1:08 P.M. EDT
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MODERATOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Today we have for you Brigadier General Holmes, who is one of U.S. Central Command's two Deputy Directors of Operations. He's here to talk on the record and in an informal way about Central Command operations and asymmetric warfare in general.
The general has a few prepared remarks, and then we'll go and take your questions. Thanks a lot. I'll ask you to also please turn your cell phones off at this time, and when you go to ask a question during the Q&A to please wait for the microphone and state your name and publication. Thank you very much.
GEN. HOLMES: Well, good afternoon. I am Bob Holmes, one of the two Deputy Directors of Operations at Central Command. On behalf of Admiral Fallon, our commander, and my immediate boss, Major General Curtis Scaparrotti, it's really a pleasure to be here with you, as we can talk about some things that are important not only to Central Command but I think to all of us.
As I said, I'm one of the two Deputy Directors of Operations there, and the things that are really on my portfolio -- if I were to begin by a thing that we call effects synchronization. And this is a new area, if you will -- not really new, but it's a new approach to looking at all of the national and international instruments of power that actually go beyond the military but look at the diplomatic activities, political activities, economic activities, social and cultural activities that really need to come together as we look at the particular conflict or the activities we're in, understanding that -- and Central Command has been very clear about this -- that what we offer as the military will only give you a piece of the overall solution, particularly when it comes to asymmetric warfare. But it's about what we as the military do in synchronization and integrated with other elements of power. So that's one of the things that's on my plate.
And then also force protection, countering the IEDs, and I understand -- or the improvised explosive devices. Some of you may have questions about that, and I'd be glad to address it. And then just the issues of security, of protecting our people, as they are in the Middle East.
I'm in town here today speaking at Georgetown on asymmetric warfare. I think it's something that we've really go to look at as we look at the fight we're in. I think for a certain period of time, we possibly did not look at and gauge the elements of activity around us. And it's very, very important that we look at, particularly now, with regard to asymmetric warfare, that what we're in is in a sense a battle for hearts and minds, not for objectives, not for, you know, military objectives but it's about the hearts of minds of the people not only of the Middle East but of the world.
As we look at the nature of the enemy we face globally, that of terrorists, insurgent, violent actors, understanding that many of these people don't necessarily like or want ascribe to those values that are very important to peace-loving peoples of the world and that if they -- these violent actors are able to pursue their vision, to pursue their end states, that it ultimately rests with being able to go after the hearts and minds of many of the world's population.
So for us as military officers, particularly at Central Command, we understand that a military solution in and of itself, without the accompanying elements of power to very importantly include diplomacy, political governance and economic development and the societal, cultural things that must be done, that the military solution in and of itself will not be the answer. So here again, that's one of the things that's on my plate. I'm very much interested in that, because I think it's a significant look at the future for us.
With that, I would like to just go ahead and take questions from you.
Q Mounzer Sleiman, Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, Lebanon and Al-Wasat Kuwait. I see in your bio that in 2005, you had fundamentals of negotiation, negotiation project at Harvard University.
GEN. HOLMES: At Harvard, yeah.
Q And now you're currently conducting joint and combined combat operations.
So my question is focused on Iran. Now all the attention in your area of responsibility is probably focused on what's going to happen in Iran. Do you think we are heading toward the negotiating table or toward the war room in regard to Iran?
GEN. HOLMES: Let me answer that on two levels. First, Central Command, particularly Admiral Fallon, our commander, has been very clear that he seeks a diplomatic solution. He seeks that we should talk, not just one-on-one with Iran but that we talk internationally, we talk regionally. We get other voices, not just a U.S. voice that seeks diplomatic solutions. And that a military option would be a last option to be considered, because force-on-force, combat operations, in the end may not achieve the desired effect, and we are very, very cognizant of that.
Me, on a personal level, as a senior military officer, in this day and age -- particularly as I've talked about the elements of asymmetric warfare -- it's very important that we talk, that we communicate. That we talk and we communicate is always ultimately important, because then what we say, what we do -- and we're able to communicate that -- is much, much clearer and it also -- it leaves less doubt the more we communicate. So I think it's very, very important.
Q You're probably aware of Seymour Hersh's latest article on this subject --
GEN. HOLMES: I'm aware of the article. I have not read it. But I'm aware of the article.
Q You're from the Air Force, I gather -- He's was talking about having a limited instead of full-blown war, maybe a punishing attack limited to so- called training camps or the places that provide arms to Iraq for the resistance. What's your comment on these kinds of scenarios, of limited war versus full-blown war?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, I -- in this day and age, I'm not sure what limited warfare is. I would again encourage, any time we consider a military action, particularly a kinetic military action, that everyone, and including the gentleman Mr. Hersh who offers this, be very cognizant of what it is you're trying to achieve.
So what may appear to be a kinetic activity, a combat operation to do a certain thing, make sure that's exactly what you're going to get once it's over. I would invite anyone who considers a military operation to look beyond that to see, well, what is the perception of that operation in the eyes of the immediate neighbors? What is the perception of this military operation in the eyes of the world?
So it's not just, in and of itself, singularly a military operation. You've got to look at all of the consequences, and I don't use that in a bad sense. But any action you take results in consequences: some good; some others leave room for judgment or not. So we need to think about all of the things that would then flow from that, and ensure that whatever end state is desired, that's the one we would achieve.
So again I go back to, I think, as Admiral Fallon has said, diplomacy. Let's talk to the neighbors; let's talk to the region. Let's talk to the international community and encourage Iran to be a very positive influence in the region.
Q Hiroaki Sugita, Kyoto News, Japan.
General, you mentioned winning the hearts and minds of the people of Iraq or in the Middle East. So on this point, would you comment on to what extent the shooting incident that Blackwater, the private security company whose people were involved, has made your job to win the hearts and minds of the people of Iraq difficult, not only the Blackwater incident, but similar incidents by private security companies?
GEN. HOLMES: Sure, first, in any environment where there's conflict, when there's violence and in this case, civilians die, that's very tragic. And in my mind personally, not as a uniformed military officer but in a personal mind, you know, my heart goes out to these families. And then as a military officer, my heart goes out to these families, because it was a tragic and unnecessary death.
Having said that, the incidence of Blackwater is that the security contractors were not performing a military task. They were there on a contract to the United States State Department, to protect U.S. diplomats and Iraqi public officers. So that is a matter now that is under investigation with the State Department, and I know that it's being investigated.
Does it make our job more difficult in the military? Kinetic operations in and of themselves, where there is force used to quell violence, always presents a problem with hearts and minds, and we have to understand why it's very, very important. And our military is very professional in exercising discipline with combat operations.
And so is this an incident that creates a problem? It creates a challenge for us to continue to focus on why we're there, which is to provide security. Our military task is to be a coach and mentor to the Iraqi security forces so that there is a stable, secure platform for governance and prosperity, those activities, to take place, so that ultimately the Iraqi people have a free and independent nation. We go back to -- there are elements of security that must occur. In this case, it was to protect the diplomats, and those contracts were not there as a military task.
Q Marco Bardazzi, ANSA, Italy. General, how concerned are you about the possibility of the Dutch forces pullout from Afghanistan, that could also open the door to a pullout from Canadian forces for example? And still on Afghanistan, what's the CENTCOM assessment on the situation in the western part of the country, where the Italian forces are based?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, first, from a Central Command perspective, those forces are there assigned to NATO as part of the international security force, ISAF. So it would really be inappropriate for me to give an assessment, since that organization comes under the command of the supreme allied, or SHAPE, the supreme allied commander for NATO and EUCOM.
As we look at the coalition in general, all of the coalition partners respond to the needs of each nation, and as we see the movement of military forces in and out of the coalition, I think we're always going to see that; because the one great thing about free and independent peoples are that we make decisions based on what the wills of our nation or what the desires of our nation. So that as we see forces come and go in any coalition, that's not a signal of anything that is wrong that is happening; it means that countries reassess what they provide. And in any case, so a coalition partner does not necessarily provide military capability, but there are other capabilities that each member of the coalition brings.
So my assessment at large, not of the -- specifically for the NATO alliance there, my assessment at large about coalition warfare is that it's very important that we let each and every member provide what their nation wants to bring to the table. Each member is a valued member of the coalition, particularly as we combat a global enemy as we see in terrorism and the extreme vile of actors.
Q Hiroaki Wada, Mainichi Shimbun, Japan. Thank you. General, thank you very much for doing this for us. My question is about Japan's contribution to the war on terror, particularly refueling operations for vessels taking part in Operation Enduring Freedom. As you may be well aware, Japan is trying to extend the law that provides a legal basis for these kinds of operations but there's some opposition from inside and it sounds like, if reports by the Japanese Navy are true, that there might be a brief suspension operations due to a failure to renew the law. What kind of impact in your assessment will this have on OEF?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, in terms of impact, Japan's partnership or Japan's participation in the coalition is very important, and the contribution of the oil to support OEF is -- has been a long-standing -- or in other words, the graciousness of that is well-recognized. So we continue to value and welcome that partnership.
Now, when it comes to -- again, I go back to each nation comes to the coalition with, you know, the overarching political desires or the will for that nation, and for me, particularly as a military officer, it would be out of my lane to then comment on the political discussions about what a country offers or not. What I can say, though, I'd go back to a very positive light to say that the contribution that Japan has made, particularly oil, in the fight against the terrorists and the contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom are very important and very valued and well-recognized by the coalition.
Q Hiroaki Wada, Mainichi Shimbun, Japan. One of the controversies now taking place in Japan is whether the oil provided by Japanese tankers for OEF operations has gone to OIF operations. There are some questions whether the U.S. vessels that received oil from Japanese tankers took part in took part in operations in connection with the situation in Iraq.
Critics are saying that this is kind of diversion from the provisions provided in dialogue. What do you think about that kind of argument? Do you specifically instruct your U.S. vessels to conduct operations only in OEF after they receive oil from Japanese tankers?
Thank you.
GEN. HOLMES: Okay, let me see. There are several questions there.
First, I am aware of this discussion, and I know how important it is to your country. And I do know that when it comes to this, that the U.S. officials are working with you to get the granularity of information that you need there.
I do not personally know of taking assets and getting oil (from Japan) and using it in Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom, I don't have visibility on that. I'm not saying that that information does not exist, but I am unaware of it.
But I think the main point is, is that I am aware of the issues. I know how important they are to your country. And I do know that our U.S. officials are working with you to give the reliable information that you seek.
Q Hiroaki Wada, Mainichi Shimbun, Japan. But, General, are there any specific instructions from your side to your ships to operate only for OEF after they receive oil from Japanese tankers?
GEN. HOLMES: None that I am aware of.
Q Thank you very much for doing this, too. It's Geoff Elliott from The Australian newspaper. I was going to ask you a slightly political question I fear I'm going to get less than an answer about.
GEN. HOLMES: (Laughs.) You know the rules of engagement. (Laughs, laughter.)
Q That's right. Well, I'll have a go anyway, but -- yeah.
GEN. HOLMES: Okay, let's give it a try.
Q The opposition party in Australia is well ahead in the polls. We'll probably have an election next year. They have talked about withdrawal of combat troops in Iraq.
Now, I guess, as you'll say, that that's up to Australia to decide. I'm just wondering, can you give us some sort of indication of what that means -- I mean, we have a limited -- a fairly limited presence in Iraq --
GEN. HOLMES: Right.
Q -- but what does that mean for your forces, for instance, in Iraq? And what do you make of the argument from our opposition party, for instance, that really the main battle on the war on terror should be in Afghanistan, not in Iraq?
That's -- that was their argument. Thank you.
GEN. HOLMES: Okay. Let me unthread the questions. I think the first is the political question as to whether or not you would provide forces to Iraq or not. Okay? Again, I think you know the answer. I welcome political debate. That's why I'm in uniform, so that policymakers can debate, not just in the U.S. but across all of our nations, to do what's best for the community of willing nations to participate in this.
The impact in Iraq if a certain level of forces were not there or not -- I've really got to put that in the landscape of where we're looking at the amount of force -- military force to do combat operations or to continue -- (audio break) -- security operations in that as you see the debate going on as to how much force we need.
So it would really be difficult to answer that question against that landscape when I think all of us are questioning the amount of forces that would be needed.
Australia has been a very important part of the fight since early on in Afghanistan. I participated in a coalition joint special operations task force, and we had the Australian SAS with us, and it was a very proud moment for me to be there with the Australian special operators. So I'm personally aware of the contribution that your forces make and appreciative of it. In fact, I put some of my folks with your folks, and they had a grand time. So -- did some good thing.
So for me to say the impact -- as I look out over the next year or 18 months in Iraq, I would have to say, you know, I think all of us are going to look at the amount of force that's necessary. So it would really be difficult to now go: Okay, that would be -- have this definite impact, this amount of force from any of the coalition partner is there or not.
But again, I'd go back to the overarching point. I certainly applaud and welcome the political debate -- (audio break) -- our nations as we look at the commitment of military force, because when you commit your military forces, that is a very important decision to make, especially for the military -- that we know what the task is, we know what the job is, the expectations that you have, and knowing that you don't commit those forces without -- (audio break) -- reason. So again, I applaud the debate.
As we look at Afghanistan -- I think that was the second part of the question -- Afghanistan clearly is on our scope. The admiral just returned from a visit to Afghanistan and voiced very much, you know, his views that we continue a very, very strong focus there as we in the U.S. partner with our NATO allies in Afghanistan, and recognizing those challenges that we face there.
And it's not just the sustained appearance of the Taliban. Some people call it a resurgence of the Taliban. I say they never went away. They questioned how long we would stay, and we're there. And now we're there as an international community. So in a mind, this is now -- we and our continued presence offers a threat, a real threat, that they thought we might just leave. We didn't. We're there to stand behind the Afghan government, and those folks who don't want us there are intent that we not be there.
So our continued emphasis on Afghanistan and not just militarily -- but as we continue to support the fledgling government, as we help economic prosperity develop there, as we look at, you know, those things that can be done to build the infrastructure in those -- in that nation, it's very important.
And as -- I go back to the nature of asymmetric warfare, and as we look at winning hearts and minds, you know, what we do in Afghanistan gives a very strong signal -- it communicates our intent that we don't just come in, create a situation and then leave, but we stay. And we stay there for the good of that nation, and we stay there for the good of the international community.
Q Hello, General, Richard Lardner from the Associated Press. A question back on security contractors. I'm wondering what kind of feedback you get from commanders in the field about their presence in Iraq.
GEN. HOLMES: Yeah.
Q Does it help? Does it hurt? You know, forget about specific incidences, but generally speaking.
GEN. HOLMES: Sure.
Q And the second -- a second part of that is, when they do have a problem with a contractor -- because these companies are not under military control -- what do they do about it? Who do they go to? Who do they complain to if they truly see something that is not good?
GEN. HOLMES: The military --
Q Who does the military commander go to?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, first, I go back to these security contracts that are in place were not Department of Defense contracts. So how the military --
Q There are some --
GEN. HOLMES: There are some, and I'll get to those in just a minute.
So when you ask how does the military commander view that, the military wants anybody who's conducting any kind of operational task, whether it's a security protective detail, supporting ambassadors or, you know, diplomatic personnel, to be able to operate in that battlespace. So clearly, folks have to coordinate, that's job number one, because there still is military battlespace there as we work with the Iraqi security forces to provide that security. So some commanders have no problem at all, and then, as we even have internal problems of command and control and communication in our own services, yes, there would be those times when, you know, we've got to work harder at that.
So for me to say there's a clear opinion one way or the other amongst military commanders about the presence of security contractors, I think that would be -- I'm not sure I could give you that, okay. I just know that it's probably different with every local commander, and so you're going to get a mixed bag for an answer there.
With regard to those security contracts that we and the Department of Defense have, those are really internal security contracts, where we have security guard personnel that are checking IDs at entry control points. They are not engaged in what we would consider active military combat operations, but they are there for force protection to help at entry control, to help at -- with identification at checkpoints coming in to or out of a military base, and then internal circulation control within the military base proper.
But the DOD cannot contract a security force to then go perform an inherently military combat operation, if you're following me there, with --
Q I am, but I'm still wondering -- I mean, I know that -- I know they're not doing offensive operations, but, for example, Aegis does convoy support, so I mean, they're going outside bases, and they are being engaged --
GEN. HOLMES: I am not familiar with that contract.
Q They also do intelligence gathering, so they're a very active part of what's going on there. So again, I'm wondering, when do you have a problem, whether it's a state contractor or a DOD contractor, because they are in that battlespace, what does a commander do? Who does he complain to? How does he address the problem?
GEN. HOLMES: If it's -- let's go back to the DOD contract, and again, the contract you mention I would have to do checking. I am not familiar with that contract. I am very familiar with the contracts for perimeter security or entry control points, where it's more of an industrial security activity.
Okay. Who would a military commander complain to? Well, if it's about the contract that is not administered by the Department of Defense, then we would have to go and complain to who owns that contract, okay, or who actually built and executed that contract. I know that there is debate right now; I've watched it unfold over the last few days about accountability among the contractors. I don't have an answer for that when it comes to acquisition and acquisition law and accountability, but I do know that that's a question that we're dealing with.
The last part of your question I think I sort of bounced over it.
Q I guess, aside from acquisition -- I don't want to take up too much more --
GEN. HOLMES: You'll really get me out of my lane if we start talking about acquisitioning in contracting.
Q I just want to know if I can catch up with you later on that.
GEN. HOLMES: Okay.
Q Hello, Mike Kellerman, Press TV, UK. In regards to Blackwater in particular, now that they're a State Department contractee, but there was a lot of testimony yesterday on the Hill about how there's a resentment among the military, the American military to Blackwater and others, contractors, in regards to their so-called cowboy culture actions, that it's making it more difficult for the American military to be liked by the local population.
Can you comment on that, please?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, I'm not aware of that. I have not talked to local commanders. I would only say with regard to anyone who creates a situation in a particular area for any commander, then that's going to be viewed as a problem, whether they're a contractor, whether they are, you know, just violent actors that we see through the threads of interest in violence that are ongoing in Iraq right now.
But -- go ahead.
Q (Off mike) -- you mentioned something about coordinating with contractors. Could you get into that a little more?
GEN. HOLMES: I'm sorry.
Q Coordination with contractors?
GEN. HOLMES: Well, what we would expect when there's a military operation and whether it's -- those areas that may still be under the command and control of the U.S. forces but -- just like those that are now under control of the Iraqi security forces -- any movement, whether it's even the movement of a nongovernmental organization that's providing humanitarian care or conducting humanitarian operations -- movement needs to be coordinated, and that goes without saying, whether it's a contractor, whether it's another federal department or Iraqi governmental agency or our own nongovernmental agencies. Movement needs to be coordinated.
Q So military authorities didn't give Blackwater permission to move about Iraq. Would that be a fair assumption?
GEN. HOLMES: I'm not sure I would gauge it as permission, but I would say needs to be aware and needs to understand that there is anyone, not just Blackwater but anyone that is moving in a sector. But that's -- I mean, that's -- there's nothing magic there just because it's a contract security force. That's just -- that's sort of military command and control 101.
Q Thank you. Rosalea Barker. I'm from Scoop Media in New Zealand.
I just wanted to go away from the military side of what you're speaking of, more to the hearts and minds side of things.
GEN. HOLMES: Mm-hmm. Sure.
Q This -- earlier this week former Ambassador Collins was speaking about what I might call "docu diplomacy," where, as part of the State Department's public affairs mission --
GEN. HOLMES: And -- that term again?
Q Oh, "docu diplomacy."
GEN. HOLMES: Okay. All right.
Q They're taking independent documentaries made by independent filmmakers in the U.S. --
GEN. HOLMES: Sure. Okay.
Q -- and offering them to public service channels in countries that are kind of on the periphery of this, the major conflicts. I just wonder, how does that jigsaw puzzle -- you know, from your point of view, how aware are you and how do you become aware of the efforts that are being made, both by the State Department and nongovernmental organizations?
GEN. HOLMES: We have an interesting term that in America we call the interagency process. And it's designed to get coordination and communication amongst the various departments that provide power, activities, services across our federal government. And this interagency process is driven normally by secretaries of the various departments.
And the challenge is, as we've grown as a democracy, we also grew bureaucracy inside of that. So the challenge is to break down the lines of bureaucracy so that we communicate effectively across all of the very important instruments of power, whether they're diplomatic, informational elements of power, political, economic, the social aspects of that, in addition to just the military.
But when we talk power, by default, many of us immediately go to the military part of that equation. So what we're trying to do, one, as a military and in Central Command, is emphasize the importance of that interagency coordination and synchronization of all of our activities to achieve desired effects, wherever it is we're conducting operations, keeping in mind that military force, combat activity, does not do a lot to win hearts and minds.
And if ultimately the game is not to hold land -- we're not an occupation military. So the last thing we want to do in terms of an end state is to present a situation where we take the military that we have, which is not designed to be an occupier, and say: Okay, now we're going to do this. That's not a good thing.
The better thing is, how do we participate as a military with our interagency partners? At Central Command, to get more specific about how we do that, I chair a process called the Effects Synchronization Committee.
And that is an interagency -- at first it's an inter-cross-functional staff activity at Central Command, where we take all members of our headquarters staff, to include everything from our resourcing through intel operations, our plans, our public affairs office, and we sit down and address the common goals and desired end states for United States Central Command.
And then, in addition to all of the military staff members, we have representatives from many of our federal brothers and sisters in the federal government, to include the State Department, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Department of Treasury, other members of, you know, the intelligence communities, and we sit and address the common goals and objectives for our region. And in addition to just the kinetic or those hard-core combat operations that we would, as a military, look at being able to prosecute, we say, one, is that what we want to do? And then secondly, what do we need to do with non-kinetic operations? What might we need to do with humanitarian ops? What might we need to partner with the Department of Justice and pursue law enforcement, particularly with regard to many of the violent actors that we see today are in areas where they're not on the field of battle -- either in Afghanistan or Iraq -- but they are internationally recognized as criminals. So we can achieve the same effect by getting Interpol to red-notice these folks so that they can be dealt with through an international or a state law enforcement agency.
So as we look at that, those are -- that's the kind of interagency integration and synchronization that must occur. And not just in the U.S., but we look at that kind of coordination across all of our coalition partners. So going to my earlier comments about military force, whether it is in or out of the coalition, it really goes beyond that. It goes to that nation, as a member of a willing coalition, what is it that nation chooses to offer that's of value? And we integrate and synchronize that. Because in many cases -- (inaudible) -- the military operation, it should be there in order to lay a stable platform clearly for political governance, economic development, so that a nation can prosper, because in the end prospering is really about hearts and minds, where people can feel good about where they are, what they're doing, and that they have a relative amount of security.
So those are the things that we look at. And if the military operation can't provide that, then I owe you as a military officer my best military advice to say I'm not convinced what you're thinking that I might do for you is really going to help us achieve the desired end state here. Let's pursue an interagency solution.
MODERATOR: I'm sorry, I think that'll have to be the last question. I'm sorry, but the general has other appointments today. Thank you all for attending and thank you for your questions. And thank you, sir, for your time.
GEN. HOLMES: And I would like to thank all of you all for the few minutes that we could spend together.
END.
