3:00 p.m. EDT 
MODERATOR: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Foreign Press Center. Today we have Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Chris Hill to give you an update on the Six-Party Talks and then take your questions.
Mr. Secretary.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, thank you. Thank you very much. Great to be back here in the Foreign Press Center here in New York the first day of playoff, baseball playoff season. Alas, we're not quite in the playoffs in the Six-Party Talks. The season continues. It's not quite 162 games, but it does seem like it at times.
Let me -- What I thought I'd do is just maybe talk a little about the last round of the Six-Party process and where we are today and where we expect to be heading toward the end of the year.
The purpose of this last round that took place in Beijing just a week ago was to begin to map out some key implementation issues relating to denuclearization. The first was to get a, try to get a timeframe for the declaration by the DPRK, the North Koreans, a timeframe by which they will have declared all of their weapons -- all of their nuclear programs, and then also work out a plan for disabling their nuclear facilities, specifically the ones in Yongbyon. Why Yongbyon? Because Yongbyon is where the actual plutonium is being made. It doesn't mean it's the only nuclear facility. But it's I think the one that is probably most important in their nuclear program, and it's the one that we felt we could come to an understanding on how we would disable.
So we had a team out there a few weeks ago, and the team surveyed the Yongbyon complex -- the reprocessing facility, the five megawatt reactor and also the fuel fabrication facility. They came back with some ideas, and we've been working with the DPRK on these ideas. So, we, in approaching the Six-Party process, the team that went out there reported to the the Six Parties. And I think we've now identified a way forward on this.
We were actually not planning to have a joint statement out of the Six-Party process, except that we felt that there were some really very positive elements that were emerging from the three days of discussion. And so as we got into the fourth day, that is, Sunday morning in Beijing, it was the strong view of the Chinese hosts -- who once again I should say played really an excellent role in shepherding the overall process and in, first of all, planning for the whole meetings, but more importantly, acting as the chair in the process -- and it was I think the strong view of the Chinese that there should be a joint statement to capture the various elements that we were discussing.
So on Sunday morning, they distributed, the Chinese hosts distributed a draft joint statement, and we took it back to capitals for consideration. In my case, I had the furthest to go. And so I flew from Beijing to New York and met with Secretary Rice yesterday to discuss the draft with her. And then this morning, Secretary Rice and I met with President Bush to brief him on the draft and to get his views on it.
We have since informed the Chinese that we support this approach. And so I'm expecting, as the Chinese canvass the other members of the Six-Party process, I'm expecting that they will be in a position in the next day or two to announce and to release the joint statement.
I don't want to talk about the specific elements of it today -- because it has not yet been released by the Chinese chair -- except to say it relates very directly to how we can move forward in the coming months on a certain timetable; how we can achieve, first of all, a full explanation or, I should say, a full description of their declaration of their nuclear programs; and then the actual disablement plan for some of the key nuclear programs. And then the statement will also deal with some of the bilateral issues, including the DPRK's bilateral relationship with the U.S. and with Japan.
So, as you will see when this joint statement is released, we have a lot of work to do in the coming months. But I think it will help keep us on schedule through the coming months to the end of the year, so that when we get through this process of a full declaration and disablement of the North Korean nuclear programs, we will then be able to move to what we hope will be a final phase -- that is, in the next year, in the calendar year '08, which will deal with the actual abandonment of the fissile material.
For those of you who are not totally steeped in this whole issue, there are three issues that are of highest concern. One is the fact that the DPRK has already harvested some 50 kilos of fissile material from this Yongbyon facility, and they will be required to declare precisely how much fissile material they have in their possession. The second element that we've been concerned about is to shut down and disable the Yongbyon, so that our 50-kilo problem doesn't become a 100-kilo problem or a 150-kilo problem but rather there will be no more plutonium produced from Yongbyon. And the third element -- and one that we've had I think some intensive and productive discussions on -- is the issue of resolving the concerns about uranium enrichment, which is another way to make fissile material.
So I think our hope is that as we get to the end of the year, we will have a situation where we know precisely how much fissile material has been produced, albeit we will not have it. It will not have been abandoned by then. It will still be with the DPRK. We will have a Yongbyon facility that is shut down and disabled. It's already shut down, and we would expect it to be disabled. And then finally, we will have clarity and a clear, a very clear situation on the uranium enrichment.
So, as it suggests, this does not end the process, because the existence of this 50 or so kilos is a key issue. To the extent the DPRK has been able to make explosive devices, it does it with the materials that it has, the fissile material that it has. So we have to address that in the coming stage. And then we have to move from disabling of the facilities to dismantling of the facilities. And so this next -- So in calendar year '08, we will have I think a lot of issues before us.
We would also like to phase in at that point some other of what we consider final stage elements, including the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula among directly-related parties. And also we would like to get underway a sort of Northeast Asian peace and security forum, by which countries in the region can, I think, help bring together or help create a better sense of neighborhood than they've had before.
So, in short, we have a long way to go. And for those of you who follow this, you realize that it is a -- You know, it's taken us a couple of years to get this far, and it's clearly going to take us more time to get to the finish line. We're certainly not satisfied with stopping where we are. We really have to continue. But I do believe we have a process that is making progress.
We have, I think, a very cohesive and, I think, a diplomatic process with an excellent chair in China. China has a great interest in resolving this matter. I think, overall, we have seen improvement among the states in the region due to the Six-Party process, and of course, we need to see more improvement.
And in that regard, we're looking forward to continuing the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, but also, very importantly, the Japan-DPRK dialogue - because, I think, the DPRK's future in the region of Northeast Asia depends on a very good and improving, at least, relationship with Japan.
So a lot to get done, but I think a lot that we've been able to do so far. And so we'll just keep at it.
So with those opening questions, and for those of you who don't follow this and if I've left you totally confused, I am very sorry, but that's what it's like.
QUESTION: Tomohiro Deguchi with Kyodo News. I know that you don't want to go into detail until the announcement, but can't you say that the delisting North Koreans from the state-sponsored terrorism list is included in one of the elements?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, this is something we have, we are working with the DPRK on. Obviously, it's an issue of great concern to them. They would very much like to be off that list. From our point of view, any time we can work with a country to get them off this list -- and that is to remove a country as a threat or as a country that we have concerns about insofar as it can be a state sponsor of terrorism -- that's something we always want to do. So, to be sure, this is an issue in our process, and we are, you know, obviously working with the DPRK on this.
We know that there are great interests in Japan in this matter. We know that this is a matter that, from the Japanese perspective, has been very important because of some unanswered questions with respect to the abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK government some 30 years ago, in 1978. So this is clearly an issue of concern to the Japanese and something we want to work and continue to consult closely with the Japanese on.
And I have certainly made the point to the DPRK on many occasions - and, I would say, just on every occasion I met with them -- on the great importance that we attach to an improved DPRK-Japan relationship and that it is very much in the DPRK's interest to try to work with Japan to make progress on this matter.
So, you're quite right. This is part of our process, and we're working very hard on it. From our point of view, it is something we would like - We would like to see the DPRK get off this list. Any time you can remove a country from that list, I think you have made the world a little safer. So we would like to continue in this process.
QUESTION: Can I follow up?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Actually, Tomo, I talk to you 18 times a day, so let me talk to some of the people who haven't had a chance. Yes? Like I have no idea who this guy is.
QUESTION: Thank you. Daniel Trotta from Reuters.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: There you go.
QUESTION: If this draft agreement is agreed to by the remaining parties, how soon would you expect disablement to occur? And are the Japanese reservations about removing North Korea from the terrorism list a potential obstacle to them accepting this draft agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, without getting into too much of the specifics of this joint statement which the Chinese will -- assuming all the other countries give their go ahead -- will release soon, we would believe that the process of dealing with disablement, that that process would get underway in a matter of weeks.
Now the DPRK is very, of course has made very clear that they want to see issues on our side -- One of them of course is the provision of fuel oil, which four of the five other countries are in a consortium to provide monthly fuel oil -- that is, Russia, China, South Korea and the U.S. And Japan has indicated it would join this effort once its concerns are met. But in the meantime, there are four countries who are taking turns to provide DPRK with very necessary fuel oil.
With respect to the terrorism list, I'm not sure if I can say much more than I said to the previous question -- except to say that this is obviously something we're working on with the DPRK. We have wanted to get through some of the past history that led to the DPRK being put on this list. But we certainly want to do this in a way that strengthens relations in the region and, in addition, strengthens our relations with the region. So we have worked very closely with the Japanese Government on this, because it is an issue of great concern in Japan.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: It's Ronda Hauben from OhmyNews in South Korea.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You're from OhmyNews?
QUESTION: OhmyNews International.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I remember those guys, yeah.
QUESTION: You do?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes. The Internet.
QUESTION: They interviewed you, I think?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay. Good. I've got two questions. I've got one, what would be needed to turn the ceasefire into a peace agreement? Can you speak to what --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, it's a fairly complex problem. It's got a lot of legal issues, for starters. It would affect, for example, what is now called the DMZ, the demilitarized zone, and trying to turn that into an international border. So there are a lot of complex legal issues there.
There are probably a number of confidence-building measures, CBMs, that would have to surround this issue. But at the end of the day, from our point of view, from the U.S. point of view, at the end of the day if the DPRK is prepared to reach, is prepared really to denuclearize and do away with these weapons and to get out of this business that it's been in, if it's prepared to do that, we are prepared to do our part to reach a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula. That would be in our interest to do.
Now you will notice in the September '05 statement, Six-Party statement, and repeated in the February '07 statement, that it will be, the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula will be dealt with by directly related parties. Some people assume that to mean four. Some people assume it to mean two. Others actually say three. So it hasn't been fully determined which parties would be defined as directly related -- except to say that, from the U.S. vantagepoint, we would very much like to do our part to reach a peace settlement that would replace the Armistice which has held, to be sure. But it's also -- You know, there have been many tense moments in this Armistice. But we would really like to work with the ROK and others in trying to accomplish this.
The key factor in this -- I must stress, the key factor in everything we do is denuclearization. And I know the DPRK is interested in moving beyond things like the terrorism list to full normalization of relations with the U.S. We are prepared to reach a full normalization of relations with the DPRK, but not with a nuclear DPRK.
So, again, the key point here is that with denuclearization, a lot of things become possible. And without denuclearization, frankly, not much is possible.
QUESTION: The second part is, I thought that the DPRK says if the U.S. doesn't have a hostile attitude towards the DPRK, that will help the denuclearization.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, that should be very easy, because --
QUESTION: Is there steps to take in -- to get rid of that? And a piece of that was David Asher and the --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Who? I'm sorry?
QUESTION: There was the policy that had to do with the Treasury Department and the Patriot Act, Section 311, and that was David Asher had been in the --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, he's been out of government for a long --
QUESTION: -- is it National Security?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah.
QUESTION: But I thought he testified to Congress that, you know, that basically there was an effort to have -- Well, he said something about we kill the chicken to scare the monkeys, and it was part of a policy about China.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I'm sorry. I can't -- I only do baseball metaphors. (Laughter) But let me just say that, you know, the U.S. has a hostile policy to nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. We don't want nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. That's the source of our main concern. There are other issues, but that's the real issue. We have no hostile policy to the people of the DPRK. And certainly there's nothing in our policy that would justify holding or development of nuclear weapons on the part of DPRK.
And with respect to the financial issues that you allude to, again, this has to do with our needs to protect our financial system, in particular to protect our currency. These are issues that we have talked about many times with the DPRK and we will continue to talk about with the DPRK. We would like them to have access to the international financial system, but they've got to play by the rules that everyone else plays by.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: Edith Lederer from the Associated Press. The other parties to the Six-Party Talks, do you have any indication at all that there are any objections to this agreement? Or do you expect that with the U.S. approval it's going to be approved? And, also, could you comment on the current summit between the two Koreas and how this might play into the negotiations that are going on among the Six Parties?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes. Sure. That's two very distinct questions. With respect to the other parties to the Six Parties, I've been on the phone with several of them in the last day and a couple this morning. I believe that the other parties are prepared to sign on to this text.
But it's not a question of the U.S. signing on and then the others, you know, put some rubber stamp to it. I mean, it is -- You know, everyone has a view on this. We've worked together on this. So I'm confident that others will come to the conclusion that we came to after studying it very carefully. And, as I mentioned earlier, at very senior levels we took a very careful look at it, and I'm sure others are doing that. And I'm confident, based on some of the consultations I've had, that others will come to the conclusion it's the right thing. But, again, it's not a rubber stamp situation. It's not because of us. It's because they have their own views on it.
I think, with respect to the ongoing summit, I think it's very important for the American people, especially, to understand -- and, frankly, not just American people, but everybody, to understand -- the great tragedy of the division of the Korean Peninsula in the middle of the 20th century. This was a division that happened through no fault of the Korean people. And so I think there is a great desire of the Korean people to have these kinds of contacts. And I would say there is a historical entitlement of the Korean people to choose political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula. It is their Korean Peninsula, and I think we need to be very respectful of that fact.
And there is no question that we and many other countries -- and I would include all the countries in the Six-Party process -- also have an interest in some of the security arrangements, and we all have an interest in nuclear weapons and getting rid of nuclear weapons there. But we should all be very respectful of the fact that this is the Korean Peninsula, and the Korean people have a right to have the kinds of contacts, arrangements, summits that they want. We have been in close contact with the Korean Government. They have kept us informed on this, but it's not for us to be passing judgment on what they're doing.
My own view, as someone who deals with the Six Parties and obviously follows Korean affairs closely, is the Six-Party process and the North-South bilateral process can exist side-by-side without interfering with one another. What's important is that there be strong communication. There is strong communication.
So, I think how this North-South summit goes, what opinions are expressed about it, I would suggest they are better directed to Koreans - who, by the way, have a lot of different opinions on the subject. But it's not for Americans really to sort of get in the middle of that. It's for Koreans to work that.
All right. Now I'll start asking people that I see every day. Yes?
QUESTION: Thank you. Satoshi Ukai from the Asahi Shimbun. When you had the September '05 agreement or February agreement, you didn't have to personally come back to U.S. for consultation. So what is so sensitive this time? What was so sensitive?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It's not, part of the -- It's not so much sensitivity. It's a matter of there are some undertakings in this agreement which will involve, for example, the issue of various parties, namely the U.S., participating very heavily in the issue of actual disablement. So we would anticipate having people on the ground to participate in the disablement, for example. And that's something that people have to look at carefully.
So we're also, I think, reaching a point where we are getting into some very serious implementation measures. It's not just something on paper anymore. It's something that -- You know, things get agreed, and before you know it, you'll see people on the ground. For example, after Geneva, after the U.S. had a bilateral meeting in Geneva, you may recall a few days later after we had consultations where I was able to consult with my bosses in Sydney who were there for APEC, we were able to announce the fact that we had a first survey team go in. So I think we are, we're just reaching an important stage, and I just wanted to make sure that everything was well connected. And taking an extra day to talk things through face-to-face rather than just do things on the phone, I think it was time well spent -- even though it was a long flight from Beijing.
Yes?
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) In Beijing, Ambassador, you emphasize the importance of proliferation issues.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: On the proliferation --
QUESTION: Proliferation, yes.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes.
QUESTION: And did you get a satisfactory response from Mr. Kim Gye-gwan, especially on the Syrian connection?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, look, as I've said before -- and I'll say again -- proliferation has always been a major concern of ours. It's why, it's one of the reasons this whole process is so important -- because it's not just for the regional issue, but for the fact that, you know, fissile material is something that in the wrong hands could be extremely dangerous.
So what I can assure of is we have pursued this in the past and pursued it in Beijing and we'll pursue it in the future. I think we have the right declaratory policy from everybody concerned. But what's very important is that as we go forward, we not hear about instances that are, that amount to proliferation. So it's something that we watch very carefully, we're going to be very vigilant about.
Yes? Did you have a question? Did you have your hand up?
QUESTION: Yes.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes. Okay. Are you so shocked I called on you?
QUESTION: Sorry. Aya Imaida with Nippon TV. I have a question about state-sponsored terrorism. And Mr. Kim Gye-gwan has said in Beijing that the date for delisting North Korea from the list is included in the statement, joint statement. And Mr. Chun Young-woo has also said the date for delisting North Korea is included indirectly. How do you react to that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think I've tried to really lay out the complexities of this and the concerns that we have that Japan is comfortable with the direction and process of this. But as for what's precisely in the statement, my suggestion is you wait a day and then read it yourself and then ask me whether you've been able to find it in the statement or not.
Again, this is a very sensitive matter. It's a sensitive matter for us, but we understand it's a sensitive matter for others. We have worked very hard on this. I think we have an understanding of the way ahead. And I think when we get to that way ahead, it will be in everyone's interests.
QUESTION: Takashi Sakamoto of Yomiuri Shimbun. Are you hopeful that two bilaterals between U.S. DPRK and Japan DPRK would take place before the ministerial meeting?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, I think -- You know, we've been very careful since we created the working groups in February to try to have all working groups meet. And what we didn't want, what we were concerned about was not to have a situation where one working group didn't meet because, let's say, one member of the working group didn't want to meet the other. I don't think we have that problem now. I think we're in good shape as far as the working groups meeting when they need to meet.
So the answer to your question is, I would hope that there would be more working group meetings even before a ministerial, which we have in mind that the -- you know, whether it's October or November, in that timeframe -- we have in mind a ministerial, and I think we'll probably need a Six-Party meeting before the ministerial. But given the need to check signals, as we say, given the need to make progress on some of these bilateral issues, I would expect to see more of the bilateral working groups. And I would hope to see, in particular, a Japan-DPRK working group.
As you know, the Japan-DPRK working group process did not get off to a very strong start. I think it was kind of cut short early on. But the last meeting, I think, was more successful, at least in the atmospherics. And I would hope that the next meeting, in addition to having good atmospherics, would also be able to have some more accomplishments.
Again, I cannot emphasize enough, that the DPRK needs to have a good relationship with Japan.
QUESTION: Mike Lavallee with Tokyo Broadcasting System. I was just wondering. You brought the agreement back to Washington, and you said you're going to transmit it to Beijing. Was the agreement accepted as written out of Beijing, or were there any changes to it on the American side?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: There were no -- I don't want to say nothing was changed, but there are no unilateral changes.
QUESTION: And also, was, just out of curiosity, in Washington -- I know you can't say very much of how the discussions went -- but was it an easy sell? Was it a difficult conversation? How did it go?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, man. There's never been an easy sell in Washington. (Laughter) People don't know what one of those is. You know, any time you have a negotiated document that represents the opinion of six different entities, sometimes things are maybe not as clear as they should be because you're trying to capture a lot of different styles of thinking. But I like to think there was a positive response to what we're doing, but it was certainly necessary to explain some things.
Yes.
QUESTION: Andy Bettag, Fuji Television.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I'm sorry I ran away from you at the airport. I just didn't -- I was totally jet-lagged.
QUESTION: I understand, and I'm sorry about that.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I was worried about the Red Sox.
QUESTION: Good luck to your Red Sox. After this draft is released, I wonder if you can tell me what kind of timing you're expecting for the next step, and will you plan on going back to China?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Some of the timing is actually described. Some of the near-term actions are actually described in the document. And we, I would expect -- Well, it's a matter of weeks that you'll start seeing things happen.
As for my next, the idea of getting on an airplane and going to Beijing now is just something I don't want to contemplate. But I'll probably get back, I'll probably have to go at some point soon -- but not in the next couple of weeks. (Laughter)
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: I'm with People's Daily.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: People's Daily?
QUESTION: Yes. People's Daily from China. You know, according to your briefing, it seems things are going quite well.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I'll have to change that.
QUESTION: But at this stage, my question, at this stage, what are you still concerned most?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, you mean what keeps me awake at night? There's a lot. Because, you know, we're doing this step-by-step. And sometimes when you do something step-by-step and you just get focused on the step, you have a sort of sense of optimism, because you know you can make that step. But when you stand back and look at all the steps you still have to make, you get a little worried.
So, I think what's very important for people to understand is that this process is not successful unless we reach the goal -- the last step, which is denuclearization. We're not in this for a partial success, because partial success is not success in this case. We have to get denuclearization -- complete, full, denuclearization.
So as difficult as we're finding, you know, coming up with a full declaration, coming up with a disablement scheme, you know, going over the scope of disablement and all of these issues that are very difficult, what I worry about is the next step. I'm already thinking ahead to that. And, you know, I have to make sure the DPRK understands that they've got to give up the fissile material and the weapons.
And I think at that point, when you're talking about weapons, you're dealing with the DPRK Army, People's Army, and, you know, they may have a tougher view than some other people. My DPRK interlocutor often says, refers to "our," referring to his own hardliners. And I said, well I think you're all kind of hardliners from what I can tell.
But, indeed, I think we'll be dealing with some people who don't want to take that very necessary last step. So that's what I worry about. Because if we don't get that last step, we don't really have a process. We are not interested in partial fulfillment. We're not interested in saying that we made a good try. We're interested in finishing this job.
And when we finish this job, because I have to remain optimistic that we'll do it, when we finish it, imagine -- imagine the sense of confidence that we can have throughout Northeast Asia at our ability to come together -- the U.S. and China, Japan and China, Japan and ROK -- you know, us all together working out one of the toughest problems in the world and solving it.
And I think as we've gone forward, I'd like to think the DPRK is getting a little taste of what it feels to be a part of a community and to understand that the DPRK can never provide security if it regards all its neighbors with suspicion and as enemies, but it can only have security if it reaches out and has good relationship with those neighbors. And that's kind of what -- That's what we're aiming for. But we can't get anything done unless there's denuclearization.
One more question. This is always a mistake, but I'll do it. Here, let me go to this gentleman here.
QUESTION: My name is Yamamoto with TV Asahi. It's been reported that North Korea is supplying nuclear technology to Syria. And --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I'm sorry? It's what?
QUESTION: Syria. It's been reported that North Korea is --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Is it important that?
QUESTION: It's been reported.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, it's been reported.
QUESTION: North Korea is supplying nuclear technology to Syria. And do you think it is appropriate to removing North Korea from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think any allegations of proliferation or transfer of nuclear technology need to be thoroughly pursued. We need to know if it happened; if it did happen, when it happened; why it happened -- all of these things. So I'm talking about any allegations in this regard. It has to be pursued. I think there has to be a pretty clear understanding that it's not acceptable to have them pass nuclear technology or know-how or something on. And so we're not just looking for declarations in this regard. We're looking for clear evidence that it's not going on and that if it did go on, it's been stopped.
So obviously, as I said earlier, this issue of proliferation is very much on our minds.
Thank you very much. Okay.
