1:00 P.M. EDT 
MODERATOR: It's our honor and privilege to host again General Kimmitt, a senior US Central Command official, here at the Foreign Press Center. He's briefing us for the second time and, without further introduction, I'd like to give you the General. We can structure this in any manner that seems most efficient. If you have remarks, sir, you can go right ahead. Otherwise, we'll go right into an informal question and answer session. It's designed to be an informal event.
BGEN KIMMITT: Okay. Well, perhaps rather than try to -- I mean, there's been a lot of discussion over the last couple of days by the President and events around 9/11, the news coming out of Iraq. I think most of you know CENTCOM covers 27 countries in the region, ranging from the Central Asian state to Iraq and Iran; the Levant, Syria, Lebanon; the Middle East; the Gulf States and the Horn of Africa. We are responsible for providing U.S. military support in that region. Our command has the responsibility for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and as well as providing support to the other countries in the region. So I think there's probably enough -- you probably have far more questions than I have to give you up front, so why don't we just go straight into the questions.
MODERATOR: I would say if you ask a question, sort of lean into the microphone, so that you get heard.
QUESTION: Marco Bardazzi, Italian News Agency ANSA. On Afghanistan, General, the situation there seems to be deteriorating with -- now. And today President Musharraf of Pakistan in Europe said that the terrorism center of gravity there has shifted from al-Qaida to the Taliban and the real problem now are the Taliban. What's your evaluation -- your assessment?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, first of all, it is not -- it is our assessment that the situation has not deteriorated. Clearly, there has been an increase in Taliban activity over the past six months and that's probably attributable to three or four factors.
The first factor is I think that we must acknowledge that the Taliban strength has been -- they have been stronger this year than we've seen in the past couple of years. Part of that has to do with the fact that they have found sanctuary and safe haven not only in the south, but also to some extent in areas of northwestern Pakistan. But there are other factors as well. NATO, by its own admission came in with somewhat of a less than aggressive posture and may have inadvertently signaled to the Taliban that they were not going to be as robust in their operations as the military -- as the U.S. forces had been. I mean, even Zawahiri referred to that yesterday in his video when he said "the second-rate crusaders taking over for the Americans who were trying to withdraw." So that public posture that we saw perhaps emanating from some of the reasonable debate in Europe at the end of the year last year, beginning of this year, in the parliaments about increasing the NATO participation in the south may have sent the wrong message to the Taliban that somehow they could take advantage of the situation.
The third is it's -- a lot of this just has to do with weather. There is not a lot of fighting in the wintertime when the passes and the mountains are frozen over, and in the summertime it's pretty much the campaign season.
The fourth factor is NATO has come into the south with far more troops than the U.S. had in the southern provinces. So as an example, in Helmond Province, the U.S. had a force of about 200 troops this time last year in Helmond and the British have come in with over 3,000. So one can imagine as you sort of extend your reach in the south to areas that you had not been operating in, you're going to -- as I think General Jones had an apt metaphor when he said it was like the bees nest. We had not poked in the bee's nest and so -- and now that we have poked into the beehive, we're starting to see some of these problems come out.
He feels very confident and we feel very confident that the situation in Afghanistan is manageable. In fact, NATO has come in. It is fighting hard. The British are fighting hard, as are the Canadians, as are the Dutch. It is our assessment that we are not going to get pushed into the sea* at any time soon. In fact, the NATO troops are having pretty good effect against the Taliban. How the Taliban continue to want to fight after the losses they've taken is quite remarkable.
But don't -- it could be unhelpful to equate the amount of Taliban activity with the amount as somehow equating to Taliban success because the Taliban have not been successful in the south. They're capable of limited attacks and usually lose in those attacks. They're capable of putting out car bombs and -- but as a military force, they are being -- they're losing most, if not all of their battles with the coalition forces. So the amount of Taliban activity has given us concern and has given General Jones at NATO concern, but they have not had a significant effect in the battlefield, on the battlefields inside of Afghanistan.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: My name is Eelco Bosch van Rosenthal, Vrij Nederland, News Magazine in The Netherlands. I was wondering if you could give me some specifics on the situation in Uruzgan where we have about 1,500 troops and how do you compare to Helmond and Kandahar?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, you could probably get a very tactical look at that from probably somebody who focuses specifically on Afghanistan. But let's be honest, Uruzgan is the home of Mullah Omar, and that whole area, Kandahar and Uruzgan, so we would expect it to be similar to Helmond, Kandahar. We've done NATO has done some operations up there, but we are glad to see the amount of Dutch participation in that region and we remain confident that the Dutch soldiers are certainly up to the task.
QUESTION: However, if I -- can I ask one follow-up? You just said about the discussions that have been going on in various Dutch parliaments.
BGEN KIMMITT: In all the European parliaments.
QUESTION: Right. That's right. In our various European parliaments. One of them was the Dutch. You're saying that maybe the way in that the discussion was held, it may have sent the wrong message. But how should that discussion
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah, yeah.
QUESTION: -- what would have been the alternative?
BGEN KIMMITT: I don't think there should have been an alternative. Again, the discussion was the right discussion to have. That's a serious question that the Dutch parliament took on.
QUESTION: But it sent the wrong message.
BGEN KIMMITT: Well -- but let me finish my statement. It is important in a pluralistic, democratic nation to have debate before you send your sons and daughters off to war. It's not -- it may have been interpreted improperly by the Taliban as somehow indicating that it showed a lack of will on the part of the Dutch people to support their troops. In fact, what we've seen is that the Dutch troops -- that the Taliban made a dreadful mistake that, you know, once in a democratic society, once the decision is made and they get on with it, then they're going to put their -- you know, you have the debate beforehand. The Taliban are the one that misinterpreted it, not the Dutch people. You need to have those debates in a parliamentary or democratic society. It's just -- that's important. That's the nature of our systems.
Now if the Taliban, a totalitarian society looks at that says well, this must mean that they're not willing to fight. Well, they made that mistake because the Dutch troops are willing to fight. We've seen that. I worked extensively with your military in my role at CENTCOM on this issue and there is certainly no doubt in my mind that the military was up to the task and is up to the task. And consider it one of the highlights of my time at CENTCOM that I could work alongside officers of the quality of General Koplunz (ph) to explain to the Dutch parliament and, by inference, the Dutch people on why it was necessary and the right debate happened. If the Taliban misinterpreted that, there are Taliban dying because they interpreted that parliamentary debate as a lack of will.
QUESTION: Andrei Sitov from TASS from the Russian News Agency. Since you referred to the fact that you have 26 -- 27 countries and they come in not just Iraq and Afghanistan, can I ask you if you know what really happened to that major who was kidnapped in Kyrgyzstan?
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah. We -- I think that Jill -- Major Jill Metzger, who was allegedly kidnapped -- I don't think we have the whole story right now. I think that the investigators at her current location will get the bottom of it. They will take testimony from -- or they will take a statement from Major Metzger. But it was the determination that it's better to have her moved out of the country for the determination, rather than let this be a local issue. I have little doubt that the American authorities will hand over the results of those discussions with Major Metzger back to the Kyrgy authorities. We're just glad that she's back, we're just glad that she's safe, and we are appreciative of the Kyrgy Government's support in this effort to recover one of our soldiers.
QUESTION: Okay. And my sort of substantive issue of interest is obviously your cooperation with the Russians. I keep hearing from the Russian officials that they have a very good military to military cooperation with the U.S. specifically in Afghanistan. But when I ask for details, they invariably stall. Could you provide me with any details as to what sort of cooperation is going on?
BGEN KIMMITT: You know, it's -- and I'm not going to be giving you specific details. But as you know, we have a senior national representative and a delegation of military officers working with us at CENTCOM. That's a strong relationship. We exchange intelligence. We provide information to the Russian delegation at CENTCOM about ongoing operations in Iraq, and Afghanistan.
I smile at that because I was looking at -- I'm moving up to Washington, D.C., and I was looking at some pictures from Bosnia just this morning of the relations, the very strong relations I had as a young colonel with the Russians in Uglevik in Republika of Srpska. And then I also remember personally meeting with General Anatoly Kvashnin at NATO in 2000 and hearing his views on Islamic extremism.
So the military professionals always have strong relationships. It's just the nature of our business. It is a -- I mentioned those particular issues because it has been since about 1996 a very strong relationship between our militaries, whether it's in Bosnia or Kosovo, the delegations that we have down in CENTCOM at Tampa right now. So what we try to do as militaries professionals is provide as much intelligence information, current operational data as is and can be expected in this type of relationship.
QUESTION: Still, it's sort of hard to see a rosy picture like that when we are talking about two military organizations that used to be basically major competitors, to put it mildly.
BGEN KIMMITT: Why?
QUESTION: What -- because the --
BGEN KIMMITT: But soldiers are soldiers. And you know, you go back to, you know, World War I, for example, when at Christmas time in the trenches they would actually declare a personal ceasefire and go have drinks with the other side. Soldiers do their national biddings, but in their heart they're all part of the same comraderie and brotherhood. And you know, when I think of Valerie Berstsoff (ph) who is my counterpart down in Bosnia, I just have very warm thoughts and warm memories. This was -- remember, this was 1997 and 1998 and I had spent my entire adult life prepared to fight the 13th Guard's Army in the Fulda Gap, but when our countries reconciled their political differences, we found that between militaries have a lot in common. We fight for our countries, we are loyal to our countries and -- but that doesn't mean that we have a particular personal animosity between the two sides.
QUESTION: What would you like -- I'm sorry, I'm monopolizing this, but this is the last one. What would you like to see from your Russian counterparts as additional input, if you wish, into resolving the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, first of all, we know that your country and your military has had significant amount of experience with Islamic extremism. I remember in 2000, June of 2000, General Anatoly Kvashnin telling us about this arc of instability throughout the Central Asian states going down through the Middle East and up to north, the Maghreb, and you have been at this business much longer than we have. Your military has learned specific tactics, techniques and procedures about how to fight insurgencies, counterterrorism against such groups as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, against the Chechen rebels, so on and so forth.
And I think that our militaries can and do have a very robust exchange of intelligence and information between our militaries so that we can fight. We have a common enemy and that common enemy is this extremism, this terrorism and extremism that manifests itself in such places as Abkhazia, as places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Now would we also like to see a stronger Russian participation in Afghanistan and Iraq? I think that there's a significant amount of help that can be provided by the Russian military and I will leave it at that.
QUESTION: My name is Reymer Kluever from the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Let's take to Afghanistan for one question before we, I guess, move on to Iraq. The Taliban are obviously importing techniques from Iraq to Afghanistan, and if that trend continues does that mean that you need troop reinforcements, more troops in Afghanistan?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, first of all, two things. It is not necessarily the case that they're importing them from Iraq. One of the things that we are very concerned about remains this use of the internet to promote extremism, to promote terrorism. So whether they come from Iraq, it's just as easy to learn this by getting into specific websites. So how the communication is passed, whether it's from Iraq or from this worldwide network of extremists, that's a moot point. We are concerned about what we're seeing in Afghanistan, as I've talked about earlier with your Italian colleague.
General Jones recently in Poland spoke to all the chiefs of defense about the need for -- to round out the -- what NATO calls its Statement of Requirements. They needed about 25,000 troops and they came up short by about 15 percent. So General Jones has admitted that he could use a couple of thousand more troops, but it is not our assessment at this point that we need significant numbers, additional troops, inside of Afghanistan, that the military situation is being handled sufficiently by the Afghan security forces and by the NATO forces and the forces from Central Command. So I would not anticipate a call for large troop increases other than what General Jones has already asked for.
QUESTION: If we move to Iraq, I'll ask a very specific question.
BGEN KIMMITT: You can move any direction you want.
MODERATOR: You can make statements* any way you wish.
BGEN KIMMITT: I'm here as a resource.
QUESTION: Let's start with a question about the Iraqi-Syrian border. Do you see any improvement in the Syrian Government behavior to stop insurgents from coming into Iraq from Syria?
BGEN KIMMITT: No. Now, I'll be more candid about that. I sat down in -- I was in Damascus almost two years ago to work with the Syrian military and the Syrian military intelligence to try to enhance the border structures that were already in place. We had come up with a number of initiatives on both sides between the Iraqis and the Syrians for enhancing the security along the border.
In truth, the Syrians made some improvements. They increased the number of troops, the quality of troops along the border, made some changes to their spotlights, so on and so forth, increased the size of the berms. But there's so much more that we would expect Syria to do. Syria has nothing to gain from instability inside of Iraq. And as we've said many times, that Syria has a responsibility to police its own borders and we've also said that border protection doesn't simply happen at the border. It has to happen throughout the country.
Damascus Airport must be shut down as a transit point for terrorists. Their visa regime isn't helpful. Any Arab can come into the country without a visa. So Syria has done a little but they could do so much more to staunch the flow of fairly well trained foreign fighters from Syria transiting into Iraq and adding to the instability.
QUESTION: And can we learn something from it about the prospect for a Syrian involvement in preventing entrance of both warriors and ammunition into Lebanon after the Israel-Lebanese war?
BGEN KIMMITT: I suspected that you were going to take me down that track. That's an issue between Israel and Syria and it's not for me to reflect on because CENTCOM doesn't include Israel, but let's be candid --
QUESTION: I mean, (inaudible) in Lebanon up until a couple of weeks ago.
BGEN KIMMITT: But let me be candid, the fact that Syria is also used as a way station between Tehran and southern Lebanon so that they -- Iran can continue to support, arm, equip Hezbollah and that Syria is a partner in this link between Tehran and Hezbollah has added to the instability in the region and a directly a cause -- and a direct cause of the recent Hezbollah activities. So we would not only call on Syria to tighten up its borders with Iraq, we'd also call on Syria to break its links with Iran and its use of Syria as safe haven sanctuary and resupply for Hezbollah.
QUESTION: What is the CENTCOM assessment so far about the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon?
BGEN KIMMITT: It is our view that UNIFIL can be a force for stability inside of southern Lebanon, but in the long run the situation in southern Lebanon will only be improved when the elected legitimate Government of Lebanon has responsibility for that area and the Lebanese armed forces are the single authority in southern Lebanon. That a militia is not permitted -- an armed militia such as Hezbollah is not permitted to become a state -- to remain a state within a state. UNIFIL can be a contributing factor to that, particularly as they work side by side with the Lebanese armed forces. But at the end of the day, it's really going to take the ability of the Lebanese Government to extend its reach all the way throughout its country and supplant Hezbollah as the de facto government, if not de facto, at least the day-to-day government inside of southern Lebanon.
It must be the Government of Lebanon that provides for the hospitals, provides for the reconstruction, provides for the schooling and not defer to a terrorist group such as Hezbollah to do that job for them.
QUESTION: May I move on to Iraq?
BGEN KIMMITT: You all have the steering wheel.
QUESTION: Okay.
BGEN KIMMITT: And we are doing this until --
MODERATOR: 1:45
BGEN KIMMITT: Okay, sure.
QUESTION: The New York Times today -- grim outlook -- seeing west Iraq without more troops and aid. There's talk that a division -- more is needed to not to pacify by here but to calm the situation down there. Obviously you don't have enough troops in Iraq. Is that correct?
BGEN KIMMITT: I don't share that assessment. I know that Rich Lowry and Bill Crystal came out with an editorial this morning.
QUESTION: Calling for more troops.
BGEN KIMMITT: Calling for more U.S. troops.
QUESTION: More U.S. troops.
******BGEN KIMMITT: U.S. troops and that's ****completely off the record****, okay. I sat down yesterday with Rich Lowry. He had already written the article so it wasn't helpful but he and I had this discussion. (Laughter.) But while I understand the logic behind Lowry and Crystal's piece, the troops that we need on the ground are more Iraqi troops. If you wanted to feed an insurgency, even Yaqubi today -- our old friend Yaqubi and Sadr's deputy said, you know, Americans would not want to see foreign troops tromping around their country. That is a cause of the instability and the insurgency. I find myself --
QUESTION: Did I get you correctly? You said the U.S. troops are a cause of --
BGEN KIMMITT: That's what Yaqubi said.
QUESTION: Oh. (Laughter.)
BGEN KIMMITT: But let's be candid, in the long run insurgencies are defeated by local forces not by foreign forces. Luckily we have no British press here, as I've remind everybody that they were unable to quell the insurgency in America, but having said that, it remains our strategy that we hand over security responsibility to the Iraqi security forces. If there is a need for more forces, as I've talked to others about, it screams for more Iraqi security forces, more trained and capable Iraqi security forces. And I think we all understand why that it: It's their country, they get the intelligence better than we do, our presence is an irritant. There is no doubt about that. The presence of American forces, of coalition forces walking up and down the streets of Iraq is an irritant. And it -- if not as a direct cause, can be used as a casus belli by the insurgents as justification for an insurgency. Whether that justification is true or not, you know, obviously people such as Yaqubi believe so. So our view and CENTCOM's in the long run we take away that source of irritant. We let the Iraqi security forces take over.
Now let's talk about your specific issue of western Anbar. There are 18 provinces inside of Iraq. In some provinces we have already handed over complete control, such as Muthanna to the Iraqi in total. There is no coalition authority inside of Muthanna. But let's also be candid, Anbar is one of the tougher provinces out there. And when we talk about gradually handing over provincial control to the Iraqis, one could have suggested well before Tom Ricks (ph) article -- who is it today, Michael Gordon?
QUESTION: Yes.
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah, Michael Gordon's article today. I mean, the last -- if we were to predict where would be the last province where American -- or coalition forces would be, Anbar would probably be one of the last of them.
QUESTION: Yes. But if you read that -- also mention the strength of the Iraqi forces and it's printed out there that they are only half of the nominal force.
BGEN KIMMITT: Right.
QUESTION: Because the guys are running away, not returning to --
BGEN KIMMITT: I don't --
QUESTION: Is it a realistic perspective on Iraqi troops?
BGEN KIMMITT: First of all, I don't think he said they're all running away.
QUESTION: No.
BGEN KIMMITT: What he said was there is a system inside that is different from European militaries, where they'd take as much as a month off. What we've got to understand is if you're going to build Iraqi army, it must be representative of Iraqi society. So if that's the case that's the case. What I would say is if you only can get half of them on the battlefield then you need twice as many so that you have enough.
QUESTION: So is that a realistic outlook?
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah, it is. It is. There has been no shortage of recruiting inside of Iraq. What we just got to make sure is -- so you have a lot of volunteers coming in the door. We just need to make sure that they're trained, equipped and experienced. And it is remarkable. I mean, how many years was it before the Bundeswehr after World War II -- I think it was five years before the Bundeswehr was self-sufficient. Do you remember?
QUESTION: It was established 1956 and --
BGEN KIMMITT: That late, yeah.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
BGEN KIMMITT: No, no, no, certainly by the beginning of the '60s there was a full-fledged Bundeswehr by that point. But look at what we're talking about in Iraq, it has only been three years and we have about -- I forgot my numbers. I always have to refer to today's numbers. There are 130,000. Two and a half years ago, in October of '04, they had one battalion -- 600 guys and they broke on the battlefield. So I think what we need to make sure is that we have a realistic expectation of how much can be handed over and how quickly it can be handed over. It is a gradual process. There is as much danger as handing over too much responsibility too soon as there is handing over too little responsibility too soon. And we trust our commanders on the ground to make that judgment. But at the same time we've got to acknowledge that Anbar has always been one of the tougher provinces.
QUESTION: Do you keep seeing the presence of Iranian forces and intelligence in Iraq?
BGEN KIMMITT: Not Iranian forces. We have seen evidence --
QUESTION: What about Qod -- could they be the special forces?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, whether Qods force are considered intelligence or whether they're considered military, I mean, we can have that debate. We can certainly see Qods force in Hezbollah, training Hezbollah in Lebanon. But there have been indications of Qods force, IRGC and intelligence service, MOIS, inside of Iraq. And that's -- our view is that's unhelpful to see destabilizing elements like that inside of Iraq trying to -- like Syria, Iran has everything to gain from a stable Iraq and nothing to gain from an unstable Iraq. So we have, through others, made it very clear to Iran that they should be a force for stability, not instability.
STACIE'S PART
QUESTION: When you translate what you just said about insurgency being -- should be by local forces not by foreign troops, when you translate that into Afghanistan and you look at the Afghan National Army, how would you grade the state of Afghan National Army?
My other question is, if I may, the Dutch are in Uruzgan right now; about two weeks ago they took over the Martello Base --
BGEN KIMMITT: Which base?
QUESTION: Martello Base, small base in the Kandahar Province -- from the Canadians. My question is are you in favor of the Dutch, the Canadians, the Brits being flexible, so operating in each other's provinces as well.
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah. On the first issue, today 29,100 in the Afghan army. They are coming along. Our -- they are certainly not yet at the position where they can stand on their own. We -- as we are doing in Iraq, we'll continue to work with the Afghan army to stand them up as a full force that one day can be the sole responsible agency for the defense of their country both from internal and external threats.
QUESTION: Five years? Ten years?
BGEN KIMMITT: I'm not going to make a prediction. I think we're going to be involved -- well, let me just say this. I think that Europe and the United States will be involved with Afghanistan for years and years and not simply on the security line of operation but also in the governance economic restoration.
QUESTION: Butyou are speaking about the military, so that's I guess my question.
BGEN KIMMITT: Exactly.
QUESTION: So my question is how long do you see a need for a military presence in the region including in some central Asian states, who are now becoming somewhat dubious about the U.S. presence?
BGEN KIMMITT: Let me first answer his second question, and I won't forget yours. Yes, I am absolutely in favor of the forces, and General Jones is very much in favor, and all the countries are in favor in principle of having the troops on the ground having the maximum flexibility. What we don't want to do is -- we have finished (ph) warlords inside of Afghanistan where there are warlords of their particular province. We don't want to now set up European warlords so that we have the British as the warlords of Helmond and the Canadians the warlords of Kandahar. Obviously, any soldier wants to have the maximum flexibility to use his forces where the need is because the enemy is going to take advantage of those artificial boundaries. And so the fewer boundaries and stove pipes and restrictions we can impose and nations impose on their forces the better. And that's been a constant -- I remember -- I could tell you stories from Kosovo in 2000 about 17 different caveats and red cards that were flashed in Mitrovica but that's for another time.
QUESTION: But it might take some while, I'm sorry, to convince the Dutch public, Dutch Parliament of this what you just --
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, but I think it's -- let's be honest. Every country has imposed caveats on their troops. America does it as well. But I think that once the troops on the ground demonstrate how capable they are, it may be that some of those caveats can be lifted. But at the end of the day, NATO is an alliance and it is not a single force. Coalition warfare, alliance warfare has, in some cases, some downsides but overall, the net effect is far more positive when you have countries involved.
I don't share your assessment that the central Asian states see the coalition participation in the region as of dubious value. I think all of us have a collective concern about the rise of extremism not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but you've got clear evidence of Islamic extremism in countries such as Uzbekistan and others.
So we maintain very, very strong relations with all the countries in the region. Some of them we have not -- we have chosen not to renegotiate our basing arrangements such as Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and there is -- but for example in Kurdistan, the Manas discussions are almost finished, and we intend to continue to work with those nations so that we can support our efforts both for the benefit of the countries as well as our mutual efforts in Afghanistan.
Now, if there have been some further north that might suggest that somehow this indicates a longstanding American presence and encroachment into an area where others might have -- well, all I would say is that we have mutual efforts, we have mutual goals, we have similar goals, we have -- and it is our view that we can work together with all those countries in the region for the benefit of all the countries in and surrounding the region as well. But I'm not a politician, so --
QUESTION: I understand that. I understand that that's why I was asking about the military need for those bases.
BG GEN KIMMITT: Well, we do have a -- there is a military need for those bases. Obviously --
QUESTION: How long they will it stay there?
BGEN KIMMITT: How long will it stay there? I think at least until the operations inside of Afghanistan are handed over to the Afghan forces. NATO has a need in Dushanbe to -- you know, you can't, as the terms go, one-hop it from Europe nor do you want to one-hop it, go direct flights from Ramstein or Paris into Kabul. So it's better to have layover spots. And the governments in the region have been very supportive in that, and we continue to look forward to working with them as long as the Afghani efforts continue.
QUESTION: Yes. You just said as a general assessment fewer restrictions nations impose on the forces, the better. So that does also apply to the German troops in Afghanistan from your point of view?
BGEN KIMMITT: Right. But it does. But again let me be very clear. We understand why nations would want to put restrictions on their troops. We understand that the governments listening to their people don't want to give unreserved use of their forces to NATO within the NATO rules of engagement. That's the nature of NATO. The national rules of engagement take priority over the NATO. And if NATO has expansive rules of engagement, but a nation says we'll commit our forces but under more restrictive rules, that's unhelpful but it's understandable. I would rather have Germany inside of Afghanistan under -- my preference would be, of course, that Germany follows the same rules of engagement, but I would rather have them in Afghanistan with restrictive rules rather than not in Afghanistan because they were unwilling to follow any rules.
The contribution of German forces inside of Afghanistan has been profound, and while they could certainly do more and we'd like to do more, we are grateful for what they are doing at the current level.
QUESTION: Sir, before we -- can I ask you how you would prefer to be referred to as a CENTCOM official? You say you are in between assignments now, do we --
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, I'm still assigned to Central Command that is at least for another week, and I'm the Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans.
QUESTION: So that's how we'll address you.
BGEN KIMMITT: I'm quite comfortable with that.
QUESTION: Okay. And I wanted to ask you about something that was reported today out of Baghdad where they say that there were some games played with the casualty figures that only those killings were counted as the killings, the execution type killings, from the hands -- at the hands of the death squads and that the U.S. authorities did not count the figures --
BGEN KIMMITT: You're talking the August figures?
QUESTION: I guess.
BGEN KIMMITT: Let me sort of clarify that. First of all, I can't sit here and defend the counting that is done down there and how it's done. General Caldwell, who is the spokesman down there, has been very clear that they're going to get to the bottom of this. But the important issue that Bill Caldwell -- General Caldwell is trying to make is that in their assessment, the security situation inside Baghdad has improved over the last couple of months since the beginning of this operation.
Right now there is a number discrepancy, and I think once they get to the bottom of it, they'll announce the correct numbers and it may change their assessment. But there has never been -- one thing I certainly know from 30 plus years in the military, you know, never attribute to a conspiracy what can be explained by incompetence, and don't quote me on that. It's just tough to get the right -- it's just tough to get -- there's nobody trying to hide. The other thing I know is that the truth always come out. You people as reporters are too good. You're not going to let us get away with trying to hide something. You're always going to catch us. And it's not helpful when you get caught.
So there's nobody trying to put out wrong numbers. There may be intentionally -- they're going to find out what the numbers are and they're going to announce those.
QUESTION: It certainly looks that way.
BGEN KIMMITT: That they're putting out the wrong numbers?
QUESTION: Uh-huh, that the --
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, look, you caught us again, see. So let's -- what you're saying is there a discrepancy here. They're going to find out the right numbers; they'll get them out. And then if they've got to change their conclusions about the security situation in Baghdad based on what they believe to be the accurate numbers -- but, you know, again, I remember in 2003 you all -- and 2004 the way you used to keep harping -- you as a collective -- kept harping us about the civilian numbers. And I'd say look, we just don't -- we're not capable at this point of tracking those numbers. There's not a system there for it. I'd rather give you no numbers than wrong numbers.
MODERATOR: Please come to the mike if you have a question. (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: For the record, it's Philippe.
MODERATOR: Sorry.
QUESTION: Yes. Maybe you addressed this question earlier. I wonder whether there is a question of a vocabulary in Iraq. When you look at the report --
BGEN KIMMITT: A question of?
QUESTION: Vocabulary.
BGEN KIMMITT: When you look at the reports, the last report of the Pentagon on Iraq and description of the security situation, you end up thinking for yourself that this is civil war, but still the word is not applied. And it seems to me that there is somewhere a finesse I don't really catch. Why isn't this civil war when you have ethnic cleansing, execution type killings? I mean all the things that are described in this report, what makes the difference with a civil war?
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah. And in my own mind a few months ago I had to come to that same understanding, what is the difference between sectarian violence and civil war? We're not suggesting for a moment that there is not a significant amount of sectarian violence that is very unhelpful. But let me perhaps give you my thoughts on why we have not yet fallen over that cliff into civil war, and three historical examples may be helpful: Lebanon, in Yugoslavia, and the American Civil War.
In Lebanon -- in all three of those examples, there was a significant amount of sectarian violence. But at what point did you cross the cliff or fall off the cliff and become civil war? And one of the reasons is when the military breaks down. When the military breaks down into, in the case of Lebanon, into the -- to help out the confessional organizations, or in the case of Yugoslavia when the Yugoslavian National Army broke down and took their tanks and their artillery and their combat vehicles to the sides of the militia; and even the same thing in America. We had a lot of sectarian violence. But when the soldiers from West Point broke and the ones from the North stayed in the North and the ones in the South headed South, when the organized military broke down into this -- and joined the militias, then you really had civil war. You saw that in Yugoslavia. And can you imagine if the Iraqi security forces said "Halas" (ph), no more, and they took their tanks and artillery to Basra or to Ramadi or to Sulaimaniya, then we'd have civil war.
QUESTION: According to the definition, we're pretty close because there are militias -- I mean interaction between militia and the army, right?
BGEN KIMMITT: Well, there's actually -- remarkably not. There is a significant concern with the amount of sectarian influence in the police forces but not yet in the army. The army has stayed loyal to the central government.
The second aspect of why it's not civil war is because you still have a central government. It does not dissolve as it did in Yugoslavia or dissolve as it did in Lebanon or broke down into a government in Washington and a government in Richmond.
If you told me that the military was deserting, taking their tank battalions over to the sides of the militia, if you told me that the government broke down and said I'm going to Ramadi, I'm going to Sulaimaniya, I'm going to Basra and establish my own regional government, then we would be in civil war. And for me that is sort of the precipice. And I'm not suggesting that that couldn't happen, but I believe that to be a very, very small probability at this point. And oddly enough, that may be of all the criticism of Paul Bremer that that may have been an unintended benefit of his decision to disband the Iraqi military.
It is my personal judgment that if we still had the same Iraqi military that we had from Saddam's area and just said let's put them to work, that organization was riveted -- ridden with sectarian differences, the Republican Special Guard, all Sunni, the leadership all Sunni, the troops all Shia. I have little doubt that if he had not disbanded the Iraqi military and started from new that that military would have broken down the way I've described. That's my personal judgment, my personal hypothesis. But the fact that he rebuilt from the bottom up an Iraqi army that is loyal -- that is, one, loyal to the central government; and two, multi-ethnic at all levels of command is why we have not seen the military breakdown and why we have not seen what I believe -- my personal judgment -- would really be the defining point for civil war.
MODERATOR: I think we're done, sir.
QUESTION: Just one. Maybe you addressed that as well before about this argument that the trial of Usama bin Laden is stone cold.
BGEN KIMMITT: The trail.
QUESTION: The trail, yeah.
BGEN KIMMITT: Yeah. Here's what I would say on that. If you would have asked me on December 10th, 2003, how are you doing with Saddam Hussein, I'd say, you know, it could be that the trail is stone cold. Two days later we found him -- three days later we found him. The interesting thing about manhunts is that it is not a straight line increase in intelligence, it's very rocky. And typically you have very, very little intelligence, and then all of a sudden you have it all. We saw that with Zarqawi; we saw that with bin Laden; we saw that with Uday and Qusay. So the trail may be stone cold today, but he could be found tomorrow. It may not be for a week. It may not be for a month. I can't predict when we are going to get Usama bin Laden. I can predict that we will continue our efforts to go after Saddam -- I meant against Usama. But we also need to understand that manhunts are very, very difficult. Radovan Karadzic is still out there. Slobodan -- no, we got Slobodan Milosevic --
QUESTION: Mladic --
BGEN KIMMITT: Ratko Mladic is still out there. The British will tell you there's still known IRA terrorists running around Northern Ireland. It is important for us to continue to go against Usama and Ayman Zawahiri. They are iconic figures. They must be brought to justice. The world must see them killed or captured.
But I would also remind everybody that just as the day after we captured Saddam, the insurgency continued. Al-Qaida will not be defeated when we have captured or killed Usama or Zawahiri. That organization must be taken down not simply at the top but throughout the organization. And not only the organization must be defeated, but the ideology that all of our countries are seeing the manifestations of extremism inside their countries. You have seen it, Van Gogh (ph) in your country. You have seen it significantly with the amount of extremism inside of France. Zarcosi* will talk about that at length.
We certainly know the Bremen (ph) cell, and sort of the root problems that we've had inside of Germany with Islamic extremism. You're from Italy and you've seen that as well. So this is -- we've got to understand, and I think we do understand -- we, all of us around this table, and we won't even talk about Beslan, Chechnya, Moscow -- that collectively this is a battle of free nations, and everyone at this table belongs to a free nation, against this extremism that wants to take the world 10 centuries back and make the world a Taliban-like existence.
All of our nations have a common understanding of this threat, and that's why we all must continue to work together to defeat this threat. And now we'll cut off.
# # #
