Update on U.S. Detainee Policy and Criminal Prosecutions in Iraq

Mr. MacInnes: Good morning and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. We're delighted this morning to have with us John Bellinger, the Legal Advisor for the Department of State. He's going to talk about detainee issues in Guantanamo and I would ask you to turn your cell phones off and to identify yourself during the question and answer session. Mr. Bellinger is going to start with a statement and then we'll have questions and answers. Thank you.

MR. BELLINGER: Good morning. Thank you all very much for coming out. As he said, I'm John Bellinger. I'm the Legal Advisor at the Department of State and before that was the Legal Advisor at the National Security Council. I want to talk primarily about two things and then take your questions. I'd like to talk about developments in the trial of Saddam and then a few general statements on detainees and particularly the report of the UN rapporteurs that -- I think it's not out all together yet but it seems to be coming out in bits and pieces.

But before I do that, because this morning's news is about the leak of additional photographs from Abu Ghraib that appeared in an Australian newspaper, I wanted to say quickly a word about that. I think you will have seen them. These additional photographs that are now out are disgusting and shows, once again, just the reprehensible conduct that was going on in Abu Ghraib. It's unfortunate though that the photographs are continuing to come out because I think it simply fans the flames at a time that sentiments on these issues are raw around the world. But the photographs show conduct that is absolutely disgusting. The President had originally said when the photographs come out and other senior administration officials as well that we were repulsed by what we saw and, unfortunately, this is further photographic evidence of what went on.

The United States Government felt that it was better that the photographs not be released, not because there was anything to hide. In fact, all of these photographs or photographs like them had been shown and briefed to our Congress, but simply that, one, we felt that it was an invasion of the privacy of the detainees themselves to have these photographs come out and, in addition, that it would simply fan the flames around the world and cause potentially further violence. We hope that it does not. People knew that these things happened in Abu Ghraib. There have been multiple investigations and that really is the difference here is that we know that people unfortunately do bad things; people in our military have done bad things here. But the difference is, is that people are held accountable.

In the Abu Ghraib incident, 25 individuals were prosecuted and held accountable for what happened. There were more than 2,800 interviews done over this interview alone. There were 31 congressional hearings. There were numerous internal reviews about what happened and we continue to look at what happened in that case. So we cannot say that the U.S. Government or our military are perfect; no individuals are perfect. This was an extremely unfortunate event but we have held people accountable fully and it's unfortunate, in fact, that these photographs are coming out further and fanning the flames.

Now what I'd like to talk about is the trial of Saddam. We've seen the press stories coming out about Saddam's antics and disrespect for the court. Most of the press stories I think that we've seen have focused on the problems in the courtroom, the changes in the judges, Saddam and the other defendants refusing to show up, delays. And what I want to say is in any trial of this magnitude, and remember, in this case we are watching as the Iraqis try their former leader, the head of the country, and senior officials, so this is an extraordinary event. Any trial that any country puts on is difficult, but in this case the Iraqis are trying their leader, so it's bound to be a bumping process.

But the Iraqis made the decision that they wanted to move quickly. One of the earliest things that the Iraqi governing council did and then the new Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Assembly was to pass the statute creating the Iraqi Special Tribunal so there could be justice and accountability in Iraq. The Iraqis wanted to do it, at home, in Iraq, so that it could be -- so that justice could be done locally.

What's actually being missed is, in addition to the antics of Saddam and the other defendants, is that justice is, in fact, being done and it's unfortunate that the stories are not focusing equally on the witnesses who are coming forward to tell their stories of the abuse that they suffered, of the torture that they were subjected to. But this is actually what the Iraqis are seeing, so that we're -- in the Western press we are seeing the long stories about the trial difficulties with hardly a mention of the evidence that's coming forward. But in Iraq, well, of course, they see that as well; they also see on television justice being done, witnesses coming forward telling their stories, and this all within two years of the end of the Saddam regime. So this is actually the remarkable occurrence, not that there are problems in the trial but that, in fact, it's being done so quickly.

And what I'd like to say, though, is that the Iraqis have asked for international support for the tribunals and, unfortunately, the international community has not come forward in that regard. The Iraqi Special Tribunal, in fact, originally mandated that there be international advisors to the court and very, very few countries came forward. And in fact, the Iraqis had to amend the statute so that they're now no longer required but simply "may be provided." The U.S. Government, through an office that was created by our Justice Department, the Regime Crimes Liaison Office, has provided support with security, with advice, with technical assistance and we've devoted a significant amount to doing that. But the Iraqis are in the lead on this; this is a process that the Iraqis want to do themselves. They have experienced judges who are leading this process, but nonetheless, there is a need for international community assistance.

Before the Iraq war there was, in fact, a consensus that the human rights situation in Iraq was among the worse the world had seen since World War II. The human rights organizations, the UN, the international community had roundly condemned Saddam for his atrocities and had called, in fact, for the world to do something about it. But unfortunately now, after the Iraq war, the international community has essentially turned its back on justice and accountability in Iraq.

We've heard some reasons that have been put forward: concern about whether the trials meet international standards, concerns about the death penalty. But these are decisions that have been made by the Iraqi people to put the trial in Iraq. And it would be somewhat paternalistic for the rest of the international community to say that, no, Iraq should not be allowed to put on their own trials; it needs to be done elsewhere. If there are concerns about whether the trials meet international standards, when in fact, the Iraqis have asked for international assistance and the answer should not be to abstain from helping and say, no, we can do this better elsewhere; but in fact, to provide the assistance that the Iraqis have asked for. To the extent that there are concerns about the death penalty, again, this is a sovereign decision that has been made the Iraqis and not for the rest of the world to substitute its judgment; but there are also many ways that the international community can provide assistance that are done in a death-penalty neutral way.

In the early part of any investigation, for example, much work needs to be done long before you know who the defendant might be or whether they would be subject to the death penalty. For example, there are mass grave sites in Iraq. There simply is technical assistance needed, forensic assistance needed to dig up the mass graves, to do the exhumations. There's enormous amount of help that the international community could provide. So the U.S. Government -- while we have stepped forward, we don't want to -- we don't want to be the only ones who are doing this. We have heard some of the criticisms that we're concerned that the U.S. Government is too involved in the process. The Iraqis are leading in the process and the U.S. Government would welcome additional support: financial, technical and legal support from the international community.

Finally, let me just say a word about the report of the UN rapporteurs. I think the report has not yet been formally released. Copies have begun to appear in the press and there have been stories that have come out. The U.S. Government has seen an advance draft of it. And let me just say this, that we think that the report is fundamentally flawed in its procedures and is riddled with inaccuracies. And really was done in a way, frankly, that discredits the report overall and the work of the rapporteurs in this effort.

Let me give you a little bit of background. The UN rapporteurs and there were several of them covering a number of different issues but led by Manfred Novak, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, had asked to come to visit Guantanamo. We -- even though the ICRC, the International Committee for the Red Cross, has been at Guantanamo and has had full access to the detainees that were there and is the appropriate organization for dealing with the detainees, we've made clear that we want there to be transparency in Guantanamo. There have been a thousand members of the media who have been there, perhaps some of you here, and many hundred members of our Congress have been down. President Bush has made it clear that he wants Guantanamo to be a transparent place. So we in fact, did invite the UN rapporteurs down for a visit to see anything that they wanted, to have briefings, to see the medical facilities, to see the exercise areas, to see where the detainees are, but they rejected our offer. And the reason that they did so is that they said they wanted to be able to interview the detainees individually.

Now, we can understand that and that's something that we generally support in the work of the rapporteurs elsewhere. In this case, however, the ICRC is the organization that has had access to all of the detainees and have been able to interview them and we felt that it would be inappropriate to have multiple organizations all coming down, all to interview the detainees. So it would be the ICRC and then the UN rapporteurs and then additional rapporteurs, members of our Congress have said they wanted to interview the detainees as well, so we said we would welcome the visit from the UN rapporteurs but not to have them also interview the detainees.

Let me end with just a couple of concerns that we had. So the UN rapporteurs rejected our offer and did not come down to Guantanamo. Wrote their report then without any benefit of having been down there, receiving any of the briefings of the people on the ground, seeing any of the facilities, they did not even receive formal briefings from the U.S. Government on the facts and the details on what is going on in Guantanamo. We invited them to Washington to receive briefings here, but they rejected that. So instead the report of the rapporteurs which purports to be a balanced review, is based only on statements from members of al-Qaida or the Taliban who've been released from Guantanomo or their defense counsel. And the report is accepting, as fact, statements made by these individuals or, in fact, their defense counsels, who of course, are advocates for their position.

Let me tell you something that concerns us in particular -- are statements made in the report about the involuntary feeding of individuals who have been on a hunger strike. The report says that according to the individuals' defense counsel, according to the individuals' lawyers, this feeding definitely amounted to torture. Well, one, the rapporteurs never went down there, they never talked to any of our doctors, they never talked to people in Washington; and yet they have accepted the word of defense counsel, advocates for these individuals to simply say that this definitely amounted to torture. Well, for one thing, it completely ignores the definition of torture. In the Convention against Torture, the Convention says that torture is an activity that is specifically intended to cause severe medical pain or suffering. Well, I think that on its face that no one would accept that our doctors are -- by giving someone food and nourishment are intending to inflict severe physical pain or suffering on them.

Now, in case people have asked questions about even how it's done, they are fed -- that those who have been on hunger strikes are fed through feeding tubes. It's a very, very small feeding tube; it's exactly the same procedure as used in any hospital in the United States for any individual who needs to be fed directly. It is a tiny four-millimeter tube in which lubricate is actually used and the detainees are offered the choice of a pain killer if they want one; most of them decline. So this is the -- our doctors there are following the highest level of medical ethics and applying exactly the same procedures that they would apply to any American anywhere in the United States. So it's a little bit difficult to understand how the UN rapporteurs, without having interviewed anybody in the U.S. Government, would accept at face value the assertions of the defense counsel that this definitely amounted to torture.

Now, it may have been that the detainees thought that this was unpleasant. But to reach that legal conclusion in a report like this, I think is simply an example of why this report is utterly procedurally flawed and unbalanced, and frankly, discredits the whole report. There are numerous additional factual inaccuracies; all of this could have been remedied, frankly, if the rapporteurs had simply decided to meet with us. Of course, if they were concerned about not meeting the detainees, they could have gone to Guantanomo and said in their report, "unfortunately, we were not able to meet the detainees," but still would have a much more balanced report.

Let me end there and happy to take questions on any of these subjects.

Mr. MacInnes: Thank you, John, very much. Mohammed.

QUESTION: Yeah, thank you sir.

Mr. MacInnes: State your name, sir.

QUESTION: Sorry, Mohammed Alami, Al-Jazeera television. Sir, about the pictures in Australian TV today, why not release all of them instead of just reacting to the photo du jour, you know. Because all people know what happened in Abu Ghraib and, you know, the pictures of individuals are out there and the judge in New York ordered the government to release them. Why not release them and get it over with?

Two, regarding the UN -- this is the UN, this is not any organization. I mean, I was of the media people who went to Guantanamo, but access is extremely limited, as you know. Why, if you have nothing to hide, let them talk to the detainees. But also you said that the report was based on the words of al-Qaida who left. Are you releasing al-Qaida members from Guantanamo?

And the last question about Saddam, if Saddam goes on hunger strike will he be force-fed, too?

MR. BELLINGER: Let's see -- let's take this one at a time. On the photographs, of course, I can understand the position of why not just get them all out. As we have now seen, and I don't know if they are all out now, but many more came out, these additional photographs are disgusting. They show depraved activities. And there's no additional purpose in having them come out. People know -- the world knows that this behavior went on. It was described; it's been prosecuted. It's been described in print. And so there's no additional value by having it come up, people know that these things went on. People are being held -- the individuals who engaged in this behavior, the soldiers, were prosecuted, so it's not that the photographs will help in additional prosecutions. So the only thing that can be possibly be added by the photographs coming out is for the world to be shocked again. But the world has already been shocked by this. People have been held accountable. And simply at a time, when frankly, nerves are raw around the world about issues like this, it will simply inflame it. There's no value that can be added.

With respect to the UN rapporteurs, we generally support the work of the UN rapporteurs around the world. In this case though, this is not a civilian context where the UN is going into a country to see civilian jails. These are individuals -- the detainees are individuals who we've largely captured on the battlefield fighting in Afghanistan or having fled to Pakistan, people who were found and trained in al-Qaida training camps. So we see it that we are in a legal state of war with al-Qaida, at the time when we picked them up and continue to be, and therefore, the ICRC would be the appropriate organization. They're the ones who have been done there.

Nonetheless, we still concluded that we wanted there to be transparency so we invited the UN rapporteurs to come down, but felt that it's not appropriate to have multiple groups all interviewing the detainees. But there's nothing that we're trying to hide. We want there to be transparency in Guantanamo. I'm glad that you have been there yourself and all I will say is that clearly the report would have been much more balanced and, in fact, objective and accurate had the people actually bothered to come to Guantanamo or even come to Washington to get the information. And instead what they've really done is done the report in reverse; it's reached judgments that they wanted to reach but not based on any evidence that they received.

And then finally with respect to Saddam, it's my understanding that, although he says that he's on a hunger strike, I think he is actually still receiving some nourishment, but I don't have any comment on what would happen if he continues to keep striking.

QUESTION: How are you doing, sir? You were talking about the international --

Mr. MacInnes: Please identify yourself.

QUESTION: Oh, Klaus Marre with the German Press Agency. You were talking about the international law of war and that this is ongoing and -- but when the administration was being asked how long this is going on, then it's until al-Qaida is destroyed.

When do you think that's going to be and how long can you have these special laws for detainees, for surveillance, all these other things? How long can you have that going on? When do you foresee the war on terror to be over?

MR. BELLINGER: Thank you. And I'm glad you asked that question, because I know that this is a concern, I think, particularly in Europe, the term that we use, "the war on terror." And let me distinguish between its political context and its legal context.

When administration officials refer to the war on terror, we are not stating that we are in a legal state of armed conflict with every terrorist organization, everywhere in the world, at all times. The war on terror means that all of us, having seen what happened on September 11th, but also in other places, that all of the countries around the world, all civilized countries need to say, "We are against terrorism. We are against people attacking civilians and other terrorist acts." That's what the war on terror means.

At the same time, though, we do think we are in a legal state of international armed conflict with al-Qaida. Clearly, al-Qaida attacked our embassies, attacked our warships, attacked our capital city, attacked our financial center. Bin Laden has stated that he is at war with us. When we went into Afghanistan with the coalition, that was clearly a state of international armed conflict in Afghanistan and clearly, the laws of war would apply to that, so that the vast majority of the people who are in Guantanamo are being held under the typical laws of war there.

Now, you're right; it's different from any other kind of war that we've had in history. Now admittedly, at the beginning of any war, we don't know how long it is going to go on. But in this case, the conflict with al-Qaida could go on for a very long time, but that does not mean that because it might go on for a very long time, that therefore, individuals ought to be released.

What it means, though, is that we are going to extra steps; one, to transfer individuals who can be transferred to other countries, to release individuals who we think cease to pose a threat, although 10 percent of the people who we've released from Guantanamo have gone right back to fighting us again. Or, to institute additional procedures of, like, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals or administrative review boards at Guantanamo who review the cases of the individuals at Guantanamo to see if they could be released.

So, it's an absolutely fair question to ask, "When might the war be over," but the answer to the question should not be because it might go on for a very long time, therefore, everybody ought to be released.

Mr. MacInnes: This gentleman and then -- Khaled.

QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you, sir. My name is Khaled Dawoud from Al-Ahram Newspaper. And like my colleague Mohammed Alami, I was also in Guantanamo to a trip organized by the Foreign Press Center here. And by virtue of even coming from Egypt, I can tell you, despite all what we've seen and knowing the culture of the people who came from that part of the world, it's one of these conditions that will definitely push you towards, you know, immediate violence as soon as you leave that place.

By virtue of keeping people for almost 24 hours in solitary confinement, except for five minutes or 10 minutes recreation, the conditions of questioning people endlessly for over three years and then even according to the FBI memos -- and I think you are fully aware of the FBI memos -- it's not the issue of going there to see something exceptional. It's the issue of, how long are you going to keep these people there for and that the conditions there apparently lead many people to commit suicide.

So, it's -- obviously, you have to do something to let people out of there, instead of just holding to the issue of, the UN people did not go there. Because even if they went there, they wouldn't have gained anything, in my opinion. I mean, by virtue of our own visit, we didn't have any access to prisoners.

Thank you, sir.

MR. BELLINGER: Well, I don't know if there's a question, in particular.

QUESTION: Why didn't you give the people access to prisoners and what difference would it have made if many journalists have been there and have seen conditions that does not give us any information behind the official tour that we get there?

MR. BELLINGER: Well, I'm not sure what additional information. I mean, there's nothing that's being hidden from people. It's -- we are trying to be transparent. We do think that we are in a state of conflict with al-Qaida. In any normal state of armed conflicts like this, the -- we do not allow, sort of, the world to come in and observe things, to have journalists come in, to have lots of groups come in.

Now, we recognize that this is a different situation, that there has been concern and criticism about Guantanamo. So, we have invited people who were down there, but I don't know what additional we could show to people. The ICRC has been there to talk individually to the detainees. More than 200 detainees have been either released or transferred. People have talked about their experience. I don't know whether we can believe all of the things that they have said. We know that members of al-Qaida have been trained to state that they have been mistreated. On the other hand, where there have been incidents, we have tried to address those.

QUESTION: Michael Rowland, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. What do you say to the UN's assertion that you should bring the detainees to trial or release them? And secondly, how concerned are you that the U.S. Supreme Court may deem the military commissions to be illegal, when there have been cases heard later this year?

MR. BELLINGER: Well, I think to the UN and others who say that they should be brought to trial or released, I say that those people fundamentally misunderstand the legal framework, that I don't see how anybody could say that -- all of the individuals who were picked up by coalition soldiers fighting in Afghanistan or Pakistan are simply criminals who need to be brought to trial or let go.

I can understand a general desire for people to be tried or let go, but that is not the legal framework that is applicable. It's clear that there was a state of international armed conflict in Afghanistan, to which the U.S. was a party, that the detainees picked up. There were people who were held as part of that international armed conflict and the appropriate legal procedures in that case are to hold people until the end of that conflict.

Now, people have suggested, "Well, why should they -- why are they not made prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions?" Well, in the first place, al-Qaida were not signatories to the Geneva Convention and neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida met any of the definitions of the term "prisoner of war" in Article Four of the Geneva Conventions. But let me say this, if they actually had been made and designated as prisoners of war, they would not have been given lawyers or tried or let go.

So, the suggestion that, had they actually followed the rules, as normal soldiers do in a war, and then they would not have had lawyers or had trials and been let go, but that these individuals who ignored the rules, attacked civilians should have greater protections then those individuals, really, is to turn the normal rules up on their head.

And your second question was?

QUESTION: The issue with the military commission's potentially being deemed to be illegal?

MR. BELLINGER: Well, they have been upheld at the Circuit Court level with a good opinion and we hope that the Supreme Court will affirm that.

Mr. MacInnes: The gentleman in the back there.

QUESTION: Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times. You've been holding some Uighur Chinese down at Guantanamo, some of them for approximately four years now. And over half of them, I believe, you have determined are not a threat to the United States and in some cases, never were. How long are you going to keep them there? What kind of efforts are you making with countries around the world to accept some of them and why does the U.S. not accept them, some of them themselves, if they're not -- if they're a threat to the U.S.? And secondly, does the ICRC now have access to all detainees being held by the U.S., either by the CIA, DOD or DOD-CIA related facilities around the world?

MR. BELLINGER: The Uighurs are a conundrum. We would like to transfer or release a number of the Uighurs who are in Guantanamo and -- but we have not been able to find any country in the world that is willing to take them back. And we do have -- we would like to find a place for them to be resettled and -- but in a place where they would be treated humanely. And at this point, it's difficult for us, because we've been criticized for holding them and we've been -- and yet have not found a country that is willing to help us to take them.

QUESTION: Well, why would another country take them if the U.S. is not willing to take any themselves? Why isn't the U.S. (inaudible)?

MR. BELLINGER: The individuals involved here were trained in Afghanistan and we think that it would be more appropriate that they be resettled elsewhere, rather than inside the United States. And your second question was?

QUESTION: Are you giving the ICRC --

MR. BELLINGER: ICRC access.

QUESTION: -- access to all detainees being held by the U.S.?

MR. BELLINGER: The ICRC has had access to all of the individuals inside Guantanamo. The ICRC was resident in Guantanamo. Let me make clear, though, that there's not a legal right for the ICRC to have access to any of these individuals, because they are neither prisoners of war under the third Geneva Convention, or protected persons under the fourth Geneva Convention.

The Geneva Conventions themselves make very clear, even back in the 1940s, before anybody had imagined that there might be mass armies of terrorists, but the fourth Geneva Convention specifically acknowledged that there would be certain categories of individuals, spies or saboteurs, is the term used in the Geneva Convention, who should be considered to have forfeited their rights of communication with the outside world. It's because they would pose a security threat.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, just to clarify this, are you giving the -- I'm not saying, are you supposed to give the ICRC access. Are you actually giving them access to prisoners all around the world or not?

MR. BELLINGER: We've given access to all of the ones in Guantanamo and we feel we're not required to provide access to people elsewhere.

QUESTION: Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service. I'm still a little puzzled by your insistence that the U.S. is being completely transparent in Guantanamo. As I understand it, the ICRC makes only confidential reports. So, the ICRC is being the only independent organization with access to the detainees. Having to make its reports confidential would suggest that, in fact, no independent group has access -- other than defense attorneys -- has access to individual detainees, which means with respect to the way detainees are being treated from their point of view, the United States is being entirely untransparent. And I would like you to show or to demonstrate that that is not the case.

I'd also like to know what you make of, kind of, the outrage that defense attorneys have voiced with respect, both to the treatment of many of their clients, bearing in mind that U.S. attorneys do have an obligation beyond representing their clients, that is, to the judicial system, and also, their outrage with respect to the lack of due process that's provided in these review tribunals. How do you react to that, as an American attorney?

MR. BELLINGER: Well, on the UN rapporteurs -- that's correct, that the ICRC files confidential reports and it's difficult for us because that's the -- that is the appropriate relationship between the United States Government and the ICRC, that they cannot provide public reports. In many ways, we wish they could.

QUESTION: My question is where, then, is the transparency that you're talking about? What group that is independent can report to the world what these prisoners are saying regarding their treatment or the circumstances under which they were captured or whatever? What group, be it Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, UN Rapporteurs -- you're denying access to all of those. And I don't understand, then, how you can get up there and say, "We're being completely transparent, we want to be totally transparent."

MR. BELLINGER: We are trying to be as transparent as we can be, given that we are in a war with people. This is not just simply a civilian prison inside the United States. 1,000 reporters have been down to Guantanamo to be able to look around and receive briefings, but -- you know, in any traditional state of an armed conflict, we do not allow -- no country allows group after group to come in and interview -- either the prisoners of war or the other sorts of people. So, we just -- we don't think it's appropriate if we go -- if we have the UN rapporteurs come and interview people, then it will be -- other groups will say we need to come in as well.

QUESTION: Could I have one more follow-up on that?

Mr. MacInnes: Let's move on.

MR. BELLINGER: Can I --

Mr. MacInnes: There's a lot of other people.

QUESTION: But we're (inaudible) you're simply arguing (inaudible) is what you're saying. If you let one group in that can communicate with the rest of the world, then you have to let everybody in.

Mr. MacInnes: Jim --

QUESTION: Why that logic (inaudible)? I don't understand.

Mr. MacInnes: Okay.Well --

MR. BELLINGER: Let me -- we think the ICRC is the appropriate group. We did invite the UN rapporteurs to come in and look around. Let me take your question about the defense attorneys who you say are outraged. You know, these defense attorneys are taking, at face value, what is being told to them by their clients. And I would treat some of that with a healthy dose of skepticism.

I gave you the specific example of -- the defense attorneys have said that force-feeding people definitely amounted to torture. Now, those defense attorneys had never been there. Those defense attorneys had never seen what happened. Those defense attorneys had not talked to the doctors. And what the Defense Department has told me is that the procedures that the doctors there are using -- and these are the highly qualified medical doctors following the standard procedures used anywhere in the world for this sort of procedure -- are not intentionally inflicting pain or suffering on people. They are treating them medically. And so, I think you should cast what some of the defense counsels say on some of these things with a healthy dose of skepticism.

The -- with respect to the -- more procedures for the detainees in the combatant status review tribunals, what's being provided to them is more -- significantly more substantial than what an individual would normally receive in an Article 5 tribunal under the Geneva Conventions. They have an individual to assist them, to present their case. Remember, this is not a criminal proceeding. People confuse and think that this is -- should be like a criminal proceeding. But in fact, these are individuals who are held -- who are picked up in a state of armed conflict in Afghanistan.

Mr. MacInnes: Let me -- because we have limited time, ask if there's any questions about the Saddam trial, because you talked -- mentioned that earlier. I want to make sure people do get to ask a question on that, if they have one.

MR. BELLINGER: I have a follow up on things that --

Mr. MacInnes: Okay. If there's any Saddam questions, just -- so he makes -- that's off the table. That's off the table.

QUESTION: You just (inaudible).

Mr. MacInnes: Okay.

QUESTION: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. No problem. Mohammed Alami again, Al-Jazeera. So, what are you expecting exactly from the international community? You know, I mean, some people in the -- the UN will -- outside the UN, will say, "When you invade Iraq by yourself, you are trying, you know, to destabilize the country, introduce democracy," et cetera.

Why, in this particular case, the trial of Saddam, you need the aid of the international community? And also, since the U.S. is very involved in this trial, don't you believe it was a mistake to pick this crime in Dujail nobody heard about outside Iraq and not the chemical attacks on Kurdistan or the Iran-Iraq war, the Kuwait invasion, probably that -- you know, they got people here are losing interest in the whole trial.

MR. BELLINGER: Well, those are good questions. And I do think that you're on to something to suggest that, why should the international community help when there was divisions over the Iraq war. And that's right, there were divisions over the Iraq war.

But people -- the international community should not then punish the Iraqi people. This is not helping the United States. This is helping the Iraqi people who want to bring Saddam to justice for the horrible acts of torture and human rights violations that occurred. So, while some may perceive that it's helping the United States, what it's really doing is helping the Iraqi people and there is help that is needed.

For any sort of investigations or prosecutions of this magnitude, as I started at the beginning to say, to put on trial the leader of a country takes an enormous amount of effort. The international community is needed to help with forensic work, with witness interviews, with witness protection, with witness resettlement, with security, financial assistance, advice to the prosecutors themselves, perhaps, on that very point of what would be the appropriate cases to pick.

On that, I think this was the -- the jail incident was the case that the Iraqis chose to start with, but there may well be others. I imagine that they will want to bring charges as well for some of the other cases that you mentioned. But the Iraqis themselves have asked for the support of the international community. The former Deputy Iraqi Prime Minister wrote about 18 months ago to more than 20 countries, asking directly for their assistance. UN Security Council Resolution 1483, after the Iraq war, specifically called on countries to support justice and accountability in Iraq. And still, I think for the reason that you suggest, divisions over the Iraq war, the international community, international organizations have not come forward to try to help the Iraqi people.

Mr. MacInnes: Given our limited time, we'll have one more question.

Mounzer.

QUESTION: Mounzer Sleiman, Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi. I heard rumors, maybe speculation, that Guantanamo will be closed by 2006. So, I hope you can confirm or deny that? At any rate, related to this question is that the issue of rendition. Now, the United States for a U.S. citizen, he will get due process of law and he will be jailed and sentenced and jailed.

Are you considering the possibility of sending those people in Guantanamo to their native countries, what kind of arrangement? And if you offer these countries, which countries refuse to accept to doing this? Because this could be one way of doing it, especially because you're selecting some (inaudible) people and send them to certain countries anyway, secretly. And we heard about those secret prisons.

The other related question is related to a cameraman from Al Jazeera, is that -- Sam al-Haj, is he an enemy combatant, since he was a cameraman and he was not detained while he was having any arms in his hands?

QUESTION: (inaudible) issue here. The issue of Guantanamo I would have to follow up on that.

Mr. MacInnes: Let's have him answer these questions.

MR. BELLINGER: I can only remember so many at a time.

Mr. MacInnes: Right, yeah. Let's let him answer this.

MR. BELLINGER: The -- on Guantanamo, -- we don't want to keep Guantanamo open any longer than we have to. We need to continue to hold the people who continue to pose a threat to us or to the international community. We think we have a legal right to do so. They were people who were fighting us when we picked them up. When we have let some of them go, they've gone right back to fighting us again.

But we do not want to keep Guantanamo open for one day longer than is necessary, for our security and the security of the rest of the world. We have been substantially reducing the numbers by releasing more than 200 people or transferring them to other countries. You've heard Secretary Rumsfeld say that the United States does not want to be the world's jailers. We think that there actually is a -- and this relates to the weaker question. We think that actually, the international community needs to work together to address people like this who would pose a threat to the world. With respect to transfers to other countries, we would like to be able to transfer individuals back to their home countries where they will be held or prosecuted. But subject, of course, to our international legal obligations, we would not transfer anyone to a country if we think that there's a substantial likelihood that they will be tortured.

So, in the cases where we have transferred individuals back from Guantanamo to other countries, we seek assurances from all countries and some countries may -- there may be more concerns than others, but we seek assurances from all countries that individuals will be treated humanely and not mistreated. And we will not return people to countries if we think that they would be mistreated or that we cannot rely on those assurances. And I know the case of the cameraman, but I just don't know -- remember enough of the details to be able to comment.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up?

Mr. MacInnes: We'll try to get you an answer on the cameraman question. I'm not aware of all the details myself. We're going to have to stop, but two things: One is, we do offer -- the Foreign Press Center would be delighted to help facilitate those who would like to visit Guantanamo. We've done the trip before and we can do another one. But if you have a desire to do that, just get in touch with us and let us know. It won't be right away, but we can arrange for a group to go down to Guantanamo, as we did earlier, and we have to break because Mr. Bellinger has to do some television programming.