U.S. Relations with Russian and the NIS

      AMB. SESTANOVICH: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to see so many familiar faces here. I want to emphasize that I am open today to questions on American policy and relations towards all the states of the former Soviet Union. I know the title you were given was U.S.- Russian relations; but, as is true of our policy toward the region, in general, which emphasizes relations with all the former Soviet states. So I hope our discussion can be just as wide-ranging.

     We are at a point of transition between two administrations. That's often a slow time in American foreign policy. I don't think that's been the case in our relations with the states of the former Soviet Union. The past year has been a particularly active one across this entire region, whether one looks at Central Asia, which Secretary Albright visited in the spring, and announced some new initiatives, particularly in the area of security cooperation to expand our relations with those states; whether one looks at the steps taken that bring the realization of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline much closer; whether one looks at close cooperation between the Ukraine, the states of the European Union and the United States that led to the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear plant just last month; or to a very active series of meetings between President Clinton and President Putin which produced, among other things, the agreement on making operational a shared early-warning center on ballistic missile launch data between the two countries. As I say, very active period in our relations with the states of the former Soviet Union.

     Since this is a transition and a new administration that is about to come into office, I can't of course speak about the future direction of American policy -- except to say that I think many of the principles that have undergirded American relations with the states of this region are widely shared across American politics, and are not disputed within the Congress or between the old administration and the new. Those principles include a commitment to promote the integration of states of the former Soviet Union -- economically, politically, diplomatically, and in other ways; a respect for their independence and territorial integrity; a recognition of the difficulty of the transition that they are undertaking; a conviction that the creation of modern, political and economic institutions is the strongest support for independence and sovereignty over time; and a readiness to work closely with the states of the region on issues of common interest. Where we have been able to find common approaches, we have over the past several years greatly expanded our relations.

     If one looks back over the past almost a decade since the states of this region became independent, many of them for the first time, one sees an extraordinary expansion of relations -- not only between them and the United States, but with other -- but with other countries as well. The uncertainty that exists -- many of the uncertainties that existed in the beginning of the '90s, as to the future of these states and their liability, and the kinds of relations that they would develop with the United States and others, have been allayed, and one can now speak of normal relations between us. And I think that is recognizing the uncertainty that attends the formation of new states, any type that in itself is an important achievement. But normalcy also creates new opportunities for an expansion of relations in the future. And without speaking for the new administration, I would expect that looking ahead a number of years one should expect the same kind of expansion of relations, because we are only at an early stage of that process.

     Let me end my opening remarks there and take your questions.

     Q Surzhansky, Itar-Tass News Agency of Russia. Mr. Ambassador, there were some reports last week that Russia may have deployed short-range nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad military base. And since Russian authorities, including Mr. Putin himself, strongly deny these reports, could you comment on that? Thank you

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: The issue of nuclear weapons and their deployments, and the doctrines that govern their use, possible use, and the safety of those weapons -- all these have been issues under discussion among European states over the past decade. These are -- the fact that such a dialogue has been created has been one element increasing security and mutual confidence in Europe. This is an important achievement. It was most recently reflected in the discussions in the permanent joint council in NATO this past fall, where there were discussions precisely of these -- of all these questions.

     We have followed this question closely. Without commenting on intelligence matters, which is inappropriate, I can tell you that there has been no gap in the attention to or analysis of this problem. But I don't want to comment further on the specific details that were part of original press reports or the ensuing ones, except to say that we are consulting with our allies in Europe on the subject, in NATO. We are consulting with other regional states --

     Q (Off mike) --

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: On the issue of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons in the Baltic region, inasmuch as these have been the subject of some commitments made in the past, and it -- we have of course encountered a high degree of interest on the part of other governments in the region, as is natural whenever there are reports of increased -- or movements of nuclear weapons or increases in their levels.

     I think it's important that we find a way of restoring confidence on this issue to the extent that it has been undermined by some of these reports. And we would assume that the Russian government would want to clarify some of these questions.

     Yeah? I'll leave it to you to recognize people.

     Q (Off mike) -- the Russian News Agency RIA. Looking back at Clinton's administration record in dealing with Russia, you mentioned a number of areas. What was the most successful one in your opinion, and what was the least successful one? Thanks.

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: I don't want to single out a single area of greatest success, because sometimes the most significant achievements involve making what could be large problems more manageable ones. Here I would mention the strong disagreements that the states of NATO had with the Russian government over the war in Kosovo. That began as an issue of very strong disagreement, and yet we found ourselves at the end of the process, at the end of hostilities, in the same place diplomatically, and working together. That's a measure, perhaps an expression, of the kinds of goals that we need to have in dealing with problems where our interests seem to diverge, finding ways of bringing them into greater convergence.

     I think, more broadly, there has been an expansion of cooperation on a great many issues of European security, whether that you have in mind the stable, peaceful and agreed withdrawal of forces from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly from the Baltic states, or the negotiation of an adapted CFE treaty at the Istanbul summit, or the creation of the Final Act -- I'm sorry, the Founding Act between NATO and Russia, which created a new relationship between the alliance and Russia. There are many new mechanisms for addressing European security questions that did not exist in the early '90s and that provide ways of maintaining and building confidence, addressing threats to security. Those were very much in evidence and of use to us, and the biggest that we -- to European security that we faced in the past decade, in the Balkans. As I said, Balkan issues in general have been both a point of strong disagreement between Russia and the West and, in the end, an area of strong cooperation. So I would count that as a very substantial success.

     Other areas have involved less success. You know that that the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spreading capability of ballistic missiles -- to launch, create, and deploy long-range ballistic missile systems has been a subject high on our agenda. I think in our -- in this administration there is a sense on that issue we have not made as much progress working with Russia and finding the common perspective as we would have wanted.

     MODERATOR: The gentleman in the back.

     Q I have two questions. My name is -- (inaudible) -- from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. First of all, you know that Russia and Iran are (closing ?) together. What does it mean for the region, and what would be the reaction of the U.S. government?

     And my second question is: What are the priorities of U.S. policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan, and are there going to be any changes in this policy in the new administration?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: On the question of Russian relations with Iran, let me start by expressing a sort of the basic principles of our policy toward Iran, which as you know aims at improvement. This has been an element of Secretary Albright's tenure as secretary of State.

     She has spoken on the subject in very important ways, and yet reiterated the difficulties that continue to mark our relations with Iran -- difficulties having to do with the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support for international terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process. Our view of Russia's relations with Iran is not to think that in all ways a closer relationship is negative, but is -- our focus is on those particular problems that matter most to the United States, and that -- where our interests are specially involved. If closer Russian relations with Iran make it easier for Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile capabilities, or to acquire military capabilities that are destabilizing in the region, or make it easier for Iran to support international terrorist groups, or strengthen Iran in its opposition to the Middle East peace process, we consider that very negative, and I think that we are not alone in having those concerns about Iranian policy.

     We would -- we have has no shortage of opportunities to express those concerns to the Russian government, which I might say professes full agreement on those three points that I mentioned.

     Now, about Afghanistan. This is a threat to the stability of South Asia, of Central Asia, and in fact I would say to neighbors in all directions. The ongoing Afghan civil war is a subject that brings us into -- we find brings us into cooperation and dialogue with a great many states that share that sense of a threat to the region. It was on that basis that we were able to develop a strong consensus in the U.S. Security Council for a tighter sanctions against the Taliban, an effort that was supported as well by states in the region not in the U.N. Security Council. There was -- I know from the role I've had in dialogue with many of the states of the Central Asian region a very strong understanding of the reasons that led to the effort to tighten sanctions, and support for that effort. I think this has been a -- the war in Afghanistan has been a threat to the states of the region, and a burden to the people of Afghanistan now for more than a generation. We have sought to increase cooperation among the states of the region, to contribution to a solution, but I can't tell you there has been any strong progress on that front.

     Q This is Umitt Engersol (ph) with Turkey's NTV Television. Under the next administration, do you expect changes in U.S. policy regarding Caspian energy projects?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: I've seen a lot of speculation on that subject in the regional media. And to be honest, I found it a little bit surprising, because I believe there is no real division in Washington on the basic principles that this administration has followed toward the issue of Caspian energy. Our basic approach has reflected a commitment to the independence and sovereignty of the states of the region, a commitment to economic integration and cooperation, a desire to increase alternative and reliable energy supplies which above all means enabling the states of this region to find secure and safe routes to international markets for the export of their energy; and, finally, a commitment to support American investment in the region. I think these are principles that are widely shared here, and have an understandable link or expression in our support for the Baku-Tblisi- Ceyhan pipeline project. The past year has marked extraordinary progress in making that project a more active and viable one, and improving in particular its strong commercial foundation.

     So my expectation would be that as a new administration begins to study this matter, if they operate from the principles that I have described, then you will see a continuity. Of course this is a new team that has to take its own look at policies, but I think the support for the principles that I've mentioned will continue to be strong. And on that basis, I think some of the speculation now about changes in policy will prove to be unfounded.

     Q I would like to go back to these nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad region, because you were very diplomatic and didn't say anything. (Laughter.) Just two short questions. Have these consultations with your European allies, have they produced any result? And the second question: Poland called for international inspections of military facilities in Kaliningrad, of course in accordance with existing arms control agreements. What is the administration's position on this proposal?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: The -- I think I am going to have to be diplomatic again in this sense, that we have a discussion of this question with all of our allies, including Poland, and now extending to other states in the region. I think the concerns that government feel on this issue are understandable, and for that reason we have felt it very important to develop a common understanding of what the situation is, to share information that we have with our allies in an appropriate way, and to understand the security implications of this matter as we see them. But I think it -- while these consultations are under way -- wouldn't be appropriate for me to prejudge their result.

     Q (Off mike.)

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: I've seen a number of different ideas for international responses that might be appropriate to deal with this problem. I am not sure that any government has a single view of how to deal with this question.

     Q Ariel Monahan (ph) of Reuters. I'd like to ask you a more general question about how you feel about the relationship between this administration and President Putin in comparison to how it was under President Yeltsin. It's been a year now. Could you characterize the relationship? There seems to have been a lot of difficult subjects -- for example, the Edmund Pope case, which seemed to drag on and was raised many times.

     And also, what's the current understanding in this administration of Russia's intentions regarding arms sales to Iran? Thank you.

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: Let me answer the second one first. I think there is a -- the question of Russian intentions with respect to arms sales to Iran certainly needs to be clarified.

     It's been a discussion that we have had ongoing over a period of time. But in the aftermath of Defense Minister Sergeyev's visit to Iran, in which there were apparently rather extensive discussions of military sales, I am sure that this is an issue that will remain under discussion for some time. A visit of this sort would naturally be the topic of discussion, so that we better understand the potential regional impact, a matter that of course is of interest not only to us but to states of the region as well.

     Looking at the question of changes in relations between the United States and Russia in the course of the past year, with the accession of a new president, it is not an easy matter to capture in a few words. We will be digesting this one for quite a while. It reminds one of the remark that Chou En-lai allegedly made of the French Revolution -- it being too early to tell what it's true historical significance was. I wouldn't want to suggest that this change in personalities in the Russian presidency has the same significance, but certainly in a country as important as Russia any change of this kind will have -- will be one of great significance.

     You know, President Putin said in an interview just before the new year that, in describing Russian foreign policy, that it was important for Russia to get over its imperial ambitions and to act on the basis of national interests. I think any American administration would welcome the first part of his statement, and ask what the second part means. In his remarks, President Putin said, We will define our interests in a -- define and defend our interests in a very consistent and hard-headed way. There is a clear potential for Russia to define its interests in a way that brings it into greater conflict with its neighbors, with other European states, with the United States as well. And I think it's fair to say that over the past year there has been a strong concern among all those states that I mentioned, whether close to Russia or not, about whether a new definition of Russian national interests and new approach to defending them is taking hold. I don't think there is a settled view of that matter anywhere as to exactly what that definition is going to be, and whether Russia will advance those interests in a way that creates more problems than solutions. But I think there is a -- what is more than uncertainty and less than alarm about whether this is going to be a major turning point in the way Russia defines its national interests.

     Q Hi, my name is Andrei Sitov. I am with TASS, the Russian News Agency. A few -- let's say two brief things. First off, we are hearing that the office is being folded back, your office is being folded back into the European Desk. So first off, could you confirm that? And, if so, then is it a commentary on the relative importance of the region for the United States, or maybe the effectiveness of the office itself?

     And then, second of all, I don't think I've heard any American officials comment on the situation in Ukraine, since you asked for questions on other countries of the region, and the situation with Kuchma and Gongadze (ph) and -- what's the take of official Washington on that?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: The State Department corridors are full of rumors about personnel decisions and organizational decisions. I can't comment on any of those. There are a variety of organizational questions that one assumes the new team is taking up, and we have had an opportunity to give our recommendations on some of these issues. But I am -- I just can't tell you anything authoritatively about that question -- except to say this: I don't think that any decision made will reflect a view about the priority of American relations with the countries of this region. And I say that because in my conversations with members of the new team I have heard a reiteration of the high priority that relations with countries of this region will continue to have. But how that priority will be expressed organizationally is a matter of course for them to decide. If you hear anything, let me know.

     Secondly, about relations with Ukraine, I think this has been an enormously positive year for American relations with Ukraine. I am thinking back to the visit of President Kuchma in December of 1999 in the wake of his reelection, which began a year that was marked by -- in which we saw some real problems ahead, both in Ukraine's financial situation and relations with international creditors, which we were looking forward -- looking ahead to the question of the closure of Chernobyl, in which we had to continue to develop Ukraine's relationship with NATO peacekeeping -- international peacekeeping in the Balkans.

     A year later, I think we can say that there has been some exceptional progress made in Ukraine's relations with international financial institutions, in the formulation and implementation of some economic reform measures -- however in complete -- that's inevitable in this process. We have seen the successful international cooperation that led to the closure of Chernobyl, and we have seen a continuation of Ukraine's cooperation with peacekeeping in the Balkans. That's some important achievements.

     At the same time, we of course have followed reports of the political controversies associated with the Gongadze (ph) case that you mentioned, and I think any friend of Ukraine would have to follow that affair with concern. Our position, guided here by what seems to be a strong consensus in Ukraine itself, is that Ukraine's interests will be best served by a speedy and transparent investigation of this matter, consistent with its own laws and with reflecting the importance of media freedom in Ukraine. Whenever reporters are harassed or disappear, it is a source of concern, given the commitments of all the European states to respect and strengthen media freedom. So we find ourselves sharing the Ukrainian consensus about the need to resolve this matter.

     Q My name is Nana Gongadze (ph), and Georgi was my relative. We were together in Abkhazia, and I am really very concerned about this matter. And if you compare Georgia with another country, like Russia, Ukraine -- and when I was in Georgia people told me the first achievement we have, we have freedom of speech. And I think that Shevardnadze does everything that we have freedom in speech in Georgia. An example is independent station Rustavy-II (ph), who -- which tells everything that happens in the republic, and nobody kills, or the reporters work very, very easily in Georgia.

     But my question will be about Georgia, and the relationship with Russia. I really love Russia. I worked for a Russian station 17 years. I have a lot of friends in Moscow and around Russia. And I see two Russias, two faces: Russia which loves Georgia and wants democracy and Russia which loves the former Soviet Union and want built again this terrible monster that we ruined 1991.

     December 5th Russia announced a visa system with Georgia, and accused Georgia that they give shelter to Chechen -- (inaudible) -- and Chechen refugees, because they have border in the mountains. So -- and then they didn't let Georgian planes to land in Cherimentu (ph). They cut energy, they cut gas. It's blockade of the Republic of Georgia. Same time, the Russian military controlled two autonomous republics -- (inaudible) -- and Abkhazia. I want to know how Americans react for this everything. The people who live in this region, they can take Russian citizenship. It means -- you talk about the independence of the Republic of Georgia -- what independence is this? Can you comment on this please?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: Well, the first thing I want to say is if you are a relative for Mr. Gongadze (ph), I think I speak for everyone in the room in expressing our sympathy. Secondly, I've been interviewed myself under Rustavy-II (ph), and I want to tell you that is a wonderful station. I have got a Rustavy-II (ph) T-shirt at home.

     I also want to say that this is not the only example of press freedom, or the importance of press freedom throughout this region. And I was asked earlier about successes over the past decade. I think it may be the most -- one of the most significant successes that the states of this region have achieved for themselves to be able to put in place and protect free media where they have seen it disappear, the states of this region themselves have been the losers.

     To support that effort, the United States has provided various kinds of assistance to free media organizations in the former Soviet Union. And I remember that when Secretary Albright visited Moscow a couple of years ago in the wake of the financial collapse of August 1998, she announced some small grants to struggling media organizations to try to help them with that -- with their survival. Across the former Soviet Union, we have had a commitment where we could within the limits of our resources to support free media, and I think it is as important as anything else that we have done. But let me emphasize it is above the achievement of the countries themselves, and their loss when it is compromised. It is for that reason that Secretary Albright has expressed the concern about the efforts to limit the independence of Russian television. When she spoke in the Congress in the fall, she stated that -- and in this respect agreeing with the comments made by President Putin -- that free media are essential for Russian democracy, that government control of television is inconsistent with that, and that control of independent television by Gazprom, to be very specific, was government control.

     So the attachment that -- the priorities that the United States attaches to this issue throughout this region is very high.

     Now, you asked about Georgia. Let me get back to that. I think the deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia and what seems to be instances of pressure have created very strong concerns not only here but in the region and in the rest of Europe. You have given examples of those pressures. One could give other ones. We have spoken out case by case on these questions when there was a renewed threat to cut off gas before the new year. We spoke on the subject. We had a variety of reasons for doing so. We opposed interference in valid supply contracts for gas. We supported the diversity of supply and competition among the suppliers. We were concerned about the hardship to be experienced by the Georgian public as the lights went out and the heat went off. This is just one of a complex of difficult issues in Georgian and Russian relations that raise questions among countries that seek good relations with both of them. The -- and this has been a high priority among the issues we discussed with the Russian government.

     Let me know that on the question of energy, we have, as we have in the past, tried to prevent hardship by providing an assistance program for winter heating. And in this coming winter I believe that program will be almost $4 million -- a small effort, but a significant one that shows the commitment of the United States to try to allay difficulties that might be experienced. But there -- you are absolutely right that there is a broader set of problems that has to be addressed. One of them involves the potential spillover from the Chechen war, and on that we have tried to find mechanisms, including through the OSCE, to bring increased transparency on the Georgian border. And we have provided our own assistance to the Georgian border guards to try to increase their ability to cope with this problem -- (audio break) -- be addressing in its -- as it surveys the Caucuses and relations with Russia, this will be an important one.

     Q My name is -- (inaudible) -- from NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation. I would like to go back to the Central Asia issues. In the next administration, do you think there is a possibility for the U.S. to join the Shanghai Five alliance?

     And the next question is: What kind of option does the U.S. have to fight against the terrorism in the Central Asia countries such as

     Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and of course Afghanistan? What do you think?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: I'm not sure what the membership requirements for the Shanghai forum are. I assume that's something the new administration will have to discuss. I'm not aware that they're looking for new members. But it's certainly true that some of the issues that are discussed in that organization are also ones that we discuss with the states of the region, whether it's international terrorism, drug trafficking, for that matter more hopeful issues like economic cooperation, opportunities for investment, and so forth. So I would say that there is -- if not a membership in the organization, at least an awareness of the importance of those issues and an opportunity to cooperate on the most important of them. I think it's fair to say that over the past couple of years the states of this region have come to feel the need to provide for their security, and have found that need more acute. They are throughout the region seeking to modernize their military establishment, find ways of largely reducing the size of them and increasing the effectiveness, in order to be able to deal with the real problems that they face. And they have as a result of that turned to countries beyond the region and international organizations for assistance in that process, whether it's through the cooperation in the peacekeeping battalions that the Partnership for Peace has helped them with, or through consultations and assistance that we provide on security of borders. Security issues are going to loom larger in the relations to the states of this region over the next several years, and I am sure that the -- as they have already, they will continue to seek assistance from beyond the region in addressing those problems.

     MODERATOR: In the back.

     Q I am Vladimir Abajnov (ph). I'm with the Expert Russian Weekly. You already --

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: Haven't seen you in a long time. How are you?

     Q (Laughs.) Yeah, how are you doing? You have already gave us your general vision on the new Russian leadership, but let me ask you what are the achievements record of this last year? I mean, we had an unbelievable number of summits -- I think six or something like that -- but what's the achievement record? And probably how do you feel how this style of dealing with Russia changed this year?

     AMB. SESTANOVICH: We had a -- you are right, many encounters between the presidents of the two countries, but also many encounters between the foreign ministers, between the national security advisors; a renewal of contacts between the defense ministers. I think one should not ignore, even though it didn't receive as much publicity as the summit meetings, the restoration of the upgrading of Russia's relations with NATO, which took place at the meetings in Brussels between defense ministers and foreign ministers in December. I would count that as one achievement, although not the -- I count it as one achievement, and in some ways the reflection of agreement reached by the two presidents themselves at their first meeting in Moscow in June.

     I think the -- I referred already to the agreements to carry forward the implementation of a cooperation on early warning launches of ballistic missiles. I think there has been a regular incremental dialogue on issues of national missile defense, which will be valuable to the coming administration. As you know, President Clinton deferred a decision on that question, but the record of discussion will be important. There has been a regular dialogue on issues of non- proliferation, which have had both positive and negative elements, and I think that too will form the basis for further discussions between the new team here and the Russian government.

     MODERATOR: I am afraid we have run out of time. Thank you very much for an excellent briefing. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

END.

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