Update on Crisis Hot Spots Around the World

10:00 A.M. EST

MS. NISBET: Thanks, everyone, for coming this morning. I would like to introduce Ambassador Nancy Soderberg, ICG’s Vice President for Multilateral Affairs, as well as Suliman Baldo, the head of the Africa Program here in New York.

As you probably know, the International Crisis Group helps to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world. They are here today to talk about crisis hotspots around the world, as well as highlighting recent developments in Africa.

I'd like to thank Mr. Baldo and Ambassador Soderberg for being here today. We can start out with opening remarks and then go into questions. Please state your name and affiliation before asking your questions. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Well, first, I want to thank Kim for pulling us in today and for all of you for braving the weather. It's so cold outside. And, you know, to let you know that hopefully we'll begin a conversation today that will continue long after this.

I haven't been here in quite some time, actually, so we're based around the corner on -- in Grand Central in the Greybar Building, so if there are things that you're writing on and we can help you do that, feel free to call us, stop by. We usually have copies of the reports and things.

What I thought I would do today -- we have about an hour, or until 11, I guess -- is give you a sense of what ICG is working on. We're launching a big effort on Kosovo right now. And then, I'll turn it over to Suliman. The two of us were just on a around the Horn trip of Africa to Ethiopia and Congo, together; and then I broke off and went to Ivory Coast and Guinea, so we'll talk a little bit about that, and then, also what we're doing on Sudan.

I have given you all copies of these -- Crisis Watch, too, which can be helpful. And it's kind of around the world update on what's going on around the world that I think is a useful barometer of things to watch, as well as our most recent report on Kosovo, which is a major effort of ours this week. This is a pretty helpful thing just to watch. This bulletin basically goes through -- around the world tour of what's happening -- areas that we're watching. The one that -- it highlights six areas which are deteriorating, and I can go into that more if anyone's interested: Ecuador, Iraq, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

Of that list, Iraq is something, obviously, everyone saw. And we have a report out on that just yesterday; it's on the web, warning about instability in Kirkuk. If the situation is not defused and if the Kurds, you know, try and move forward on independence or anything, it's a real possibility Turkey would actually take military action there. So we need to watch that very carefully. And it's a very interesting report that's on the web, and we'll have copies in our office in a day or so.

Nepal is the other issue that we're really watching very closely. And the Secretary General is -- his office -- it's very much on their radar screen as well. They're trying to increase their level of attention to it. Our program director is there right now. He'll be back in a week or so. He's based in our office -- Robert Templar. So if anyone is interested in Nepal and what's happening in Nepal, he's available around the corner as well.

There, the insurgency with the Maoists is getting increasingly violent. It's the most violent conflict in that area right now, and one that's likely to get worse long before it gets better, so we're watching that pretty closely. It also highlights -- has these little arrows like Newsweek -- up and down -- for a quick thing. It highlights Afghanistan, Georgia and Ukraine as moving forward in a positive direction. And then it has a big section on the Kosovo -- an alert.

And then there's a whole series of African crises that we're watching very carefully, which I'll get into in a minute. The issue on Kosovo is one I'll just briefly go through. Then we'll talk about Africa briefly and then just open it up for questions so we'll make sure we hit whatever you all are interested in.

This report was launched yesterday with our new co-chair, who's Chris Patten, in Brussels. And then we're starting -- we're launching a big advocacy campaign to try and get people to focus on it. The person who runs our Kosovo office is here today and tomorrow. If anyone is interested in chatting with him, just let me know and we can arrange that. He's got some time both today and tomorrow. His name is Alex Anderson, and he's our Kosovo project director. And we're having meetings with the senior UN people, a number of the Security Council members, (inaudible) and others.

What we're advocating here is that the international community begin to focus on Kosovo now, so that by the time the review that's planned for the spring, you have, actually, a consensus in the international community that three things are off the table: That Kosovo would ever go back to Belgrade; that Kosovo would be divided; or that Kosovo would become part of Albania and the fact the one viable option for the region is independence.

That said, there needs to be more progress on protection of minority rights and democratic reforms than they've done to date in order to have full control of their territory. So, it's -- the international community would recognize the independence of Kosovo, but they would still be run, essentially, by an international protectorate until they had met the standards.

Now, there's a standard review that's due by the international community. It's actually, I'm not exactly sure who's doing it. I think probably the UN will end up doing it. And that will, hopefully, begin the discussion there. What we advocate in this report is that there is an appointment by the Secretary General of a special envoy as soon as possible. That envoy would then take the next six months and discuss with the parties and the key countries in the contact group what, what is a consensus and then put forward a plan for consideration.

The Security Council Resolution 1244 still guides what is the status of Kosovo, which makes it very clear that it's unresolved at the moment, and so we believe it's time to resolve it. ICG argues that -- by the way, we've changed our short name to "Crisis Group," so we're not supposed to say ICG anymore. You know, it's now International Crisis Group or Crisis Group, not -- we're -- ICG is supposed to be banned from our vocabulary right now, but old habits die hard. And it basically argues that the possibility that Kosovo could once again be ruled by Belgrade is, in itself, a destabilizing factor to be taken off the table. And that's kind of the guiding force behind this report. I'm happy to go into any more details on it.

My own sense of what's going to happen is, there is some interest in the international community on the idea of an envoy, and I think there's a possibility that that recommendation would get accepted. Whether or not our policy recommendations here will be accepted, I think, will depend largely on the reaction in Belgrade and by the Russians. I think in Europe, it has a certain amount of acceptance as the way to go. Whether or not you can get a consensus within the contact group, particularly Russia and Belgrade, is obviously the question. And then, we would argue that even if you can't fully get them on board, the international community should make it clear that this is what we will recognize, and that it may take a while for the others to catch up, but to try and begin to move it in that direction.

I'll talk now to -- just a minute about Africa and then turn it over to Suliman. Our trip was first to the AU, which, I think, is very much in the nascent stage of development. It is a very different organization than the African -- than the OAU was. There's also not much structure there. And the fact that they got this whole Darfur mission dumped on them was actually a very good thing for them because it forced them to operationalize themselves very quickly. They didn't have the staff. They didn't have the military plan. There's no there there; and they're getting it. And they recognize they need help. They're very open to ideas and interests.

But you have to look at the AU force as -- it doesn't exist except for the people. And so you have to train them, equip them, lift them, provide the communications, the infrastructure of a peacekeeping operation. So it's taking them a long time to do it.

There's about 1,060 people on the ground right now. Their current estimates are that by the end of February, they'll have the full, authorized monitoring unit of 3,320. My guess is that will probably slip a little but. There's a lot of talk in the AU of trying to get this new peace and Security Council really operational, moving forward, and have it operate like a security council here with a planning mission and actually be able to deploy. Plans -- they have very ambitious plans to have regional brigades that can be deployed within 10 days or two weeks? I can't remember.

MR. BALDO: Two weeks, two weeks. Yeah.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Two weeks. And the SADC countries and ECOWAS countries can probably meet that goal by the summer. The other three regions are very much in need of assistance, and it'll be a while before that happens. But it's starting and there's a really refreshing new tone to the African discussion on how to address some of these conflicts. It's really Africans taking responsibility, African solutions to African problems, African renaissance. It's really kicking in. It's a very interesting development if anyone's interested in that.

I also broke off and went to Guinea and the Ivory Coast and then Suliman and I, together, went to Kinshasa and then he went off to Abidjan, so I'll let him talk about Kinshasa and the (inaudible). In Ivory Coast it's getting worse. I think it's something that you guys should be watching. The country is dysfunctional. It's in the middle of a civil war and Abidjan is, you know, full of militias shaking it down as you go through the town. It's really one of the more frightening places. But the government is very proactively using the xenophobic card, the anti-Francophone card to divide and terrorize the population.

It's going to get much worse. And I think it's -- unfortunately so far, the U.S. has not been willing to support the UN's request for additional troops, and they really do need them. And one of our efforts is to try and get them to rethink that position. They do need more UN troops in the capital. The French are politically in a very difficult situation, given what's happened in the last few months there. So, that's something that I think is worth watching.

Guinea, on the other hand, is a little bit more optimistic than I was expecting. But there's not going to be a whole lot that changes there until the government changes. There's no real sense that large changes will come until the president departs. He's rumored to be very sick. He's apparently a lot better right now, so reports of his imminent demise seem to be premature. But there's -- a big question on that front is how do you manage the transition? There's a consensus in the country, which I found really quite surprising, that the military will take over when he goes. And even the opposition say that. The opposition say, "Well, we want them to stay for two weeks, not 20 years," but there is no respect for the constitutional transition to the head of the national assembly; and there's a bizarre agreement that that's what's going to happen. So, I think there's a role for the international community to play there to try and begin to plan for a democratic transition instead of a military coup transition. And -- you know, the timing of this is very difficult to predict, given the uncertainty around the president's health, but it would be useful to try and think about that.

The main focus of the trip was the Congo, so let me turn it over to Suliman, who is -- without bragging on the International Crisis Group really is one of the world's experts on Africa, on particularly both the Congo and Sudan. So, let me turn it over and maybe he can fill us in on our trip to both the Congo and then sort of an update on what's happening on Sudan; and then we'll open it up for questions.

MR. BALDO: Well, very quickly on the Congo: The threat to regional security, which was high in November with Rwanda threatening to raid Congo, to attack the FDLR, the Rwandan Hutu extremist forces that are based in eastern Congo. That threat has somewhat subsided now, but the episode has really underlined the fragility of the transition in Congo.

We have, basically, reluctant partners. The former combatants in the war in Congo who are together in this transition, each not very sure about their chances of political survival, post-elections that are slated for June of this year. And therefore, each keeping to their own, armed group, not integrating them into a national army as required by the peace agreement.

And this is one major destabilizing factor -- the failure to demobilize ex-combatants from the war period, the failure to integrate them in one national army, and then to stick to the calendar of the political process: The elections, the -- what is needed to get to an elected government in Congo. None of that, including the formal government headed by President Joseph Kabila, which is now also the head of the country, is sure about their chances and therefore, they are, you know, maneuvering, delaying, and so on.

Congo will therefore continue to be an area of concern because of these dynamics of the internal situation and the regional situation. Players will seek to delay the electoral process one way or the other by keeping their armed groups autonomous and within their own chain-of-command. They are probably seeking to have an option to go back to war or to some armed protest or contestation of the outcome of elections and the like.

We believe that this situation -- the, you know, note it is really very destabilizing internally and regionally. Therefore, preemptively, people really need to get involved now in making sure that the transition progresses towards its declared objectives of realizing some legitimate form of government through an electoral process.

There is an understanding, there is consensus that elections can not be held this June because of the delays that took place in passing legislation, and just the logistical preparations for the elections are not there in terms of polling stations, you know, all that is needed to have the mechanics of an electoral process underway. But the delay of six months, which appears to be making consensus now, is a realistic horizon for this process to take place. We believe that the international community should be pressing on all the players, on all the parties in that direction.

We believe that for the question of regional threat from the FDLR, obviously, one that has legitimate concerns there, but it has been overplaying the card. The FDLR doesn't pose any special set to Rwanda as a military force. It has been weakened through attrition, through isolation, and in Congolese (inaudible) (inaudible) and the jungles of Congo are not very hospitable to these kind of groups.

The attempt they made in 2001 to stage a major incursion into Rwanda was devastating. In terms of impact on them, the Rwandan army simply decimated those forces that succeeded into, you know, into invading and killed about 1500; detained a similar numbers and then, in a show of confidence, the Rwandan army then released them to their civilian life. The remnants have been cut from direct supplies by the Congolese Government. These forces, therefore, are very weak at present.

They constitute a political threat to Rwanda, an ideological threat to Rwanda. Rwanda's emotional concern, also, about the ideology of genocide is quite legitimate, as we said. We believe that there are solutions in the mechanisms that have been put in place, which are the tripartite verification mechanism and agreements signed under the auspices of the U.S. between Rwanda, Congo and Uganda, allowing verification of movement of armed groups along the border, the UN border between the three countries. This is, you know, a valid mechanism that could address Rwanda's security concerns. I think, without going into further detail, we can stop there and then --

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Do you want to spend a minute on Darfur?

MR. BALDO: Darfur, as you underline, you know, the African Union is now there, as they are the protection force. It's struggling to bring its force up to the authorized number of 3,300. As you saw, you know, opposition aligned, this is a nascent security and peace structure, that of the African Union. They were just putting in place the architecture of this peace and security capabilities of the African Union when Darfur happened, and the international community turned to the African Union to undertake a peacekeeping mission there.

It has accepted the task with a lot of assistance from the international community, from the European Union, from the U.S., Canada, Australia -- all the parties who are willing to help with that effort. There is two, you know, dimensions to this involvement. The African Union is the main, you know, is the mediator in the political talks between the government and the rebel groups in Darfur. And it's also providing, therefore, this peacekeeping force consisting of an observation mission of the ceasefire between the government and the rebel groups; and the understanding that by their mere presence, they will provide protection, you know, through their presence. They don't have a mandate for civilian protection. Here, we are very critical of this arrangement. We believe that the situation in Darfur is very genocidal in nature because particular communities are being targeted through systematic attacks on unarmed civilians. And these communities are now the ones that are found in displaced persons camps and refugee camps across the border in Chad. This is deliberate targeting by the Government of Sudan air force and army in conjunction with militia that are armed, trained, and supplied by the Government of Sudan.

For the international community to require the government to then turn back and disarm or contain these same militias is out of the question. You know, it is just totally unrealistic. The emphasis should have been put on civilian protection. You know, ending the violence against civilians, and we are still not there yet.

Emphasis should have been put on the issue of accountability for these policies that's to say the use of attack on civilians as a policy, you know, to counter insurgency policy. And impunity is going to be this issue these coming few weeks as the UN investigative panel submits its report to the Security Council; mostly probably, as everyone expects, with recommendations to refer the case of Sudan and Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Some other considerations are very likely to take over, you know, with the dispute between the U.S. and the European members of the Security Council on the appropriateness of using the International Criminal Court or, you know, (inaudible) court and the like.

And this tangle of a different nature, the whole issue of impunity for this egregiously slips through the international cracks again. Emphasis should be on the political process, as we said, and that's taking place.

Some developments are of grave concern; for example, the developments have been very rapid, very fast, of a very fast pace in Darfur, bypassing the capability of the armed groups there. You know, they started the rebellion immediately. A couple of months thereafter, the government unleashed this campaign of attacks on what was supposed to be the civilian base of the rebellion. The rebels don't have the political capability, you know, to cope with what they are able to achieve, you know, at the military level. They don't have the political capability to engage in a, you know, proactively in peace negotiations with the government. There are signs of strains in rebel ranks; there are signs that some rebel commanders are reneging as two more months and a phenomenal fallout that may develop in certain areas leading to more cracks that the Government of Sudan could then use to its advantage.

Therefore, we are at the stage where the conflict could still worsen further if people are not attentive and really pushing for the priority of civilian protection and accountability for policies that continue to be applied in Darfur by the government and its allies.

I will stop here and, yeah.

MS. NISBET: We can open this up to questions now. You don't need to state your name and affiliation more than once, but please, the first time around. Thank you.

QUESTION: Aberrahim Foukara, Al Jazeera. I have a question for Suliman about -- further to what you said about genocidal action.

MR. BALDO: Mm-hmm, yeah.

QUESTION: We often hear about conflicts in Darfur between Arab Sudanese and Black African Sudanese. How accurate are they?

MR. BALDO: This is not accurate. If you go to Darfur, you wouldn't distinguish who is Arab and who is not. These are political identities. The region is, you know, one of coexistence between these groups. They have been there for generations. They have been interchanging, you know, peacefully coexisting, intermarrying. They are all Muslim. You know, the level of Arabization and Islamization that is taking place in Darfur spontaneously before has been very great and therefore, differences that existed in the past, for example, over grazing lands, over access to water sources, were settled through communion, peace, settlement, you know, conflict resolution mechanisms -- communion and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The governments of Sudan, during the colonial period and after the colonial period and their independence, acted as literal arbitrators and guarantors of agreements that were reached by the communities themselves.

It's only in the mid-1980s that some Darfur groups of Arab background thought to exploit their ethnic, you know, background for political gain and they formed, you know, a certain pressure group under that label, you know, the Arabs of Darfur. It's a recent identity, which is of a political nature. The Government of Sudan today has decided to side with one group against the other, therefore feeding into this xenophobic, into this ideology, which is racist in nature, finally.

The other groups that are at the receiving end of these policies of exclusion are now identifying with the African identity because they need a common identity as groups that are targeted, that are victimized by this, you know, aggression from the groups of Arab origin and by, you know, backed by the Government of Sudan. They believe that there is an advantage in this label because of the international sympathy from the humanitarian community, from NGOs and the public opinion internationally as demonstrated over the last few years.

They believe also that there are some advantages by identifying themselves with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the SPLA of southern Sudan. Initially, the SPLA has helped these Darfurian groups of African origin through some logistical support, some training, some, you know, some contribution to their political manifesto and the like.

But then as the SPLA, as the southern SPLA became engaged in the peace process with Khartoum, they disengaged because they were talking seriously about, you know, about peace with the government, and they didn't want to be exploited at a different level.

The fact of the matter -- the situation of this polarity, Arab versus non-Arab, has been fed by Khartoum, and it is leading to the reversal of all the spontaneous form of Arabization, Islamization that has been taking place in Darfur for centuries. And it's done in the name of Islam, which is totally, you know, irresponsible, to say the least. But you know, from the side of Khartoum government.

QUESTION: I mean, if you have, you know, --

MR. BALDO: Yeah --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) actions that the Security Council may take, whether we're talking about the sanctions or the referral to the Criminal Court, do you or the Ambassador think that those measures will be adequate enough to arrest the deterioration in Darfur?

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: It certainly helps. I mean, if you look at what the international community has actually done so far, it's not much. You know, it's threatened sanctions that they don't impose, and then they talk about a force that doesn't exist. And there, the Sudanese Government has pretty much had a free hand to conduct genocide or ethnic cleansing, depending on how you define it. A lot of people are still dying there.

And so if they really were to do a referral and have a serious investigation, whether it's the ICC or some other cobbled-together investigatory body, I think it would send a chilling effect through those responsible for this campaign.

And, you know, targeted sanctions do tend to have an impact on individuals' decision making. I mean, we've seen it in other cases. And so I think it's time for, you know, real decisions on this issue.

MR. BALDO: Yes, I would agree, definitely. The referral to the ICC would really be, in the sense of holding particular individuals in the government structure responsible for the policies of, you know, that have led to massive war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and actions against the populations of Darfur -- whatever the label you use on them, there is no hierarchy in international law. You know, these are all crimes under international law, and the mere naming of officials who are responsible for this policy would have that chilling effect, that Khartoum cannot go on a ride because of all these divisions within the international community about the International Criminal Court or about this and that.

The mere naming of these officials would send a very strong message. You know, they cannot devise policies that attack civilians with impunity. You know, there is a determination to end that.

QUESTION: Andrea Boehm, Die Zeit Germany. I have two questions with regard to Congo.

First of all, I would like to know how much leverage do you think the UN mission MONUC still has, which, as far as I can see, never had that big of a reputation there anyway, given the recent scandal with regard to peacekeepers sexually abusing girls and women is the first question.

The second one, people in Kinshasa and people going back and forth I talked to said that what concerns them over the last, you know, month or maybe one or two years, is what they say a growing, increasingly irrational anti-Tutsi sentiment. I mean, you can give all kinds of reasons why that has come about, but they said it has reached the level where they fear this might -- with a sort of a certain mixture of incidents of escalation, might lead us to real anti-Tutsi violence, and I was just wondering if you would share that assessment.

And third, I'd just like to know, we hear of basic -- most of the time, we don't hear about the sort of daily atrocities that are being committed by all kinds of militias, especially in the eastern part of Congo, but that have reached an incredible, from what I can say, atrocious level with regard to violence against women, and I was wondering if you have more information on that.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: I' ll tell you about MONUC, maybe you could talk about the others.

MR. BALDO: Yeah.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: I think mainly -- the UN has had a very difficult time there, and I think the sexual scandal that occurred has to be dealt with very, very forcefully from here and from the headquarters. I mean, heads have to roll, people have to be investigated and prosecuted and brought to justice. It's unacceptable. And the UN needs to send that signal very, very forcefully. I hope they will. I'm expecting that they will, but --

QUESTION: They sent Angela Kane over there, I think.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Well, see, I don't know, actually. I'm just back, so -- but I think there is, you know, there's got to be a very strong signal from the beginning. The SRSG, Bill Swing, is, I think, the best in the business. He's very, very experienced, good, determined. He needs to, I think, take a very strong leadership role in this, in partnership with the UN; he's very good. I have a lot of confidence in him.

But the problems of MONUC are beyond that, too. I mean, it's a very tough mission. And the problem is anytime the UN is put into a situation where there is not the political will to move things forward, and the peace process is what they're based on, and that the process of transition and ending this war and the ceasefires is not working, MONUC is not going to look very good.

And so, part of it is, you put the UN in the middle of a situation that's moving in the wrong direction, they're going to have problems.

So I think the more positive news that we heard while we were there was the CIAT, the international community that has a formal role in the transition, and we -- ICG, or Crisis Group, excuse me, had been fairly critical of the CIAT's role, saying it wasn't being strong enough, wasn't coordinating, and I think that's changing. They're beginning to take a more proactive role. We're recommending that they begin to set clear benchmarks, really try and move this forward and be more proactive about it.

But right now you have a situation where the key political players in the transition view it in their interest to keep the transition going. And they fear they're going to lose influence, power, money, wealth, influence at the end of the transition. And so -- and I would include Rwanda in that, as well as most of the actors -- they're nervous about what's going to happen. And that equation needs to change. And until that changes, there's a limit of how much money can do.

You've also got the war still going in eastern Congo in some respects. And this is not an enforcement operation, and so any time there is a military operation, MONUC's going to be put in an awkward position. And that's going to remain the case until the Congolese army is strong enough to be able to conduct the war on its own. There's not going to be a third force that comes in and saves the day, which lot of people hope. And so it's going to be a continued rocky road moving forward.

I'll leave it to you. By the way, I've heard the figure that 30,000 people are dying a month in the Congo. Is that right? Someone said that. It's very high.

A PARTICIPANT: It's thousands and thousands a day that came up with the whole tsunami --

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Yeah, it's really high and nobody's paying attention to it.

MR. BALDO: Yeah, the situation in Eastern Congo has not changed much for the civilian population. It is true they are still under daily harassment and attacks by all these tributary armed groups and by these groups, I mean groups, for example, such as the remnants of the ex-FAR, Interhamwe, FDLR, who live in isolated areas, difficult of access in eastern Congo, and they prey on the civilian population because this is the only way they can get to please themselves. One might say daily exertions. These include forced labor, you know, making people work for them in the field, for example, or picking what they need for their own food and wanton attacks.

But Congolese factions that are in the transitional government have also done a very bad job disciplining their own armed groups. ALC is, for example, Armée de Libération du Congo. The armed groups for the RCD, any of the other factions of RCD, Armée de postplus Congo, or APC, the government's own army is -- all these groups are unpaid and the assumption is that they have to raise their salary from the population, so they have roadblocks; they, you know, impose ransom money on the people. You know, as you said, rape is very prevalent, and that's what makes the high numbers of those killed because the population is under constant pressure. They are forced to leave their traditional livelihoods and to live into displaced conditions, and when you don't get your regular, you know, rations of food or access to health, what ends up being the situation is that you are exposed to all these epidemics and sicknesses and you end up with a higher rate of mortality among the civilian population. This is, sadly, the reality of everyday life of the Congolese.

MONUC has a serious problem because it doesn't appear, up to now, to have a very coherent, clear strategy to exercise its mandate of civilian protection, however limited that mandate is. Events in Kisangani in June of 2002, in Bukavu in May and June of 2004, and recently in November around Kanya-Bayunga in North Kivu have shown that MONUC is always "off guard," even when violence against a civilian is entirely predictable. That has been the case throughout these incidences, recent incidences. And until MONUC addresses this issue, you know, of how it could really forcefully, you know, own its own mandate, then MONUC would still be subject to criticism in addition to what's happening with its, you know, the recent scandal and the like. This is my major concern. This is --

MS. SODERBERG: The other thing, just on that, is we're recommending that MONUC do more in the border monitoring on the arms embargo and try and accelerate a process of attrition for the FDLR like, you know, cutting off any kind of arms flow, as well as trying to take over key areas of funding for some of these groups such as the mines. You know, it would not have to be a firefight. They could -- you know, if they take over these key centers and do a lot more on the border, I think it would begin to speed this process of attrition in some of these groups.

MR. BALDO: Yeah, this is definitely the case here because a major destabilizing factors in Eastern Congo, where most of the violence against civilians is taking place is the signs of the presence of these foreign armed groups and the FDLR. In a way, Congo is the scene of the second force genocide conflict of Rwanda. It is spilling over in Congo. In 1996, Rwanda invaded Congo because of the Interhamwe presence in the refugee camps next to the border. And then Congo was the scene of a certain amount of squalls between the Rwandan Tutsis and related army and the remnants of the Hutu extremist militias and former army that perpetrated the genocide, not only in the border area but right across Congo until the border, you know, in the west with Congo- Brazzaville of Central Africa.

You know, there were killing fields in Tingi Tingi, in (inaudible), right across Congo. And then when Laurent Kabila differed with Rwanda, there was this second invasion, which made of Rwanda instead of the ally of the sitting government in Congo of Laurent Kabila, occupation force, in Eastern Congo.

For the best part of six years, the Rwandan army had exclusive control militarily of the eastern half of Congo, and it has failed to take out the remnants of these extremist groups. Now, to turn around and demand the same of the Congo, this couple of years since the war ended, is really, you know, not very realistic. There has to be some international addressing of this problem. MONUC has to play a role. But the main force to undertake the containment of the FDLR, the Rwandan Hutu groups in Eastern Congo should be the Congolese army. As we said, and the Congolese army needs a lot of reform, you know, a lot of effort to put it in a fighting, you know, spirit --

QUESTION: Who's training them right now? I mean --

MR. BALDO: There are initiatives, you know. The Angolans have trained three brigades; the Belgians have trained one brigade for (inaudible), and the South Africans are also involved in training. And there are efforts to coordinate, you know, the three training partners: Angola, Belgium and South Africa so that there is some coordination which you --

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Well, and there should be more. I mean, they've only -- they need about -- we go back and forth -- it's 17 battalions? 17 --

MR. BALDO: Brigades.

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: -- brigades, I think, are what, ultimately, it's basically one per province and two in the Kivus, in order to stabilize the country. And the current rate of training is, you know, a multi-year effort at the rate they're going. So if that could be sped up, it would go a long way towards addressing some of the root problems that are there.

MR. BALDO: Yeah. Now, just last issue of this anti-Tutsi sentiment, because of this background, as I said, the feeling that, you know, the Kivus are the core of the problem is really prevalent. The main argument of the presidential party, the PPRD, the party, du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et le Developpement, the presidential party, is this anti-Tutsi feeling.

Tutsis of, you know, the Congolese of Tutsi origin have collaborated with the Rwandans with during the first war, you know, it was the Banyamulenges issue under Mobutu that led to the triggering of the 1996 -- there was a conflict of interest between the Rwandan Government at the time and the Banyamulenges community in Eastern Congo. And then when the Ugandan -- sorry, the Rwandan army, or the invading force, in 1998 the same groups of Congolese of Tutsi origin also collaborated. Other Congolese tend to take -- hold them accountable for that.

What's happening now is that the Congolese of Rwandan origin generally, Tutsi and Hutu, are really in control of the southern part of north Kivu. This is where they have the largest number of people. It's about a million of them there. This is where they feel that this is their last stronghold. And therefore, the RCD-Goma, the political movement that was, you know, fighting on behalf of the Congolese Tutsi has reinvented itself as the Front for the Interests of Congolese of Rwandan origin, including Tutsi and Hutu. They created a new identity of Rwanda form, you know, of people of Rwandan origin who are Congolese. And the governor of North Kivu, who is from that community, has been using this very successfully to mobilize the Rwandan -- again, it's Congolese of Rwandan origin, against the defense of the RCD-Goma and the interests of the elites of this community.

There are issues of coercive investments in farms, in, you know, illicit exploitation of natural resources that are involved. One result of this process is an emergence, you know, or a heightened level of anti-Rwandafone feeling, particularly in the Kivus, and then in the rest of the country. So it's not only anti-Tutsi. It's anti-Rwandafone. This is a criminal element, which is very, you know, alarming, the level of, you know, extreme polarization that is happening now, and if people do not pay attention, it could lead to further trouble in the future.

If you look at the history of this vision from the early '90s, comparatively, you know, the Congo has been an island of pacifism, you know, if you compare it to Rwanda and Burundi. But this is --

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: It's a rough neighborhood.

MR. BALDO: Yes, a very rough -- you know, it's a very rough neighborhood. It's only this spillover effect, this politicization, this exploitation by elites in Rwanda and in Congo for political and economic gain, which is leaving the communities finally into a sense of separation and of polarization, exactly as it's happening in Darfur between Arabs and non-Arabs, you know. These type of divisions exist in all communities. It's only when elites try to exploit them for political, economic gain, there become factors of division and factors of violence.

QUESTION: All right, so then, how (inaudible) is the potential for either another genocide or of ethnic cleansing in Great Lakes now, based on your --

MR. BALDO: Well, we have to be very careful because this is, you know, the issue of genocide and of, you know, ethnic killing, is also exploited by the political elite. Look, for example, at the incident of Bukavu in May or June. There was a very loud announcement by the RDC-Goma in Congo that Congolese of Tutsi origin in Bukavu were under threat of genocide. That wasn't the case. But it created a situation where there was an attempt by the RCD-Goma to import its control over Bukavu, which failed, lack of sympathy and support of the international community to the claim by Rwanda, Burundi and the Congolese or the RCD-Goma that, you know, there was a genocidal threat; and therefore, Kinshasa and the government of Joseph Kabila were able to take control of South Kivu. You know, that attempt at exploiting genocide for political gain has failed, okay? Now, with the issue of South Kivu out of the way for the government in Kinshasa, there is an attempt to take control of North Kivu, where we said there is a mobilization of the, you know, the Banyarwanda, Rwanda, the people of Rwandan origin in eastern Congo. And the government in Kinshasa, if it is not very careful, it could really fall into a situation where there is this, you know, violence between the communities, the Banyarwandans and the others.

And the situation is created for inter-communal violence in Eastern Congo now because of this environment. The issue is political strategic control of the Kivu province, but the elites, the political elites that are struggling for this control don't have any problem using, you know, ethnic affiliation for political gain, on both sides, you know, people on the side of Rwanda and people of Rwandan origin in Congo, or on the side of the government. And now the communities are gradually separating and, you know, arming themselves to face each other. So we really need to be watching very carefully for this situation.

QUESTION: I had a question for the Ambassador on Ivory Coast. The anti-French sentiment that you talked about, to what extent is that manipulation by Laurent Gbagbo and his cohorts? And to what extent is it based on -- to what extent is it justified, based on what the French themselves have done -- the bombing of the aviation, the police and other things?

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: Well, I don't think inciting violence against civilians is ever justified, so I think as much as there's you know, anger over the French action there, that doesn't justifiably translate into encouraging attacks against civilians. The French population has, by and large, departed the country at this stage. There are -- I don't know what the numbers are, but the civilian population, for the most part, is now out there. I talked -- there are a few there, some humanitarian workers there are French nationals, and it's very frightening for them. And that's a direct campaign run by the president and I think it's immoral and dangerous.

You know, the French are certainly not perfect in that region, but I think they also, you know, have made an investment and to try and promote, you know, a stable resolution of this problem.

My own personal sense is that the French send very mixed signals under the best description, of what happened on November 4th with the decision by the government to try and change the balance against the Force Nouvelle. My own sense, and the French deny this, but I still think it's probably fairly accurate, although I think the French Government was very divided. Apparently, Chirac did make a phone call to the president. What he actually said, I don't know, but there were clear indications given on the ground that yellow light, it's okay. You know, I think the analysis was -- it's kind of like the Kraijna in the Bosnian conflict when the Croats decided to clean the Serbs' clock, and that changed the balance of the war, and that's actually what started the -- paving the path towards peace in Bosnia.

And I think they made the same calculation. Well, I'll say of acts of Force Nouvelle that it might make the peace process backfire very gravely on that.

But I think there -- what needs to happen there is a -- you know, we've been arguing for some personal accountability, what's going on, some of the -- again, a lot of this is economic, too. I mean, how much does the corruption play into this as well? And this is a completely divided country right now and there isn't much of a peace process, either.

And so there, I think you have -- as well as the international community can be a lot more aggressive as well. So the government is directly responsible for most of the problem.

QUESTION: Do you have any quick thoughts on Western Sahara, by the way, as for the prospects of a resolution?

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: I mean, I haven't been following the Western Sahara lately, but I know it pretty well. I've been there many times. You know, I don't see any great change or movement on that any time soon.

My own view on that has long been that the -- there is a resolution of this to be made if there, you know, was some kind of referendum moved forward, but the politics in Morocco are far from letting that happen right now, and it's not really a priority for the U.S., which is probably the sole country that could push it. Baker's now left and quit. I think Alvarez is doing an admirable job out there under very difficult circumstances, but I don't see any great progress right now. But I haven't been following it that closely.

Is there something that went on? Did something happen that you're asking about?

QUESTION: No. I was just thinking about the recent -- about a month, two months ago, there were reports that there was some sort of military escalation between Morocco and Algeria.

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah, okay. Over this?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah, I haven't heard about that. But I don't expect any grand breakthrough.

MS. NISBET: It's almost nearing -- well; it's after 11 now. I don't know if you could shed some light on possible concerns on other crisis hotspots throughout the world that are worth mentioning, if possible.

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah, I mean, I think we can just keep this conversation going. This is great for us and our people come through on a regular basis, so I'm happy to make them available to come by and do this as they come through. And again, our Kosovo person is here if anyone wants to chat further with them give me a call. We can set that up or let you know, and you can let me know whatever you want to do.

You know, I think, as I said in the initial comments, I think Nepal is something that we're watching very closely. Nepal is about to get worse. Indonesia, it's interesting to see what -- Aceh has been a very much of a hot spot. I think it'll be interesting to see whether this recent ceasefire and if the Free Aceh Movement put forward after the tsunami -- the tsunami really did just wipe out Aceh, and it's awful -- whether some good can come out of that. There is an opportunity here and I think that there's a possibility, if the government can move it forward.

I think, you know, we're watching Georgia very closely. The elections were defused on that. Ecuador is getting a little tricky with the dismissal of the Supreme Court. You know, the Middle East, I think, is -- Iraq, I mean our -- we've -- I mentioned our report on Kirkuk that's out. I mean, my own view on the elections on Sunday is, there's not a lot that's going to change after those elections. There's going to be a long haul to establish a legitimate government. That's a multi-year process to get them accepted by the country. You're going to have the disenfranchised Sunnis. You're going to have, you know, wonderful stories of, you know, tearful stories of people struggling to get to the polls to vote and standing in line forever. And then you're going to have some bloody scenes on TV, no doubt about it.

But the longer-term thing there, I argue, is it's a, you know, it's basically a long obstacle course with highs and lows. And it's going to primarily depend on three things: Getting the legitimacy established with that government, which is not going to happen on Sunday. It's a step in the right direction, but it's going to take years. You're going to have to do a national assembly, a prime minister or president, have a constitution; have a referendum. And that in itself is a yearlong process, and so it'll be a couple years before people -- the majority feel this government has earned its legitimacy.

The second thing is, you know, you we have to have a security force to hand it over to. And, you know, the numbers are all over the map on exactly how many Iraqi security forces exist, but most people I know who observe it fairly closely, it's a multi-year effort to have a security force that you can hand this over to. And they've got to get the lights back on. I mean, the country has to function, and that's a billion dollar -- billions of dollars investment on our part, but I think it will work.

You know, Saudi Arabia and the whole Arab Reform effort I think that the Bush Administration needs to turn to. And we don't know what they mean the President's speech. You know, it's a very controversial speech, but you know, that's what inaugurals are supposed to do, set lofty goals. The question is, what does it mean? And they don't know what it means.

You can see that, you know, they're backing away from it. They're walking away. You know, it's a lot of rhetoric at this point and they need to figure out what they really want to do. They've put forward this Arab Reform program in the most glam-handed way possible and the Arabs have rejected it. Now, whether they can recoup that and actually begin to move forward, I think the Israeli peace process probably will begin to move forward.

We're watching Uzbekistan and the -stans very closely. Afghanistan actually seems to, you know, be moving better than expected. You know, those elections really, I think, went better than everyone expected, which is a rare piece of good news.

And you know, I assume you guys all look at our web site and things like that. But if there are things that come up, we can put you in touch with the people that are on the ground as well. The New York office has myself, Suliman, who is the Africa Program Director, Bob Templar, who's the Asia Program Director, and the three of us are, you know, either always available or we can put you in touch with someone who's on the ground and can give you kind of the better side.

And feel free to use this room right around the corner. Stop by any time.

MS. NISBET: And you have many regional experts.

MR. BALDO: Yeah, we have field officers.

MS. SODERBERG: 40 of them. So we're not everywhere, but we're almost everywhere.

MS. NISBET: Please ask for the Media Relations department. Or can they actually call and ask for one of you directly if the journalists have questions?

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah. You can just call us or we'll put you in touch with -- you know, we have a press officer based in Brussels, but with the time difference, it's often difficult to do that. So, you know, you're welcome to call me, and if I'm not there, someone in the office can help.

My assistant's name is Kate. And, you know, she can help put you in touch with -- but it's better just to call us directly if you need anything. It's faster. We're pretty accessible.

QUESTION: Will you be able to do live over the next few days on either Iraq or Sudan?

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah.

MS. NISBET: Well, I really thank you for being here and I know it's beyond the time you were expecting, so I really appreciate it and I hope that we can continue to have similar discussions along the way.

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah, definitely. We'll let you know when people come. I mean, I do this kind of very ad hoc, but there's no reason I just can't bring them over here and do this on a basis. And I think the people we have coming up is somebody from our office in Osh, David Lewis, I think, is coming if anyone is interested in the -stans. Do you have anybody else coming?

MR. BALDO: Mike, our person in West Africa who is based in Dakar, and who covers Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and has done recent research on the Pan-Sahel initiative of the U.S., you know, the anti-terror law in that region and the Islamism in the region of the Sub-Saharan Africa will be around on March 21st, 23rd in New York area. And by that time, we are expecting two reports to be out: The one on the Islamism in the Sahel region, and another report on Cote D'Ivoire.

But, you know, if these reports are out, but -- or you can just pick up the phone, you know, whatever follow-up questions you have for him, or clarifications, you can do that. But when he is here, he would also -- will come. You know, coming and briefing (inaudible).

MS. NISBET: Ambassador Soderberg and Mr. Baldo, thank you so much for coming.

MR. BALDO: Yeah. Thank you.

MS. SODERBERG: Yeah, my pleasure. It was great. Thank you.

MS. NISBET: Thanks a lot. This is being transcribed, so it will be up on our website. It takes, typically, anywhere from two hours to maybe eight. So just keep an eye out. I think you all have our web site address. Thank you.