The New Strategic Framework with Russia

 Real Audio of Briefing 

Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045, USA.   For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202) 824-0520.

 MR. BOLTON: Thank you.

Well, it's a pleasure to be here. I wanted to just take the opportunity to kind of brief you on where we are in our ongoing discussions the government of Russia on the new strategic framework between our two countries. Obviously, this is all in preparation for President Bush's trip to Russia in May, where he will meet with President Putin in Moscow and St. Petersburg, beginning on May the 23rd. It is the reciprocal visit from President Putin's visit here last year to Washington and Crawford.

At the time of President Putin's visit last year, we had spent several months in fairly intense negotiations and consultations with the Russian side on the subject of missile defense. It had been, from the time the campaign, really, President Bush's intention to move beyond cold war paradigms of dealing with Russia to try and construct what we call the new strategic framework, encompassing both questions of strategic offense, strategic defense and nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

And one of the -- the first thing that President Bush turned to last year was the subject of missile defense, in an effort to see if it was possible to find a mutually acceptable way with the Russian side to move beyond the ABM treaty of 1972. As I think you're all aware, as I said, we had extensive consultations between Russia and the United States. It ultimately proved not to be possible to find a way that was mutually acceptable to the sides to move beyond the ABM treaty, and so we announced on December the 13th our withdrawal from the treaty, effective pursuant to the treaty's terms, six months thereafter, on June 13th of this year.

But at the same time, in the course of the Moscow-Crawford summit, President Bush announced that following the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review that the Department of Defense has undertaken, that the United States would, over a 10-year period, produce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present level of START I, about 6,000 or so, to a range of between 1,700 and 2,200, as I say, at the end of the 10-year period. And President Putin made a similar announcement. What we have been doing in the course of a number of meetings with my counterpart, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov, in other meetings in the Pentagon, to Ministry of Defense channels, including a couple of weeks ago, as I think you all know, a visit here of Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov, where he met with President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell and Dr. Rice, and which will continue with a meeting between Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Madrid on April the 10th and the 11th.

We've been discussing ways to codify the reductions in offensive warheads in a legally binding document, as President Bush said, that would survive the terms of both himself and President Putin. And we're engaged in discussions and negotiations on that point. In Geneva last week, we had two extensive days worth of discussions. We received briefings from the Russian side on their nuclear doctrine and on their thoughts -- further thoughts on missile defense cooperation from Colonel General Bayuevsky (sp), who accompanied Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov. We also had discussions on the text of both the draft agreement that we're working on on offensive warheads and on the draft political declaration that we expect the presidents will issue during the summit in Moscow.

We made progress on a variety of issues. We still have some important issues between the two sides that remain outstanding. I expect that those particularly important issues will be the principal source of discussion when Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Ivanov meet in a couple weeks.

In addition to the strategic offensive and defensive questions, of course, part of the new strategic framework is the subject of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. And we had indicated to the Russian side back in December when Secretary Powell met with President Putin and others in Moscow, just before our announcement of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, that issues of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction would be -- already were an important element of our dialogue but would income an even more important element. And that has been the case over the past several months, focusing on questions of proliferation involving Iran and other countries of concern.

We will continue to discuss those issues with Russia as well. I do expect that these questions will arise in the course of Secretary Powell's meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov. My next trip to Moscow will be on April the 23rd and 24th, the week of April the 22nd, where I think we will follow up from whatever the outcome of the meetings in Madrid, and also on the offensive warhead agreement and on the political declaration on the new strategic framework, as well as on questions involving nonproliferation.

So that's basically the state of play. All of this is aimed toward the May summit in Moscow and St. Petersburg. We're hopeful that we will have both an offensive weapons agreement and a fairly specific document on the new strategic framework.

There are issues that remain to be discussed, as there always are in this sort of affair, but we're making good progress. And I think it accurately reflects the maturing and emerging relationship, which is both strong and deep and, hopefully, will culminate in being able to sign and release these documents in May.

Why don't I stop there, and maybe the best thing would just be to answer any questions you might have.

MODERATOR: Start up front --

Q Andre Sitov from the Tass news agency, Russia. Sir, can clarify to us what are those outstanding issues that still remain in the draft agreement? And I would be interested both in substance and maybe even in the size of those. What's in parentheses as related to the (clear ?) text?

MR. BOLTON: Yeah. Well, the issues that remain cover a variety of fields. We have proposed, as a way of delineating what it is we're agreeing on, using the concept of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is different from the kinds of counting rules used in START I and that would have been used in START II.

What we are saying is that we ought to focus the agreement on the category of weapons that are of most immediate concern to both sides. And we define "operationally deployed warheads" to mean warheads that are mated to ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or that are closely associated to heavy bombers and heavy-bomber bases.

We do not use the sort of attribution system that is used in START I, where to calculate against the limits of the treaty, capabilities are attributed to different warhead systems. So, for example, if a particular missile has a capability of being MIRVed to have 10 reentry vehicles, one of those missiles counts as 10 for limits purposes under START I, no matter how many reentry vehicles it actually has. Whereas our proposal is to count as operationally deployed only the warheads that -- as I've previously defined them. So we think this is actually a much better way of counting what it is the two sides are limiting. And it remains between us. I think the Russian side certainly began with a preference to use START I counting rules. I think we have now made it clear, and I think this was particularly usefully done during Defense Minister Ivanov's visit, we're really talking about parallel systems; that the START I -- all of the provisions of START I remain in effect, including its counting rules and other procedures for verification and compliance, down to the limits prescribed in START I. But for the lower range of limits, the 1,700 to 2,200 range, we're proposing a different method of calculation and also different means of verification and transparency.

There are a variety of other questions that have arisen, but I think -- I don't want to overstate this because I don't want to leave you with the impression that we've reached agreement, but I think where the parties -- where I see progress being made, where I see a convergence of views, is in focusing on limiting what really is of most concern to the sides and to their military planners, and that is to say those weapons that are immediately available for deployment, operationally deployed, as we define them.

And I think if we are able to reach agreement by the time of the May summit, it will focus on those particular areas of concern that the presidents have already addressed.

I think Secretary Powell said the other day that he expected that the agreement would be something like three our four pages long, which should indicate to you that it's a very different kinds of arms control agreement than START I or some of the others that run onto hundreds, in some cases thousands of pages.

Q A brief follow-up, a very brief follow-up. Do you feel, sir, that the remaining differences are such those can be overcome in Madrid?

MR. BOLTON: Yeah, I think that we're making progress. I don't -- I don't want to overstate that we have -- or leave you with the impression, as I say, that we have reached agreement. But I think the pace of our discussions is encouraging, and I think that Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Ivanov, who have been in conversation, certainly, in the weeks since they last met, are preparing for discussions that typically you can only really have at the ministerial level. And I don't expect them to conclude an agreement in Madrid, but we're certainly hoping that that will further the progress we've made and make it possible to reach a final agreement between the two presidents in Moscow.

MODERATOR: We'll stay up front here.

Q Arkadi Orlov (ph) with the Russian News Agency, RIA (sp).

Mr. Bolton, you mentioned something like possible missile cooperation was discussed in Geneva last week.

Could you elaborate a little bit? Thanks.

MR. BOLTON: Certainly. One of the things that we said to the Russian side during our consultations last fall on missile defense was that we felt that both Russia and the United States, in many respects, face the same threats. And that is that we didn't view -- neither side viewed the other as a threat to it. But we both faced threats from other states, from rogue states that didn't have anywhere near our respective capabilities, in terms of ballistic missile delivery systems that might have only a handful of ballistic missiles with the capability to put a weapon of mass destruction on it, but that it was that threat that we felt we should -- that we could profitably address together -- a threat, I might note, that was not in existence and not contemplated at the time the ABM treaty of 1972 was written.

I think it's fair to say that the -- from the Russian side, their threat assessment ultimately was not that different from ours and that, in fact, many of the military and civilian officials on the Russian side recognized that in many respects, the threats faced by Russia were more imminent than those faced by the United States because of geographical location of the rogue states that possessed or were getting close to possessing the ballistic-missile capability.

So our hope and our -- actually, our continuing expectation is that we can find ways through cooperative research and development programs, through data exchanges, certainly through mechanisms to provide transparency about the ongoing American missile defense program, that we can work together with Russia -- perhaps bilaterally, perhaps in the NATO context, perhaps through other mechanisms, to continue to work together against those common threats.

Now one curiosity here, one anomaly here, of course, is that the ABM treaty, which we will continue to observe as long as it remains in effect, precludes the sharing of technology and research and development on missile defense from one country to another. So -- (chuckles) -- our ability to cooperate with Russia is still inhibited by this treaty until it goes -- until it disappears of its own effect, on June the 13th. And I would anticipate that actually after that date, we can have more serious conversations with the Russian side about these possible joint research and development programs.

But it is something that we look forward to, because it would be reflective with what we hope would be the increased cooperation between the two military establishments that has really already begun in the past several months, especially since the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, where we've had very extensive cooperation with the Russian side on a variety of military and intelligence-sharing matters.

MODERATOR: Let's go back to Le Monde.

Q (Inaudible) -- Giraux, Le Monde, France. Could you tell us if the disclosure of the secret parts of the nuclear posture review had any effect on the discussions with the Russians? And, more generally, has any progress been made on the issue of proliferation?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the -- the press reports about the nuclear posture review were both incomplete and inaccurate in many respects. And I don't really want to get into the specifics, because the -- it's still a matter that shouldn't have been -- shouldn't have been leaked in the first place. But I can tell you that from the discussions we've had with the Russian side where we have given them briefings on the nuclear posture review, as they have given us briefings on their nuclear doctrine, that we weren't terribly surprised by what they said, and they weren't terribly surprised by what we said or what they read in the newspapers.

Q (Off mike) -- accurate?

MR. BOLTON: Well, it was not -- no, it was not accurate in many respects. What they were not surprised at was that prudent planners on both sides look at the world they live in and make appropriate plans for contingencies, none of which any of us expect or hope to happen. But I think it's fair to say there was a lot less discussion of the nuclear posture review, and has been, in our bilateral discussions with the Russians, military and civilian, than there has been commentary in the American and international press.

In terms of proliferation, our view is that the -- there are a whole range of proliferation questions dealing with implementation of existing arms control agreements that Russia and the United Stats are part of. There is also concern about onward proliferation, particularly in the nuclear and missile areas, to countries like Iran. We have said this publicly repeatedly. We have had discussions with our Russian counterparts about that subject. I have myself met with Minister of Atomic Energy Ramonsev (sp); with the head of the Russian Space Agency, Mr. Koptev; with Minister Klebanov (sp) of the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology, and others as well. And we are continuing those discussions

We think that there is ongoing cooperation. That has not been entirely the position of the Russian government. I think we're going to have further discussions on that subject. I am hopeful that we can announce some breakthroughs by the time of the May summit. It is certainly the case that both governments believe that nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an important policy priority. Whether and to what extent we're going to have progress on that score, I just don't know.

Our focus on the hard negotiations has been on the two documents involving offensive nuclear weapons and the new strategic framework. But as I've said, the nonproliferation question is a very high priority for us.

MODERATOR: I think this gentleman -- (inaudible).

Q Thank you. You mentioned besides some document --

MODERATOR: Would you please identify yourself.

Q Oh, I'm sorry. Vissarion Sisnev, Russian newspaper Trud. You mentioned that besides some document on missiles, there is going to be a political declaration by both presidents. Can you give us a general idea about the purpose and the content of this? Is it the intent to have close, better relations, or what? What was this all about? Thank you.

MR. BOLTON: Well, the exact shape and content of the political declaration, of course, is still being negotiated, and it may well be that there will not be simply one political declaration, there may be several. On the new strategic framework, specifically we expect to cover a description of where we stand on offensive -- strategic offensive questions, on defensive questions, on nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities, on the very extensive counterterrorism activities that we've had, especially in the wake of September the 11th.

There will also be discussions of other political and economic questions, particularly the range of economic issues between the countries. Whether that is actually going to be in the political declaration involving the new strategic framework or not, I don't know, but we will be addressing this range of subjects.

And I think what it will show, if you compare the political declarations that were issued at the time of the Moscow -- sorry, the time of the Washington Crawford summit, going back to Genoa and the meetings of the presidents in Genoa and then back in Ljubljana, you will see a growth in both the depth and the breadth of the relationship as we are able to expand areas of cooperation and move really into the sort of post-Cold War relationship that I think both presidents have been trying to achieve.

Their determination to move forward is really quite evident. And I think what we're hoping is that the summit will be reflective of the actual state of the relationship, which is making progress in both private-sector areas and in government. Even as our respective foreign ministry bureaucracies struggle to be able to record it, out in the real world, progress is being made.

And as I say, what we're hoping is that we'll have a political declaration that will reflect that reality.

MODERATOR: Gentleman in the middle.

Q Mesudid Ibir (ph) from the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, in Finland.

I'd like to ask you about NATO, on the enlargement and Russian relationship with NATO. Does this thing play any role in the ongoing talks?

MR. BOLTON: It certainly will be a part of the discussions between the two presidents in Moscow. When Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov was here two weeks ago, it was the subject of discussion with all of his principal interlocutors. We're discussing a variety of things, the expected expansion of NATO later this year, but also the ongoing efforts to make sure that Russia and NATO have an evolving relationship and the discussions between the two sides on that subject. And I think it's fair to say that when the Defense Minister Ivanov was here, there was a very good exchange of views and better understanding of the Russian position position and some of the aspects of the relationship with NATO that they'd like to see.

We have a whole -- there are -- and it really is in two parts -- there are a series of procedural questions dealing with that relationship and a series of substantive questions, as well. And it's one of those areas where the substantive areas of cooperation, I think, are really quite promising and -- for example, could well encompass joint efforts in the fields of missile defense, of what we used to call "theater missile defense," in particular, but broader national missile defense questions, as well.

So we're very optimistic on that. I think that those discussions that I'm not personally carrying on but which are being carried on by my colleagues are also progressing well, and I have no doubt that they will form either part of this political declaration on the new strategic framework, will be the subject of a separate statement by the presidents in Moscow.

MODERATOR: There's time for about three more.

Q Parasuram, from the Press Trust of India.

You mentioned in the -- not only the United States but also Russia is worried about rogue states. We know the rogue states the U.S. is worried about is Iran, Iraq, North Korea -- at least for the next 15 years. Who are the rogues in the Russian gallery?

MR. BOLTON: (Laughs.) Well, I should let them speak for themselves on that, but I think certainly, the concern that we have about the three states in the "axis of evil," but other states, as well, that are seeking to acquire or already have ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction capabilities, like Syria and Libya -- these are states that are closer to Russia than they are to the United States.

They're closer to many of our friends and allies as well. So that our concern, while we worry about ICBM capability, intercontinental capabilities that could threaten us, our immediate concern is the threat to our deployed -- forward-deployed forces and our friends and allies close to them.

And I think -- as I mentioned a moment ago, I think the threat assessment on the Russian side is not that dissimilar from ours. And indeed, many of our Russian interlocutors have said we have absolutely no interest in an Iran, for example, that has a ballistic missile capability associated with a nuclear capability that would pose a direct threat to us.

These are encouraging observations, and one reason why I remain optimistic that progress on the nonproliferation front is possible.

MODERATOR: Back here.

Q (Off mike) -- TV of Hong Kong. I have two questions. One, after last consultation with the Chinese, the Chinese delegate and Mr. Wolf both said there was possibility for progress. However, is there any progress?

Secondly, the Chinese ambassador in Geneva said there should be a ban for outer-space arms race. What's your position on that?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the United States has long urged that the peaceful uses of outer space, which include military uses, as do the peaceful uses of the seas, are something that should not be -- do not need to be regulated beyond the prohibitions that already exist in the outer space treaty and similar documents. And that position really has been unchanged for quite some time.

In terms of the implementation of the November 2000 agreement between the United States and China, we're still waiting for the promulgation of an export control regime from the Chinese side, and aggressive action against the entities that we believe continue to export technology and equipment associated with weapons of mass destruction. It's not enough simply to make the commitment to do so, for us it's important that there be implementation from the Chinese side of the agreements that they made in November of 2000, which has not happened.

MODERATOR: Back to ANSA and then we'll have to finish -- (off mike).

Q Yes, Jean Pierre Gromali (ph), Italian News Agency, ANSA. How are the European allies of the United States associated to those nuclear negotiations or informed of those nuclear negotiations? And the reduction of the nuclear level of the United States and Russia will not effect the level, the nuclear level of the European countries with nuclear power?

MR. BOLTON: Right, let me answer the second question first. Our negotiations with the Russian side on offensive weapons are strictly bilateral; that is to say about their offensive capabilities and ours. And we do not, as we never have in such negotiations, attempted to speak for the other nuclear power allies of ours, the French and the British.

Our discussions with the Russians do not in any way touch on their nuclear capabilities.

In response to your -- and, obviously, we don't talk about the Chinese nuclear capability either. It's an entirely bilateral -- not that the Chinese would want either one of us to speak for them. But it's an entirely bilateral negotiation.

We have kept the friends and allies of the United States really around the world briefed on our progress on the discussions with the Russians. We have briefed the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. We briefed on a bilateral basis, at different times. As we meet people and as Secretary Powell speaks with his counterparts, the subject comes up really quite often. I try and keep people at my level apprised. French Political Director Gerard Errera was in Washington yesterday, for example. He and I met, as we had met in Paris a few weeks ago, and discussed it. And that's just one example that happened yesterday.

But our effort is to keep people fully informed in friendly and allied capitals. We've kept Congress fully briefed on it as well, since we expect that whatever agreement we come up with will require approval up there.

And I'd say that -- you didn't ask the question, but I'll answer it anyway. I think people are generally pleased with the progress that we're making, recognizing that we do not -- we have not reached a final agreement with the Russian side yet; recognizing we've got now a little bit less than two months until President Bush goes to Moscow. But our feeling is while there are still several important issues to resolve, there are or no insuperable obstacles to reaching agreement with the Russians by May.

MODERATOR: And this will be our last question.

Q Dimitri Gersan (ph) of Russian news agency, Tass. Speaking about nonproliferation again, sir, could you please comment on recent statements made by Russian governmental officials about possibility for Moscow to build nuclear power plant in North Korea?

And slightly apart from this, I wonder what's so different between building nuclear power plant in North Korea, KEDO project, for the United States and building nuclear power plants in Bushehr, Iran for Russia, if both countries make light-water reactors, which are not capable of producing weapon-grade plutonium?

Thank you.

MR. BOLTON: Well, with respect to the last part of your question, I don't necessarily agree that they're not capable of creating weapons-grade plutonium.

The issue for Korea is one that, as you may have seen, there was a recent flurry of press activity because the United States did not certify that North Korea was in compliance with the agreed framework, although we waived the condition, as we are permitted to do under our legislation, in order to keep the agreed framework functioning.

The real issue is whether North Korea will allow the IAEA inspectors the kind of access that they require to do the baseline -- to verify the baseline declaration of the North Korean government, to assess whether it's complete and accurate, and to do the other analysis that they need to be able to do to declare that North Korea is in compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.

It is at this point uncertain whether that will be possible, and the issue really is the extent to which the North Koreans will continue to frustrate the IAEA's ability to carry out the responsibilities that they had previously committed to.

One of the reasons that we're concerned about Russian activity in Iran is because of our view that there is an ongoing Iranian offensive nuclear weapons program that is receiving Russian assistance, and that would be a concern quite apart from activities at Bushehr. But it all fits together as a question of Russian cooperation with Iran, and it's of great concern to us, as we have expressed this to the Russian government.

MODERATOR: Thank you all very much. I might mention we've just learned that Secretary Powell will be giving a briefing from the main State podium in the next -- starting any minute now, and we'll have that on the large screen out front and in the back of this room, if anyone's interested.

MR. BOLTON: Okay. 

Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202)824-0520.