1:30 P.M. EDT
MR. BOOKBINDER: Welcome to the Foreign Press Center. We're very pleased this afternoon to have a Senior Defense Official with us, who will talk about Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's upcoming trip to Asia. And after our Senior Defense Official makes his opening remarks, we'll throw it open to questions. A reminder that this is all on background, so the attribution would be only Senior Defense Department Official.
Okay, thank you very much, with that please.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, pleased to be with you folks today. Rather than make a long presentation or discussion about the trip, let me just mentioned a few things just to highlight the trip. And then I'd like to throw it open for questions because I think our time is limited and I'd like to get to as many questions as possible.
As most of you know, we are going to go next week in order: China, Republic of Korea, Mongolia and then onward into Central Asia and into Europe. The trip's going to last about a little over a week and we expect to be spending five or six days in those three countries in Asia. Again, the sequence is China, Beijing only; Republic of Korea, Seoul only; and Mongolia for a brief stop and then onto Central Asia.
The trip, obviously, will begin in China. We'll be responding there to long-standing request, a number of requests from the People's Republic of China to visit China, and reciprocating actually a visit made to the United States last year by the Minister of Defense. We'll be seeing the Minister of Defense, other senior government officials there and have an opportunity, I think, to interact with a pretty wide spectrum of Defense and other government officials in China.
In the Republic of Korea, of course, the highlight there is our annual security consultative meeting that is in Korea obviously this year; we alternate capitals each year and this year will be a normal SCM meeting for us. We'll be spending about a day and a half there and then onto Mongolia.
And I think with that overview I'd like to throw it open to questions.
MR. BOOKBINDER: I would ask that before you ask your question, you identify yourself and your media organization and we'll going to start in the tenth row with Korea.
QUESTION: Hello, good to see you. In Korea there was a report when Ahn Kwang Chan Korean DOD Deputy Minister visited at the end of September. He proposed a new negotiation on the so-called wartime operation or commandship. South Korean government tried to return it from USFK. What is the U.S. position on the issues? It will be your top agenda of next week's SCM in Seoul?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It will not be -- thank you for the question -- it will not be a top agenda item, but let me explain something to you by way of background. We have a process now called SPI and the SPI is really our strategic dialogue on a whole range of issues with the Republic of Korea. It's actually the successor program to the Future of the Alliance, the FOTA process. We meet about once every two months. And again, we engage in a discussion of these very significant policy issues that overlay security issues.
Part of the SPI process for the past year, since we started it, has been a discussion of command relationships. So we have a command relationship study. We have a parallel study ongoing that has to do with the way that we have a consolidated security assessment as well of the region. All of these are ongoing activities that we have. So we -- actually each time we meet, we do talk about these things. The goal was originally to complete that process by the end of this year, some time early next year.
So I think what we'll do is continue talking about the issue of -- and I think what you're referring to is the operational control OPCON issue. Is that what you're suggesting or is it the command relationship?
QUESTION: Operation -- wartime operational --
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Wartime operational control, OPCON, yes. That has been and is part of a much broader discussion that has to do with command relationships. I've seen in the press the suggestion, for example, that there is this issue of the United States having taken away operational control from the Republic of Korea, when in fact, that is not the case. We have a situation where there's operational control in peacetime; the Republic of Korea has that.
In wartime, the Republic of Korea can or cannot yield operational control and that the process has been, to date, that has been the understanding. But that does not mean that we're not willing to discuss this issue. So it's an ongoing issue. It's a subject of ongoing discussion. I'm sure we'll discuss it this time, but I don't attach any particular significant to that topic at this SCM.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to China.
QUESTION: Yes, Charlie Weng from China Youth Daily. You know, last year Secretary Rumsfeld made a very strong statement about China's military buildup in Singapore. So my question is does the Secretary have a second thought about it or will he, you know, continue to approach the issue, you know, ask China to justify its military buildup when he's in Beijing next week?
And my second question is can you, from a Pentagon perspective, give us some comment on the Deputy Secretary Zoellick's speech made in New York last months?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Oh, you mean State Department Deputy Secretary Zoellick's speech?
QUESTION: Yeah, yeah.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Is that what you're referring to?
QUESTION: Yeah. The Pentagon's, you know, comment. From Pentagon's perspective, how would you see, you know, Zoellick's speech in New York?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I am very reluctant as a Pentagon person to comment on a State Department speech. (Laughter.) But just let me say by way of answering the first part of the question last, that I did notice that the Deputy Secretary did reference the China military power report and did reference the fact that Secretary Rumsfeld had addressed the China military power report, I believe, in Singapore. So there is mention at least and acknowledgement by the Deputy Secretary of the importance of that China military power report, I believe, in that speech. Beyond that I won't comment. I'll let State Department comment on it.
Regarding the first part of your question, I, like many of you, was there in Singapore. You heard what Secretary Rumsfeld had to say. In point of fact, we think what he had to say and the report itself was very balanced. And what he emphasized was that we have the able to look at capabilities. And as capabilities are being expanded, the one thing that gives us pause for concern is we do not know what the intent it. We can measure capabilities but we have no way of judging intent.
So the issue, and I think the call that the Secretary made, was to greater transparency, greater discussion, so that we, the United States, and perhaps the neighbors in the immediate region, would have a much clearer understanding of what the Chinese intent was in developing the capabilities they're developing. That's the theme. I don't think the Secretary will beat that theme to death and emphasize that theme too much when he's in China, but I believe if he's asked about his comments in Singapore he would probably come back to a statement along those lines that what concerns us is a lack of transparency and our inability to appreciate and understand and predict what China's intent will be.
Combined with that, the capabilities that are dramatically being expanded gives us cause for concern. And I think that's the main thrust of what he had to say in Singapore and I think that's what we're continuing to say.
QUESTION: Andrev Surzhansky, ITAR-TASS news agency of Russia. Which countries in Central Asia are you going to visit and what issues are you going to discuss there?
And secondly, if I may, do you have plants to expand your military base in Kyrgyzstan since you have to withdraw your military personnel from Uzbekistan?
Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I could answer that question very completely right now, and that is I don't have any ability to comment on that because I'm only responsible for the Asia portion of the trip. I'm not being facetious here. This is really the situation as I'm limited to commenting on the Asia portion of the trip. And at least because of my responsibilities, that does not include Central Asia. So I would punt that to someone else that perhaps might be briefing on the, let's say, west of Mongolia portion of the trip.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, let's go to Taiwan in the front row.
QUESTION: I'm Betty Lin of the World Journal. This will be the first time for SECDEF to visit China and it will be very symbolic and he probably will see President Hu. And other than the high-level discussions and Second Artillery, do we expect any deliverables, like you suggested about the transparency and reciprocal ECUs and also like maybe (inaudible) between the SECDEF and General Tao.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Indeed, this is his first visit as Secretary of Defense and, in fact, I think the last time he was there was in '99. He led a businessmen's delegation at that time. And my memory may be wrong, but I think actually that delegation was actually hosted by Dai Bingguo at that time at a different function -- in a different function. I think he was then at the International Department of the CCP.
At any rate, I think that the invitation has been out there for four years for him to go. He feels it's the right time to go.
Deliverables. There are no specific deliverables. There's nothing that we're really looking for except engagement. I think that engagement means that we're going to talk to as diverse a group of people as possible. I think that some of you have discerned that we are probably going to have an opportunity to meet with the Central Party School. That will be a very important event as far as we're concerned. It's the first time that I believe that a senior leader has sat with the Central Party School and engaged in a give and take. This is not a 50-minute speech. It's a brief exchange of remarks followed by an exchange with the folks there.
I think we're also going to be the Academy of Military Science for, again, brief remarks plus some exchange back and forth. And we'll have some opportunity, I think, to talk to leadership. And the Secretary is looking for nothing more than a straightforward exchange, and I think that's what they expect from him. There are no deliverables. There's nothing we're going to sign, nothing we're going to agree to, at least to my knowledge. And I think it's just an attempt for us to comply with and demonstrate that we are engaged in a forward-leaning way with the People's Republic of China.
QUESTION: Are they going to talk about Taiwan?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I have no idea. No idea whatsoever.
MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to the gentleman in the back row.
QUESTION: Yoshi Komori of the Sankei Shimbun of Japan. What is prominently missing from the least of the East Asian countries that you provided with us is Japan. What is the rationale behind your obvious decision to exclude Japan despite the fact that you will be flying over our archipelago? (Laughter.)
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Gosh, I never really thought of it that way. (Laughter.)
We're not excluding Japan. The simple fact is that we have two bookend events. One of those bookend events in Europe, one is in the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea is an SCM meeting, which is a formal date. We have something that we're doing in Europe. We wanted to allow enough time to service the places we are stopping. A decision was made fairly early on that probably we would not have time to stop in Japan and do Japan justice. If we're going to stop in Japan, we should really go for two days, and the way the schedule plays out, we really don't have that time. So as a result, we are not stopping in Japan.
Now, I should mention to you, and you've seen in the press -- some of you here have written about it -- that there's a possibility of a ministerial level meeting later in this month. And if that meeting comes off as scheduled, or as we hope it might, there will be an opportunity there for the Secretary to interact with his ministerial counterparts in that meeting. So we really don't think we've lost that much, frankly, speaking.
QUESTION: Xingfu Zhu from Shanghai Wenhui Daily. People here say that U.S.-China relation is so important, that it's the most important bilateral relations in the world today. But why the Secretary is so reluctant to visit China? I mean, not in the first term but in the second term?
And also, why each time when the senior U.S. officials visit in China -- Mongolia is just around the corner, the next stop. That means Mongolia is equally important to China? And what are the major topics the Secretary is going to bring to Beijing when he meets Chinese leaders there?
Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: All good questions. I think every country we fly over, as my Japanese colleague just mentioned, is our friend, so I don't necessarily attach any important significance to visiting Mongolia. As a matter of fact, I believe the very first stop that Hu Jintao made when he was President was to stop into Mongolia on the way to Europe. I may be wrong on that, but I think that's -- memory serves correct.
The issue of the Secretary's delay in going to the People's Republic of China, I think it's just simply a function of what time he had to be where. We were very, very busy the last four years, as you're aware. We wanted to do it right when we went to China. We had a visit from your Defense Minister last year and it was appropriate that we do this visit this year. So I think it's a very good time to be doing the visit. I don't think there's any special that we didn't go in the past. The point is we're going now, we're going with a very positive attitude, with a very good schedule, and so we're looking for a successful trip.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we will go to Taiwan.
QUESTION: I was just wondering whether -- oh. Charlie Snyder of the Taipei Times. I was wondering if you would expect the Chinese to raise the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and, if so, where do you think that conversation would go and do you think that the Secretary would raise the issue of the Chinese missile buildup against Taiwan and other military actions aiming at Taiwan?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You know, I hesitate to predict what the Chinese will ask or what the Secretary will say, so let me just say that I assume that the issue will be raised because it's always raised, and I assume that our reply would be something along the lines it always is, which we have obligations related to the Taiwan Relations Act and with regard to the defense buildup of Taiwan or any weapons sales that are pending to the Republic of China to Taiwan; that the issue there is for us that in the first instance the problem is caused by the Chinese missile buildup which continues apace and which we believe is a primary driver for the tensions in the straits and our concerns there.
So that's probably the answer that we would give if asked, but I'm not even sure to what degree this issue is going to be raised with the Secretary.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to Japan.
QUESTION: Mike LaVallee with Tokyo Broadcasting System. I know you gave a lot of reasons why you're not going to Japan, but there's a lot of speculation in Japan that you're not going because the realignment talks have not gone well. I was wondering if you could comment on that directly, if there is anything to do with the realignment talks or not.
And then as a follow-up to that, if you could talk -- if you could mention how the realignment talks are going and there's speculation that there's going to be an agreement by the end of the month, and I was wondering your thoughts on that.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Having gotten off the plane last night from Tokyo, I can report to you they're going reasonably well, as a matter of fact. We have some issues left in what we're calling defense transformation and realignment. And the goal was originally to complete an interim report, as you probably are aware, by September. What happened is we had the Japanese election process intervene and we're now approximately six to eight weeks behind that timeline. I have every confidence that we'll be able to complete those discussions by the end of October, which is our -- a reasonable goal, we think, so that by the time that other parties get together, say in mid-November, those talks will have been completed and we'll have a completed and a great interim report.
So I think we're on a path to do that. We have four or five major issues left to resolve, but based on yesterday's discussions, my discussions as of Thursday in Tokyo, I think we're in good shape.
QUESTION: And the first part of the question about -- the first part of the question about the speculation that you're not stopping there because an agreement hasn't been reached. And since you mentioned it, could you say anything about the four or five issues left to resolve specifically?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Actually, I'd rather not. I'd let the Japanese side do that.
Actually, as long as the discussions and negotiations are at my level, and I think that's where an appropriate place is for them to be right now, there was really no reason, as some of the press has suggested, for the Secretary of Defense to come into Japan and have his visit be characterized or be dominated by those discussions. So we're trying to keep the discussions at the appropriate level and we will then elevate the discussions at an appropriate time, and that might be later this month. But I'm hoping that it's later this month, that we can resolve everything this month.
QUESTION: Thank you. Naichian Milosevic from Phoenix Television of Hong Kong. When General Myers visited China in 2004, he became the first foreign visitor to Beijing's Aerospace Control Center. Does the Secretary plan to visit any China's space facility or any military base? I would think it's a good chance for China to demonstrate greater transparency.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It's a good point. When we were putting the schedule together we did give that some thought, but the point of the actual fact was that concurrent with the Secretary's arrival the decision at that point had not been made by the Chinese Government as to when it was going to launch its space mission. The space mission is now airborne. I believe it will return soon, and I think that may be impacting on something we might want to do with regard to the space center.
That doesn't suggest that we can't have a discussion about the space program when we're there. As a matter of fact, when the former -- when the Chinese Defense Minister was here, one of the major topics of discussion was his personal role in the space program. And so I'm sure that when we return to Beijing he'll want to talk a lot about that success and we may have an opportunity, actually, to have some discussion on this issue. So I think we're looking forward to it. The timing is very fortuitous in that your people, I think, are due back on Saturday, I believe. Sunday now, is it? Okay, so again, we'll be arriving on -- well, a few days later, so we'll be in good shape.
QUESTION: The China Times of Taiwan. My question is really a follow-up to an earlier question about arms sales to Taiwan. I know you know it, the U.S. is very unhappy about Taiwan's, you know, indecision to approve the arms package approved by this Administration over three years ago. And China, of course, has always opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. So Chinese opposition plus U.S. unhappiness, will this impact on the United States commitment to continue to provide arms and services to Taiwan in the future? So this is my question.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll answer your question but I'd like to correct something that you said to begin with. You say that we continue to express frustration or whatever. I think you're alluding to the special budget.
QUESTION: Right, right, right.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You know, I want to be careful how we say this, but the issue is not the special budget per se. Okay? That's for the people of Taiwan to decide, the special budget, so we're not attempting to interfere, as we are so often accused -- myself personally and other people -- to interfere in the process. We're simply saying that whether it's -- however it's budgeted, this is an issue for the people of Taiwan. And if the people of Taiwan decide not to budget for it, then that's their business. So I want to make sure that you understand how we frame that issue. It's important that you understand that.
Secondly, the response or the position of the PRC with regard to our arms sales to China is very well established and well known. It's imbedded in every discussion that we have. Likewise, in every discussion we have, we very freely cite the Taiwan Relations Act and our obligations under that act, which are very clear that we are obligated to provide for the defense of and provide Taiwan for the ability to defend itself. And the wording in the Taiwan Relations Act is fairly clear in that regard. So we have that obligation but it isn't our obligation necessarily to force anything on Taiwan. So I ask that you understand that distinction because it's an important distinction for us.
QUESTION: But you know, it's been widely reported the U.S. is really pushing Taiwan to approve this special package as soon as possible, so how do you separate, you know, the fact that, you know, you're saying this is for the people of Taiwan to decide? On the other hand, the strong impression has been created in Taiwan the U.S. is really twisting its arms with Taiwan, trying to get Taiwan to approve this package.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I would challenge you to show me anything in the last two years where we have twisted Taiwan's arm to do anything. (Laughter.) We have expressed frustration, we have expressed disappointment that you can't make the decisions you need to make, but these are your decisions to make, not ours.
Let's take another question.
MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go over here to Japan.
QUESTION: I have a follow-up question on U.S. forces in Japan. Well, I think the biggest problem is the replacement of Futenma. And a few weeks ago (inaudible) you were very -- you seemed to us, I mean, very pessimistic about the replacement of Futenma. You actually said that Japanese proposal is unacceptable.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes.
QUESTION: But right now you seem to be, you know, very optimistic. You know, could you elaborate how the discussion about the replacement of Futenma has been going on?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don't want to get down into the weeds on this because it's a really complicated issue, but to put it very -- in a general sense, I think that the Government of Japan has showed increasingly flexibility with us with regard to the location of where that replacement facility might be.
When I spoke over on Capitol Hill, I believe the situation was that we were being confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation. That's not the case now. We're very pleased with where the discussions are and with the options we have in front of us and we're going to work through those options over the next week to two weeks and hopefully from that make a decision. But it's a much more flexible situation we have to deal with now than we had before.
QUESTION: So do you think you can reach an agreement by the end of this month?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We are reasonably confident. I'm cautiously optimistic that we'll be able to reach an agreement by the end of this month, yes. So say "cautiously optimistic," that's the best way to put it.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Because our time is running a little short, we'd like to concentrate on trip-related questions. If you have some trip-related questions.
Okay, China.
QUESTION: Yes. Ban Wei with China's Xinhua News Agency. How do you characterize the current state of military to military relations between China and the United States and do you see any specific areas where the two sides can improve their actions?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Actually, I think they're in pretty good shape. We've had now three DCT, Defense Consultative Talks, since the relationship really had reached a low point, I think, with the EP-3 incident back in -- several years ago. And I think that we're on a good trajectory. It is not a sharply uphill trajectory, but it is a reasonably inclined trajectory as a positive way. We have expanded military to military contacts. We will be looking for additional ways to expand military to military relations particularly in academic exchanges. We'll look for news way to expand reciprocal visits, such as port calls and things like this.
In every case, I think the United States has been very forthcoming in what it has proposed to do. But it has asked for reciprocity, meaning if we put something on the table, a suggestion on the table, we expect that the Chinese side would not only take that suggestion for what benefits them, but offer us back something in return that's a rough equivalent. And we're trying to drive that point home. We're not after the optics of a relationship or the symbology of a relationship so much as we're after the substance of it.
Admiral Fallon visited China and had a very successful visit about a month ago. He discussed expanded exchanges and visits will be following on that with -- in our visit next week and then we'll have a DCT meeting which is our senior policy level bilateral discussion. We'll be having that meeting, I believe, in either January or February of 2006. So we've got a very good policy discussion mechanism going. And I think that allows us to every year plan for the events in the year ahead and very gradually incrementally expand the relationship. But again, it takes two to tango. When we make a proposal or we propose expanding a given relationship by doubling the number of port visits, let's say, we would expect reciprocity from the People's Republic of China to do so.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go way in the back.
QUESTION: Follow up on Rumsfeld's trip to China. Gregory Hill from Radio Free Asia. Are there any restriction of movement of Rumsfeld in Beijing? Are there any special facility location or person Rumsfeld wants to meet, but the China side has resisted or hesitated to allow?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Not really. We did provide our wish list of where we would like to go and who we'd like to see and what we would like to do. There were a couple of locations which the China side decided would not be appropriate for scheduling reasons for us to visit. But by and large, the response to our suggestions, and they were just suggestions, has been very good. We're very satisfied with what we've been offered and I think we'll have a very successful trip, as a result. Again, a good example is the fact that we're going to be visiting the Central Party School. And I'm very pleased that that event has been arranged and that we'll have an opportunity -- the Secretary will have an opportunity there to have a real interaction with the students at the Central Party School -- very important as far as we're concerned.
QUESTION: Can you name the refusal of what -- which are the locations or facilities the China side refused?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way and I would suggest that you might want to ask them and we'll leave it to them whether they want to discuss issues that were taken off the table or possibilities that for one reason or another, several of the issues perhaps might not have been in Beijing themselves locations, and we just simply couldn't make the schedule work that he could stop in more than one place. So I don't want to suggest that there was a flat denial in the area.
MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to the third row here.
QUESTION: Thank you. Nikkei Newspaper, Japan. Now China and Japan relation is growing tense over the energy exploration and also (inaudible) historical issue. At the visit to China, how does security or United States address these tensioning relations between Japan and China? And if you don't want to comment on the Secretary's conversation, how the -- Senior Defense Official, how do you perceive this situation?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I noticed that while tensions might exist, it seems like Japan and China are meeting on a regular basis very interactively and very aggressively to work it out. And they're meeting at the level of ministerial and vice-ministerial level. So it seems to me that you have a path toward resolving some of your issues including your energy dispute over energy issues. I think that it is not our intention to raise any issues related to Japan during this trip. If it's raised by the China side I believe you know, we'll just respond accordingly. But we're really not going there to have a discussion about Japan. We're going there to have a discussion about the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. We're going there to have a discussion about the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) transformation question. Just to follow up. Follow up about the discussion over the U.S. transformation in Japan -- U.S. military transformation, a transformation over U.S.-Japan.
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sure, sure. You know, in the last three bilateral meetings, senior policy meetings with China, on each occasion we have briefed them on our global transformation program and we've updated them on a regular basis and we have invited a give and take on global transformation, including the pacific portion of our global transformation what our planning is. And that has had them give us or cause them to give us a number of questions. So I think that we've done a pretty good job of explaining to China how we are transforming ourselves internationally. And I think there is this inclination to look at one very small piece of the transformation, for example, the alliance transformation in Japan and just see that in isolation from everything we're doing all over the world.
So one of the things we did in China consistently was say, this is what we're doing globally and this is how this piece fits into it. When we made that explanation in China, it was very useful because it allowed the Chinese to talk to us about everything we were doing in Europe, what we were doing or not doing in Central Asia and everything we were doing in the Pacific. I would expect that same discussion to be had this time, but probably on a global scale and then they can talk, if they wish to, to us about our pacific transformation.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to China (inaudible.)
QUESTION: Thank you. Wei Jing for Global Times in Beijing. My question is would the Secretary raise the question to ask the Chinese Government what China is going to be like in ten or fifteen years? And in answering that question, does the Pentagon or this Administration have a long-term China policy or the Chinese Government has to get from administration to administration from election to election?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, we are a democracy, so they always have to guess from election to election. Maybe we don't have that same problem going the other way. But the issue here really is that we have said in our annual military power report and it's actually reflected very much in Secretary Zoellick's speech which I think suggested that there is a great deal of concern about what direction China's growth is going to take it and how that growth is going to manifest itself. And he talked in there about intent and capability.
So I think for us to be remarking on where China might be or where we think it's going to be is very difficult. We've tried to capture that uncertainty in our annual military power report. And in fact, the direction that we have from the U.S. Congress is it requires us to speculate on where we think that military power might be and what that might mean to the United States of America at the 20-year point and 25-year point.
So when we change the military power report this year a little bit, you'll notice that one of things we attempted to do was address that very issue which the Congress had come back to us and said, we're not satisfied with the report you've given us in previous years because it didn't address that issue sufficiently. So we tried to speculate a little bit, not much, and we'll continue to do that in future military power reports. And our uncertainty is we do not know where China will take its industrial economic and military capabilities over the medium and long term and that is cause for uncertainty and this is why we have pressed for additional transparency into their defense planning and their defense strategy planning on China.
MR. BOOKBINDER: And final question, can we give Korea a chance, okay, ladies (inaudible).
QUESTION: South Korea had announced that a while back.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Please identify yourself.
QUESTION: Oh, sorry. Don Min Lee, Yonhap News Agency. South Korea had announced a couple of months ago in its Defense white paper they will be reducing its size of the ground forces. Is that something the U.S. is taking note of and is that something the U.S. will indicate to South Koreans during the visit that you have taken to note and especially in terms of possible further U.S. troop reduction from the Korean Peninsula?
SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Actually, at our last SPI meeting, the Republic of Korea provided us with a fairly detailed briefing on their transformation plan. It is on the agenda, this SCM, for them to explain that -- for the Republic of Korea to explain it to us in more detail. It seems to me to be a very logical, reasonable, well thought-out 20-year plus program of modernization and coincidentally with that modernization troop strength reduction. I think that this is a subject of ongoing discussions with us. It doesn't really trigger anything automatically. It seems to me it's a very long-term program and it is -- also presumes a reasonable degree of reduction in tensions on the Peninsula. So as far as I'm concerned, it is something that we've taken onboard. We understand it. And there's really nothing for us to take issue with in that program.
MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Thank you very much, Senior Defense Official.
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