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Foreign Press Centers > Briefings > -- By Date > 2004 Foreign Press Center Briefings > March 

Current Topics in United States Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean


Peter DeShazo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
March 10, 2004

1:00 P.M. EST

Peter DeShazo at FPC

Real Audio of Briefing

MR. PRINCE: Good afternoon and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Welcome, also, to viewers watching us on the American Embassy Television Network.

We are pleased to have with us Ambassador Peter DeShazo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Mr. DeShazo's portfolio consists of the Caribbean and Andean regions, as well as the Public Diplomacy operations of the Western Hemisphere Bureau.

Before we begin, I'd like to add for those of you who are covering Haiti that we will carry Assistant Secretary Noriega's Senate testimony later this afternoon on monitors up in the front, scheduled to begin about 75 minutes from now.

Ambassador DeShazo.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Thanks very much. I guess we're starting with Haiti, and I'd be delighted to answer questions that you may have.

Sir. If you could please identify yourself and the media you're from.

QUESTION: Yeah. I'm Charlie Cobb with AllAfrica.com.

We have a question related to Mr. Aristide's presence in Chad, and that is: Whose decision was it for him to go to Chad? Did he say, "Take me to Chad?" Did the Ambassador say, "We'll take you to Chad?" How, exactly, did he land there?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: After he had departed, after he had departed Port-au-Prince on the airplane, the Government of Chad, the government -- I'm sorry -- the Government of the Central African Republic, not Chad -- the Government of the Central African Republic had offered to receive him, and that was the decision that was made.

MR. PRINCE: Sonia, did you have a question?

QUESTION: Yes, but on Venezuela.

MR. PRINCE: No. We'll stick with Haiti in the beginning. Haiti. Right there, please, Mr. Lamprecht.

QUESTION: Deon Lamprecht from Media 24 in South Africa.

There seems to be some confusion on the question of a waiver. Secretary Powell, anybody from the State Department actually did phone the South African Government and asked them if they would be willing to receive President Aristide or not?

Can you clarify that for us, please?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: The issue of a destination for former-President Aristide was raised with the Government of South Africa, and in the end, it was the Central African Republic where he ended up going.

MR. PRINCE: Maria.

QUESTION: Yeah. I'm Maria Peña from EFE News.

There's growing criticism that the U.S. didn't do enough to prevent the chaos that eventually evolved in Haiti that led to his ouster. And I was wondering if you could elaborate on that, the -- you know, the criticism that the U.S. did not do enough to stop that from getting worse.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Well, the chaos in Haiti, or the violence that was ensuing was not, obviously not the work of the United States Government. This was the direct result of President Aristide having armed and empowered groups -- gangs, and groups of thugs.

On the one side there were gangs that had formerly supported President Aristide around the country that later turned against him. And in the case of Port-au-Prince, they were the Chimere who had been armed by President Aristide who supported him. These were illegally armed civilian groups. So the confrontation that had occurred and that was brewing and that was certainly to get worse in Haiti was the direct result of policies taken by the government of President Aristide, by President Aristide, himself.

MR. PRINCE: Further questioning on Haiti? Let's go back here, please.

QUESTION: Prior to his getting on the airplane --

MR. PRINCE: Would you identify yourself, please?

QUESTION: Oh, sorry. Excuse me. I'm sorry. Jim Lobe, InterPress Service.

Prior to getting on the airplane, did President Aristide at any time request the United States to provide security for him?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Security in what sense?

QUESTION: Security in terms of a force either through the State Department, either the State Department Security Service or private contractors provided by the United States, or U.S. troops of any kind to provide security for him as the democratically elected President of Haiti?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: He had made appeals to the international community for intervention. This was while he was still in power. And the United States made the decision that it was not going to intervene in Haiti if there were not a political solution, a viable political solution to Haiti's difficulties.

This was on the eve of President Aristide's departure, on his voluntary departure from Haiti. We were not, and nor were any other members of the international community, open to the idea of sending or of supporting with force a failed political status quo.

So that was a decision that was made in the end. President Aristide decided to leave the country and then he contacted us and asked for our assistance.

QUESTION: Okay. Can I just follow up on that?

When you say -- I want to get your words right, and I'm not sure I have them written down. We're not open to the idea of supporting a failed presidency. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: The political status quo in Haiti on the eve of President Aristide's departure we view as a failed status quo that we were not willing to risk sending our troops in to defend, nor were any other countries.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, my question, then, is: Does that stand as a kind of a corollary to the Santiago Declarations over the last 12 years? That is to say, if a democratic government requests aid from the international community or the members of the OAS, or the signatories of the Charter, then aid will not be provided if it would be in support of a failed status quo? Is that a kind of new legal doctrine on the part of the United States?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: It's not a question of a new legal doctrine. It was a decision made at the time and it has nothing to do with legal doctrine.

QUESTION: Well, but -- if I could, just one more on this, because Senator Dodd, who has more experience on Western Hemisphere than any other U.S. Senator, he says that the United -- it's his interpretation that the United States violated its commitment under the Democratic Charter even three years after it took affect. Now that's his position that he stated on the floor of the Senate, and that it violated it by not coming to the aid.

And what you're saying is, you didn't come to an aid because of a "failed status quo," which sounds to me like the United States is trying to establish a corollary or a reservation to its signature.
Do you completely disagree with Senator Dodd on this question?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: I am not agreeing or disagreeing with Senator Dodd on this question. The point was that under these circumstances the United States nor any other country wished to send in forces to reestablish a situation that was seen as not viable.

MR. PRINCE: Let's go back to Mexico, please.

QUESTION: José Carreño, El Universal, (Mexico).

Two questions. (Clears throat) -- Excuse me -- first, I would like to ask you to clarify if possible if it is truth that what used to be the personal security detail of President Aristide was paid by the American Government -- either State Department or another agency. There is at least one version that says.

And second, you -- there is the possibility -- at least some people believe that Haiti might be considered already a failed state. What makes you believe that Haiti might be able to raise from its actual -- its current state without the massive American and international help?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Thank you very much.

On the first question, President Aristide's personal security detail is paid for by the Government of Haiti, not by the United States.

Secondly, in terms of the commitment or the need to help Haiti to reestablish its institutions, clearly the last ten years in Haiti had been a grave disappointment. There had been an enormous amount of investment made in Haiti by the international community and these investments did not, did not produce fruit.

They largely did not produce progress or a country that was on the right road in terms of its political or its economic development, and that's largely due to the fact that the efforts that could have put Haiti on the right road were frustrated by Aristide and by his policies.

Our sense is that there has to be a government that is strongly committed to allowing the Haitian people to express their will, to reach out and to unleash the potential that the Haitian people have. The Haitian people are a hardworking and very talented people.
They deserve a government that's worthy of their talents. They deserve a government that's able to promote their own well being, to look out for their well being and to unleash their talents.

QUESTION: Me, please.

MR. PRINCE: Let's go back to Panama. We'll stay on Haiti for a little bit.

QUESTION: Yes, on Haiti. Betty Brannan from La Prensa of Panama.

I'm still a little confused about how President Aristide ended up in the Central African Republic. It was reported in the Panamanian press that Secretary of State Powell called
the Panamanian Foreign Minister and asked Panama to offer temporary asylum, which Panama did; and also, Costa Rica apparently offered temporary asylum. So it would be so helpful if you could clarify a bit with all of these offers of asylum, how did the United States make the determination that he should go to the Central African Republic?

Thank you.

MR. DESHAZO: In the end, it was the Central African Republic that had stepped up and made the offer to take him in, and that's where President Aristide ended up.

MR. PRINCE: Still on Haiti.

Mr. Cobb.

QUESTION: I suppose, again, on how President Aristide landed where he landed, was the Administration, State or the White House involved in discussions with the Central African Republic or South Africa or Panama? And did the State Department or the Government reach a conclusion itself as to where Aristide should go?

And, I mean, he's in the palace, at one point; he gets to the airplane. Is he told on the way, "You're going to the Central African Republic?" Or is he told when he's in the airplane, "Well, we're flying you to Africa?" Or is he told, "Well, we're on telephone with this guy or that guy?" How does this work? We'd like to know some details here.

MR. DESHAZO: The United States was involved in attempting to find a country that would take him. And while the plane was in the air, it was the Central African Republic that agreed to do that, and that's where he landed.

MR. PRINCE: Still on Haiti.

Mr. Lamprecht.

QUESTION: Okay. Mr. Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa was here last week for discussions with the State Department, and he is in the Central African Republic today to have talks with President Aristide -- or Mr. Aristide, I suppose you'd call him now. Can you tell us, firstly, what was discussed in Washington with Deputy Minister Pahad? And is he taking a message from Washington to Aristide in the Central African Republic today?

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: The matters of the Central African Republic, South Africa and President Aristide are questions that are up to those parties and I'm not going to speculate as to what conversations they may have had.

MR. PRINCE: Mr. Lobe.

QUESTION: And here in Washington?

MR. PRINCE: Could you repeat the last part?

QUESTION: Sorry. Just on the first part of my question, and here in Washington, can you tell me what was just discussed here with Mr. Pahad?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: In terms of general conversations that we've had with South Africa, I can get you information on that. It's not part of my portfolio.

MR. PRINCE: Back to Mr. Lobe, please.

QUESTION: Jim Lobe from InterPress again. Can you confirm, in fact, what my colleague in the front just asked from Panama, that the United States did receive offers that asylum, or at least temporary asylum would be provided by either Costa Rica or Panama or both?

And can you comment on whether there has been any -- whether there was any contact over the last several months prior to what took place to Aristide's departure, or even to the recent insurgency there, between U.S. officials of any kind and Mr. Guy Philippe in the Dominican Republic?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: In terms of any contact between Guy Philippe and the United States, we have -- well, in the period after the departure of Aristide --

QUESTION: Before, I mean -- I'm sorry.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: In the period before?

QUESTION: Before he crossed the border into the -- from the DR in Haiti.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Not that I am aware of, no. No, I am not aware of any contact.

QUESTION: And the first question please?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: The first question was regarding?

QUESTION: I'm sorry. Whether you can confirm that the United States received offers of temporary or other kinds of asylum from either Panama or Costa Rica or both?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Once again, I return to my answer. President Aristide was flown to the Central African Republic, where he was offered to come in, and that's where he ended up. I'm not going to go into any other details on that.

MR. PRINCE: Yes, sir. Right here, please.

QUESTION: Haiti.

MR. PRINCE: Still on Haiti, right?

QUESTION: I'm sorry. I don't want to be a pest about this. But I'm kind of confused about how he gets taken to a plane with nowhere to go confirmed, and all of sudden in the middle of the year they decide to take him there?

I mean, what we're trying to find out is: What other countries offered some sort of -- you know, political asylum or whatever, refugee status or whatever, before taking him to a plane? I mean, it would seem that something had to happen before he even got put on a plane.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Bear in mind the situation as this took place, that President Aristide had approached us on the evening of the 28th, and within hours had departed. He felt that his security was at stake. He felt that there was bloodshed that was a possibility. Certainly, there was confrontation that was going to take place, and he willingly left the country within a very short period of time. And so this was not a matter that was broadly discussed before. This was something that the decisions were made virtually within hours as the events were taking place.

MR. PRINCE: Let's go now to Venezuela. Sonia.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. DeShazo. Venezuela will announce before --

MR. PRINCE: Can you --

QUESTION: Oh, sorry.

MR. PRINCE: Can you introduce yourself please?

QUESTION: I'm sorry. Sonia Schott, Globovision, Venezuela. Venezuela will denounce before OAS Permanent Council the interference of the U.S. Department of State in domestic -- Venezuelan domestic issues. Do you have any comments, any reaction on that?

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Well, I'm not exactly sure what the Government of Venezuela would be referring to. We've heard a lot of charges against the United States from the Government of Venezuela in the last few weeks and a number of personally oriented statements, very strong statements, against President Bush and against other high U.S. officials.

These charges, which have been many, are basically ludicrous, they're baseless and they're irresponsible; and we've rejected them. And we feel that the charges that the Government of Venezuela has made -- that the United States is trying to topple the government, that it's fomented violence, that the United States wants to cut off oil imports from Venezuela, a number of claims that the Government of Venezuela has made, our sense is that these claims have been made as an attempt to divert international public opinion from the referendum recall process that's taking place at this time.

QUESTION: No, specifically, it is Venezuela Government says that U.S. Department is supporting the opposition, the Venezuelans' opposition, in its efforts to overthrow President Chavez from power. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: If the -- and again, I can't answer for what the Government of Venezuela feels is -- I can't speak for them. If they're referring to the support that the United States Government gives to nongovernmental organizations, NGOs that work worldwide to support democracy, I'm not sure if that's what they're referring to or not. But clearly the United States is not engaged in trying to topple a government, and those charges are baseless and are false.

Right here, please.

QUESTION: Maria Elena Matheus, El Universal, Venezuela.

Today, the ambassador of -- the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the OAS, Ambassador Jorge Valero, said that the state of Venezuela is preparing a claim against the U.S. Government that is going to presented in front -- to the OAS.

The accusation, the specific accusation is that the U.S. Government has led an international conspiracy against the democratic and constitutional President of Venezuela. So I would like you to be more specific regarding this particular accusation.

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Okay, well again, I haven't seen what the Government of Venezuela is putting forward. It's very hard for me to respond to a statement from the Government of Venezuela that I haven't seen.

If you are asking me is the United States leading an international conspiracy against Venezuela; that's ludicrous. Whatever matters the Government of Venezuela wishes to put before the OAS, I can't respond to that until I know exactly what they intend to do.

QUESTION: A follow-up on my question. What -- there have been reports that there is Cuban military presence in Venezuela. Is the U.S. Government considering this possibility? Or has the U.S. Government evidence of this military presence in Venezuela? And what would the U.S. Government do in case that this evidence is completely proved?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: Okay, well, I can't speculate on issues that are, you know, what would the Government of the United States do if -- I certainly can't speculate on any kind of issue like that.

In terms of the Cuban presence in Venezuela, it certainly is something that has drawn the attention of the international and the inter-American community that a country in the hemisphere would reach out to the only dictatorship that exists in the hemisphere and seek to improve, strengthen relations, especially coming on the wake of the recent crackdown on political -- on dissidents and on civil society by Cuba. It's something that clearly has got the attention of the international community.

MR. PRINCE: Yes, right here, please.

QUESTION: Maria Victoria Verde from National Radio of Venezuela.

The New York Times say yesterday that United States is not even-handed with Venezuela because of the appearance that it is openly supporting the opposition. What is United States doing to change the perception it supports the opposition against the Venezuelan Government?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: I think the United States has been very clear that what we support in Venezuela is a constitutional, democratic, peaceful, electoral solution to the political impasse in Venezuela that's been a key factor in that country for -- for now, a very long time -- for more than a year, almost, two years now.

The United States firmly supports [Organization of American States Permanent Council] Resolution 833 that calls for that electoral, peaceful, democratic, et cetera solution. The United States strongly supports the work of the Organization of American States and the Carter Center in observing the process of the recall referendum that is taking place in Venezuela now.

QUESTION: I haven't finished.

MR. PRINCE: Did you have a follow-up?

QUESTION: Yes.

In the end, do you think the opposition should abide by the rules of verifying signatures as laid down by Venezuela National Electoral Council?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: The United States supports the position of the OAS [Organization of American States] and the Carter Center that the rules for the reparo process should be transparent; they should be fair; they should be viable; and they should respect the constitutional rights of signatories, of signers. That's our position.

MR. PRINCE: Let's go to the -- I don't see your hand anymore. Do you still -- and then I'll come back to you. I promise.

QUESTION: Actually, I can wait because I don't know how it works. I will like to make my questions in Spanish. I would like to have the answer in Spanish.

MR. PRINCE: We'll do some Q&A in Spanish after the conclusion of the formal briefing.

QUESTION: Okay, then I'd rather wait. Thanks.

MR. PRINCE: Yes. Let's come back to María, then, in the second row.

QUESTION: Thank you. Since the briefing is on Latin America as a region, I was wondering how would you respond to charges that President Bush has not fulfilled his promise to not have Latin America as an afterthought like he promised in his presidential campaign of 2000?

Democrats are saying, well, in fact, Latin America has been an afterthought. Can you rattle off a list of commitments the U.S. has in the region? How do you prove that Latin America has not been an afterthought for the Bush Administration?

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: All right. We're straying from the topics of Haiti and Venezuela, but I'm pleased to answer this question.

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

AMBASSADOR DESHAZO: I know. Sure.

Absolutely, the Administration is strongly committed to Latin America. The recent Special Summit of the Americas that took place in Monterrey, Mexico, I think, is very strong proof of that commitment.

The fact that President Fox just this weekend visited President Bush, that we are strongly committed to supporting democracy in Colombia and other places in the region, our concern and our work with the OAS on a number of multi-regional issues, Haiti among them, is another symbol of our strong concern.

The United States is firmly engaged in Latin America. We realize that there is, in terms of the domestic importance to the United States, no region in the world that is more pertinent than Latin America. Our two strongest trade partners are Canada and Mexico. Quite clearly, Latin America is of great importance to this Administration.

MR. PRINCE: Venezuela, still. Any further -- Javier? No? Not on Venezuela? No. We're not taking questions on Mexico. It's not in Ambassador DeShazo's portfolio. Haiti?

Thank you very much.

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