The Six-Party Talks

Thank you. Assistant Secretary.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, thank you very much and it's a pleasure to be back here to discuss, I guess, my favorite subject and maybe your favorite subject. Saturday night, I attended the Chinese festival at the Kennedy Center and I had to note that it was actually the second Chinese festival I had attended in the last few weeks, the first being at the Diaoyutai Guesthouse.

You know, the six-party talks will continue. We had, I think, a pretty successful fourth round. It took 20 days and nights at the Diaoyutai Guesthouse to get there. I must say there were moments in the first round, in the first part and the second part where I wasn't sure whether we were going to succeed, but I think all of the delegations, all six, really were committed to finding a way to go forward and I think because of that dedication on the part of all the delegations, we were able to find a way to put together the set of principles.

As we always made clear, the set of principles is but a means to show us the way to the next phase, which is to try to fashion a set of measures to implement these principles. And to be sure, if you thought the principles were difficult, the implementation measures, I think, will be even more difficult.

So in the two weeks since I've been back from Beijing and I suspect in the several weeks I have to go before I have to return to Beijing, we will be doing a lot of discussion internally and among other partners as to the way forward. There is clearly a lot to do. One issue is the question of how we sequence the various measures that we have in mind, beginning with the DPRK's commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs, all the existing nuclear programs. That is going to be a very important aspect of implementation. We're going to have to see how we can implement that and then verify that it's been implemented.

But of course, we also have to take some measures on our side, specifically, to move ahead on some of the other elements, including normalization of relations, which is also going to be a complex series of issues.

So for us on the past two weeks, we've had a lot of internal discussions here in Washington. I know our other partners are also having their internal discussions. We've been in touch with each other by phone but I'm sure we will begin to fashion a travel schedule in the next week or so and we'll figure out where we go, both literally and figuratively, from there.

I know people always ask me if I'm optimistic, if I'm pessimistic. I suppose it depends what day of the week it is, but I will tell you today that we did make a lot of progress in Beijing. It doesn't mean that we've seen the end of this process or that we can yet predict the end of the process. But certainly I think it was very important that we worked closely with our partners in this and where we, I think, developed a pretty clear consensus.

I know that immediately after the agreement in Beijing, there were some signs from Pyongyang that their understanding wasn't the same as the rest of our understanding. On the other hand, two days later, there was still another version of it. But I know because I was there and I know very clearly that all of the participants understand what they signed up for. And with respect to the issue of future peaceful use, which was I think a rather hot topic during the hot days of August -- in fact, when I was here -- it is very clear that we have laid out a plan by which the DPRK must first abandon its weapons, abandon all its existing nuclear programs, get itself back into the Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that it withdrew from earlier, and then get itself back into that treaty in good standing, meaning get itself back into the treaty with IAEA safeguards. And only after that and at an appropriate time, will we consider having the discussion about the subject of the provision of a light-water reactor.

So as you can see, this is not the really urgent issue. The really urgent issue is what we're dealing with in the initial phase, which is they've got to get out of this weapons producing and out of the nuclear program business. And so that's going to be very much on our minds and, you know, downstream, once they're back into the NPT in good standing and with IAEA safeguards, can we look at that other elements.

I continue to believe that this arrangement, the overall shape of this arrangement is not only a very positive plan for the United States and for our partners, but also very much for the DPRK. This is the future of the DPRK. If they can get through this, if they can take the tough decision to do away with programs, programs that they've had for some quarter of a century and maybe more, if they can make that decision, I think their future will be much brighter.

I think there will be reason to believe that they can get more energy. And as you know, a very important element of the agreement is the South Korean provision of conventional energy, which is exactly equivalent to the energy that was foreseen in the 1990's arrangement, that is the agreed framework -- 2000 megawatts -- and that is to be provided from South Korea by conventional means.

So this is a huge undertaking just by itself. So there is a lot on the table with this arrangement. I think it's very, very important to the DPRK that it understands that if it values security, if it values its economic future, it will value this six-party accord. So I hope we have that understanding and we will certainly try to go forward from there.

So those are, sort of, opening comments and then we go to questions.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. I would just ask before you ask a question, please identify yourself and your media organization. We'll start with Russia up in the front.

QUESTION: Dmitry Kirsanov of Russian News Agency-TASS. Mr. Secretary, as far as I understand, you have just repeated twice what you said a couple of days ago.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Sorry.

QUESTION: No, no. That first is for the DPRK to announce what they have, warheads, programs, come clean. Could you expand a little bit on that? I mean, sequence of steps, and if this understanding is being shared by other five parties.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Yes, I think, first of all, you cannot verify what you don't know is out there. And so in a voluntary program, and entering into this agreement is voluntary, voluntary for all sides, including the DPRK. The DPRK is not a defeated country; it's a country that has decided to participate in an agreement because it sees that its interest can be met in that agreement. So in this voluntary program the DPRK agrees to give up all of its weapons and all of its nuclear programs that exist.

As you know, the DPRK has said that it wants to have the right of peaceful nuclear energy in the future, so that is why it said it will abandon all existing programs, rather than programs that could exist some time in the future, all existing past and present.

So being voluntary, it is not our intention that we will -- that we, the collective we, the international community -- would go into the DPRK and start an Easter egg hunt for weapons and for programs. We expect the DPRK, as part of its voluntary commitments, to cooperate with us.

So the first step is to declare what they have and we hope the declaration is complete. It's very important that it's complete because we do have to overcome a lot of mistrust. And in order to do that, it's important that people put their cards on the table. In this case put their nuclear programs on the table so that we don't find one that wasn't listed because that is a good way to build back the mistrust.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to Japan in the third row.

QUESTION: Mike LaVallee with Tokyo Broadcasting System. Kind of a follow up on that question. What I'm understanding is that more than the LWR issue for North Korea at this next round the sequencing issue is going to be the key in how much progress can be made on that. You just said that the first step would be for North Korea to give a complete list of what they have.

AMBASSADOR HILL: The first step in any verification process, yes. In any dismantlement, abandoning process, you can't work on dismantling or abandoning programs that you don't know exist.

QUESTION: And I'm wondering in terms -- that's also part of the sequencing process of what needs to be done, when and where.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Yes.

QUESTION: If they do that, do you envision a first step by the United States in giving something back in return? I'm kind of -- how you envision the sequencing process? Is it North Korea must do this and this and then the U.S. will take a few steps later or is it going to be more of a tit-for-tat-type situation?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, you're asking a very important question. It's really the heart of any negotiation and we would obviously have to be discussing what we do versus what they do. But I don't know if I can really negotiate that here in the Foreign Press Center. It's a very important aspect of it.

The DPRK has not wanted to have all of its obligations frontloaded with all of our obligations backloaded, so we have to figure something out. I think if the DPRK is truly, truly prepared to do what it says it's prepared to do, that is, get rid of all of its programs, and do so in a prompt manner -- I mean, we don't want to be waiting around for these -- while all these programs continue to function -- if they're truly prepared to do something, I think we can find a solution to the sequencing problem.

But if we're going to find them asking us to frontload all of our undertakings while they backload all of theirs, then we've got a problem. So I can't get into more specifics because this is the essence of what we're doing in the negotiations, so stay tuned.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, we'll go to China in the fourth row.

QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary, I'm Yi Zhao from the Xinhua News Agency of China. I would like to ask you, do you have any plan to have more talks with DPRK through New York channel? That's the first question.

The other is that you said a lot of progress has been made in the six-party talks. Are you very much optimistic about the future talks? Do you -- does the United States, U.S. Government, have enough patience or very much patience for the future talks?

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, believe me, I'm a patient guy. I hope I demonstrated that in the previous talks. I would hope that if we can continue the atmosphere of the previous talks, which was tough but businesslike, I think everyone understood why we were there and everyone was committed to finding an arrangement. If we can preserve that, I believe we can make progress in the next set of talks even though the next set of talks is going to be a very, very difficult phase.

I can't predict, for example, that we'll have a big announcement after one session. We may have small announcements after several sessions. It's just hard to predict at this point. But as the previous question suggested about sequencing, and, you know, these are going to be tough issues, but I think if we continue in the spirit we did in the first set of talks, if your delegation in particular, the Chinese delegation, can continue to work as hard as it did at being a host and at being a participant, then I'm sure we can continue to make progress.

I was watching the Chinese festival the other night at the Kennedy Center and one of those acrobats up there balancing six different bowls on top of his head. All I could think of was my counterpart, Wu Dawei, with six different things on top of his head all of the time. So it's a tough issue.

With respect to contacts with the DPRK, we have had contacts with the DPRK through the New York channel. We do this. I know there's a question about my own travel plans and I haven't made travel plans yet. But I don't think contacts should be really that taken as the real issue here. I think it's not that we meet; it's what we say and what we agree on when we do meet.

So I think we will continue to have contacts and I would look for, in the coming weeks, to see an intensified diplomatic round. I mean, if I can say in the first couple of weeks it's been kind of a bureaucratic round as we've been working internally, and I think as we get closer to the next session, the date for which has not been precisely set but we assume it will be in early November, I would look for a very intensified diplomatic calendar and I would look to have U.S.-DPRK contacts.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Why don't we go to Korea in the fourth row?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Which Korea? (Laughter.) Just checking. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Yes. Ki yon Kuk, Segye Times, South Korea.

AMBASSADOR HILL: South Korea. ROK.

QUESTION: Yes. The rumor is the World Food Program said it would end food shipment to North Korea by January and focus on development project. Does your government consider to join the development project of the WFP?

And one more related question. South Korea will keep sending food aid to the North. Do you have any plan to ask South Korean Government to stop providing food to the North bilaterally?

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, let me restate our position on humanitarian assistance, which includes food aid, and that is we believe food aid should not be affected by politics. It should not be affected by diplomacy, including the six-party talks. We think food aid needs to be determined by three categories: the first being the need, the second being the competing need in other countries where there might be even more need than in the country that one is talking about. So need, competing need and ability to monitor, ability to make sure the food aid gets to the right place.

I'm not going to tell the ROK Government how to monitor its food aid. I know from the U.S. Government's perspective, we give food aid, which is essentially a gift from our taxpayers, and we have to turn around and say to our citizens, say to our taxpayers, that the food aid has been well spent and has gone to the right -- to the intended recipients and this is really a question of our duties as a government to our own citizens. So that's why our ability to monitor is very important.

With respect to the DPRK, the announcement that they don't need food aid and only need development assistance, our understanding -- and this is based on briefings we've received from the World Food Program -- our understanding is that this is a country that is still in need of food aid. I'm not prepared to say at this point what the harvest looks like; I'm not an agricultural expert. But I do know that when we last looked at this and when the U.S. Government provided 50,000 tons of food aid, it was based on our assessment that there was a very real need, that the need was substantial and substantial in terms of competing needs. And, moreover, we felt that with the World Food Program there we could have sufficient monitoring.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to the Philippines up front.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Jennie Illustre. I'm with the Malaya Philippine News Daily. I was wondering if you can make this a seven-party talks because I can understand the urgency of a nuclear threat, but something volatile is also going on in the Philippines right now. And I was wondering the instability is causing the government to lose focus in Mindanao, the terrorism threat there, and also loss of investor confidence.

AMBASSADOR HILL: You know, I appreciate a question about the Philippines because I've often said to audiences I didn't like giving up the ambassadorship in the Republic of Korea to become the Assistant Secretary in North Korea. And in fact, I'm the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, including the Philippines. Let me assure you, though, we are following the situation closely in the Philippines. We're aware of the governmental issues. We're aware of the situation in Mindanao. We had a temporary ambassador there, Ambassador Johnson. We have a new Deputy Chief of Mission who will be the Chargé very shortly, I think, next week. His name is Paul Jones. I want you to know that I picked him personally. He was my deputy in a previously ambassadorship I had. We're very close. He is an extremely competent person and I know that he will do an admirable job until we have a new ambassador in place. So we are following the situation in Manila and Mindanao very carefully.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Let's go to the second row over here.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Toshiyuki Matsuyama with Fiji TV. Yesterday, the Russian wire reported about the succession of power from Chairman Kim Jong Il to the next generation because -- and it could happen as early as August 10th when they will have a big ceremony on --

AMBASSADOR HILL: October 10th.

QUESTION: October 10th, yeah, the 60 year anniversary of the regime. Have you received any indication about the shifting power? And also, what does this mean to shift the power in DPRK? Do you think that's going to have a huge impact on the nuclear talk?

AMBASSADOR HILL: I have nothing to confirm this Russian wire service report, perhaps we can ask our Russian colleague. He may know better than I but --

QUESTION: I didn’t write it.

AMBASSADOR HILL: He's denying it already. (Laughter.) I really have nothing to add to it, except I read it with great interest but I cannot, you know, I have no information on it. It did refer to October 10th, which is just next week, so I guess we won't have to be in suspense for very long. But I have no information beyond what I read in the Russian wire service report.

QUESTION: But is that accurate and do you think that's going to have a huge impact on the nuclear talks?

AMBASSADOR HILL: You know, government officials have a habit of saying they don't like to respond to hypothetical questions, and you are on a very big hypothetical question, so, sorry.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We'll go to India up front here on this side.

QUESTION: T.V. Parasuram, Press Trust of India. Just to clarify for people not directly involved. What are the dangers of a stalemate? Because in this world, you find so many problems and apparently no solutions. What are the (inaudible) and what are you doing?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, I think we have put a great deal of emphasis on finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. It's an issue, which will not find its way toward a stability; it's an issue that will continue to cause problems and instability for the region. That is, if it's left alone, it won't just find some natural level and be okay.

So we need to stay with it and we need to find a solution. Our belief is that the way to do this is not to just engage on a bilateral basis but rather engage all the countries in the region. And we have been doing that with China having an important interest in the DPRK, playing the host to this process.

So I have said before and I'll say again, we have a lot of options for dealing with it. Diplomatic is obviously the best option. But the one option we don't have is to walk away. We have to stay with it and we have to find a solution. And I very much would like to find a solution because I think it could really open the way to making -- to really helping Northeast Asia realize its potential. And I think Northeast Asia has shown an extraordinary economic potential, in fact, economic achievement. But it has not shown the achievement it should have, the potential it should have in terms of having the countries work together and creating a sort of regional structures, overcoming historical issues and the like.

So I hope that in addition to solving this terrible problem of nuclear weapons, a problem which really should not exist at this time in history. But in addition to solving this problem, I hope it will open the way to addressing broader issues. And in the final analysis, the six-party process will be what brought the U.S. closer to these countries, brought us closer to China, brought us closer to Japan and the others. So that I hope that if we handle this carefully and if we show some patience and really some stubbornness, if we stick with it and don't become weak but stay strong, I hope that this can help address one of the great tragedies of the 20th century, which was the very rude division of the Korean Peninsula. And I think that anybody who has been to Korea knows that the pain that everyone feels at having a line drawn right across that Peninsula.

So I hope that we can deal with the fact that Korea, for example, has only an armistice, a sort of elaborate ceasefire. It doesn't have yet a full peace mechanism. So we mentioned that in the Statement of Principles to try to push ahead on these issues. So it is very important that we succeed and I would argue that we have to succeed. And I can assure you that I'm going to do everything I can do to make it succeed.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. We're going to go to the third row to Japan.

QUESTION: My name is Yoshio Miyasaka from Kyodo News, a Japanese News Agency. I have a question about the light nuclear reactor.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Light-water reactor.

QUESTION: Light-water.

AMBASSADOR HILL: LWR. I've heard all about them. (Laughter.) Never seen one.

QUESTION: The question is, what is the North Korean motive of raising this issue? And you stressed that the (inaudible) -- the other day that this is just purely appealing to the domestic Koreans. And so that is maybe one scenario.

But another maybe theory is maybe they raised this issue because they are not ready to, you know, make a strategic decision or choice. And they are trying to, you know, maybe this issue will detract every party of a core issue, nuclear issues. And the other day, you characterized North Korean negotiating, you know, tactic. They raised some issue to smoke screen the real issue or bypassing the core issue. So what is your take on this North Korean -- maybe they're trying to -- buying time or prolonging their final decision?

And the second question is very simple -- (laughter) -- a very simple one. What is your potential trip to -- what is the status of your potential trip to Pyongyang?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, I can do the second issue fairly quickly. I don't have a trip yet planned to Pyongyang or anywhere else. Again, we've been dealing a lot with internal discussions here. We're going to be entering a very important phase of the six-party process. There's been a lot of work to do in various agencies in the U.S. Government, so I've been here the entire time. You know, being at home, I've been home all weekend. It's great. I think in the next couple of weeks we'll do a travel schedule and we'll see where that takes us, but you'll be among the first to know. Maybe. (Laughter.)

I guess, you know, you've been having too many news conferences when you're quoted in a previous one in the next one. So why do they want a light-water reactor? The easy answer is you should ask them. You know, I think that the DPRK argues that they don't have any natural -- they don't have strong deposits of coal and oil and natural gas, et cetera. They've got some trace amounts of uranium, natural uranium in the mountains, therefore, a nuclear program is something they should have.

They would argue that they have not had the technology to have a modern program, a light-water reactor, therefore, they've had the older programs. The trouble is DPRK cannot point to a single light bulb that they have been able to light up through their nuclear program. None of the electricity has gone into their national grid. And their nuclear program has produced a lot more plutonium than it has light bulbs. So it's hard for some people in the DPRK to understand this, but I must say there is a lot of mistrust about their nuclear program. So when they say they want it, it is understandable, it is entirely understandable why people go through a lot of potential reasons why they might want it and don't ask them precisely why they want it.

I think, certainly, the idea they want to delay this, I've heard that analysis many times, and the only thing is I'll say it doesn't make sense for them to want to delay. They are a country that needs to get moving on their economy and as long as they have nuclear programs now they're not going to move. They're going to be isolated. That is just a sheer fact. So the quickest way they can get going on their economy is to get rid of their nuclear programs.

They have argued that they need nuclear weapons for security. They don't need nuclear weapons for security. Nuclear weapons don't make North Korea secure. What will make North Korea secure is good relations with their neighbors and good relations with other countries, including the U.S. So if they want security they ought to get rid of these programs.

So I don't see any justification for them to be belaboring the issue of nuclear energy. We have a conventional plan, which would get their cities and towns, their villages lit up in a way that they haven't been lit up in a long time; 2,000 megawatts is very compelling. So I hope, in addition to making a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons, I hope they have made a strategic decision to open their country up and to join the rest of the world. Because as long as they have nuclear power, these current nuclear programs, they're not going to succeed. And they're never going to get the type of cooperation -- no country will cooperate with North Korea and nuclear technology while they are outside of all the international standards for it.

So why they want a light-water reactor, back to your basic question, I don't know the answer to it. I do know that they have many, many economic problems and a light-water reactor should not be on the top of their agenda.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Why don't we go to Bangladesh in the second row.

QUESTION: My name is Arshad Mahmud and I represent the Daily Prothom Alo in Bangladesh.

AMBASSADOR HILL: You're just on the other side of my border, but --

QUESTION: Yes. And I have a general question.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Okay, I'll do a general question.

QUESTION: Yes. First of all, given the critical energy shortage all over the world, don't you think that every country should be allowed and encouraged to pursue nuclear options to increase their productivity in electricity?

And just one more thing, you have just said something that, you know, we don't think that North Korea needs this. We don't think North Korea did that. And to me it appears that, you know, I mean, they have not been given a chance to explain what they want in the press -- just conferences like this. And shouldn't they be allowed to also state and say what they need actually instead of the United States telling them, "No, you don't need this, you don't need this. We know exactly what you need." I mean, if you could just kindly explain that.

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, I want to make very clear I've never stopped a North Korean official, a DPRK official from having a news conference. I mean, every day of the week they're invited to have a news conference, and if they can make the case to you in a convincing way that's fine, but they should do so.

They've had nuclear programs for 25 years; they have not produced nuclear power. They've produced plutonium. They've produced weapons grade plutonium and they are proud of that. That's what they produced from their nuclear programs. So I don't mean to be lecturing them about their nuclear programs; but I do have the right to state a fact, which is they have produced plutonium, weapons grade plutonium and they've not produced electricity. So to say that they now want nuclear programs in order to produce electricity and not bomb-making material is to some extent, a hope for the future, rather than a lesson of the past.

So if they can explain why they can -- I mean this gentleman just asked me why do they want a light-water reactor, frankly, it's a difficult question to answer. They should try to answer it themselves. But I do know they have many, many problems. They have problems in their agriculture, in their health care system. The DPRK health care system has a lot of difficulties. Their road network is very problematic; their airports -- the airport in Pyongyang has difficulty -- they have a lot of problems. So I don't see how a light-water reactor helps them with all these problems.

So, again, I don't mean to be patronizing. I don't mean to be telling them what they need because they are certainly free to say what they need. But in my opinion this should not be -- a light-water reactor should not be on the top of their list.

MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to France in the third row.

QUESTION: Parameswaran Ponnudurai from Agency-France Press. Mr. Hill, do you think the time is right now for the United States to at least begin the stage of normalization of relations with the DPRK?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, it's going to -- normalization is envisioned in the Statement of Principles. It is what we want to do as we move to implement. And our undertakings in that regard would be, undoubtedly, part of the implementation, absolutely. So I'd like us to get moving on all of this. I'd like the DPRK to get moving on getting rid of this plutonium, these weapons, these nuclear programs, and I'd like to get going on our undertakings as well. But I can assure you that when we get to the implementation, I can assure you, the United States Government, we will absolutely fulfill all of our undertakings.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Shall we go to China in front?

QUESTION: This is Charlie Weng from China Youth Daily. I would like to ask the question a little beyond the current six-party talks. In a statement (inaudible) party concerns would like to seek or negotiate a permanent peace agreement to replace the current Arms Peace Treaty, as well as talking about the, you know, exploring means and a way to -- for promoting the security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

So my question is what's on your mind for now when they come to these questions and how these two issues fit into with your security strategy in the region? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, first of all, I think those issues are envisioned in the Statement of Principles, but it's not meant to be a substitute or to somehow get out ahead of the nuclear problem because we have to solve this nuclear problem. We really cannot leap over the nuclear problem to address these other issues. Our only point is that we would hope that in addressing the nuclear problem and in putting together a framework for addressing it, that is, in putting together an implementation measures and a Statement of Principles as we've already done, I would hope that the level of cooperation we've established could lead to addressing some of these other problems.

The DPRK is, with its nuclear program, is probably the most serious issue in Northeast Asia today, but as your question implies, there are others as well. And we have seen great strides in Europe. It's not customary for Americans to be complimenting European political structures, but I can tell you there is a great deal that every European can feel very proud of in what they've accomplished since 1945. And I just feel that Northeast Asia also needs to get going on these issues.

As you know, with respect to the Korea Peninsula questions, we've talked about an appropriate forum, appropriate partners and we would hope that we can, indeed, make progress. We want to see a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and we want to see the DPRK as a member of the international community in good standing.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. And we'll go to Japan in the second row.

QUESTION: I'm Takashi Sakamoto from Yomiuri Shimbun. And if North Koreans declare their programs as the first step to abandon their nuclear programs, do other five parties also need to take some measures as the first step? And if so what kind of the first step are you going to take?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, you're getting into this question of sequencing of various obligations. Obviously, this needs to be discussed and as we go to the implementing rounds. The urgent issue, the number one issue is denuclearization and so we certainly need the DPRK to be denuclearizing, but we understand we also have undertakings as well. And in the course of the implementation and as we negotiate through the timing and the sequencing and the time flow of this, we would fulfill our obligations. But at this point, I'm not prepared to say with precision, you know, who takes which step first. But I am prepared to say that all of our undertakings, we will definitely undertake -- we will definitely accomplish.

MR. BOOKBINDER: We'll go to Reuters in the third row.

QUESTION: Thank you. Hi, Ambassador. Paul Eckert from Reuters. If I understand it correctly, the agreed principles talk about the denuclearization of the Peninsula rather than just the DPRK. Now, is that a potential loophole that North Korea might exploit to cover the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which, you know, doesn't have weapons on the Peninsula or anything South Korea might do? They have used those pretexts in the past to delay things.

AMBASSADOR HILL: During the course of the negotiations, the issue of the U.S. nuclear umbrella came up and it was dropped as an issue. That is the U.S. nuclear umbrella is part of the U.S.-ROK alliance and it's part of the U.S. alliance with Japan. And our alliances were not on the table. They're not a fit discussion for negotiation with another party.

We also, though, made very clear and affirmed that we do not have nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula. And the ROK Government also made that clear.

QUESTION: Okay, I'll give you one more --

MR. BOOKBINDER: The final question.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Yes.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay. Last question, we'll go to that gentleman.

QUESTION: I'm Yoichi Nishimura with Asahi Shimbun in Japan. Mr. Hill, could you describe how often do you have contact with the President on this issue, directly or indirectly? And how much you -- (inaudible) and how much domestic issue, like hurricane recovery or argument with the Congress affect the motivation of -- for solving this problem?

AMBASSADOR HILL: Well, you know, I work for Secretary Rice and I have daily contacts with Secretary Rice on the issue, so with regard to my internal matters, let me just leave it at that.

With regard to Hurricane Katrina and other issues, obviously, the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula is not the only issue that our senior policy makers are following but I can assure you it does receive a lot of attention, sometimes more attention than I need but it's a lot of attention. And I have felt absolutely supported as I've gone out to these talks. I've had really excellent support and I like to think that it's a government that is really united in a policy. And I like to think, maybe I flatter myself, but I like to think that when a government can make a clear policy and have clear understanding that we can make progress and maybe that's why we were able to make a little progress.

QUESTION: Could I make a point of clarification?

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Point of clarification. Sounds like a question to me. (Laughter.) A lot like a question.

QUESTION: No, it's just a point of clarification. You said you had made contact with the North Koreans up in New York. I'm just wondering if that's since the last round of meetings or before and when and what the purpose was.

AMBASSADOR HILL: That's a question. (Laughter.) The clarification part is yes, it was after the second session of the fourth round, so indeed, we've had contacts through the New York channel. And frankly, I don't know how many and I don't know precisely when because we just have contacts with them because we have information we need to share. So it's, frankly, maybe we could get details on it, but I just don't know how many contacts. I personally have not had the contacts, but people on my staff have and it's fairly routine to have these contacts. It's in the context of the six-party talks, don't forget.

QUESTION: Okay.

AMBASSADOR HILL: Okay, thank you.