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The Human Rights Commission and UN Management ReformAmbassador John Bolton, Permanent Representative to the UN Foreign Press Center Briefing New York, New York March 9, 2006
MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to introduce to you Ambassador Bolton and he will take questions after a few short remarks. He asks, though, that you please identify yourself and your news organization before you ask your question. Thank you. Ambassador. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I don't really have any opening remarks, but I thought it might be better, given how many of you there are, just to try and respond to your questions. So, whatever subject, no limitations. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Elena Molinari with the Italian newspaper of Avvinire. My question is on the draft of the resolution for the Human Rights Council. What will the United States do if the draft resolution is actually voted and approved by the General Assembly? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, we haven't reached that question yet because we've been focusing our efforts, since the text by President Eliason came out on February the 23rd, to trying to reopen the text to fix the deficiencies that we see in the text. We do not see it as substantial reform, we do not believe it accomplishes the objectives that we set out to do, and we've been trying to renegotiate the text further to accomplish those objectives. So really, until we see whether that effort is going to succeed or fail, we have not projected beyond that. And I'd just note, I saw before I came over here that the organization Reporters Without Borders had said that the Eliason text was unsatisfactory, which I thought was interesting, for those of you who are members of Reporters Without Borders. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: I'm Angela Pimenta from BBC Brazil. And my question, sir, it's about the timeframe for the management reform at the UN. How long do you think that it will take, and after that when would be the time for the UN to approach the Security Council reform? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Our view is that the overall management reform -- and by that, I mean both the reforms contemplated under the rules and regulations review that the Secretary General announced on Tuesday and the reforms that will come under the mandate's review, a report for which we expect later this month, that those reforms taken together, really should have priority over further work on Security Council reform. That's a view we've really held since last year, but I think it's further confirmed by the fact that, as of this point, there doesn't seem to us to be any consensus around any of the various proposals for reform that we've seen. And I know there are a lot of proposals for Security Council reform, none of which we've endorsed and none of which we see as commanding two-thirds support in the General Assembly. And for that reason, given our experience last year in which discussion after discussion after discussion of Security Council reform sucked the oxygen out of negotiations on other reforms, we think it's better now to focus on the management program reviews and just continue consultations as we are, for example, particularly with Japan, on how to obtain a permanent seat for them. Yes, sir. QUESTION: Lennart Pehrson with the Swedish newspaper Sydsvenska Daglbadet. There is some assumptions within the UN that the U.S. doesn't really want an agreement on human rights, but instead see it as an opportunity to move human rights outside the UN to some other forum. Do you think that the UN can really handle human rights in a satisfactory way? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: I think the UN can handle human rights if we can achieve a reformed intergovernmental decision-making mechanism and that's one of the disappointments that we feel, that these so-called facilitator-led negotiations have not produced that result. And our view is that in order to achieve a satisfactory level of reform, we're prepared to try and continue the negotiations to reopen the text and not accept halfhearted reform. And I might say that's exactly the argument that Reporters Without Borders picked up in their release today and I think that's a view with a lot of support, not least of which in this country have been editorials in the New York Times and The Washington Post supporting our position, not something that happens every day, that's for sure. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Hi, my name is Sara Zandieh from Voice of America, South and West Asia Division. As you know, next week, the Security Council is going to discuss Iran's nuclear program. To what extent the United States is willing to push the idea of implementation of sanctions against Iran and what kind of sanctions? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: The United States has been considering for over three years what we would do once Iran's nuclear weapons program is brought to the Security Council, since we have argued for quite some time that the program does constitute a threat to international peace and security. And there are a variety of steps that one could contemplate. But we have also said, right from the beginning, that Iran really holds the key to what the Security Council is going to do in its own hands. If they were to make the strategic decision to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons, we could have a very different relationship with them. That's a decision they are obviously nowhere close to making. So before I -- you know, sort of speculate what can come down the line, I think our first step, which is -- we've already begun with consultations among the five permanent members yesterday and -- expectation, we will have further consultations and then in the larger membership of the Council is to strengthen the hand of the International Atomic Energy Agency and support the numerous resolutions that the Board of Governors of the IAEA has passed over the years. Now, how Iran responds to that will tell us what we think the next appropriate step will be. Yes, sir. QUESTION: I'm Renzo Cianfelli of Italian Corriere Della Serra. Could I follow up on Iran? Should Iran persist in its present policy, which we do not deem as satisfactory -- in other words, it might have some non-peaceful aim* over -- would you feel confident to rule out the use of force and who would authorize such use of force? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, I think the President -- our President has made clear that no options are taken off the table. But he has also made clear, with great force, that he believes that we should try for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran's nuclear weapons. Iran is completely isolated within the international community on this point. Whatever tactical differences there may be among other nations, there is no one else that supports Iran's assertion that it's entitled to pursue research and scientific capabilities that could allow it the path to nuclear weapons. So how we express that isolation, what shapes that it takes I think remain to be decided. But there's no doubt that there's complete agreement that it is unacceptable for Iran to possess nuclear weapons and the Iranians need to know that. We've told them that before. They obviously still don't get it. And that's why we've brought the matter to the Security Council to increase international pressure on Iran, to reaffirm how isolated they are, and to begin to think about what other steps might be necessary if the Iranians don't see the light of sweet reason and give up their illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: Denise Langenegger, Television Switzerland. Ambassador, I understand that opposition to the current text on the Human Right Council comes mainly from the U.S.A. and Cuba. Can you explain why the U.S. finds it's of -- in this company on human rights issue? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: I don't think we're in the same company. I think the United States is over here requesting a very strong and effective human rights commission. And Cuba is over here -- for one thing, a weak and ineffectual human rights commission. And in the center is sort of everybody else. We -- we, over here, want a butterfly, not a caterpillar with lipstick on it. Cuba doesn't even want a caterpillar. So, I don't think we're in company with Cuba. Sir. QUESTION: Thank you. Gabe Plesea from Romania Libera Bucharest. For many years, there were calls for a UN reform, in general, of the whole organization, not only, you know, parts of it. And most of those were made by the United States, you know, in a vocal, diplomatic or undiplomatic or whatever. In the U.S. -- from a U.S. perspective, what are the real chances that this current set of proposals by the Secretary General of the UN be successful? In other words, is U.S. going to support these reform requests or what is the position and what do you think about that? Thank you. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: We support the objectives that the Secretary General laid out on Tuesday and what he called for was a radical restructuring of the secretariat and a strategic refit, as he put it, of the entire secretariat. Those are objectives that we share and really were foreshadowed by Secretary Rice last September when she called for a lasting revolution of reform at the United Nations. Now you know, it's not often that a U.S. Secretary of State calls for revolution, but that is indicative of how strongly we feel about the need for change at the United Nations. Now, with respect to the specific proposals the Secretary General made in his report on Tuesday, we're going to study them carefully. As I mentioned earlier, we're also waiting for the mandate review that was requested by the September summit, along with this -- what we call the rules and regulations review that came out on Tuesday. What the chances are for a truly successful reform, I don't know, but it's a test for the United Nations. It's a test for the seriousness of the commitment of member governments to wanting to have a truly effective United Nations system. And that's what we're pressing for and that's what we hope we'll succeed in achieving. Yes, ma'am. QUESTION: I'm Anna Dahlberg of the Swedish National News Agency. The negotiations for the Human Rights Council have been going on for months and months. Why hasn't the U.S. done more to bring up your objections before *President Eliason* presented it? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: We have made our position clear in every meeting that's been called on this subject and we've made the position clear in Washington, we've made the position clear in capitals, we've made the position clear in New York. I don't think the problem was not making our position clear. I think the problem was that certain people from countries that I won't identify, but well-known to you, maybe didn't listen as much as they should have. And we regret that. We regret it very much, because we want a strong and effective human rights commission. That's why we're continuing to push to reopen the text and continue the negotiations. There has been a lot of effort since the Eliason text came out on February the 23rd to get the United States on board. It's too bad some of that effort wasn't expended earlier to get the text more satisfactory so that we could have supported it. But make no mistake about it; we are committed to successful reform, not cosmetic reform, but real reform. And if we can get real reform, we'll be happy to support it. Yes, sir. QUESTION: Thank you. John Ellis from Tokyo Broadcasting System. Many people are saying that Iran and Iraq are similar situations, comparing Iraq to three years ago and the United States position to it. Do you think that this is true, that is, it is comparable? And if so, why and if not, why not? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: I think that's a hard question that would require about an hour's worth of an answer. What I can say about Iran right now, though, is that it has been pursuing a nuclear weapons capability through clandestine means for close to 20 years. It has lied to the IAEA. It has concealed data from the IAEA. It has obstructed the work of the IAEA. It has cleaned up sites where nuclear research was going on so that the IAEA couldn't determine it. That includes bulldozing many cubic yards of dirt, demolishing buildings, and doing all kinds of things to conceal information from the IAEA. I don't think that the situations are comparable in every respect, but I think it is clear that Iran is in violation of its obligations which it freely undertook under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its safeguards agreements with the IAEA. And I think that when a country conceals its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction in that way, it's something that the Security Council needs to take very seriously. That's why the United States has believed this had to come before the Security Council and it will be a test to the Security Council to see if it can deal with this threat of nuclear proliferation. In the back there, in the very back. QUESTION: Juergen Schoenstein from the German news magazine, Focus. I just want to follow up on your explanation about the different assessment on Iraq and Iran. But in hindsight, doesn't that put the decision or the procedures taken, in the case of Iraq, in quite a different perspective when with Iran, you say we have to pursue the diplomatic option? And in 2003, a different path was chosen. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, we pursued the diplomatic course with respect to Iraq. From the time of the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 687, the Ceasefire Resolution in 1991, when -- as a condition of the ceasefire, that coalition forces allowed Iraq -- that Iraq undertook certain commitments, among which were establishing that they had declared and destroyed all of their weapons of mass destruction. And Iraq consistently, for 12 years, failed to comply with that obligation. And so, it was not a question of how much additional diplomatic activity there would be in 2002 or 2003. It was a question of 12 years of Iraq ignoring Security Council resolutions. And you have to ask yourself, if the Security Council doesn't look after its own resolutions, who will? So in that respect, I think there's a substantial difference. Sir. QUESTION: Konstantin Semin with Russian television. If all options are still on the table and sanctions are on the table too, what kind of sanctions could it be? I mean sanctions for Iran. Will they be aimed at Iranian leadership or at the whole population of the whole country? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, I think we've tried to make it clear -- Secretary Rice did, in particular, in her testimony a couple weeks ago and earlier today, that our quarrel is with the regime in Iran, not with the Iranian people. What we think the Iranian people really want and deserve is democracy, which they manifestly do not have now. So I think we would make it clear in whatever steps the Security Council takes in sanctions or whatever other actions the Security Council may endorse that these are not targeted at the people of Iran, but at the regime that's pursuing the illicit acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. And what those steps might take -- as I say, it's not -- I don't think it's profitable to speculate at this point, particularly since it's up to the Government of Iran to respond. They have consistently been told by the IAEA in multiple resolutions over the last three years to comply with their obligations, which they have consistently refused to do. And you know, for those of you who believe in the importance of strong international organizations, how do you feel when an international organization speaks and a country ignores it? I mean, if you carry that logic through, you'll see why we're so concerned in this case, particularly when the issue is the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yes, sir, in the back. QUESTION: Besan Vikou with BBC Africa. On Human Rights Council, could you please remind us what's wrong with the text and like, if we have to -- the GA have to reopen the negotiation, what would you like to change in the text, specifically? Thank you. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, there's a list in several places you could look at. Reading the New York Times editorial would be a good place to start. Our feeling is that there are many deficiencies in the text and that many of the steps that we wanted to take have been eliminated or watered down. We felt, and indeed, the Secretary General felt that it was important to have members of the human rights council, the new body, elected by a two-thirds majority. And we endorsed that, the European Union endorsed that, other countries endorsed it, and then steadily, one by one, the countries that supported it backed away. They backed away in the face of the opponents of human rights in the United Nations who said, "No, no, no, we can't accept two-thirds." The United States stood on the two-thirds point when everybody else flaked off. And that's why we think that it's important that -- and that's one of the critical issues for us, is to get that election requirement back up to two-thirds so that it makes it much harder for gross abusers of human rights to be able to acquire that level of support. There's also an anomaly now in that the way the text reads, the requirement to be elected is only a majority of the members of the General Assembly, but it takes two-thirds to get kicked off, which is interesting. It ought to be two-thirds to get on and probably less than that to be kicked off. If you're -- once you're violating human rights, that ought to be a disqualifier and that’s really the reason for the second major American objection. We feel that any country that's under Security Council sanctions for gross abuses of human rights or support for terrorism ought to be, per se, ineligible to serve on the human rights commission. How can you say that a country that may be under Security Council sanctions for supporting terrorism should be allowed to be on the human rights commission? It's just inexplicable and yet, we pressed that position very hard, very hard, including to the facilitators who were working on this and it wasn't accepted. That's something I think our Congress will find hard to understand and it's one of the reasons why we've pressed for the text to be reopened on those two points. There are lots of other points in this we don't like, term limits and other aspects that I could go into, and we've elaborated them in statements. But those are the two points we think are required to be reopened in the text and fixed. Yes, sir. QUESTION: Roman Elsener with Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Switzerland. If Human Rights Watch in Switzerland, who has a longstanding tradition of fighting for human rights, can accept this text, don't you think it might be the best possible compromise? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: No, no. I mean, we have been trying to persuade our friends in Europe not to accept second best -- not to accept second best, but continue to struggle for a dramatic change from the present commission. Because once this resolution is adopted, you can predict with near total certainty there won't be any more reform in the human rights mechanism for a long time. And if the predictions turn out to be true that it's ineffective, as we think is almost certainly the case, we will have lost the opportunity and it won't come again. So our judgment is that it's better to continue to press for real reform than to accept something that has been described by the New York Times as a sham, a sham. Yes, sir, over here. QUESTION: Mare Coulton from the Sydney Morning Herald. Does it make it harder to get the support of other countries to bring Iran to conform with the NPT when President Bush has agreed to sell nuclear technology to India, which is a non-signatory to the treaty? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: No, I don't think so. I don’t see any evidence of that so far and for, among other reasons, the following: India never signed a nonproliferation treaty; it never undertook the obligation not to develop nuclear weapons. That's a completely different circumstance than Iran, that's been violating the nonproliferation treaty and lying about it for close to 20 years. So, I think we'll do maybe one more if there's -- over here on this side. Let me get somebody who hasn't asked a question yet. Yes, sir. QUESTION: Uwe Kroeger, German television ZDF. AMBASSADOR BOLTON: I was afraid he was going to say Voice of America and then somebody would have said, "See?" (Laughter.) QUESTION: Sir, are you ruling out a last-minute compromise before the human rights commission convenes on Monday in Geneva? AMBASSADOR BOLTON: Well, I don't know what's going to happen with respect to the commission in Geneva. We have been -- for two weeks now, since the President's text came out, we have been pushing for renegotiations. We are not finding any support to reopen the text. President Eliason has said repeatedly he doesn't want to reopen the text. Other governments have said the same thing. I understand what they're concerned about, but if we can't reopen the text, we can't make the important fixes that we want and we risk having a commission that simply will not be measurably better than the body that we have. And if that's the case, then all of this enormous effort will have been expended with no outcome, no outcome. And as I say, once it gets locked into place, it's not going to change. Okay, thank you very much. |