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Foreign Press Centers > Briefings > -- By Date > 2005 Foreign Press Center Briefings > January 

Elections in Iraq


U.S. Department of State Official
Foreign Press Center Background Briefing
Washington, DC
January 21, 2005


1:00 P.M. EST

MR. MACINNES: Good afternoon. Welcome to our first press conference after the inauguration and we're really delighted today. Let me start off by saying it's a backgrounder. You can use the attribution Senior State Department Official, but no personal attribution.

It's my pleasure today to introduce a Senior State Department Official.

We also have New York on today, so there may be some questions from New York. It's closed-circuit DVC, digital video conference, with them. So without much further ado, so this is not to be recorded -- there will be a transcript available later today, probably this evening. Thank you.

Sir.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good. Welcome, all of you, to this informal meeting. (Statement in Arabic.) We don't do this in Arabic. There are far too many from all over the world here today, and I think it's a good sign of the interest that the world community is taking in these elections that so many of you are here today.

Let me explain briefly my own involvement with the issue of Iraq, which began in the fall of 2003 as I was solicited to go out to Baghdad. I did go out to Baghdad in January of 2004, and stayed more or less continuously, until September.

During that nine-month period, I worked very closely with Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador Jones and others on the full spectrum of political and political-military issues of the day. Since September, I've been dividing my time between Baghdad and Washington. I've been back about a month at this point, originally for the holidays, but coincidentally, to try and get over a bout of near pneumonia, which I hope I don't pass on to you.

But we are coming up on the 30th of January to national elections in Iraq. To me, as a long time observer of and specialist in the Middle East, they are very significant in that, to my knowledge, these are the first elections in modern Arab history in which the outcome cannot be predicted.

They are genuinely free and fair elections, open to all registered voters, open to all registered political entities and individuals. And so there is a certain unique, and I hope, precedent-setting character to these elections. At the same time, I think it's important to recognize that as important as these elections are, they are one step in an overall process of transition, which began in April of 2003 and will go forward until December 2005.

As I think all of you recall, the period from April 2003 to June of 2004 was a period in which the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually, the Interim Governing Council, the Iraqi Governing Council, were in charge, and one of their main accomplishments was to draft and approve the Transitional Administrative Law, which provided the rules of the road for the transition that was to follow.

In June of 2004, of course, the -- I'm trying to remember the right word here -- the Interim Iraqi Governing Council took over. Its powers have been limited. One of its main tasks has been to provide for these, and prepare for these January elections. Assuming these elections go forward on schedule, which I have every confidence they will, as of January 30th, a transitional government will be formed, which will govern from February until December. This transitional government will be composed in the first instance of 275 National Assembly members elected in this national election.

Its tasks, as a body, will be to elect a presidency council. The presidency council will appoint a prime minister, who will then choose his ministers and that whole slate of prime minister and ministers will go before this National Assembly for approval.

In parallel with that process of setting the first Iraqi governmental institutions to be chosen exclusively by Iraqis, in parallel with that process, the National Assembly will have the very important task of drafting the permanent constitution of Iraq, of putting it to a national referendum in October of 2005, and then, under electoral laws and regulations to be drawn up in light of the constitution, to hold a second set of national elections in December of 2005.

This whole electoral process, leading up to January 30th, was established in May with participation from Iraqi personalities, the Governing Council in particular, the participation of the Coalition Provisional Authority of the time and the participation of the United Nations, particularly, the Special Emissary, Lakhdar Brahimi, and the UN's elections expert, Madame Pirelli.

Once the broad lines of this electoral process were defined, the implementation was put in the hands of the Iraqi -- the Independent Iraqi Electoral Commission, or the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, which, from the time of its establishment to today, has been a completely autonomous decision-making body, which listens to a variety of opinions, but has exclusive decision-making power for every aspect of the elections.

In its work, it's been assisted by various parts of the United Nations. The principal figure in that has been Carlos Valenzuela, who's been in Baghdad serving as an ex-officio non-voting member of the Iraqi Commission. The Commission's also been assisted by IFES, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

As you know, the electoral system that was chosen Madame Pirelli was a single-district, proportional representation system. The whole country is one district. Voter registration proceeded. There are now a total of about 14.5 million voters who are eligible to vote; a wide spectrum of electoral regulations has been promulgated. Overseas voting centers have been established under a contract with the International Organization for Migration -
There are a large number of domestic observers that have been trained by a number of international NGOs. There are about 6,000 polling centers foreseen all over the country. Security is in the hands of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior with the coalition forces playing a security role, a supporting role.

What will happen on January 30th is a total of 20 elections, not just one. There is one national election for the National Assembly, in which those 275 candidates who win the most -- the largest number of votes will be elected. But at the same time, there will be one for the Kurdistan Regional Assembly and 18 provincial elections for provincial councils.

In all of this, and as a measure of the interest that these elections have generated within Iraq, there are about -- if I can find the figure, not to mislead you -- somewhere around 11,000 candidates running in these various elections. And although I don't find the exact number, that's close enough.

In the election for the National Assembly, there are over 100 political entities present. This has made for a rather complicated electoral ballot. It's not quite as big as some that have been held in other elections around the world, but it's a substantial ballot. And in each of these elections, where you will have a combination of electoral lists running and individual candidates running by themselves, the voter will be called upon to pick one choice for whom to cast a vote. That one vote might be for a list, or it might be for an individual candidate who is not a member of a list, but is running independently.

I think you're all aware of the main lists that have been formed. I think you're all aware of the challenges that face this election, and one must emphasize that there are real challenges here. I will simply mention the issue of violence and voter intimidation, the issue of the participation of the Sunni community, and the simple issue of arranging logistics for such an event -- one that has not been held in Iraq for some time.

I think for the moment, I'll leave it there, and we'll get into other issues of more specific interest to you in the question and answers.

MR. MACINNES: All right. We'll take questions. Just please make sure you identify who you are and your organization.

QUESTION: Umit Enginsoy with Turkish NTV Television.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You like to ask questions, don't you? I remember from the last briefing I did here.

QUESTION: Yes. First of all, I hope you're totally fine now, in terms of your health.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: More or less.

QUESTION: And, well, the Iraqi Election Commission has recently made a decision under which those who had been expelled from Kirkuk in northern Iraq during Saddam's Arabization policy now could return home and vote in Kirkuk. And the United States supports this policy as well.

Now, Turkey is complaining that tens of thousands of Kurds who had never been residents of Kirkuk are now being registered as voters there, and the Turks say that
is a move that could alter the political balance in the area.

Now, two things: Have you observed any voter registration irregularities in Kirkuk? And secondly, are you concerned over potential election-relation violence in Kirkuk before or after the polls? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The issue of voting arrangements in Kirkuk has been a major one throughout the period of preparations. For a long time, the Kurdish community was recommending that provincial elections for the provincial council not be held on the grounds that until the population issues of the province of Kirkuk were settled, it made little sense to elect a provincial council that might not reflect the population balance within that province over the long term.

Agreement has now been reached to hold these provincial elections. I, at this point, having been away for a month, am not familiar with the precise arrangements that led to that agreement, and I know that there are some voices that are still contesting those arrangements. But I would point out that the election that is to be held is not going to affect the long term inasmuch as a second round of elections is foreseen under new electoral guidelines in December of 2005. And one would presume that by that time, some of the issues related to the various categories of displaced and other persons in Kirkuk will have been sorted out more or less to the satisfaction of all the parties.

It is a very difficult issue, given the history of population movements in and out of Kirkuk over the decades. But we are encouraged that agreement has been reached at this point on holding a provincial election.

QUESTION: Are you concerned? Violence was the second part of the question.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Violence has -- the potential for violence has been a concern of the Iraqi Government and of ourselves as a coalition from the beginning. It's clear that there are elements in Iraq that do not want these elections to be held because they will set up a new political equation that is not to their liking.

That said, the majority of Iraqis, by the latest poll, some 82-83 percent, want to go to the polls. Even among Sunnis, according to this latest poll, 50 percent say they intend to vote or at least try to vote. So the desire for an election is there. There will undoubtedly and regrettably be acts of violence associated with this election. But I repeat that this election is the gateway to a fully legitimate Iraqi Government that can take the country forward in the future. And we, as a government, encourage every community in Iraq to participate in that election, to gain for itself its rightful place in the new political equation.

I think those of you who recall Iraqi history recognize that, or remember that in 1920, under arrangements that the British set in place, the Shiite community decided to boycott elections and, as a result, was excluded from political life in any meaningful way for many, many years. I think it's incumbent on the Sunni community at this point not to repeat that mistake.

We are working for a truly legitimate representative government in which there is majority rule with full respect for the rights of every minority. And those who choose not to participate in the election are merely going to complicate the task of ensuring full representation for their community in the next phase of this political calendar, that important phase of drafting and improving the new constitution.

Violence is a problem. The Iraqi authorities and the coalition authorities, in a supporting role, will do everything they can to minimize violence, but as I say, there are those committed to trying to derail this process, and regrettably, one can foresee acts of violence in the lead-up to this election.

QUESTION: Thank you. Philippe Gelie, Le Figaro, France.

What will be the measure of success of these elections? Will it be the turnout? Will it be the outcome of the election, the political color of the assembly? Or will it be the eventual impact on the level of violence in the country? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think the issue of what constitutes a successful election is one for the Iraqi population, first and foremost, to decide. All of us outside Iraq can make any number of judgments, but in the end, this election will be regarded at legitimate or illegitimate largely on the basis of the views of the Iraqi population itself.

The main issue there, of course, is Sunni participation. The Iraqi Government and members of the coalition have been doing what they can to encourage the widest possible Sunni participate through a variety of meetings, conferences and appeals. It's very difficult to predict at this point what Sunni participation will be. There is the factor of calls to boycott. There is the factor of intimidation and violence.

But in this regard, I would point out that a large number of Sunnis in Iraq live outside Sunni areas; for instance, in the city of Baghdad, which is a very mixed city. And the issue of their going to the polls in terms of violence and intimidation is somewhat different from the issue as it presents itself in completely Sunni areas such as Al-Anbar province.

I would also say that legitimacy is not of one dimension. There are many dimensions to legitimacy, and one of them will be how the newly elected National Assembly picks it presidency council, in which there will be a Sunni; how it picks its -- how the new prime minister picks his cabinet; how the new cabinet officers function; what place is given to Sunnis in the appointments that will be made thereafter; what role the Sunnis as a community play in drafting the constitution, and here I know there is a lot of discussion in Iraq today about creating some kind of mechanism to broaden the process of drafting the constitution to make it a truly national process, through such devices as town hall meetings, conferences, media work, possibly even according to some, setting up some kind of advisory commission in which Sunnis would be represented in a respectable manner.

From our discussions with the major political figures as they have emerged to date, it is quite clear that they share the notion that future governmental arrangements should be representative and all-inclusive. They are not seeking to shut anyone out. And to the extent there is insufficient Sunni participation in the January 30th election itself, I'm quite confident that ways will be found in the months to follow to balance that to ensure that the Sunni voice is heard as the constitution is drafted and put to referendum.

The referendum had an interesting twist here. I think some of you may recall that the Transitional Administrative Law, when it set up the constitutional referendum, indicated that if three provinces voted against the constitution, it would not be approved. At the time, this was conceived as a way of protecting Kurdish interests. In fact, it has now turned out to be a way to protect Sunni interests because whatever mechanism and whatever group of people drafts the constitution, this body will have to take into account the possibility that three Sunni provinces could vote against it. And so there is a built-in mechanism for protecting Sunni interests in this arrangement.

But, as I say, this is an election whose outcome it is impossible to predict. I think that's one of the delightful aspects of it, and we shall wait until January 30th and some days thereafter to see what has emerged. I say some days thereafter because it's quite clear that on January 31st, results will not be available. It will take some days for the Electoral Commission to gather all the ballot boxes, sort out the votes and announce results.

QUESTION: President Bush, when he gave comments on the elections in Afghanistan, mentioned the turnout. You just said that you expect 50 percent of the people at least to express the desire to go to the polls.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sunnis, yes.

QUESTION: Yeah. So, I mean, to answer that it will just be a matter of the Iraqis themselves to say they are satisfied, of course, I suspect the people who will be elected will be satisfied with this election. I would like to know what it will take to the American Government and to the State Department to be satisfied?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The Secretary of State himself has enunciated two achievements that, for us over the long-term, would constitute success. The first is the establishment of a legitimate representative government able to carry forth in the coming months, as the constitution is written and put to referendum, as the new
elections are prepared for December. The second measure is continuing progress on creating an Iraqi security force that is able to defend the country from both internal and external threats. If you want a precise figure of participation that would constitute success, I'm not prepared to give such a figure. I think it would be presumptuous of someone standing in Washington to set up criteria of that sort when, quite genuinely, the principal judges of this election are going to be the Iraqis themselves.

MR. MACINNES: We're going to go to New York now for a question from the New York Foreign Press Center.

QUESTION: Yes, [senior State Department official], thank you very much. My name is Neeme Raud. I'm from Estonian TV.

We have been hearing in the past weeks that administrations have tried to lower the expectations for these elections. Do you agree with that, and what is your comment? Is that -- we read it all the time in the media. Is that so? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'm not prepared to get into a barometer of when expectations have been high and when expectations have been low. It is fair to say that we would have hoped that more would have been achieved in the way of reestablishing security and in the way of encouraging those elements of the Sunni community that wish to boycott this election or that have called for a boycott of this election to participate. Those two elements remain question marks that may affect the outcome of the election, but I don't want to talk in terms of higher and lower expectations at this point.

QUESTION: My name is Pal Reti. I am the Washington correspondent of the leading Hungarian news magazine, HVG.

And my question concerns the division of the Iraqi society, not along only by ethnic lines but certain political lines. And my question concerns whether the U.S. is supporting some of these political orientations of certain candidates or groupings, meaning that liberals or Democrats or -- so is there a hidden or an open support for certain groups or candidates by the U.S.?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We have consistently stated that we hope for the emergence of a legitimate, representative government that is an all-inclusive government that respects the rights of minorities, that promotes tolerance and reconciliation within Iraqi society. That's the general principal.

We have very carefully avoided promoting the interests of one or another party or one or another political candidate. The main element in our support for the electoral process in concrete terms has been the work of the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, all of which have been very active on the ground in Iraq providing training and voter education for any political party that wished to avail itself of those services. And, indeed, over the months, a wide variety of political parties have availed themselves of these services, and there has been no distinction made. As long as a party was a recognized party, it was eligible for participate in all of the training and educational activities of these institutes.

Your question raises a wider point, perhaps, as to the nature of Iraqi society itself. The polling would indicate that Iraqis, as a population, have a very high degree of religious faith. At the same time, they have widely varying opinions on the degree to which religion should enter into political life. And if you look at the full spectrum, you can go from full theocracy to secularism and everything in between.

I think there will be increased attention paid to the religious element, but by no means is Iraq going to become a theocracy. Even those parties that the press has labeled as closely aligned with Iran show no interest in the Iranian style of Velayat-e faqih. They speak instead of a greater recognition of the Islamic character of Iraq and there are obviously specific issues where this could come to bear.

But at this point, it's impossible to judge where in this spectrum I have outlined, the new government that is elected, the new assembly and the government to follow, where in that spectrum it will fall. And one reason I say that is that we've all witnessed the political jockeying that has gone on in Iraq since these elections were set in motion, coalition-building alliances, dirty campaigns, clean campaigns. Everything under the sun has been seen. But that was all to maximize the chances of getting elected.

Once these 275 people are elected, we can expect a whole second round of coalition building to take place. And it's not necessarily going to follow the same lines that the pre-electoral coalition building took. You have some very important groups that will play a very important role in the National Assembly. The Shiite community is obviously one of them. They are the majority in Iraq today, and it can be expected that there will therefore be majority rule.

But at the same time, you have a very important Sunni Arab minority. You have a very important Kurdish minority. You have an important Turkoman and other minorities as well. All of these will have to be balanced in the coalition building that is to take place once the assembly is formed. And as I mentioned earlier, one of its first tasks is going to be to pick a presidency council of three where it will have to balance various community interests out; and that process, in and of itself, should favor compromise

MR. MACINNES: Thank you. This gentleman over here.

QUESTION: Ron Baygents, Kuwait News Agency here in Washington. You were up front about saying there will be violence on election day and, I believe, said 6,000 polling sites. Brief question is this: What could you say to the Iraqis to reassure them that it's not a high-risk game to go vote and that they would have some -- specifically, what can you about security measures that would give them some confidence that by going to vote they can get out of it alive? Thanks.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, one thing one can do is to describe the very elaborate security arrangements that will be in place, ranging from Iraqi security forces close at hand near the polling stations, to a wider circle of coalition forces, to areas in which no car will be allowed, much as for the inaugural. There are concrete security measures that can be publicized; however, given the nature and history of violence in Iraq over the last few months, I wouldn't expect the best exposition of security arrangements to be necessarily convincing.

It's going to take an act of courage on the part of Iraqis, courage and faith in a democratic future radically different from the existence that they had under Saddam Hussein. The polls do demonstrate, as I say, that 83 percent, 82-83 percent of those polled state an intention to at least try to vote, and among the Sunnis the number approaches 50 percent. The most recent poll is a poll done by the International Republican Institute in the last week of December and the first week of January, and its results should be available to you. It makes for some interesting analysis.

One other thing I should mention, which I forgot to mention at the beginning. Two days ago, Ambassador Negroponte, in Baghdad, gave an extensive on-the-record interview to Western journalists and the transcript will be available to you from the center here, should you wish to look at his exposition of the various issues and factors involved.

QUESTION: Michael Backfisch, Germany's Business Daily Handelsblatt.

The Administration has stressed that violence will increase immediately before and after the election. When you do think the unrest will calm down substantially? And is this expectation realistic for the near future?

Secondly, how many Iraqi troops, both military and police, are being trained or serving right now? And again, here, do you have a realistic time frame when they might be able to do the job in defending the country against internal and external threats?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I know that there's a huge debate about how many are in training or have been trained. And part of that debate would probably hinge on what constitutes training. Is three days of training training? Are two weeks of training training, et cetera? So you can play all kinds of numbers games here and I don't want to play those games. I will state, as a general proposition, that there are fewer Iraqi security forces available than we would have liked to see, and we are in the process of greatly intensifying our efforts to train Iraqi security personnel for the longer term.

I think this coming nine days and the days immediately following the elections will see, regrettably, a significant amount of violence, bearing in mind that there are people who do not want this process to succeed because it has upset their applecart. But I think the key to reducing violence over the long run is, first, the establishment of a legitimate representative government that is seen as such by the Iraqi people. This is important because neither the Governing Council nor the Interim Government have enjoyed that image with the Iraqi population because they were not elected by the Iraqi people.

This is going to be the first government elected and formed by Iraqis themselves. The legitimate government that we hope will emerge from these elections, I think, could go a long way in reestablishing people's confidence in the future. This is important because the insurgency, as it exists, benefits from the frustrations and concerns, particularly of the Sunni population, and it has been difficult under these circumstances to separate the wider Sunni community from the insurgency that has been operating within it. The establishment of a legitimate government that enjoys people's confidence, that has a vision for the future, would be a very useful first step in bringing the wider Sunni community to accept that the insurgency does not serve its interests and to take concrete measures to work with the new government to defeat that insurgency.

The other element in looking at security over the long term will be the degree of success that the coalition has in training and equipping a larger number of Iraqi security forces. But again, to me, the establishment of a legitimate government with a vision for the future is critical because if you're going to ask Iraqi security forces to go out and combat other Iraqis who happen to feel differently about the process, those security forces need a sense that they are working for a legitimate government and working to achieve a widely- accepted vision of the future in Iraq. And for various reasons, those elements have not been at the forefront heretofore.

QUESTION: You said you didn't want to go into numbers games. In the sheet of the State Department, it says that more than 62,000 Iraqi armed forces, including army, air force, national guard and so forth, are serving or training. Is that a reliable figure? And how many Iraqi troops are in place right now, is not being trained, but in place?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think the State Department document speaks for itself and I have every confidence that figure is correct. As for separating out who is serving and who is training, I think you'd need to ask the Defense Department that. I really don't have a clear notion of it, one month absent from Iraq at this point.

QUESTION: Thank you. Ruben Barrera, Notimex, Mexico.
Can you define that you say that according with these latest polls, more than 80 percent of Iraqis want to vote. The question I think will be, you don't foresee the necessity that you may be near a second election if the level of participation is very low. So I'm guessing that you're expecting really a high turnout in this election. I would like if you can clarify that.

And also, when you say about these 6,000 polling places, are those 6,000 polling places distributed evenly across the country or they have been concentrated in some areas depending on the security situation?

And that's -- finally, how much is going to affect the international perception on this election, the fact that there is not going to be any foreign observers for this particular election? And I don't know if there is going to be some number of foreign observers.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the issue of participation, yes, the polls demonstrate that over 80 percent intend to go to the polling stations. I would point out that geographically 14 of the 18 provinces of Iraq are living in a fairly safe environment in which a visit to the polling stations should not be a major problem. The four provinces where it does remain a problem, of course, are Al-Anbar, Saláh ad-Dín, Nineveh, the three heavily Sunni provinces, and parts of the city and province of Baghdad.

But certainly in the 14 provinces where security is not a major concern, there will be quite heavy turnout. The real issue hinges on what happens in the three provinces plus parts of Baghdad that I've mentioned.

The polling stations, the Iraqi Electoral Commission identified locations for polling stations by the potential number of registered voters. It was a fair and transparent process, and I don't detect any games being played there. Clearly, though, in some provinces, because of the security situation, some of these polling stations have not been set up and, you know, special provisions are being made to try and figure out how those stations can be set up and how elections can take place in those areas.

The issue of international observers, as of a month ago when I left Baghdad, people were still talking about trying to get a certain number of international observers in. I, frankly, don't know what's happened on that issue since then. Do you?

A PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So there is something afoot for some level of international observation. I mean, again, in many parts of the country, the work of international observers would be fairly easy. In a few provinces, it would be very difficult. But I would stress that the main element of observation here is in the hands of Iraqi themselves, and many thousands of Iraqi election observers have been trained by international NGOs and will be on hand to assist in making this as good an election as the circumstances will permit.

MR. MACINNES: I'd like to have one last question, short, if possible.

QUESTION: Yeah, Jonathan Beale from BBC. What happens if acts of violence does affect polling in those three areas you mentioned and Baghdad? Have you made alternative arrangements?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It's going to be an issue that the Iraqi Electoral Commission is going to have to confront if that happens. It's not a matter for us as a coalition to take the initiative in solving.

The broader issue, as I mentioned earlier, the broader issue of inadequate Sunni representation in this Interim Government -- and again, I stress it's a government from February 1st to December -- this question of inadequate Sunni participation is being extensively debated within Iraq and various measures are under discussion to counter that possibility if, in fact, it emerges. But again, lots of Sunnis live outside the affected areas. There are a sufficient number of Sunni candidates on the ballot and we're just going to have to wait and see what the final figures show.

QUESTION: (Off mike.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don't have the count off the top of my head, but we can get it for you, certainly.

MR. MACINNES: Can you do one more?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sure. I'm easy. (Laughter.) I made you wait, so let's do an hour. I'm not rushing back to Baghdad tomorrow.

QUESTION: Raimund Loew with Austrian Television.

If 14 provinces are more or less safe to vote, why can't the international observers then get into these 14 provinces?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This all depends --

QUESTION: Do you have an explanation of this problem?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don't know precisely where the observers will be going. It would be a matter that the Iraqi Electoral Commission and the observers, and presumably whatever security forces are going to ensure their security, would discuss. But assuming that the security situation remains stable outside of Baghdad in those 14 provinces, one could reasonably expect that at least some international electoral monitoring could take place.

QUESTION: But how is the counting of the votes actually going to happen? and what kind of measures do you have to make sure that afterwards there is not accusation that there was some fraud and that some of the results might have been changed afterwards?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This is all in the hands, again, of the Iraqi Electoral Commission. At one point, my understanding was that they would gather all the ballot boxes in one place and then proceed to count the votes. It was even possible that it might be someplace outside of Iraq. But -- do we have any later news on this? No?

A PARTICIPANT: (Off mike.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Oh, okay.

A PARTICIPANT: (Off mike.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So, according to my associate, the current thinking is to have the ballot counting take place in Baghdad. And as I recall, there will be provisions for observation of the counting process, again, to make it as transparent and respectable a process as possible.

QUESTION: (Off mike) representatives to observe?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, so there will also be observers from the political parties themselves. Everyone has a stake in this election and everyone claims to have a wide number of constituents. If you add up all the percentages that the various parties claim to have, you end up with an Iraq that's 200 percent instead of 100 percent.

QUESTION: (Off mike.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah.

QUESTION: Guy Dinmore from the Financial Times.

Nothing has ever been said by any U.S. official, as far as I can tell, on the question of
complaints and disputes after the elections. You say the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission has complete authority. Does that mean the Iraqi judiciary will have no role, whatsoever, in adjudicating over any complaints after the elections? And is there a deadline by which the Transitional Assembly must be in place?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of a deadline. As far as adjudicating disputes is concerned, I'd have to go back and look at the various texts. But my recollection is that some kind of judicial body would, in fact, play a role, that it would not be the staff of the Iraqi Electoral Commission that would be adjudicating the various disputes that might come up.

And one of the disputes that people were predicting, one category of disputes that people were predicting was complaints made against an individual candidate who, after the election, turned out to have significant leadership or policy ties with the former Baath Party. So it was a whole possibility of contested of results stemming from that, but it was fairly clear what was to happen if individual candidates were found, in retrospect, not to have qualified to run. Their names would simply be removed and the next person with the next largest number of votes on this electoral list would simply move up and become part of the 275.

So there is a fairly simple mechanism for replacing people whose seats become contested. And there is even the possibility that some people who were elected may resign right away because, if I recall the legislation of the regulatory framework correctly, anyone who wants to serve in the government as a minister cannot be a member of assembly. So if you have ministerial aspirations, and you're tapped as one of the ministers, you may end up resigning. So a final list of the 275 may take some time to generate.

QUESTION: Nicholas Skibiak from the Saudi Press Agency.

I notice here on the information sheet we were provided that the Transitional National Assembly has set forth a goal of 25 percent female representation, and to borrow your phrase, I was wondering what internal mechanisms there are to help ensure that this 25 percent goal will be met.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, the various coalition or party lists that were registered as political entities had to observe the rule that every third name on that list was a woman. And if you apply the rules of proportional representation, a list that got 10 percent of the vote, you would go down and pick the top members of that list, and automatically every third winner would be a woman. So that was the mechanism by which at least 25 percent was to be guaranteed.

Now, that requirement for the list ideally yields 33 percent or whatever. The fact is that there are a large number of political entities that are individual candidacies and there is no way of predicting how many of the individual candidates are men and how many are women in the final electoral result. So I think there was a bit of padding, if you will, on the lists in order to compensate for the inability to predict what might happen with the individual candidacies.

I mean there has been a lot of debate in Iraq on this subject, not all of it enlightened. There are still a great many men who feel that women don't have a real place in running a country. One of the little vignettes of one of the town hall meetings was a gentleman who said he didn't understand why it was a requirement that every voter had to show up at the polling station to vote. Under previous electoral arrangements, the head of the household could go and vote for everybody in his family and that way the women didn't have to leave the house. But he was told that it was one-person, one-vote, and that would stick. But there is going to be a sizeable representation of women in this new assembly, and it's very clear from the workings of the Interim Council, that I have observed, that they have a real impact there and certainly do not hesitate to express their views and insist on being included in the various decisions that are taken. So on that score, I'm quite optimistic.

One more. One more.

MR. MACINNES: One more.

QUESTION: Previously, in the White House, when we had a briefing from officials on the election, they set a date of March the 1st, by which the new government expected to be in place, having gone through the process of being chosen by the presidential council and approved by parliament. Are you saying if there is no deadline and there is not a clear mechanism established for sorting out complaints and disputes that that date might well slip or is March the 1st somehow enshrined somewhere in a plan or --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'm not aware the March 1st is enshrined anywhere. I think that is a target that both Iraqis and others might wish to see achieved. And I think giving the assembly four weeks in which to create the next government is reasonable given the very complex political calculations that will go into forming the presidency council of three and then choosing a prime minister, who, in creating the cabinet, will also have to balance political factors, most importantly the representation of the various communities in the government.

So it could be a complex process, particularly since it is probably going to be preceded by a certain period of coalition building among the members of the assembly themselves; and how long that process will take I don't know. I mean, one of their first tasks is clearly to elect a speaker, and we go on from there. But I think one month is a reasonable target for the completion of internal organization and formation of a new government.

But we shall all see. Again, I end on the same note that I began. This is a unique moment in the history of the region in that we are not able to predict the results in advance. I think all of you know the history of the 99.8 percent elections in the Arab world. You all know the old joke about the Arab leader who was told, "Wonderful news. You've won by 99.8 percent. What more could anybody want?" And he said, "I want the names of those who voted no." (Laughter.)

Thank you.

MR. MACINNES: Thank you.

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