Missile Defense and Other Security Issues

  2:13 P.M.

MR. BOLTON: Thank you. Well, it's a pleasure to be here today. I understand you have the statement that I delivered this morning at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. It dealt with the question of American policy on missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. What I said basically in short summary is that in light of the very successful meeting between President Bush and President Putin that we were looking forward to a period of intense ministerial level consultations with the Russians on helping to create the new strategic framework that President Bush has been speaking about, a new strategic framework that would take up beyond the adversarial relationship that we had during the Cold War and hopefully into a relationship that was more based on cooperation than on mutual- assured destruction.

The elements that the two presidents discussed will be discussed in the follow-on meetings which would involve both questions both of missile defense and offensive weapon foibles, as well as areas of non- proliferation, counter-proliferation, cooperation and also the broader range of economic and political relationships. As I think you know, the national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, will be traveling to Moscow tomorrow. She will be discussing the schedule of meetings between Secretary Powell and his counterpart, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, as well as the meetings between Secretary Rumsfeld and his counterpart, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. She is accompanied by Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill and Secretary of Commerce Evans, as evidence of the broader discussion that we are hoping to have with the Russians.

And as the president said today in Italy, he is very optimistic, very hopeful, that we can work and find a cooperative relationship with Russia in the context of the new strategic framework. We start off optimistically, but the president remains committed to a missile defense system for the United States. Hopefully we can move together with the Russians on it. But as he said he is prepared to move on his own if need be.

So why don't I stop there? I'd be pleased to answer any questions either about the testimony today or the meetings, or whatever is on your mind at this point.

Q My name is Andrei Sitov. I am with the Russian News Agency Itar Tass in Washington. My question is about the ABM Treaty obviously and the general summit. What is new in the American position after the summit? What has changed? And secondly, since you are coming from the Senate, we all know that there was the stronger position in the Senate towards unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for the United States. Would you say that this position is now diminished, grown stronger, or remains the same?

MR. BOLTON: Well, I think the -- what the president, our president, discussed with President Putin was a continuation of the conversation that they had in Slovenia a couple of weeks ago. He elaborated further on the idea that a cooperative open transparent relation between Russia and the United States should replace the hostile adversarial relationship that we had during the Cold War, and that in that context he thought it was important that we move ahead as expeditiously as possible, with high level discussions on the new strategic relationship that we would have. And as he said -- as the president said in his Fort McNair speech of May the 1st, obviously the overall strategic relationship includes a discussion at both offensive weapon levels and missile defense. And I think what was important and what was new was that President Putin agreed to talk about the new strategic framework. Now, you know, it's very early. It's premature to predict outcomes. But it's a very positive first step and one that we are quite encouraged by, and we are looking forward to seeing what the outcome of Condi Rice's discussions in Moscow would be.

In terms of the ABM Treaty, you know, I think there is near universal support in the Senate particularly for missile defense. When the national missile defense act was adopted by Congress a couple of years ago it passed by a vote of 97 to 3, to say it was the policy of the United States to deploy a missile defense system as soon as it was technologically feasible. And it was the same statute that was adopted overwhelmingly in the House as well.

There obviously remains disagreements as to how and under what circumstances moving beyond the ABM Treaty would be accomplished. We talked a lot about that this morning in the questions and answers, and that's obviously one of the critical topics that we will be discussing with Russia.

Q This is -- (inaudible) -- with Turkey's NTV Television. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. First of all, Defense News reports from Brussels this week that the European Union is likely to declare operational readiness for elements of the planned European force before the end of this year, regardless of whether or not there would be an agreement with Turkey on the use of NATO assets? I know that doesn't directly fall under your portfolio, but it's a security matter. And what do you say about the U.S. position on that?

And, secondly, some Turkish officials have expressed a willingness to take part in the missile defense program. Is the United States likely to offer or propose an active participation, including the use of Turkish territory? Thank you.

MR. BOLTON: On the first question, we remain committed to the European Union working out with non-EU but NATO members operational relations that take into account their interests that don't jeopardize the efficacy of NATO as the EU moves ahead. And that remains one of the issues we have been in -- not myself, but my colleagues -- have been in consultations with Turkey, with other NATO members on, because of our strong, very strong feeling that whatever develops in the European Security and Defense Identity does not undercut NATO as the central element of the transatlantic defense.

In terms of participation between missile defense development, that's one of the things that we have been discussing in various consultations with allies and friends around the world, is how the benefits of missile defense would be made available as the technology develops. And I think finding ways to involve not just friends and allies but perhaps even Russians in some of this research would be questions that we would like to explore. I think one of the important things that has happened in the past several months as a result of our consultations, especially in Europe, is we have gone a long way in overcoming the fears of many people in Europe that development of a national missile defense system for the United States would somehow result in a decoupling of the United States from Europe; that is to say that we would develop a missile defense system that would protect the American homeland but that would leave European allies unprotected, thus exposing them to greater vulnerability. In fact, I don't think that's ever been the case. I don't know of any serious advocate of missile defense who has ever had anything other than a very clear understanding that when we developed missile defense sufficiently technologically, that we would make it available to all of our friends in Europe -- in the Pacific as well as Europe. So I think that that willingness to include allies and others in the research and development and testing and so on is something that we're looking at very aggressively and hope that something will come of that.

Q Thank you, Mr. Bolton, Nadia Chao (ph) with the Liberty Times. The president of Taiwan, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, he just expressed his willingness to join the missile defense system with the U.S. in an interview with the Washington Times. I'm just wondering do you have any comments on that?

And a second question, also in Washington Times, it mentioned that four senior Republican senators sent a letter to President Bush, urged that they should still remain in control of satellite exports to China. I am just wondering would there be any policy review before President Bush visits China? Thank you.

MR. BOLTON: Well, on the first question, obviously in the defense consultations between the United States and Taiwan that were concluded some months ago, the question of systems related to missile defense came up, and a conclusion was made at that point not to sell Aegis destroyers to Taiwan, although there's no preclusion that that might happen later.

I think that one of the things that we have been consulting in Asia and in Europe as well about is the -- to try to explain what the relationship between things that previously were called theater missile defense and things that were previously called national missile defense actually were, and to point out that the technologies and the capabilities that are involved across the range of missile defense activities are things that we see very extensive research being conducted, and it's part of the fiscal year 2002 budget supplemental that the Defense Department has submitted. But exactly how participation would be worked out, as I think I mentioned at least in part in response to an earlier question, we're still under discussions with.

In terms of the China satellite launch question, that really involves -- that letter that the senators sent, I'd really leave that to them to comment.

Q Two questions also, one on national missile defense. I'm Jim Lope (ph) from Interpress Service. You remember that report by the intelligence community that national missile defense, if it's done unilaterally, will lead almost assuredly to some think the ripple effect, beginning particularly with China and then India responding and then Pakistan and onward. What is your response to the argument that this will have a kind of domino effect, because China in any event is certain to take it as a countermeasure against its possible strategic force?

The second question is about the meeting that's opening tomorrow in Geneva about the chemical and biological agreement treaties. Is the United States, as has been widely reported, prepared to say that we are not going to sign that treaty? And will we be seeking amendments? And, if so, what will they be?

MR. BOLTON: In response to the first question, obviously we never comment on intelligence matters, and I am not sure that even if there were such a thing, predicting what governmental responses would be, that I would rely on their interpretation any more than I would rely on my diplomatic political assessment of what I thought people's reaction would be.

The president made it very clear over the weekend in Genoa that he hoped we would be able to find a way to move together cooperatively with the government of Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty, to move into the new strategic framework that he's been talking about. But he has also made it very clear that he is not going to engage in a traditional arms control negotiation with small armies of lawyers and diplomats wandering around Geneva looking for things to talk about that takes five years, that he said yesterday time is of the essence, he is going to move quickly, and that if our present optimism about our chances of moving together cooperatively with the Russians do not materialize, that he is prepared to move, as we have the right to do, to create missile defense on our own.

With respect to the second question, I guess I -- about the BW protocol, I guess I should say that the State Department has issued a notice -- I don't know what it is called exactly, but explaining that an unnamed senior official will brief tomorrow. I think it's at 10:30 -- brief tomorrow at the State Department press center, whatever it's called, about the U.S. position on the BW protocol. So since that notice is out there, that's when I think the department will comment.

Q Parasuram, with the Press Trust of India. There is some confusion about whom actually the missile defense is supposed to defend. You say in your statement -- (inaudible) -- that it is meant to defend the U.S. mainland -- (inaudible) -- and allies. Sometimes the president says allies and friends. In other words, friends -- and Korea also was speaking -- you mentioned friends. Friends are not defined. I wonder whether you would be good enough to define exactly whom it is supposed to -- I mean, who it will defend and who the friends are.

MR. BOLTON: I guess we'll find out. (Laughter.) I think clearly for those countries with whom we have formal military alliances, alliance structures, that there is no question that if they were willing -- and I assume they will be in due course -- that missile defense would be available to them, because in almost every case we also have American troops of some sort or another deployed in or around those alliance structures.

For others it would depend on the circumstances. But we have a -- we have the hope actually that we might be able to work jointly with the Russians on missile defense. They obviously face many of the same threats from rogue states and terrorist states that we do. And it's our feeling that if we had a -- for example, the capacity to shoot down an accidentally launched ICBM that might come from them, that their security would not be threatened by that. Nor would our security be threatened if they had the capability to destroy an incoming ICBM that perhaps was accidentally launched from another power. We wouldn't see that as threatening our security.

So I think the possibilities are quite extensive in terms of cooperation with a wide range of countries. How far it goes particularly in terms of our discussions with the Russians, I think it's too early to say. But I think the important point to stress is that President Bush was very open to a wide-ranging series of discussions with Russia to explore the new strategic framework that he has been talking about and to have a more cooperative and transparent relationship. So if that were possible with Russia, it may well be possible with other countries with whom we do not have formal alliance structures.

Q (Off mike) -- of the Sankei Japanese daily. My question is, are you subscribing to the opinion that the days of mutual-assured destruction are over? If so, why? If not, why not?

MR. BOLTON: Well, as I said in my prepared statement this morning, what we would like to do is move away from a circumstance where mutual-assured destruction is the centerpiece of our relationship with Russia. There is no question that -- and I discussed this this morning with Senator Kerry of Massachusetts -- there is no question that under the present circumstances with offensive weapons being what they are, that the capability of mutual- assured destruction still exists. And it was never the intention of President Bush in talking about a national missile defense system to say that we were ignoring the present circumstances that we faced, or that we were in some way sacrificing our offensive capabilities. What he said is that he is prepared to see the United States lower its offensive weapons to the lowest possible level consistent with our national security, based on the assessment through the nuclear posture view that the Department of Defense is now undertaking.

But a limited system of missile defense that would defend against launches by rogue states or accidental launches, a layered system with capabilities in all the different phases of ICBM flight could add to international security by providing a supplement from traditional retaliatory deterrence concepts. And that as part of moving toward a more stable international structure overall that missile defense would play into it.

But certainly nobody looking at the existing military capabilities of ourselves, the Russians and others would say that mutual-assured destruction would be put aside. The question is whether our relationship can evolve in a way that it moves out of being the centerpiece of our strategic relationship with Russia and is replaced by a relationship of cooperation and openness.

MODERATOR: The gentleman in the back.

Q Greg Terride (ph) with the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong. It seems given the extensive testing and research plans that the Pentagon now has that this is moving beyond just the realm of defending America and its allies from a limited strike by rogue nations. Are you going to stop there, or in fact in the long term are you now open to the prospect of a far more extensive defense?

MR. BOLTON: I think with all due respect, the premise of your question is wrong. What the Pentagon's proposed program would do would be to open up testing and development for mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, space-based anti-missile capabilities, all of which are expressly precluded by the ABM Treaty as written. As I said this morning, to give homage to where homage is due, the ABM Treaty is actually a very well written treaty. It is intended to prevent us from defending our national territory, and I think it accomplishes that objective -- and that's -- I won't read from the treaty -- that's more boring than you could probably take. But it's intended -- it does what it is intended to do. It prevents us from having a national missile defense capability, and that's what the president wants.

Now, that capability, to be effective, we think, ought to have capability to destroy ICBMs in all three phases of their flight -- in the boost phase, in the mid-course phase and in the terminal phase. And different kinds of systems have different capabilities. Sea-based systems, for example, have the capability, depending on the nation in question, to be very effective at the boost phase. Mid-course systems could well be fixed land-based, could be mobile-based, could be a lot of different things. And then likewise in the terminal, the descent stage of an incoming ICBM, you might want other kinds of systems, airborne systems or the like.

The testing program that has been devised by the Defense Department is intended to explore all of the various possible architectures of missile defense. But that doesn't necessarily -- and obviously no decisions have been made on deployments since we're still in the early research and will move into the testing and development stage.

But whatever architectures are pursued are still intended to result in deployments of anti-ballistic missile systems that are capable of intercepting hundreds of -- sorry, handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands. And that is necessarily a system -- that level of capability is one that could not have an impact on Russia's strategic rocket force. So it's not a question of this program being expanded to cover the kind of defense system that would protect against a first or second strike, but to provide a national but limited missile defense against the launch of handfuls of missiles.

Q (Off mike.)

MODERATOR: Well, there are a lot of other people with questions. Let's see if we can get back to you later.

This gentleman with the beard.

Q Thanks for recognizing the beard. (Laughs.) Siegfried Buschdet (ph) of Deutscheland Radio. You mentioned space, Mr. Bolton. It seems to me that space is becoming increasingly important. And what would you say to critics of ballistic missile defense who are saying that BMD is not primarily intended to defend the territory of the U.S. but that its ultimate objective is to dominate space and control space? This argument is not new, and I'm sure you are familiar or used to it.

MR. BOLTON: You know, it's always a pleasure to be criticized for being too smart. The effort at looking at space-based systems is simply to take into account, for example, particularly in the realm of sensors, but possibly also in the case of interceptors, the advantages of space-based deployment. And it is a way of -- it is another architecture that's being explored.

It's not an architecture on which a final decision has been made, but it is something that any rational planner, looking at the various options to provide for missile defense, would be imprudent not to look at it. And, you know, at this early stage to predict whether that will turn out to be a more feasible, more cost-effective system than sea-based or some other, air-based, it's just impossible to predict.

Q Thank you. My name is -- (inaudible) -- with Asahi newspaper, one of the Japanese newspapers. My question has something to do with missile defense and U.S. alliance policies with Japan. The Bush administration has been trying to combine the TMD and NMD into a single integrated system that they are calling now the BMD. What role does the Bush administration expect Japan to play in developing this over-arching system? Because, you know, some people say that Japan cannot use the TMD system that they have been developing jointly with the United States now unless they change their interpretation of (their?) constitutions.

MR. BOLTON: Well, we've actually had very recently consultations with my counterpart from the ministry of foreign affairs, and we've been in consultations with others on the subject. And if I can just take one second to explain to others what this issue is, it really arises, in the case of Japan, because earlier in the year, Secretary Rumsfeld put aside the distinction between national missile defense and theater missile defense, in part to overcome the concerns of some of our European friends that this is the isolation point that we would develop national missile defense and then say, "The rest of you are on your own." That was never the intention.

And I think the rhetorical distinction between theater missile defense, on the one hand, and national missile defense, on the other, gave the impression that somehow there was a dichotomy in our mind where, really, that was as much an ABM Treaty-driven distinction as anything else. And given our desire to move past the ABM Treaty, we thought that, both rhetorically and operationally, that we should eliminate that distinction. And, indeed, if you look carefully at the DOD budget documents for their Fiscal Year 2002 planning for research and development and testing of missile defense, you'll see they've moved beyond the distinction as well.

Now, where this impinges, as I understand it, in Japanese constitutional terms, is whether the melding of theater and national missile defense moves beyond -- in some sense, if Japan were to participate -- moves Japan beyond legitimate self-defense activities and into collective security. I certainly understand the sensitivity of that in Japanese political debate, and I would be the last one to want to jump into the middle of it. But I would say that I think that we see advantages for Japan in joining with us in the development of missile defense certainly has direct implications for American forces in and around Japan and South Korea, but also for Japan as well.

And part of the reason that we hope that leaders in Japan will see that this should not be seen as a constitutional problem from the point of view of collective self-defense is that it's very hard, really, when you think about it, to distinguish theater and national missile defense. What's theater missile defense for some people turns out to be national missile defense for others.

So we would see this as entirely consistent with legitimate self- defense preparations in Japan. But as I say, I think that's -- I'm certainly no expert on the Japanese constitution, but it is something I'm familiar with from my earlier days at the International Organizations Bureau as Japan considered the question of participation in international peacekeeping activities. And I am sensitive to it, and as I say, it's something that we have been in consultation with both of them.

MODERATOR: Right here.

Q (Inaudible) -- with Power TV of Taiwan. Mr. Secretary, I would like to come back to President Chen Shui-bian's proposal that calls for cooperation and joint research and development of the missile defense between the United States, Japan and Taiwan. I know, you know, for a matter of this magnitude, it's very difficult -- it may be difficult for you to say yes or no on the spot. But do you support the idea in principle, in general? Are you willing, at least, to look into its feasibility or possibility? Thank you very much.

MR. BOLTON: Sure. And I think President Bush has made it clear in some of his earlier remarks that defense of Taiwan is something we regard as very important, and this could well be an element of it. And it's something that, as our research and development continues for Navy theater-wide and other missile systems, that obviously, I'm sure, we'll be in consultation with the authorities on Taiwan about.

MODERATOR: The second questioner with a beard. (Laughter.)

Q Actually, he asked part of my question, so as a follow-up, the president earlier this year said that the United States would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan, and he supported the now-dead Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which would lead to greater cooperation between the militaries. And there have just been talks recently in Los Angeles between the two militaries. Does this represent a change in America's view of Taiwan's strategic role in Asia as we focus more on Asian matters, focus our strategic view away from Europe and towards Asia?

MODERATOR: Can you identify yourself?

Q Oh, I'm sorry. I'm Charles Snyder of the Taipei Times and the Hong Kong I-Mail.

MR. BOLTON: I don't think we're changing our strategic focus away from Europe toward Asia. I think we're trying to understand better what the future strategic situation in Asia is going to be. But I think the president and others have made it clear that they value the relationship with Taiwan and that one of the things the president did at the time of the decision earlier this year on military sales was suggest we move away from this kind of annual decision-making process and have these consultations be more of an ongoing, continuous sort of dialogue that is, I think, over the long term, going to be much more productive.

But I think that's all part of the -- just looking at contingencies we may have to face, I think a lot depends, obviously, on what Beijing does. Secretary Powell will be in Beijing on the 28th of this month, in just a few days, and will be having a wide range of discussions there. I think it's important to see what comes out of that.

Q (Inaudible.) There have been reports that even before the full cycle of -- (inaudible) -- is complete, perhaps you may be able to deploy a rudimentary form of a defense system. What are the -- (inaudible.) When do you think the rudimentary form can be deployed?

MR. BOLTON: Well -- (laughs) -- I am not a rocket scientist. And as I say, this is rocket science. You know, it depends on how the testing goes. And I think that's one of the reasons why it's not possible at this point to say with precision how many cases and in what order and at what time we will find ourselves bumping up against the ABM Treaty. Some tests might go well. Some tests might not go so well. Some tests may provide us with information that helps us in other areas. It just is really too hard to say.

And I think you would get the same answer from General Kadish, the head of the ballistic missile defense operation, because what he's trying to do is develop a very robust and broad-ranging test program. And obviously the whole purpose of tests and development is to find out what works and what doesn't work, and on the basis of the evidence accumulated in that testing and development, to provide decision- makers with options of how they might go in terms of procurement and deployment.

MODERATOR: Murray.

Q My name is Murray Hebert (sp), Far Eastern Economic Review. Secretary Bolton, you mentioned before that the missile defense is not targeted at Russia. But could you tell us how it relates to China? Is China a country to be defended against by the missile defense?

Secondly, China has indicated -- China is also very opposed, like Russia was, to missile defense. It indicated a couple of months ago that it might be willing to talk to the U.S. Has Washington thought of talking to Beijing about missile defense?

MR. BOLTON: Well, Washington is talking to Beijing, since Secretary Powell is going there, as I mentioned, in a couple of days. And the missile defense system that we're talking about under the several different architectures that are under consideration is really not aimed at Beijing's ICBM capability, although the number is small, and I think people tend to look at that.

We've also heard from the authorities in Beijing that they have intended for some time to build larger numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles. I think their situation or our response to their situation is complicated by their shorter and intermediate-range missiles as well, which are or could be targeted at Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and other American friends and allies in the Pacific. But I have no doubt -- we have had consultations with the PRC already on missile defense in the wake of President Bush's May 1 speech at Fort McNair. As I said, Secretary Powell will be there on the 28th, and I'm confident we'll have other discussions with them as well.

MODERATOR: Way in the back.

Q If I can change the subject a little bit --

MODERATOR: Introduce yourself before you --

Q My name is -- (inaudible) -- VOA, and Macedonian Media (too?). How would you describe long-term U.S. strategy in the Balkans, given the very explosive situation right now in Macedonia? That question is becoming an issue again. And more generally --

MR. BOLTON: I would say that's not my area of responsibility.

Q (Laughs.) So you wouldn't respond?

MR. BOLTON: So I will duck that question. How about that?

Q Okay. My next question was --

MR. BOLTON: Call Marc Grossman.

Q -- related to the Balkans. How do you see U.S. interests in the Balkans? But since that's not your area --

MR. BOLTON: Well, the broader question, I think, is the United States obviously has an interest in stability in the Balkans. And I think this is one of the areas where, in our discussions with Russia, we're hoping that we can make some progress in terms of building on work that's already been done in previous discussions, and as a way of showing that we regard them, in fact, as a legitimate player in European matters, that they are a European power, as we are.

But beyond that, I'd rather not comment on the specifics, because that's -- I didn't mean to be flip about it, but that is really -- that's not something that I do on a day-to-day basis, and I'd rather leave it to the people who are handling it to address that question.

MODERATOR: Andrei, another question.

Q Andrei Sitov again from TASS. I just wanted to make sure that I understood your original answer correctly. The American position is not changed in any significant way, since you were referring to the change in the position of President Putin mostly. And secondly, the Russians have been saying that the first shovelful of concrete in the foundation of the new base in Alaska would be the breach of the ABM Treaty. You obviously know a lot about that treaty. What is your opinion as to when that breach may occur, whether that construction in Alaska would constitute a breach of ABM Treaty?

MR. BOLTON: Well, what the two presidents said was that -- what they said on Sunday was we agree that major changes in the world require concrete discussions -- no pun intended -- (laughter) -- would require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. And I think that is a -- basically moving forward on that together is something that does represent a stepping forward for both sides. So I don't see this as a one-sided arrangement, and I don't think President Putin does either.

In terms of the specifics on when a particular activity taken in connection with missile defense testing and development actually comes into conflict with the ABM Treaty, that's really a matter that you have to look at very specifically. But I don't think there should be any misunderstanding. We regard this treaty as comprehensively written, and it is intended -- I just can't help myself; I've got to read you just one phrase from the treaty, because you'll see that the drafters did exactly what they intended to do.

It precludes -- for each party, us and then the Soviet Union, now Russia, it precludes, and I'm quoting, "a defense of the territory of its country" -- "precludes a defense of the territory of its country." And that is exactly the opposite of what President Bush wants to do. He wants to be able to defend the territory of the United States, and obviously to move away from that prohibition in a way that would grant Russia exactly the same rights.

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)

MR. BOLTON: Could I just add one thing? You know, in the political context in this country, it's very hard to explain to Americans that we're not defending our territory. Now, you can talk about the theology of arms control and missile defense, but to say we have signed a treaty that precludes us from defending the territory of our country, it just mystifies people. It mystifies me.

Q I'm Dave McIntyre (sp) with DPA, the German Press Agency. I apologize if this came up in the hearing this morning, but for those of us who weren't there and haven't slogged through the entire transcript yet --

MR. BOLTON: It's fascinating.

Q I'm sure it is. The first part certainly was. What is your response to Senator Biden's comment the other day that the Bush- Putin statement indicates or implies to him that the U.S. will not unilaterally withdraw from the treaty while the talks are going on?

MR. BOLTON: Well, as he said, this was his inference from the statement. And I would suppose it is a permissible inference from the lacunae of the statements, the inference he draws. An equally permissible inference would be exactly the opposite, because the subject simply wasn't addressed.

I think we would prefer to look optimistically at the prospect that we can reach a mutually agreeable solution with the Russians to move beyond the ABM Treaty. But I don't think -- and the president made this clear in his remarks in Rome yesterday -- that he in any way sees that he has limited his options, which he has under Article 15 of the treaty, to withdraw unilaterally if we're not successful with our discussions with Moscow.

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)

Q I'm -- (inaudible) -- Magazine of China. In China, there is a strong belief that in the final analysis, national missile defense is kind of a preemptive strategy against China's limited nuclear deterrence. What is your comment to that?

MR. BOLTON: No, it is expressly not intended to permit any kind of preemptive strike against anybody, for that matter, but certainly not directed -- and the concept for missile defense is not directed against Russia or China. It's designed to protect the United States and its allies against threats from rogue states or accidental launches of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction.

This possibility was something that did not exist in 1972, at the time of the signing of the treaty. It was not contemplated by the treaty. And changes to the treaty or replacement of the treaty to permit defense against things that the treaty never contemplated one way or the other should not be read by any nuclear power as intended to be directed against them.

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)

Q I must, on that point -- and it flows through into my earlier question, and also the Far Eastern Economic Review question -- I must ask for elaboration here. If you move away from the ABM Treaty with Russia's, you know, agreement, there's nothing to limit you in the future, say, 50 years down the track, when you've got the architecture in place, if you think you can, to defend yourself against a far bigger attack from the likes of the Russian or Chinese strategic force of nuclear weapons.

So -- and certainly many Republicans up on the Hill think that's exactly what you should be doing, and that's why they support national missile defense. So is this really about rogue nations, or is it, in fact, the long-term view is really far more extensive?

MR. BOLTON: Well, number one, the United States has never had a foreign policy that looked 50 years ahead. (Laughs.) We couldn't do it on our best days, let alone on a typical day. The direction that this is aimed at is to avoid the situation where a state that has next to nothing to lose, has no capability of otherwise engaging the United States, could use an ICBM capability either -- actually to use it or to threaten, in a way, to blackmail the United States or its friends and allies. That is the fear that we have. That is the question that motivates the president to want to develop a limited but nationwide missile defense system.

What one might do once one acquires that capability, after research and development, after decisions on the appropriate architecture, after procurement decisions, after deployment, years and years, maybe decades down the road, is anybody's guess, because the status of the situation in the world will have changed dramatically, and it's very hard to project that far into the future.

What I think we do want to do is take prudent steps now against the threat that is visible to us, but also the threat that might exist 10 years from now. If we don't develop the limited defense capabilities we have now, because it is a process that takes time, we will simply be more vulnerable. And the scenario that we have used as an example is what would have happened, to come back to the Balkans, in the recent crisis over Kosovo if Slobodan Milosevic had had a ballistic-missile capability with weapons of mass destruction?

We would not have been in a position to defend anybody in Europe against that. Now, would that have changed the outcome in the Balkans? I think almost certainly it would have. We've used the example of the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, where, if Saddam Hussein had had an intermediate-range or long-range ballistic missile capability, would that have changed our ability to put together an international coalition to resist his aggression against Kuwait? I think it would have.

So those are the kinds of circumstances that we're looking at. It's one of the reasons why I think national missile defense has begun to gain the amount of support that it has in many countries around the world, as others have seen the reality of the threat from rogue states and begun to appreciate the potential benefits of a missile defense system. And, I mean, that is what it's about. There are all kinds of theories of all kinds of systems in all kinds of ways that might be developed a long time from now, but that's not what either our intentions are or, if things go as we planned, as well as we've hoped, what our capabilities would be in any case.

MODERATOR: And on that far-reaching exchange, I'd like to thank Undersecretary Bolton and I'd like to thank you for some very good questions.

MR. BOLTON: Okay, thanks very much.

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