Regional Dynamics in the Middle East and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace - Considerations for U.S. Policy

11:05 a.m.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Thank you very much, Jeff. Good to be back here in your remodeled digs.

I'd like to, just before I get into some very brief remarks and then open up to questions and have a discussion, that the -- we're doing two things in Washington today -- the Baker Institute. One we've just done is the publication of what we consider to be a very important task force at the Baker Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York -- Les Gelb and I decided to do this a year ago -- but it is a major task force study on recommendations on what U.S. energy policy should be. And we have some briefs, a news release, and some copies -- not many -- in the corridor and the office outside. But you can certainly get the reports.

And it's also going to be on our website, www.bakerinstitute.org, if you want to bring up the executive summary.

It also gets into Middle Eastern issues, on relations with OPEC and of course with Iran, Iraq, et cetera. So it's a very comprehensive report -- 51 experts who have been involved in that from all various -- a whole spectrum, from environmentalists to corporate executives in the energy industry.

This afternoon another joint project, with the Woodrow Wilson Center, Lee Hamilton and I -- we are hosting a forum for national security advisers to discuss the role of the national security adviser in the coordination of national security and foreign policy. And we have six former national security advisers, and Wolf Blitzer is going to be the moderator of that. This is at the Woodrow Wilson at 2:00 today.

I'll make some remarks on "The Middle East and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace: Some Considerations for United States Policy." What I'd like to do -- we have very limited time, so I'm going to make my basic presentation as concise as I can and short, and then open it up for discussions. What I'd like to do is, in the first instance, try to get to some of the underlying factors that I see as the basis upon which the current situation is evolving -- it's very difficult, the current situation we all find ourselves in, in the Arab-Israeli context -- and then talk very briefly on the various tracks that need to be negotiated -- the Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese, and the Palestinians -- but really concentrate on the Palestinian track at this stage, and some short concluding remarks.

Underlying the current crisis in Arab-Israeli relations and the prospects for peace, I believe, are four basic factors that, if not understood and dealt with more decisively, can lead not only to continued violence and confrontation, but also destroy any prospects for peace in the near future and foster instability in the region as a whole.

First, there are the fundamental political and socioeconomic issues which impact heavily in the Arab-Israeli context. This is not a situation only in the Palestinian context, but certainly in the Arab world as a whole. And what I'm talking about are the fundamental political, economic, socio-factors that are impacting on these societies.

It's a time of change in the Middle East. If you look at some of the fundamental things that are going on below the headlines -- the rate of demographic growth, very high; the increasing numbers of young people seeking employment in economies that cannot create enough jobs to fill the demand -- in some countries, more than 50 percent of the population is under 25 years of age. Foreign direct investment in the Middle East remains very low compared to other regions of the world, except for Africa. Status economic structures still prevail in certain countries; accordingly, economic reform and a transition to private market economies have proven to be halting and difficult. The education system is not geared to produce qualified entrants into the marketplace who can meet the new challenges of globalization. And these structural problems are exacerbated by endemic corruption in the public and private sectors of society. And further, the large gap between rich and poor raises the fundamental issue of social injustice in the region.

And if you look at this situation as a whole -- and again, I don't have time to go into this in more detail -- you could take it into the Arab-Israeli context, and you can see that the desperate economic plight of the Palestinians encourages extremism. In the current context, the lack of employment, food, water, and basic services is fueling anger and resentment against Israel and the Palestinian Authority itself.

In a broader regional sense, many regimes in the Middle East are becoming increasingly vulnerable to their public opinions, which perceives their governments' inability to deliver on urgently needed economic reforms, broader participation, and the peace process with increasing frustration. The second factor is the delayed promise of the Madrid peace conference of 1991 for a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors through direct, face-to-face negotiations, and based on central United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.

The wide gap between elite opinion in the region and popular opinion concerning the peace process has had a negative impact. To many Palestinians, the so-called "fruits of peace" are non-existent, and they perceive no change in the difficult circumstances of their daily lives. For many Israelis, they have neither peace nor security, an essential equation in the Israeli context.

The Oslo process, with its focus on step-by-step diplomacy and interim accords has been too protracted, without enough tangible results on the ground. Further, neither Israel nor the Palestinians have been able to move forward in the recent negotiations, in part because the gaps on key issues such as Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees have not been sufficiently narrowed to come to a final settlement.

The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994 was a major achievement negotiated directly between the Israeli and Jordanian governments and presenteded to the United State government as a fete accompli. However, on the Israeli-Syrian and Lebanese negotiating tracks, I believe there have been important missed opportunities since 1993, the most recent example being the file summit in Geneva between President Clinton and the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in March of 2000. An agreement on this track would have had important strategic implications for the region as a whole and could have enhanced the prospects for final status agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The failed Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 between President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat deflated very high expectations and set the scene for the tragic violence that followed, with well over hundreds of persons killed and thousands wounded -- in large part, Palestinians.

Third factor: In October, 2000, within Israel, and the first time since 1976 when they demonstrated over land confiscation issues, Israeli Arab citizens demonstrated once more, but in solidarity with the Palestinians in the occupied territories during what is called the intifada laksa (ph). This led to confrontations with the Israeli security forces and 13 Israeli Arabs were killed. This development has had a sobering effect on Israeli public opinion, where the threat to Israel is perceived now to be both from within its borders and from outside.

Subsequent attack by Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs only exacerbated the problem. In general, the Israeli mood has changed from relative optimism to pessimism and disillusionments over the prospects to obtain both peace and security.

The fourth factor is the political symbolism throughout the Arab and Muslim world of Hezbollah as a national resistance movement that has accomplished, in their eyes, what Arab governments and armies have not -- the evacuation of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory; in this instance from southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's perceived victory has emboldened Palestinian groups, including Hamas Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even groups within Fatah, which is the main base of Arafat's support, such as Tanzim, who see violence and confrontation as a necessary concomitant to negotiations.

Indeed, a major issue between Israelis and Palestinians is the question, "Who has the right to be violent?" And both sides are now in a very difficult equation on how to stop the violence or abate the violence so that security talks and political talks can proceed and eventually lead to where I think the parties are going to have to ultimately come to negotiations.

Further, the idea of pan-Arab nationalism as a united front against Israel, which was decisively set back by the Desert Storm coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the Madrid peace conference, is being exploited today by the very same Saddam Hussein, who is trying to exacerbate growing anti-United States sentiment in the Arab world in order to break out of U.N. sanctions and pursue his own political ends, including the development of weapons of mass destruction.

These trends were exemplified most recently in the demonstrations by Israeli Arabs on Land Day on March 30th, 2001, where Israeli Arab youths unfurled the Palestinian flag and burned Israeli and American flags while chanting, "Hezbollah take revenge for us," and "We raise a drink to (you ?), Iraq."

In sum, it is very important to determine whether the Palestinian leadership will opt for armed resistance or peaceful resistance in the period ahead.

Now let me say a very few words on the Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese negotiating tracks. With the focus on the Israeli- Palestinian negotiations, the Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese negotiating tracks seem to have become the forgotten agenda of the Madrid peace process initiated in 1991. In the short run the situation, in my view, may be tolerable, but as time goes on, failure to settle the issues at stake poses a threat to the peace and security of the region. There will be increased risk of miscalculation and polarization between the two countries.

Now, much work, and much good work, has been done on the Israeli- Syrian negotiating track since 1991. There have been extensive negotiations that have had an up and down course but in which the key component of a settlement on that track have been dealt with quite comprehensively: on land, which is withdrawal from Golan; peace, which means the definition of peace and normalization between Israel and Syria; security arrangements in order to reinforce the treaty that is eventually signed; and access to water and water rights.

All of these issues have been extensively negotiated. All of these issues can be resumed at the right time and, I believe, brought to effective and successful closure if the political will prevails in Syria, in Israel and in the international community, especially by the United States.

Now let me say some words on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations after the Camp David Summit in the summer of 2000, the tragic violence and killing that followed, and the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's new prime minister necessitated, in my view, new thinking on how the peace negotiations should be pursued. The parties should first pause and learn from the successes and failures of the process to-date. And there are lessons to be learned.

One major guideline of the peace process should be lifted from the model of the 16th century Pope, "Festina lente" -- make haste slowly. This is not a formula for indecision and lack of leadership or engagement. Rather, it means that the parties should engage seriously in direct face-to-face negotiations with the strong support of the international community, especially the United States, to achieve, in a deliberate manner, what is obtainable now and prepare the way for the next stages through a comprehensive settlement on final status issues.

Agreement on Jerusalem could not be forced at Camp David without much more preparatory work than was done, and consultations in the Arab world and beyond that in the Muslim world. Further, former Israeli Prime Minister Barak's insistence on the end to the conflict without being able to come to closure on key final status issues, altered the very process at the heart of the Oslo Agreement; in other words, trying to obtain what is obtainable as interim goals.

Beyond the current crisis, we must understand that the basic parameters of the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians have not been altered by the recent and tragic recourse to violence. Whether it's the Labor Party or Likud Party or National Unity Government in Israel in power, the Israelis are going to have to deal with the Palestinians as a separate and distinct national and political identity. As for the Palestinians, whether or not they unilaterally declare their state, they will not be able to achieve their requirements without a negotiated agreement with Israel.

At the end of the day, if there is to be peace in the Middle East, a viable and independent state will have to emerge, living next to Israel in peace. So the endgame remains the same, which is a negotiated settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The question is, how many more people have to die? How much longer does the tragedy have to continue before the parties can get back to the ultimate point to restart the negotiations?

So what are some of the options? Well, we've seen one option as trying to get a comprehensive agreement a la Camp David, and the reasons why it did not work at this stage. The comprehensive agreement assumes, also, a very strong outside hand from the international community, and especially the United States, to broker the agreement.

Another option would be security now, and wait for a better day. There is a body of opinion in Israel that concludes that our fight is not ready to make the necessary compromises and decisions on the final status issues, and therefore, maximum agreements that can be achieved on security issues should be reached, preferably between the parties, or imposed unilaterally, and that the parties should live in separation and wait for the day when perhaps changes in leadership and generational change would allow closure on final status issues.

And even Ehud Barak suggested that forced separation measures could be taken by the Israeli government and put in place, and that these measures could become permanent if there were not peace talks leading to a negotiated settlement between the two sides. And he ordered planning for permanent, militarized border between Israel and the Palestinian territories, substituting Palestinian workers for foreign workers, disengaging Israel from a complex of services with the Palestinians; utilities and other things. So, if things really do not move forward, there is the possibility that there could be a resort to unilateral separation.

Now, I believe that a unilateral separatist approach is a formula for continued strife and could prove to be seriously destabilizing in the Middle East as a whole. So, that is an option but I don't think it's a good option. So, perhaps one of the things that could be done in the present circumstances that has to be looked at -- and again, there's a new government in Israel, there's a new administration in Washington, there is much turmoil within the Palestinian Authority as to how to proceed, but I think with the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister of Israel, the option of some sort of partial agreement, leading to, at the appropriate time, a comprehensive agreement, has become more in focus.

And, according to this body of opinion, that since the parties tried at Camp David to achieve a comprehensive agreement on final status issues with the Palestinians and failed, consideration should be given to a lesser goal which will not include an end to the conflict, which Barak insisted on, and not include agreement on key final status issues such as the right of return in Jerusalem. These two sensitive final status issues could be put in separate but continuing negotiating tracks to explore compromise solutions. On the other hand, agreements can be reached, where possible, on land, security, water and economic relations.

Some of the major settlements could be consolidated, and these settlers could become more confident of their eventual status as part of Israel.

So it is important to take a look at what is obtainable in the current context in terms of a mutually negotiated separation where a Palestinian entity and state emerges that begins to live in peace next to Israel, side by side, and where the final status issues, such as Jerusalem and right of return, continue to be discussed and negotiated in their own channels. And when the opportunity occurs to come to a comprehensive agreement and truly the end of the conflict, that could be done.

I think economic separation -- I'm talking about a mutually negotiated agreement between the two sides, and obviously a security border will be defined -- however, I think it's important that there not be economic separation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This would be a particularly heavy blow for the latter. So if you have a security border, don't have a closed economic border.

One-third of the Palestinian GDP depends on Palestinian labor working in Israel. Palestinian exports are highly dependent on Israeli markets. The customs union between Israel and the Palestinian Authority is an important source of funds for the Palestinian Authority. So in this respect, the creation of economic borders would be detrimental to the Palestinians especially.

And I think there are also supportive economic initiative, especially in terms of water and energy, that can be put into place to bolster an agreement along the lines I've outlined.

So, let me conclude by just making a few remarks that the immediate task of the Arabs, the Israelis and the international community on the Israeli-Palestinian front is to reopen the channels of dialogue certainly on security issues, which we've seen progress on in the last 48 hours; obtain, at the very least, the sustained abatement of the killing and violence; reinstate the political dialogue and restore the prospects for peace negotiations. Further, efforts should be made to reopen the negotiations not only on this track but on all fronts, including Syria and
Lebanon.

But looking beyond the current challenge, the time may also have come for the United States, given the vital interests we have in the Middle East and our key role in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, to reassess United States policy toward the region as a whole.

Here it should be noted that the history of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations have demonstrated that when the president of the United States and his secretary of State have taken timely -- and I stress timely -- and well-prepared -- and I stress well-prepared -- (chuckles) -- and decisive leadership roles in the process, including the political will to take the heat from both sides, there has been significant progress in agreements; namely Nixon and Kissinger, in the disengagement agreements in the early '70s; Jimmy Carter and Cy Vance in the Camp David Accords of '79; and Bush and Baker in the launching of the Madrid Peace Conference in '91. There are paradigms there of effective American leadership, but in all these initiatives there has been very careful preparation before summitry was engaged in.

A comprehensive approach to regional economic, social and political development and regional security is also essential. The principled approach of the Madrid Peace Conference should be adhered to as the basic framework of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations; namely, let us not forget direct, face-to-face negotiations on all remaining fronts -- Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Syrian, Israeli- Lebanese -- to reach comprehensive agreements under the aegis of 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace; and here, very importantly -- it's been forgotten in the last couple of years -- re- engagement of the multilateral track committees on refugees, water, regional security, environment and economic development. In all these negotiations, the interrelationship of land, peace, security and water issues are central and each negotiating track should proceed at its own pace and not at the expense of another track.

The new United States administration, under President Bush, in consultation with its allies, regional friends and the United Nations and international organizations, should structure the next phase of the negotiations along these lines in a more coherent and realistic regional framework which accommodates the interests of both sides and does not ignore popular opinion in both the Arab countries and Israel.

I believe we need to do this in light of the fundamental trends and factors at play in the region and in order to enhance the United States interests throughout the Middle East. I believe this could be one of the most important initiatives of President George W. Bush's administration.

Thank you, and I'll take any questions you have.

MODERATOR: Would you please wait for the microphone and identify your news organization?

Q Hi.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Hi.

Q Jim Anderson, DPA, the German Press Agency. So far, since --

MR. DJEREJIAN: You and I go back a long way, Jim. (Laughs.)

Q Yes, I know. Longer than we both would like to think.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Exactly.

Q Since the beginning of the new intifada in September, how would you assess the permanent damage done to United States relations with the Arab world?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I think there is certainly an increase in anti-American sentiments in the Arab world and, more broadly, in the Muslim world, not only because of the desperate situation that prevails in the Arab-Israeli context and especially between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the intifada, but also because of what is perceived to be U.S. policy in the region as a whole; for example, how effectively Saddam Hussein has exploited the issue of the plight of the Iraqi people in order to garner support within the Arab and the Muslim world.

And therefore, in terms of public opinion or popular opinion, there's a problem out there. And we can't and shouldn't discard it, because it affects policy.

I think one of the lessons learned in the summitry in the last administration is that you just cannot ignore public opinion, be it Arab or Israeli. And I think, with the failure of the Camp David summit, the public opinion in both the Arab world, especially the Palestinians in the Arab world, and in Israel demonstrated that there was a lack of support for certain of the initiatives that were being taken in negotiations and in summitry.

For example, in Israel, as I said in my remarks, there's this perception that that there's neither peace nor security, and with the Israeli-Arab incidents this sense that it's even exacerbated from the threat from -- with the perceived threat from within.

On the Arab side, the Palestinians have seen fancy meetings and negotiators meeting in various parts of the world -- in Washington, Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh, Camp David, Wye -- but when they look at one another, and they look at their daily lives, they see absolutely no improvement.

So you can't just ignore the popular sentiment. The leaders depend on popular sentiment. If the popular sentiment turns sour, the leaders will be constrained on how far they can go in negotiations.

So there has to be into the foreign policy formulation process a recognition that popular opinion is important and an effort has to be made to educate that public opinion on both sides of the street, if you will, in order to enhance the prospects for negotiations.

MODERATOR: Tom?

Q Thomas Gorguissian, Al Wafd, Egypt. Ambassador Djerejian, you mentioned what the Palestinians or, let's say, the Israelis have to do to find out the direct negotiations.

But still it's not clear for me what is the role of the United States in all this process. Whether it's process; whether it's negotiations; whether it's involved or hand-off policy, what are the lesson that U.S. or Washington can learn from this whole process in the last few months or years and they can apply it in the new administration, if you have a formula for it?

MR. DJEREJIAN: (Chuckles.) Well, I don't have any magic formula for it, but I think I did mention that there are lessons to be learned.

Q But it was in general terms.

MR. DJEREJIAN: In general terms. Well first of, I think there is a misperception, especially in the region, in the Middle East, that the United States is somehow detached from what's happening. The United States is not detached. The United States, this administration -- and I'm speaking personally; I'm not a member of this administration; I'm speaking as the director of the Baker Institute -- but this administration, in my view, is very seriously engaged in the Arab-Israeli context. It is engaged at the diplomatic level; it is engaged in, as demonstrated that the first trip -- foreign visit that the new secretary of State, Colin Powell, took was to the Middle East; that he met with key leaders on the Arab-Israeli side; and that there are efforts underway as we speak to try to lessen the violence and bring the parties to security discussions so that political talks could start.

But the nature of that engagement is not -- I think there's a very disciplined approach toward engagement by the new administration. And that is that the prospect of U.S. involvement in the Middle East is obviously there, but the manner of engagement, level of engagement and the quality of that engagement will, in the first instance, depend on how the parties evolve in the current situation to show that American involvement will have an effective end.

Engagement for the sake of engagement we've seen -- we've seen in the last two years. And unfortunately, it did not produce that much. So there are lessons to be learned here.

So I think this new administration, I think the Bush administration is acting very deliberately, is acting with serious assessment of the situation in the region as a whole and formulating its policy, I think, again, in a very deliberate manner.

And I think that's good.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q Hasan Hazar, Turkiye Daily. Mr. Ambassador, what should Turkey's role be in the Middle East? And how does Turkey-Israel relations affect the peace process?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I think Turkey has a very important role, it has always had an important role in the Arab-Israeli context. But I think that the major contribution that Turkey can do and make is reinforcing the regional aspects of peace. And that could be done by -- in one area that is critical, and that is water. Turkey, of course, is at the headsprings of the Tigris and Euphrates water systems. Turkey has an abundance of water. Water is a scarce commodity in the Middle East, as we all know. And the Turkish government itself had a proposal, as you know, in the past for a peace pipeline, a border pipeline that would go down to countries such as through Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian entity that emerged, and even as ambitious as going off into Saudi Arabia. And there are other schemes that have been studied.

So I think that even on that one critical aspect, Turkey can play a very important role in reinforcing peace. That's why I said it's very important to keep alive the multilateral track of the Madrid peace conference, because when we put Madrid together in 1991, we decided to do a -- in the Bush, the first Bush administration, with Secretary Baker, what we decided to do is to have a dual-track approach, which was basically bilateral negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbors. And we must remember that was a sea change. It was the first time that the Arabs went into direct face- to-face negotiations with Israel. That was a conceptual breakthrough, Madrid.

But we said as these bilateral talks proceed, we must have a multilateral approach of the Europeans, the United States, the Canadians, the Japanese, the allies in the region, international organizations, the U.N., multilateral organizations, that would study these key issues such as water, refugees, security, economy and environment, so that when the bilateral tracks reached a certain stage of development and progress in the bilateral talks, you could -- and if you will, I'm simplifying -- sort of go to the multilateral committees and bring out the blueprint: "All right, now we've gotten to this point, this is good, but how are we going to now reinforce the peace that we're about to sign or agree upon on water issues, on refugee issues?"

For example, take one of the key issues at Camp David -- one of the reasons that Camp David failed, of course, was on the right of return; critical issue. In some ways I think it was more critical than even Jerusalem in terms of being a barrier to the success of Camp David. But had we had enough work being done that when the questions were asked in a bilateral context, "Well, how are we going to do resettlement, what about compensation, what about relocation, what are these schemes, how can they be put in practice -- pull them down?" Now, certain work has been continued to be done in those channels. What I'm saying is that we must reinvigorate that channel, is my private suggestion.

Q (Off mike) -- from Middle East News Agency, Egypt.

The U.S. president, as you may notice, is alienating himself from Palestinian Authority Chairman Yassir Arafat since the beginning of his administration. He has not invited him to the White House. He spoke with him just once over the past couple of months. In your assessment, at what point will the White House take a more anti -- or alienate itself more from the Palestinian Authority? And how do you explain the cold relationship between Arafat and Bush?

MR. DJEREJIAN: First of all, in my assessment as an outsider from the administration, I don't agree with your assessment. I think this -- but I think you are reflecting a view of the Middle East -- from the Middle East, which I think is very inaccurate. There is engagement; there is involvement by the Bush administration, including the president himself; and especially by the president in terms of his leadership meetings with the big -- you know, with Sharon, with Mubarak, with King Abdullah, and certainly others who will come to Washington, and whom he will visit with.

But again, the administration is, from what I know, is working all of these issues -- the security channels; trying to open up security channels between the Palestinians and the Israelis in order to then start political discussions that then could lead to agreements on how the violence can be abated so that the parties can start reengaging.

But, you know, the timing and the quality of American involvement at the presidential level is very important. It is not a card that can be used, I believe, in the first instance. It's a card to be used when some groundwork had been prepared for that type of involvement. And that's why I referred to the paradigms of success in American foreign policy in the Middle East with Nixon and Kissinger, with Jimmy Carter and Cy Vance, and with Bush and Baker.

It's when you prepare the groundwork and you have negotiated many of the underbrush issues and you bring those issues to a point where it is truly appropriate for the president and the leaders to engage to break whatever barriers are left, that to me is a much more sensible approach than what we saw at Camp David, where the president virtually became -- President Clinton virtually became the desk officer, the Middle East desk officer, and there was no point of referral. I mean, every issue. And it didn't work. It didn't work.

So I would not -- I would not equate the current approach of the Bush administration with disengagement, ignoring, alienating; not at all. I think it's a very deliberate approach. And I think you've also seen that in the manner in which they handled the Chinese incident with our-- our airmen and -women in Hainan Island. Take a look at that paradigm. The president laid out the strategic guidelines. He had his key lieutenants, the secretary of State working with our ambassador in the field and our defense attache, letting the professionals do their work, with strategic guidance from the top. It worked. But a deliberate approach like that should not be equated as disengagement. In fact, I think it's real professionalism and -- with strategic policy advice from above.

MODERATOR: (Inaudible) -- two more questions.

Q Hoda Tawfik, Al Ahram Newspaper. Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the American role. What are the bases of the America role? America is an arbiter. She is supervising the peace process and the peace talks. Shouldn't America stick to certain legitimate parameters for the solution? After all, a judge who is an arbiter, he sticks to the laws, to the legal approaches. But like this, all the eight years past, what happened is that there was a biased role towards one party and not supporting the legal parameters. So how do you think America can succeed if they get involved again?

Shouldn't they rely on the legitimate parameters acknowledged by the whole world concerning right of return, concerning Jerusalem, concerning the land, concerning settlements and all that? Otherwise, we'll be in the same mess again. What's your opinion?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I think I addressed that in my remarks when I said that the United States policy in the Middle East, we have the framework. We established that framework in Madrid in 1991. And it's a principled approach based on the principle of land for peace and 242 and 338 and all the other requirements that we negotiated and brought the parties together in at Madrid. And the United States, to play its role as an honest broker, must, I believe, work within those parameters of that principled approach toward Arab-Israeli peace. But that has been our policy, and we should adhere to it. The United States should adhere to that principled approach that's embodied in the Madrid peace conference. And I think that's where we can maintain our role as an honest broker between the parties.

MODERATOR: Is there a last question?

Q (Name and affiliation off-mike.) I'm just wondering, on your critique of Clinton and your praise of Bush, when King Abdullah comes to Washington or Mubarak comes to Washington and pleads publicly for a greater U.S. role, it may be that in fact behind the scenes there is a greater U.S. role, but doesn't kind of the lack of apparent response undermine their position back home in a way that complicates the regional situation generally?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I think the relationships between the two cases you cited, with Jordan and with Egypt, the U.S. relationship with both of those countries is very strong and is perceived to be strong; and it's not just words, but it's deeds in terms of the assistance and the -- with Jordan, the free trade agreement. When you think about it, Jordan is the fourth country with which we've signed a free trade agreement. It's rather remarkable.

So I think that the closeness of the relationship is not in doubt in this context, but at the same time, with a new administration coming into office in Washington having inherited what I think most analysts will say one of the most serious and dangerous situations in the Arab-Israeli context, this is a time for the administration to deliberately assess the situation on the ground, to urge the parties to do what they can to allow the context for them to reengage. I think that's a very wise policy, and it should not be equated with disinterest, it should not be equated with neglect; I think it's the right way to go.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

END.

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