12:00 P.M. EDT
MODERATOR: Matt's just returned from a long, I believe, 10-week trip to the region to --
QUESTION: Ten days, but it seems like --
MODERATOR: Ten days, sorry. That was his holiday. I got the week part -- the 10 part right, a 10-day trip to the region, where he was in Turkey, Cyprus and in Greece. And now he's going to share some recollections and some insights and then we'll take your questions. Most of you know Matt, so this should be a fun time. Thanks very much.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thanks, George and thanks, everybody for coming today. Yeah, it was a really constructive and energetic trip. Started out with a whole series of consultations in Ankara, where I was hoping we could take the first steps towards implementing the shared vision document that Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Gul concluded a couple weeks ago. And so those discussions, of course, focus on, well, what the key elements of that shared vision document are. So we talked, of course, about Iraq and our shared battle against the PKK. We talked about our shared vision on advancing democracy in the broader Middle East and in Central Asia. Of course, talked about Israel-Palestine, about the situation in Iran and our cooperation with Government of Turkey and Syria, how to deal with the Syrians most effectively in pursuit of our shared goals, and spent a fair amount of time talking about energy security and how to help Europe diversify its energy supplies, especially its natural gas, looking at Azerbaijan as the next major producer and supplier of gas for Europe and seeing Turkey and the South Caucuses as a major transit route, first and foremost into Greece.
In Athens, also had similarly detailed discussions on energy security, as I just described, and Cyprus. I was only there for one day. And then on the island, on Cyprus, I spent Sunday there and then Monday and Tuesday as well. Sunday, I spent taking some time to get to know the island a bit, which was great. I hadn't been there for a few years and it's truly a beautiful place. And Monday and Tuesday, I had meetings; on Monday, with Republic of Cyprus leadership, so with Director General Zakheos, also Ambassador Marcouli, who is the lead on the Cyprus question. I met with DISI party leader Anastasiades, I met with the Speaker of the House, Christofias, and then with business leaders, Greek Cypriot business leaders, as well as the United Nations P-5 ambassadors on the ground.
The next day I met with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Mr. Talat, also with Mr. Denktash, Mr. Soyer as well, and with Turkish business leaders -- Turkish Cypriot business leaders. And what came out of all of these discussions, in my mind, was a sense, number one, that on the negative side, there's some degree of drift between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities if you look at public opinion polling. I don't know if you believe the public opinion polling, but the opinion polling seems to indicate that as populations grow older, people forget what it was like to live together on the island and how well that worked and they seem, maybe, to forget the sense of community on both sides of the green line, the sense that Cyprus is a community of Cypriots, regardless of whether they're a Turkish Cypriot or a Greek Cypriot.
That was the sense that I was feeling coming into the island and looking at the polling data. But the pleasant surprise, I felt -- it's not a grand surprise, but the pleasant finding I had was that Under Secretary General Gambari -- UN Under Secretary General Gambari's visit the previous weekend really did generate some positive momentum, didn't create any enormous breakthroughs but generated a more positive spirit. And what's positive, in particular, is number one, the agreement of -- well, first of all, the fact that President Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat met. They hadn't done that since April 2004.
So they met and they reached some interim agreements; number one, to establish technical committees to have the technical discussions on elements of the Cyprus plan -- Cyprus settlement plan that's very useful -- not the Cyprus settlement plan, sorry, I should be clear there is no specific plan that I came there to propose, but on the Cyprus settlement issue in general. That was a significant step because until the Gambari mission, there was a growing debate about what sort of items would be on the agenda of the technical talks. So until you agree on an agenda, you can't start the talks. Well now, the parties seem to be beyond that and they're forming technical committees, actually, to convene the discussions hopefully by the end of the month. So that's positive.
President Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat also agreed to exchange lists of specific items that they will discuss in the so-called substantive discussions that will happen sometime soon. And then they agreed to meet periodically, Mr. Talat and President Papadopoulos; all very positive developments.
So my goal in arriving on the island, then, was to try to build on that spirit, that positive spirit, that positive momentum that the Under Secretary General established and not to present any specific plan. I mean, many people in the Cypriot media said, "What plan are you coming with," with the intention being we're trying to maybe force a set of ideas on people. No, I had no specific plan or set of ideas other than what's been tossed around in the international community a lot lately, recently particularly in Brussels but also in the EU member state capitals. But frankly, many of these building blocks have been tossed around for years. So many great American diplomats, mighty American diplomats greater than I, have preceded me in working on the Cyprus problem. It's hard to imagine that there are any specific ideas or building blocks of a settlement that are truly new and we've thought about everything, more or less, over the years.
What's different is how we assemble those pieces and take advantage of the moment at hand, which again, is one of there being a little bit more momentum, I think, as well as incentives on both sides to move forward a compromise, given the course of events in Europe. So I'm hoping that we can build on this momentum and be quite creative and find a way to assemble many elements that have been on the table for quite some time into a workable package to move the process forward.
And I can just say, to wrap things up, that the leadership on both sides of the green line and business leaders and civil society leaders I spoke with were all willing not only to listen, but to think and to entertain new ideas; again, not radically new ideas, but new ideas or new ways to assemble the ideas that provide me a little bit of optimism at least, at least not pessimism.
And the very last thing I should say is the main reason for going to Turkey at this time was to celebrate the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which just makes me smile. I can't believe it's finally done. We spent so many years listening to people, no one I see in this room, but many experts and journalists saying that it could never happen, there wasn't enough oil, other countries in the region wouldn't let it happen.
Of course, they were all wrong. The United States was always confident that the project made commercial sense, we had done our analysis, we had done our homework, and we also felt that that particular pipeline, in conjunction with the other four that we have supported in the Caspian Region, provided the best way to enhance global energy supplies, make sure that Caspian oil and gas, the largest finds of oil and gas in the last four decades, can make their way to global energy markets in an environmentally sound way, free from geographic chokepoints, be they the Turkish Straits or the Straits of Hormuz and free from monopolistic pressures of state-owned pipeline companies. We knew that this project could work and it just feels great to see it's finally all finished and to have seen that first oil tanker -- I guess, actually, the second one, but loading up oil ready to leave Ceyhan.
So that's it. I'm ready for any questions as to framework and thank you again for being here.
MODERATOR: If you could just make sure to announce -- give us your name and your affiliation and we may have some questions from New York as well. Wait for the microphone, please.
QUESTION: George Bistis, Greek Service, Voice of America. Matt, during your visit to Cyprus, you happened to be there at the time of evacuation, the beginning of the American evacuation from Lebanon. How was the cooperation that you had in connection with the subject -- with the Cypriot authorities?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thanks, George. I probably should have mentioned that at the outset. It was excellent. The cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus was and remains excellent. It's terrible that we have to work together on an issue like this at all. I mean, it's a tragedy in so many ways. But the good news story is that we are able to revitalize an aspect of cooperation -- bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Cyprus, thanks largely to the Government of Republic of Cyprus' very constructive attitude.
It's quite remarkable how quickly the Republic of Cyprus Government and our own embassy have responded. I mean, I was there with our embassy country team watching them as we were first learning the magnitude of what was about to descend upon the Island of Cyprus. And so far, I understand that we -- the United States or about 4,000 American citizens have moved to the island from Lebanon. Several hundred have already been moved back to the mainland, to the United States via aircraft. But there are several thousand today -- I mean, this will be maybe the biggest day for numbers of evacuees, close to 4,000, around 3800, I think, Americans will be on the island today and most of them should move out tomorrow.
But the cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus has been great and we're particularly grateful that the Republic of Cyprus was able to help us get access to the international trade fair center -- the international trade center, an air-conditioned facility which is quite important when the temperatures are as high as they are right now on the island and otherwise would have been a much more uncomfortable situation for our citizens. Thanks.
QUESTION: Lambros Papantoniou, Greek correspondent, Eleftheros Typos Greek Daily news. Mr. Bryza, in all these activities, where the Annan Plan stands today?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Yeah. I don't know. I have to say that I -- what I said in my press conference in Nicosia was I had not uttered that phrase really at all during my trip because we were looking at -- you know, all sorts of ideas that are out there, have been on the table for a long time. Some of those or many of -- well, put it a different way. It would be senseless to simply throw out the window all of the good work that has been done over the last four years in a negotiating process by everybody who cares about the Cyprus issue. That means, first and foremost, the parties themselves, I mean, the Republic of Cyprus and our friends, the Turkish Cypriots as well, both friends, but mostly all the hard work of Secretary General Annan. Throwing away all that work makes no sense.
But clearly, there needs to be some movement forward. That's what I was getting at before, in that there are many ideas already out in the international community, good ideas, and now it's time to build on those ideas, move forward, taking advantage of this momentum of Under Secretary General Gambari's visit. So to put it a different way, the Turkish Cypriots approve the Annan Plan, as we know, showing that there's a significant amount of agreement. Greek Cypriots didn't approve it and we have no choice, absolutely no choice, but to respect -- absolutely respect the democratically articulated desire of the Greek Cypriot people to -- well, not to accept the plan in its entirety. So it's time to build on that, move forward.
QUESTION: Does it exist now or does not exist in those new initiatives, activities, whatever you are doing right now as the Deputy Under Secretary for Business.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Lambros, well, I guess let's get existential here. What do you mean by exist? I mean, does it -- do you mean, is it -- what do you mean by exist?
QUESTION: That means that I would like to know if it's still there as a kind of solution or something like that. It's totally out of the table.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I would just repeat what I said, that the basic ideas that are -- that became known as the Annan Plan reflect wisdom and hard work and a spirit of fairness, I would argue. So we don't want to lose that which is mutually agreed. I mean, many of those thousands of pages are agreed, so we ought to take what's agreed and then find what's wrong with what's not agreed and proceed forward.
QUESTION: Ten thousand.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Ten thousand. That's a lot of pages. And a lot of that was mutually agreed, so it's time to move forward beginning with the Annan Plan as the basis of discussions, I guess. But I would rather not even use the term "Annan Plan" at this point because I think Gambari's visit showed the process has moved. It's moved in such a way that the two sides have agreed to begin technical talks and they're forming committees to do so. And they're exchanging their ideas now on what they should discuss first in terms of the so-called substantive issues. And it's those substantive issues that are a subset of the Annan Plan. If I haven't confused you thoroughly, I'll continue and try to even more, Lambros. (Laughter.) Sorry.
MODERATOR: Let's go to Turkey on the first row here and then we'll go to New York. Thank you.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Hi, Umit.
QUESTION: Hi. Umit Enginsoy, Turkish TV television. On PKK, you have been advocating the use of the so-called tripartite mechanism --
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- for a solution to the PKK problem. But at the time when the central Iraq Government has its own problems with an average of a hundred people getting killed throughout the country, they probably will not have the energy and means to deal with that situation. Given this, how do you think the mechanism will ever work at all without major cooperation by Iraqi courts toward that cooperation? Have you been in touch with the Iraqi courts? And there were reports that yesterday General Casey was meeting with Massoud Barzani in northern Iraq. Was it PKK or the Turkish force or troop movements on the border? Was it a matter of talk?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Okay.
QUESTION: If I may, a second thing is there's a Saudi Arabian guy who's name is Yassin El Kadi who has been accused by the United States and the United Nations of financing al-Qaida or whatever, and he's in the list of people qualified as al-Qaida financiers or whatever. Yesterday a Turkish court decided to lift restrictions on him that had been in place for some five years. And the guy reportedly has ties with the Turkish Government or the Turkish ruling party. Any comments on this? Thank you.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thanks, Umit. Thank you. First of all, on PKK, I will repeat what we've said so many times, we've heard so many times, but it's absolutely true that we are doing everything and will do everything we can in close cooperation with the Governments of Turkey and Iraq to eliminate the PKK terrorist threat in Iraq and everywhere -- everywhere. You know that that's -- one would see that that is one of the central goals of our shared vision statement. That's a real commitment and we recognize that -- what you said, I mean, that real cooperation of the key parties in Iraq, meaning the Kurdish Regional Government and, of course, the Central Government, most importantly, in Baghdad, it's -- well, it's very difficult to resolve this problem and eliminate the terrorist threat. So we need -- we're constantly searching for more cooperation with the Iraqi Government as well as its -- and Kurdish Regional Government affiliate.
We are working through the trilateral process, indeed, as you suggested to do a few things. One is to go after and eliminate PKK operations and financing systems in Europe, and I think we've done a fair amount on that. In fact, we've done a good job on that. And two, then we're really trying to get the Governments of Turkey and Iraq to work together to -- well, to do just what we've always said we need to do, which is eliminate that terrorist threat in Iraq. That requires law enforcement cooperation and legal cooperation to identify and to arrest and capture the terrorists. So I don’t have anything more specific for you, except to say that we will hopefully reconvene – no, not hopefully -- we will reconvene our trilateral talks shortly, but we don’t have to have the trilateral talks sitting down in some capital to be able to have the real cooperation, actually increasing in recent days, I would say. We're doing even more -- working very closely with our friends in Ankara.
I don't know about General Casey's meeting specifics of that. I just didn't hear about it this morning. But of course, we -- our people at our embassy, especially our Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, we meet with Mr. Barzani, of course, we do. I mean, he's a key leader of Iraq and those are ongoing discussions and a central item on that agenda with Mr. Barzani or any leader of the Kurdish regional government is always going after the PKK.
Targeting the PKK, eliminating the terrorist threat is a complex venture, as you know. We tend to focus in Turkey on security/military response. But any counterterrorism operation is much more complicated -- has many levels, ultimately requires winning the hearts and minds of the potential supporters of those terrorists, involves economic factors, involves political factors and yes, involves serious security measures, as well. We're discussing all those things and hopefully doing more than discussing them.
Yeah. On the -- Mr. Kadi, I don't have anything on that. I apologize. I just hadn't seen the latest reports. The obvious response would be that, you know, we -- number one, want to make sure that anybody affiliated with terrorism in any way or financing isn't allowed to go free; number two, we ensure that it's important that due process is served and the rule of law is served in any such -- in a legal proceeding.
MODERATOR: Let's go to -- we need to go to New York, if we could, please.
QUESTION: Michael. Mr. Bryza, what is -- my question is on Cyprus, of course. What is the procedure from now on and what are your plans to help the practice to start the negotiations again? Are you planning to go back to the region? And I have another question, if it's possible? Mr. Erdogan yesterday called President Bush. Is it true that he ask him to let the Turkish troops to go to the north Iraq?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thanks, Michael.
QUESTION: First of all, I'd like to say I would like to thank my friends in the Republic of Cyprus for the hospitality they showed me -- very warm hospitality. On all sides, both sides of the green line, as well as officials in the Republic of Cyprus Government. And I would like to go back there as often as possible and stay as long as I possibly could because it was really enjoyable. But it doesn't really matter when I'm going back to the island. I'm not the mediator of the process. The Secretary General is and Under Secretary Gambari is and Mr. Moeller is the person on the ground we're working with very closely, but I do hope to come -- go back some time -- I don't know -- in the next few weeks or months or so. It depends on the pace at which the parties come together and fulfill the obligations that they committed to, which is again to start up work of the technical committees and to finalize their list of substantive issues which they're supposed to do by the end of the month -- 26th or 29th of July.
Yes, Prime Minister Erdogan did call the President. Of course, I'm not going to divulge the details of that conversation. I mean, that's for the White House to do. I work at the State Department these days. But you know, obviously the discussion had to do with a range of issues that are on -- that appear in our shared vision document and you could imagine what the obvious topics would be, right. Of course, there's a lot of discussion among us always between Ankara and Washington on Iraq, as well as the current situation, more broadly, in the Middle East. Thank you.
QUESTION: Onur Sazak with Turkish Business Daily Referans. You had mentioned that your talks in Turkey also involved energy security. Was the nuclear issue ever being brought up in your talks? And my second question is what did you talk with the business leaders in northern Cyprus?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you. Thanks very much. I was in Turkey as part of a delegation. I mean, at least when it came to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan ceremony, a delegation lead by Deputy Secretary Clay Sell. In my discussions in energy security, which, you know I met with on my own with Energy Minister Guler and a bunch of others, I didn't touch on the nuclear issue because I'm very focused on hydrocarbons, especially this natural gas question of Azerbaijan increasing its production. I understand the Deputy Secretary did, however, discuss nuclear energy projects, but I'd refer you to the Department of Energy further to discuss that. Was there a second part to your question? Did I forget?
QUESTION: Turkish Cypriot business leaders, your conversations with them.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Yeah. Well, of course, they are very interested in anything that can be done to ease their isolation and to afford them access to European markets and global markets. Their spirit was very constructive and pragmatic one, as is always the case with business leaders, and it was the same on the other side of the green line, when it comes to the Greek Cypriot business leaders that I met with.
So the Turkish Cypriot business leaders are -- we were looking at ways and will continue to look at ways to make it easier for them to export from ports on the island. It's no secret that they would prefer to be able to export from ports in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots and that's something, of course, that I discussed with everybody I talked to. That is a big issue. They are also very interested in coming up with a way to foster a more cooperative approach to tourism on both sides of the island. And I think again, the Greek Cypriot business leaders I spoke with shared that goal.
Tourism is obviously the most -- maybe the most dynamic and promising sector of the Cypriot, be it Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot, economy. It's important to coordinate development of the island, to maintain its enormous ecological beauty. It's also important to take advantage of common business opportunities on both sides of the green line. And so we started to explore the concept of maybe without, you know, without a timeline, but the concept of maybe getting business leaders, especially in the tourism sector to come together and develop the building blocks of a strategic approach to strengthening tourism on the island.
QUESTION: Good morning, Mr. Bryza.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Good morning.
QUESTION: Tsitas Newspaper. Two questions. To what extent your USA interest on Cyprus issue is determined by consideration on Turkey's European orientation or as an independent problem? And the second question, for the last two years, the United States considered that the Government of Cyprus was responsible for the rejection of referendum and believed that it was not a flexible negotiator. After your trip to Cyprus, have you formed a different opinion?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I'll start with that second one. I would not agree with the precise way you formulated that question. It's not that we hold anyone responsible for the Annan plan not being accepted by the Greek Cypriots, it's that merely a fact of democratic political life that the Greek Cypriot side chose not to accept the Annan plan. We have no choice but to respect a democratically reached decision like that. That's up to the people of Cyprus. Of course, we wish that the decision would have been different. I think many people on both sides of the green line share that sentiment. But we are where we are and frankly that's always what my thoughts and my opinion had been. That's the opinion of our President and that's the opinion of our Secretary of State that we have to respect the democratically reached decision of the Greek Cypriot people. So in that sense, no. My view on that didn't change one iota, not at all. What did change was that I acquired a sense of optimism that it is possible now to make some progress, building on some of the thoughts I just mentioned about, tourism and building on shared interest maybe in raising the economic cooperation on both sides of the island. I think that's a way forward. I'm sorry. What was the first part of your question?
QUESTION: To what extent your USA interest on Cyprus issue is determined by consideration on Turkey's European Orientation or as an independent problem?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you. It's important to underscore that the Cyprus comprehensive settlement question exists in its own universe. I mean, it's important onto itself as is the case of Turkey's EU aspirations. We, my government, support both. We support both Turkey's EU's accession; that's not surprise to you, and we support fully, 100 percent, the Secretary General's efforts to forge a just and lasting Cyprus settlement that reunifies the island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. I need to report that; that we support reunification every single step we take. We respect to Cyprus aims to facilitate that reunification into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. And any claims to the contrary simply are false.
Turkey's EU's accession matters to us apart from Cyprus. It matters -- although Turkey's EU accession is quite relevant to Cyprus. We care so much about Turkey's EU accession, not so much because we care about whether or not Turkey has joined a particular club or particular organization. I mean, we're not a member of the EU. It's really not our business who joins. But our goal is that Turkey continues to advance democratic and market economic reforms that are difficult politically. It's not easy for any government to enact the sorts of reforms that we hope to see Turkey continue to enact. And we believe that the prospect of accession to the EU provides the strongest possible incentive for Turkey to keep going, to keep enacting these reforms.
How is that connected to Cyprus? Because every step that Turkey takes in terms of deepening its reforms and anchoring itself in Europe makes Turkey a more collaborative and more reliable neighbor for our friends on the island of Cyprus as well as all of our friends in Greece. So in a theoretical way, in a strategically conceptual way, of course these concepts are related. But in terms of what I do when I wake up every day and think about how to advance the comprehensive settlement process, how to support the secretary general, these are unrelated. I mean, they're -- I should say they're not unrelated, they're discrete processes. And I am unable then to develop useful ideas if I blur the distinction between those two.
The UN settlement process is under the auspices of the UN. The EU accession process for Turkey is under the auspices of the EU. Those are two separate organizations, two separate processes.
MODERATOR: Let's do one here and then we'll back to Lambros.
QUESTION: Ali Aslan with Turkish Daily Zaman newspaper. Hi, good to see you again. I understand Turkey and U.S. are cooperating against PKK on many fronts in Europe and Turkey. But Turkey is not satisfied with the efforts on northern Iraq. I wonder why PKK is not untouchable there where al-Qaida is touchable as a terrorist organization. Why PKK continues to be untouchable? And I am especially wondering if you're satisfied with the support you're getting from the Kurdish leaders in the region and from Baghdad.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you, Ali, a typically thoughtful question from you. No, of course we are not satisfied with our success so far in eliminating the PKK terrorist threat in Iraq and to do so requires deeper, more effective, more results-producing cooperation with the central government in Baghdad and with Kurdish regional government authorities. And it's not like we're just sitting on our hands. As I say, we have to do more and we're waiting for some time in the future -- we are doing more. And absolutely -- to respond to your first question, it's absolutely not the case that the PKK is untouchable while al-Qaida is an organization that we're targeting. We're moving after the PKK, as I said a few minutes ago, everywhere we can, including -- not especially in Europe, but including in Europe where we have made some real inroads. And I think we've succeeded working with the Government of Turkey in changing political attitudes toward the PKK. But what you care most about is what we're doing on the ground in Iraq and that is really the central focus.
And I can't go into any specific details. I know this will be unsatisfactory because the Government in Turkey and the people of Turkey want specifics. They want to see the results. They want to know exactly what's happening, and I'm afraid I can't tell you. But this isn't a clever way of dodging your question. Bear with me here for a little while and you'll see some more -- I think some more concrete results shortly. Part of that will come through the trilateral process, but they'll be other ways that you'll see us move against PKK.
But at the end of the day, it's really up to the Turkish Government to work directly with the Iraqi Government in Baghdad because we share with Turkey a deep profound commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq. And one of the prerequisites for achieving and sustaining the territorial integrity of Iraq is to make sure that that the government in Baghdad is fully sovereign and is fulfilling its own responsibilities. And one of its key responsibilities is to eliminate all terrorists -- PKK and other ones. So the U.S. will be very supportive of efforts by the Government of Iraq to do just that. It's important that Turkey keeps on working directly with the Government of Iraq.
Finally, I just would like to say that the United States Government is wholly sensitive, totally sensitive, fully sensitive to Turkey's historical concerns that often go unmentioned, that date back to the beginning of the Turkish Republic. We understand what the Montreaux Convention means and have absolutely no desire to force NATO or any other military assets into the Black Sea in any way that could threaten the integrity of the Montreaux Convention.
We understand how the Montreaux Convention is connected to the Treaty of Lausanne and that these documents form the absolute legal foundation of the Turkish Republic and we understand as well that there are societal fears and historical fears that are conjured up when people wonder about the sanctity of the Montreaux Convention and look at the question of federalism in Iraq and then wonder whether or not there could be a separate entity in Northern Iraq that could play into a repeat of the 1920s.
Let me just say we know the history. Turkey is our friend, one of our most important friends anywhere. Turkey is a NATO ally. Turkey’s integrity – territorial integrity is an absolute given in U.S. foreign policy. Without Turkey sustaining its territorial integrity, without us therefore sustaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, it’s much more difficult for us to conceive of how we achieve a very broad range of national security interests.
MODERATOR: So quickly to Lambros, then we’ll go to New York. If people could keep it to one question, we’re down to our last 10 minutes or so.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, during your talks in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia, did you get the chance to discuss the huge gap that exists between the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey, vis-à-vis the European Union regarding their opinion that Turkish ports and Turkish airports to the Cypriot vessels and planes sometime by the end of the year in order to avoid any kind of veto action to their accession to the EU?
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: Of course. Yes.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: And what was behind your question – well, you mentioned a gap, right, a gap in the vision?
QUESTION: Yes. There is a gap between –
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: I don’t know how much of a gap there is in the strategic sense. I think that the leaders of the Republic of Cyprus and the people of the Republic of Cyprus share our appreciation for Turkey as a great success story as a secular democracy with a mostly Muslim population that as – that will become a more reliable and collaborative neighbor for it, for the Republic of Cyprus, as these reform processes go forward and as Turkey moves into the EU.
There are some differences of tactical approach. I always say, and I’ll say again here, the first thing I say when I talk about Turkey and the EU is that Turkey has an obligation to fulfill, to extend the additional protocol of its customs union to the Republic of Cyprus. That’s diplomatic and legalistic speak for the fact that Turkey’s committed to opening its ports to Greek Cypriot ships, period. That’s a commitment Turkey undertook. I hope you’ll report this faithfully because very often I say this every time I speak, and not you guys here but other journalists fail to make that point. So Turkey must fulfill its obligation.
At the same time, it’s important to make sure that in encouraging Turkey to fulfill that obligation we not back Turkey into a political corner such that it actually de facto becomes difficult to fulfill that obligation. So in negotiations, the job of a diplomat, my whole reason for existing – my career is all about helping sides come together to reach their shared strategic objective when the tactics may differ or when there may be short-term obstacles between them in terms of getting to their shared strategic vision. So the way we remove those obstacles is to talk about how do we get to the point where it’s politically feasible for Turkey to open ports now to Greek Cypriot shipping.
The Turkish side’s position, as Foreign Minister Gul has articulated – this is not my position, it’s the Turkish Government’s position. Its position is that it proposes doing so in the context of a comprehensive lifting of all embargoes, all trade restrictions on both sides of the island. That’s not my position, that’s Turkey’s position. It’s an understandable position.
So what we need to do is find a way to get from the situation where we are today anywhere that vision of Foreign Minister Deputy Prime Minister Gul is not acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, to the Republic of Cyprus, and build in interim steps that are acceptable to both parties to get us, like climbing up a ladder, to get us to a position in which that comprehensive proposal of Foreign Minister Gul is realizable or to get us to a point where the Turkish side agrees to meet the Republic of Cyprus half way on this ports issue. And it’s that sort of a discussion that I had with everybody I spoke with on the island.
QUESTION: Does he have the right for civil defense in case of attacks like the Israelis?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I don’t mind answering that question. I’ll hold it in the back of my mind but --
MODERATOR: We have New York first.
QUESTION: Good afternoon. Apostolos Zoupaniotis, Cyprus News Agency. Is there, Mr. Bryza, any timetable of when this workable package, as we describe it, has to be assembled? This has to do at all with October developments between the European Union and Turkey? And whether the crisis that seems to build up in the area with Lebanon and the possibility of having a humanitarian problem in Cyprus with all those refugees, how could they distract the process of that right now on the political level after Gambari‘s visit?
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thanks Apostolos. Thank you very much.
There’s – it’s not for me to set a timetable. Again, it’s the Secretary General of the United Nations that has to be convinced (a) to renew his good offices mission, and (b) to find a way to keep the parties negotiating, moving forward, and not simply letting this positive momentum kind of sink into the sand like water in the desert.
So I don’t know of any timeframe. The answer is simply that, you know, by the end of the month, the President Papadopolous, Mr. Talat did commit to agreeing on their list of substantive issues. So that’s their own self-declared deadline. Otherwise, I don’t know of any deadline.
In terms of how this evacuation effort would influence efforts to forge ahead on a settlement process on Cyprus, I don’t think there has to be any interruption or interference whatsoever. The Republic of Cyprus is demonstrating its ability to facilitate in a very professional way this evacuation and that’s a separate issue involving very often separate officials than the Cyprus settlement process.
QUESTION: Cem Sey, Deutsche Welle. You are talking about good ideas to move the Cyprus issue forward. Are the proposals from Ankara only good ideas you mean or did you hear in Athens or Nicosia good ideas too, or did you hear some other good ideas? Can you tell us somehow concrete?
And the second is you also said you would cooperate with the General Secretary of the United Nations. What would be the form of this cooperation? What do you mean with cooperating, just waiting for him moving forward with the process or will the United States do something?
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you. Well, the answer to your second question is in the first question which is that yes, I heard very constructive ideas everywhere I went, all three capitals, in Nicosia, in Athens and in Ankara. It doesn’t mean the parties have come to an agreement yet. There are components. There are ideas. Each party has one or two or three or maybe a hundred goals it would like to achieve in this process. Not a hundred. And the key is to find a subset that is agreeable on all sides. And that’s something I am just – I personally am working very active on as my government’s person who handles the Cyprus matter, doing that with Nicosia, with Athens, with Ankara, with Brussels and with member state capitals – EU member state capitals. So, no, we’re not just sitting on our hands. We are developing these ideas. And also in cooperation with the Secretary General. Well, not me, I don’t have access to Secretary General Annan. I can’t pick up the phone and call him, but I do collaborate, cooperate with Under Secretary General Gambari. I mean I’ve met him a few times and his representative or the Secretary General’s representative on the ground in Nicosia. Mr. Mueller is in constant contact with Ambassador Schlicker, our ambassador on the ground, and with his – with Ambassador Schlicker’s P-5 counterparts.
So there’s constant thinking, cooperation, sharing of ideas all the time. If you’re asking whether or not the parties are appointing special envoys, I don’t see any plan to do that at this point. If the need arises, we’ll do it. But we’re really doing all we can to help the Secretary General and his team think through next steps and come up with a package that’s agreeable to everybody.
MODERATOR: We’ll take one last question in New York and then one last in Washington.
QUESTION: I would like my – I’m from Anadolu News Agency, a Turkish news agency. And my question will be – would be we know that the old Turkish Cypriots have accepted the Annan plan. Their isolation as people continues. So can you tell us briefly what does the U.S. Government plan to help these people and their isolation? Thank you very much.
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you very much. I would say that we’ve done a number of things. You know that Secretary Rice met with Mr. Talat in her office last October. I had the good fortune and honor to meet with Mr. Talat just last week in his office. We have -- we are providing $30.5 million in assistance to the area – to the Turkish Cypriot community, assistance that aims to do a number of things. It aims to help Turkish Cypriot businesses prosper. It helps to develop an investment climate. Also to support the prospering of those businesses, our assistance aims to build cooperation among the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities as well and to – well, that’s the best way to put it. I don’t have to go into all the details. There’s more on the environment, environmental preservation but -- how much detail you want.
So we are already actively working to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots or to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. But the other way that we do it is through what I’ve been talking about repeatedly, our effort to assemble a comprehensive package that will lead to opening some ports, that will lead to greater economic interaction between both sides of the island. I talked about tourism, for example, earlier, again, joint projects or a joint strategy on developing tourism in both parts of the island. And if we succeed in this package of measures I’ve been talking about, then I think the question of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots will be past us.
Just as it’s important for Turkey to fulfill its commitment to opening its ports, it’s also important that the European Union fulfills its commitment to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots by enacting its direct trade regulation. And so another thing we do is strategize and brainstorm with our friends all throughout Europe on how to help Europe fulfill its own obligation to the Turkish Cypriot community.
MODERATOR: Who has not asked a question yet?
QUESTION: I would like to follow up on Cem’s question. Why are you so optimistic -- more optimistic after your visit to island? What are the facts or senses that make you more optimistic? Please clarify.
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: I don’t know if I – I don’t think that I said I’m optimistic. I said I was surprised by some positive momentum, which means there was more positive momentum that I expected. So it is accurate to say I’m not pessimistic, but that doesn’t mean I’m optimistic. I’m somewhere in between. I’m still in a learning phase. My whole goal in going to the island was basically to learn. It was to meet as many people on the island as I could in the government, outside of government, and to hear as many viewpoints as I could to enrich my own thinking and see if there’s a way to reassemble all these components that have been floating around for years into a new whole that can build on the progress that the Under Secretary General made.
So I come away from the island saying I think there is an ability for us to do just that. It’s up to you to characterize whether that’s an optimistic scenario. And the devil’s always in the details, and pulling this all together is the hard part. Hearing people’s ideas, which is what I just did, is the easy part. And now I’ve got some ideas. Making them all work in a package that’s mutually acceptable is the art and the science of diplomacy. And I don’t know if we’ll succeed, but I guess what you’re hearing from me is a lot of enthusiasm and energy to do everything possible to make this or to help the parties succeed.
MODERATOR: I’m going to break my rule and let someone ask the last question.
QUESTION: Thank you. I’ll ask a non-Cyprus question. Given the Middle East violence, what do you want Turkey to do about Syria and Iran? Thank you.
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: Well, I think it’s important for the United States and Turkey to continue cooperating as they have been in recent weeks and months. The decision of Prime Minister Erdogan to send his foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu to Damascus a couple of weeks ago was really positive. I mean Secretary Rice cited that in the press conference she held with Foreign Minister Gul just a couple of weeks ago. That sort of step is a reflection of a strategic partnership, of the deep friendship that binds us together with Turkey and has for 50 years notwithstanding bumps in the road. We’ve had some big bumps lately. You all know better than I. But the way the Prime Minister and our President were able to collaborate and Ahmet Davutoglu was able to operationalize that cooperation, that was an example of what it means to have a strategic partnership.
On Iran, Turkey had -- when we were talking about the EU3* consensus, Turkey repeatedly demonstrated its support for that consensus, which we welcomed. In terms of reform and our broader Middle East initiative, Turkey has consistently been a partner. And you all recall the very helpful speech that Foreign Minister Gul made, I guess it was about a year and a half ago in Tehran where he basically said it’s up for us, the political leaders of these countries, to enact reform or the reforms will pass us by. I think that’s absolutely correct. And at this point, it’s crucial that we sustain that spirit of cooperation as we move into a much more intensified period of diplomacy with regard to Iran as well.
QUESTION: I’m asking what you want from Turkey?
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARY BRYZA: Well, I can’t predict, Umit, because I don’t know where events are going to go and what specifically we’re going to ask happen. It depends on how our Iran policy and our Syria policies go. But in a general sense, we would like Turkey to work with us to sustain the international consensus on both issues. In the case of President Assad, you know what the consensus is, right? We have limited international interaction with him. We believe he ought to be putting pressure on Hamas to abide by the quartet’s three basic principles.
When it comes to Iran, it’s important that everything that we decide in the UN context, be it at the IAEA or in the Security Council, whatever the diplomacy leads us to, that the U.S. and Turkey are in lock step. But it would be foolish really on my part to speculate even further on what we’re going to ask each other to do.
Thanks.
MODERATOR: Thank you, Matt, very much for sharing so generously of your time and your insights. And thank you all for coming. That was a very good session. Cheers.
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