824-0520.

       MR. GROSSMAN: As Peter said, let me just make a couple of opening comments, and then I'd be glad to take questions.

       I led an interagency delegation to a number of NATO capitals between the 15th of April and the 19th of April. Just to make sure you know what we did, I went on the 15th, I started -- and I briefed the NAC on some themes and ideas that we have as we move toward the Prague summit in November. I then had a chance to visit in Turkey, where I again made some presentations to our Turkish allies. I then went to Rome, I went to Lisbon, I went to Paris, I went to Prague, I went to Berlin, I went to Oslo, and I went to The Hague during that period of the week.

       And what we did was in each place we said that we had been thinking a little bit about what themes we ought to use for the Prague summit, that we felt it was time to consult with our allies about those themes. And I said the themes that we had come up -- and we were obviously interested in their views -- were three, and that to really make this an alliance relevant to the 21st century, we hoped that the Prague summit would put out three themes:

       First, new capabilities. We argued that the alliance needed new military capabilities to meet the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

       Second theme was new members. We all agreed that probably if we'd have made this trip or had this summit 15 or 18 months in advance, the Prague summit really would have been mostly about enlargement. And enlargement's still obviously key, but now enlargement, we think, should be part of three themes. But that second theme of new members is still extremely important. We have taken as our guidance the statement that President Bush made in Warsaw last year, that we ought to have as robust an enlargement as possible, that NATO ought to be open to all of the new democracies in Europe that can meet both the rights and responsibilities of NATO membership.

       And the third theme that we consulted our allies on, for Prague, was the theme of new relationships. Clearly, NATO-Russia has the possibility of being a new relationship, and people are working hard to make sure that that comes out to be true. There are also possibilities, we believe, in new relationships with Ukraine, with Central Asia, and a number of our partners suggested also that we pay strict and good attention to relationships with the Mediterranean states.

       So we proceeded off these three themes -- new capabilities, new members, new relationships -- and although they would have to speak for themselves, I think, by and large, we found most people in the alliance thought that these were useful themes.

       There's a lot of consultation yet to do. We very much look forward to that as we move forward to Prague 2000.

       Anyway, we've put so much of this out on the Internet and every other place, I don't think I need to do too much more than that, and I'd be glad to take your questions.

       MODERATOR: Your questions? Marc?

       Q Marc Chavannes, NRC Handelsblad, the Netherlands. There is some talk about Iraq of late. How will that influence this quiet and well-thought-out development into the former Eastern Europe?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Help me with your question.

       Q It seems as if we're living on two different planets. This Prague -- this road to Prague --

       MR. GROSSMAN: Right.

       Q -- seems to be a very well-thought-out -- if I may say so, the State Department we know -- development.

       At the same time, you keep hearing and listening about preparation for another war, which many people in Europe don't support at the moment. How do you think those two roads will coincide, or will they stay apart? Will the Prague development be influenced by -- the Boston Globe said this summer -- a war in Iraq? The New York Times said early next year.

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, let me try to answer your question in three ways. First of all, I'm certainly not going to comment on anonymous sources in various newspapers around the United States. What we say and what Secretary Powell said is what the president has said -- is that he did not have on his desk and has not received any recommendations from his advisers about doing anything in Iraq in terms of war and, I think, talk about this really as you see from these newspaper articles is done by anonymous sources. So I did go to Europe to consult on this. And what we stick with is the fact that as Secretary Powell has said, the president does not have a recommendation in this and hasn't made any decisions on that.

       Second, though: I think it's very important, as the president said in his speech to the Congress -- and we've talked about again and again and again -- Iraq certainly bears watching, and it bears watching in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It bears weapons -- it bears watching in terms of its relationships to its neighbors. It bears watching in terms of the negative role that it plays in the peace process. So I don't think we're living on two planets at all -- that is, is that you would expect us to be paying attention to the threat that Iraq poses through weapons of mass destruction and through its support of terrorism to the international community.

       Third point is -- is that the NATO summit is about the future of NATO. And new capabilities, new members and new relationships is what we're all about at NATO. When I talk about new capabilities, we're talking about new capabilities to push off the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. So I don't see that this is sort of two-planet problem is a big one. On a list of my anxieties, one to 10, that's kind of low.

       Q (Off mike) -- more?

       MR. GROSSMAN: I did not. I did not get very many questions, and those questions I got, I answered exactly in this way.

       Oh, sorry.

       Q (Off mike) -- Radio. I would like to ask you about my country. Slovakia is once again on a crossroad, and it seems we do have the similar problem which we had before. Can you comment on this situation? And then Slovak president Mr. Schuster will come in next month to Washington to visit President Bush. I would like to ask you if you could give me information -- what kind of message we can get from American side?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, the message, I think, is the message I've been trying to give, which is that that we believe that NATO membership ought to be open to all of Europe's new democracies, from -- as the president said, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all of those people ready to take up both the rights and privileges of NATO membership, but also the responsibilities of NATO membership.

       And we've been very careful -- and I won't change that today -- to not name names. We think it's way too soon to be naming names of who we think ought to be new members of NATO.

       But Slovakia is a country that's been interested in NATO membership. It's one of those nine countries that people talk about a lot for NATO membership. And this is a matter both for the Slovak people and then, obviously, for NATO members to decide whether Slovakia should become a member of NATO.

       When you say you've got some of the same challenges as the last time, that's true, and obviously, people in Slovakia will choose any leaders that they want. But all we've been trying to say is, is that democracy and a commitment to democracy and a commitment to the kinds of values that NATO has is part of the decision about whether countries get to be NATO members.

       Q Jean Pierre Gromali (sp), Italian New Agency, ANSA. Which kind of a relation does it exist between the summit in Rome next -- this next month, and the enlargement of NATO in November?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, an enlargement decision, if one is to be taken, will be taken at Prague in November. As I understand it, the Italian government has very generously offered to hold a summit in Rome in May to focus on the new-relationships part of the agenda. If it's new capabilities, new members, new relationships, I think that's what the focus of May would be.

       As I see this playing out, sir, what happens is, is that NATO foreign ministers, when they met last December, made a promise to themselves that they would have a new NATO Russia organization ready to go when they meet in Reykjavik in May. So I think -- I'm optimistic, actually, that they will meet that charge for themselves. They'll create this new organization. Then this new organization will be, as the Italian government has said, celebrated at a NATO-Russia summit in May. And we've supported that, and we were among the very first people to come out in support of that summit, and we're very glad that NATO countries have accepted Italy's invitation.

       MODERATOR: The gentleman here.

       Q I'm Mattay Shotts (sp), Radio-TV Slovenia. Mr. Grossman, I'm particularly interested in Slovenia. Slovenia allocates 1-1/2 percent of GDP for military, but as we've heard from Pentagon, the percentage should be higher, up to 2 percent. Do you think that this percentage could be an obstacle for Slovenia to become a full member of NATO?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, again, you won't hear me today, I think, talking about any specific names. What we are talking about is criteria. And since we've chosen new capabilities as one of the main themes for the summit, I would say that there is incumbent upon all NATO members to do more in defense, and I think that that would apply to aspirants as well.

       Q (Laughs.)

       MR. : (Inaudible.)

       Q Okay. My name is Yvonne Estahazi (ph). I'm with the Financial Times -- (inaudible). And two questions: The first -- everybody seems to talk about criteria for new members. What about existing members that no longer meet the criteria? And what would you suggest happen with them? And my second question is about the future mission of NATO, since many people seem to think that there's a big question mark. And I particularly like you to comment on the U.S. position there.

       MR. GROSSMAN: Sure. Well, let me take your second question first.

       I think somehow the idea that NATO is not a relevant organization to everybody's security in the 21st century, as far as I'm concerned, anyway, is wrong. One is, I think it remains very key to the trans- Atlantic tie and to European security. Second, I can't imagine what the '90s would have been like without NATO, in terms of the Balkans, in terms of all the things that we have done to bring peace and security in that area -- a job not yet done, but I'm glad that NATO existed in the '90s. And as I look forward to the 21st century, I see NATO as still one of the core organizations in this world, and especially between Europe and the United States. It's the way we work together militarily. It's the way we spread our values. It's the way that more countries are involved with us. I mean, again, let me give you give a couple of examples.

       When I think back to the end of September and early October, when we were forced by these terrorist acts to go into military action in Afghanistan, and we went knocking on doors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, in other places in Central Asia, asking for help, think how much easier this was, because those countries had been members of the Partnership for Peace for 10 years -- how much easier it was, because they had been members of the EAPC for 10 years. Every single one of the NATO aspirants has chosen to act like a NATO ally, in terms of Operation Enduring Freedom -- overflight rights, bed-down rights, basing rights. And so I think the fact that people have worked together at NATO, have lived together at NATO, have committed to these values together at NATO means this is very relevant to organizations of the 21st century.

       The other thing I would refer you to is the strategic concept in 1999 which was adopted here at the 50th-anniversary summit of NATO. And in it, clearly, it talks about new threats to the alliance, and among those new threats, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

       In terms of your first question, it was -- ?

       Q What about the existing members --

       MR. GROSSMAN: Sorry.

       Q -- and they're not -- no longer -- (off mike)?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I think all the existing members do meet the criterias (sic) of NATO. There is a lot of conversation, though, in Washington at the moment about what if we take a country in and they fail; they don't turn out to be a democracy in the future?

       I'll tell you what I think. I think two things. One is, is that you have to realize that over the past 50 years NATO has had some ups and downs in terms of people who have been in the alliance. There have been some military governments. There have been some governments that were perhaps not the greatest. We stuck together, and I think the fact that they were in NATO helped people move out of these crises.

       And my own view is, if people meet the requirements of the membership action plan in terms of their democracies, their values, their public opinion, their work on their military structures, that once they're in, that instead of trying to figure out ways to kick people out, we ought to make sure that we've got ways to make sure that they keep raising standards. And this is obviously a conversation we'll all have to have lots more of. But I think if you set a set of criteria and then say, "Well, we're going to look to the bottom end of this and always be looking at people to see who we can kick out," what you do is, you race to the bottom, whereas at -- now what we say at NATO is: Here's the goal. Here's what we want countries to be like. Here's what it takes to be a NATO member. And I think that raises boats, not lowers them.

       Q I'm Kazon Anatobe (sp), Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan. I was in Brussels in '97 and covered the last round of enlargement. And back then, I recall, it was the United States who was supporting this rather small scale of enlargement of enlargement -- I think it was three countries -- and France and others countries advocated for a larger enlargement. Well, but that -- this time around, it seems -- sounds like you are supporting a rather large scale of enlargement. And what happened between then and now?

       And the second question is, if -- as the members -- as the number of member countries grows, it is natural to -- it becomes more difficult to get a unanimous vote in there. Well, so are we seeing a kind of debate like we are seeing in the European Union, to -- whether to stick to the union and the unanimity principle or to go -- (inaudible) -- different kind of decision-making?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Yeah. Both good questions.

       First, I think what's changed -- well, let me say in terms of your first question, one is we are for a robust round of enlargement. As I say, we've taken our position from President's Bush's speech in Warsaw. But again, we have not named names, and so the president does not have a recommendation and he's not made a decision about who we will support.

       I think what's changed, sir, since the last enlargement are two things. One is, the last enlargement has worked extremely well, and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are superb new allies. And don't forget, when they joined the alliance in 1999, they were alliance members for a couple of weeks and we went to war. And I believe that they have done an extremely good job, and we're very pleased with that enlargement. So that's the first thing that's changed.

       The second thing that has changed is, again, I think that the alliance made a very smart decision after 1999 to go with what's called the Membership Action Plan. And it's very clear criteria, and it's long and it's complicated, and people are constantly judged on this Membership Action Plan. And so it's a lot clearer to people, I think, that more countries either meet criteria or don't meet criteria.

       So I don't say it's scientific, I don't mean that, but I think it's more -- that there's a longer set of criteria to deal with, and it's easier to judge that way. And we believe that we an justify to ourselves, to our Senate, very importantly, and to publics around the alliance that a robust enlargement is a good thing and not a bad thing.

       As to the question of alliance management, I think it's important for people to realize that the alliance was not 16 countries, historically. The alliance started at 12, and then Greece and Turkey were added, and then Spain was added and then other countries were added. And it's interesting to me that if you go back in history -- and I had the historian's office take a look -- each time there's an enlargement of the alliance, there are people who stand up and say, "It's unmanageable; you'll never go to war again; it won't be a military alliance; it won't work." And each enlargement actually works pretty well because people are committed to values and the Membership Action Plan, et cetera, et cetera.

       So, I think this alliance management will be a challenge. I don't say it will be easy. But I think if people sign up for this club, they want to be members of this club, I think that they will be serious about it. As Secretary Powell said the other day at the Senate Appropriations Committee, he said: You know, everybody wants to get a membership application to this group, and people know they're not joining a country club. This is a military alliance. And as I tell people, all you have to do is ask the three newest allies, who signed up and then two weeks later were at war.

       So, as I say, there will be issues of alliance management. I think they can be met.

       Q (Name inaudible) -- the Russian News Agency, TASS.

       And I have a question on the new NATO-Russia --

       MR. GROSSMAN: Please.

       Q -- relations and the new NATO-Russian Council. Could you share with us any ideas how this council will work? Will it have secretariat? How often it will (sic) meet? How -- what will be their decision-making process on the questions that will be in the sphere of its responsibility? And can you say now that the so-called problem that emerged on the -- during the discussions between NATO and Russia, the so-called program of the reversibility of the decision taken -- is it solved now?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, there's still some details to be worked out, as I tried to answer the gentleman from the Italian New Agency. The foreign ministers will meet in Reykjavik to make final decisions here. What I said was that I was optimistic that we would get to a structure that will work. And I'm optimistic about that.

       Why am I optimistic? Because I think people are committed to having a new kind of relationship between NATO and Russia. I think that the basics, the outlines of this are pretty clear, and that is, is that the NATO-Russian Council will work, as they say at NATO, at 20 -- that 20 people will sit around the table, and that's a good thing -- that there will be a way for the alliance, by consensus, to send issues to this NATO-Russia Council. And the issues people are talking about are serious issues. They're counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, emergency response. These are serious issues. Are there (sic) other issues on the table than the allies are talking about including airspace management all across Europe. So these are big things and not small things, and they will be discussed at the NATO- Russia Council, and I think the idea is that where we can take joint action between NATO and Russia, we ought to find those areas and do it.

       For us, there are certain things that are also important. Those are things that the NATO-Russia council is not. The NATO-Russia Council is not a way for Russia to have a veto over what NATO would or would not do. It's not a back door, if I could use that phrase, for NATO membership. But we think it's a pretty big and important step forward. And if the foreign ministers can bring this together in Reykjavik and then take it on to a summit in Rome, we think that's a positive development.

       Q Erno Kladnik (ph), Delo (ph) from Slovenia.

       In Slovenia, there has been a bizarre development in terms of joining NATO in the past few weeks. The membership of NATO was a top political priority for successive Slovenian governments fro 10 years. And the public support for membership was pretty high.

       And now, in the past few weeks, it's started dwindling. There are opinion polls that put it below 50 percent and one actually around 38 percent. And since you mentioned that there are criteria for invitations --

       MR. GROSSMAN: Right.

       Q -- is public support one of them?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Obviously we'd like to see public support for membership in NATO. But I have to reverse my answer to you, which is that public support is an indicator to the government of Slovenia or the government of Romania or the government of Britain, not to us, and so, in all of the aspirant countries, governments will have to make the decision about whether they want to pursue this or not. We're not pursuing members; members are pursuing NATO.

       MODERATOR: The gentleman in the gray sweater. Microphone.

       Q Thank you. Lou Mivacol (sp), BBC Bulgarian. Mr. Grossman, Bulgaria's one of the countries still possessing those Soviet-made missiles, SS-22 or -23 -- I'm not quite sure.

       MR. GROSSMAN: Right. Twenty-three.

       Q What happens if Bulgaria fails somehow to destroy those lethal weapons before the summit in November?

       MR. GROSSMAN: (Chuckles.) Well, I think all the Bulgarian visitors that we've had here -- foreign minister and prime minister and others -- have said that their plan is certainly to destroy those weapons before November.

       MODERATOR: (Off mike) -- question. Mike.

       Q Hi, Secretary Grossman. Wei Jing (sp) from Phoenix TV of Hong Kong. What a message you're sending to China that -- the strengthening of NATO-U.S. relations and the enlargement plan?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I don't think we're sending any message to China, other than NATO has been a force for peace and stability in this world for 50 years. It's been one of the most successful military alliances in history. It's not only a military alliance, but it's an alliance of shared values among countries. And we think that it's a very good thing in this world to have such an alliance. And if more people want to be members of it, good.

       MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

       Q Hi. I'm Dave McIntyre with DPA. You've spoken of new members, new relationships, new capabilities. Could you elaborate a little bit more on perhaps new roles for NATO as it expands way beyond its traditional boundaries in terms of Eastern Europe and Central Asia? Will we see the NATO alliance taking more of an active role in issues well beyond Europe, however broadly defined?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I mean, the NATO alliance talks about Europe and the United States, and don't forget, one of the, I think, most interesting things in history was that the very first invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty was for the defense of the United States of America.

       I mean, who in 1949 or '69 or '79 or '89 would have thought that the first time Article V would be used would be in the defense of the United States? And so this isn't just about Europe; it's about the defense of NATO territory and when, in the strategic concept, in 1999, NATO leaders talked about weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, I think they were looking forward to this very day. I mean, you have a situation in the world now where a terrorist operation that can be planned in Afghanistan and refined in Hamburg, for example, and then carried about at the World Trade Center, at the Pentagon or in a field in Pennsylvania -- that is an -- the attack is on NATO territory.

       So I think this idea somehow there has to be a new mission to defend the territory of the alliance or to push off threats to the territory of the alliance I think has actually got this pretty much backwards. In a way, terrorism and weapons of mass destructions lead us -- I'm sorry -- in a way, the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction lead us back to the original principles of the alliance, which is the defense of the territory of NATO members. Now where that threat comes from might be different and of course is different than it was in 1949. Secretary Powell tells this wonderful story of his conversations with Russian military officers that are -- you know, "We're not still trying to defend ourselves at the Fulda Gap." But those attacks in September of last year took place on NATO territory. And how to defend them it seems to me is a very important and key thing, and that's not a new mission for NATO; that's an original mission of NATO.

       MODERATOR: Time for about one more question.

       Q Giampiero Gramaglia, Italian News Agency, ANSA.

      

       Mr. Grossman, the European defense policy in the framework of the European Union: Is still a niche of United States in the NATO framework something you are now adapting to?

       MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I think both -- I certainly think this administration, from the very beginning -- if you'll at the statement that President Bush issued with Prime Minister Blair, (one of ?) the very first statements that he issued was our strong support for the European security and defense identity ad the European security and defense program.

       Here's our challenge: Our challenge is that we want this ESDP program to work. And so we are fervent supporters, for example, of the headline goal that the European Union set for itself. The European Union said that in 2003, the European Union countries would have the capacity to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days, sustainable for a year. We want this to be true. If it were true, I think it would -- there would be a better balance between European defense capabilities and American defense capabilities. Exactly the same kind of capabilities that are required to support NATO would be required to get this headline goal where it's supposed to go -- air transport, sustainability, communications, all the kinds of things that we need to strengthen the alliance.

       So we're supporters of this. And now we fervently hope that it will be successful.

       We've also said, in 1999 and afterwards, that we want ESDP to be something that is in support of the transatlantic relationship, in support of the strong military structure between the United States and Europe. So we're supporters of the SDI, ESDP, we always have been, and we want it to be well connected to NATO, in support of NATO. And we hope that the capabilities that will be built to create this headline goal will be the same kind of capabilities which will support the NATO alliance.

       MODERATOR: Thanks you very much.

       MR. GROSSMAN: Okay? Thanks a lot. Thank you very much. 
 

Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202)824-0520.

 


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