3:00 P.M. EST
Real Audio of Briefing
MR. DENIG:Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center.
We are very pleased this afternoon to be able to welcome to our podium the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder, who will brief us this afternoon on recent events in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Secretary Snyder will have a brief opening statement to make, and after that, we'll be very glad to take your questions.
Mr. Secretary.
MR. SNYDER: Thanks a lot. I'm glad to see there's a decent turnout given the Iowa caucuses. Maybe I could get better than 22 percent, who knows? (Laughter.) I'll have to look into those possibilities.
I just like to use this time of the year and the fact that Walter Kansteiner recently departed to kind of say a kind of word on where this Administration has been in Africa. I'll try and keep it down to five minutes so that I leave you plenty of time for questions.
When Walter came in, we decided to take a fresh look at Africa policy. And frankly, Africa policy, since the foundation of the Africa Bureau, has always been about the same things, just different emphasis in different administrations. And being a Republican Administration, and Walter being who he was, we put trade and investment at the top of the list because we really do believe that the answer to bring Africa onto the world and into the modern economy is more trade and investment. And so we decided to focus on that. And so we moved down democracy and development to the second place under that, but did not neglect it. And that has also been part of the policy in this Administration, to pursue democracy and development.
When we came in and decided to push trade and investment, we said we would hold our traditional development and democracy budget harmless; we would pursue this trade and investment agenda, AGOA 2, and other kinds of things as a special initiative to get sovereign credit debt ratings for many African countries -- those kinds of things -- we would hold the regular budget harmless.
And traditionally over the last ten years, the United States has given between $800 and a $1 billion a year, going back to about '92, to Africa in what would be called, developmental terms -- those kinds of things -- including some money for HIV/AIDS. We held that harmless and then went on to do new things in trade and investment.
The other thing we took a look at was the environment. Walter was very interested in the environment, and we've done some things in the Congo Basin Initiative, one of the lungs of the world, to see that that is saved for the world, but without harm to Africa in terms of development; in fact, to use it for eco-tourism and other things that might encourage growth in African economies.
We couldn't do any of those things without taking a look at the crosscutting issues. Global terrorism is one of those things, post-9/11. There is a front to be fought in Africa. It's not the number one- or the number two-priority, but it is a priority in the global war on terrorism. You couldn't have won World War II without fighting in the China-Burma-India Theater, and that's a fair enough analogy. Africa's an important front in this war, but it's not a crucial front.
The President has given $100 million initiative for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa. That's really about improving the system of border control, police, better sharing of information -- that kind of thing. It's not targeted at some grandiose crusade to nail down two or three al-Qaida cells, although hopefully, that'll be one of the results of that initiative.
In addition to the global war on terrorism, which also extends into West Africa, by the way, the old camel caravan route coming down from Libya all the way through Mauritania is an area of interest and an area of trouble, which extremists can use and we're paying attention to in this global war on terrorism. But you have to do that as well or you're kidding yourself. If terrorists can blow you up, you can't do trade and development. No businessman is safe, no contract is honored, and therefore the trade and investment initiative just doesn't work.
The other major crosscutting issues, of course, are HIV/AIDS. If you don't get a handle on HIV/AIDS, you're kidding yourself about development. If you have to train three teachers to get one survivor, you're just wasting your money, ultimately. You're throwing a lot of money at a problem that you could do much better about.
There's also cultural damage, which a lot of people forget when they look at the HIV/AIDS problem. One of the reasons the drought in Ethiopia was so bad recently was because the farmer that had seen this cyclical drought before was gone. So was his wife -- victims of HIV/AIDS. And what you got were the very young and the very old dealing with the drought. In one case, they weren't quite able to deal with it; in one case, they hadn't seen before, and so it was much worse.
So there's a real cultural residual wealth dimension to this HIV/AIDS problem that people miss sometimes, and it's just as insidious as the more transparent thing -- training three teachers to get one.
And President Bush decided to do something about this: the $15 billion initiative. Now, there are "lies, damn lies and statistics," $15 billion divided by 5 should be $3 billion a year. We didn't quite get there. We got to $2.4 billion this first year.
But the good news on that score is, it proves our commitment. And this is in addition to the HIV/AIDS bit that we were doing already, because I said we've held that part of the budget harmless. This is new, and it's focused for right now on African and Caribbean countries, although it will be beyond that, hopefully, because the AIDS crisis is beyond just Africa and the Caribbean.
But we've engaged that in a serious way. That's serious money -- more than anybody else is doing in this regard, because you can't do development or trade and investment unless you get a handle on HIV/AIDS in Africa.
The third crosscutting issue is conflict resolution, where we've had some success. Again, development is a joke if there's war, if you have refugees, if nothing is dependable, if systems don't work. And we've done our best to do some things about the conflicts in Africa.
The Sudan policy is part of that. We took a fresh look at that and tried to do it differently. When we started this Administration -- I won't kid you -- we were looking at the crisis in Sierra Leone as conflict resolution. We managed to get a handle on that, and then Liberia sprung up. And now we've just barely -- but we do -- have a handle on, the crisis in Liberia. But you can't do development if you can't stop the conflicts.
The Congo has been one of the secret success stories. Given where we were when we started, the Congo is actually a place where there's some hope for development. Certainly the political advancement inside the Congo has finally begun to move after that Lusaka agreement that was made long ago, way back in '94. It's finally coming to fruition.
And we've played our share behind the scenes. The Europeans have taken a big lead, but Africa has taken the biggest lead. It was the Lusaka agreement.
And that's the other theme we've focused on. What we did in Sudan when we looked around for a way to intervene effectively was, we built on what Africa had already done. IGAD had engaged in this and cleared the ground and allowed the United States, by throwing its weight into it, to advance the process, but always advanced the process by backing up the IGAD initiative.
So, again, this African partnership, I think under this Administration, has matured.
That's the propaganda piece that I wanted to get out of the way up front. That's what we are about. That's what we've done.
What will we do in the remaining year of the Administration? We are from the hard school of politics. I could list five or six things. We couldn't get it done in a year, but we're going to take another hard look at Somalia. Is there something we can do, based on what Kiplagat has done? Is there an African initiative that we can fall in behind and make a difference in Somalia? Maybe not. I'm not convinced that that's right, but we're going to take a hard look at that.
Obviously, we have to finish what we started. We have to finish Sudan. We have to see that Liberia gets past the post in better shape than when we found it. And, you know, some crisis out there now that we can't even anticipate, we'll have to do a lot about. We're also hoping to continue the trade and investment portions of this, looking at new enhancements toward the AGOA legislation, that kind of thing.
That's where we are. And I lied, I went seven minutes, but I'd like to take your questions now.
MR. DENIG: Let me remind you to use the microphone, identify yourself and your news organization, please.
QUESTION: Ahmed El Bashir from Sudan. I recently wrote two articles about your excellent seminar in UCLA.
MR. SNYDER: That was off-the-record, by the way.
QUESTION: UCLA -- yeah, the 14th of --
MR. SNYDER: I remember. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: And I couldn't help noticing that the State Department right now is in the hands of the military people: Powell, Armitage, Natsios, you. In Sudan, we have Bashir, Garang. And from Kenya, we have Sumbeiywo. I would like to hear from you about this coincidence and whether it is really helping to move the American involvement in Africa in the direction of conflict resolution. Nobody knows the pain of war like the military people. Now all of you are military people. My two questions:
The first is the extent of the concerted American involvement in the peace process in the Sudan and whether the final agreement will be signed in Washington, D.C. There is a lot about that in the Sudanese press. And the second question is about -- the negotiations that are going on. Two days ago, Al-Bashir said that the three areas, Blue Nile, Abyei, and --
PARTICIPANT: Nuba Mountains.
MR. SNYDER: Southern Blue Nile? Nuba, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei.
QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, the Blue Nile. He said that they are off the table. They are not for negotiating. The Sudanese people did not give us any authorization to do that. We are -- this is only south-north thing. So as of now, they are out of the table, off, you know, we're not going to talk about them. So I would like you to comment on this.
MR. SNYDER: I hadn't actually thought about your first point, which I find intriguing, that these are all military men dealing with each other. And I suspect there may be something to do that. I mean, say what you will, military men around the world kind of speak their own language, and maybe we do hear each other a little more clearly, and maybe that's one of the reasons we've had a little more success in Sudan. I had never -- never considered that point.
But certainly General Sumbeiywo and I, when we talk to each other, can, as we American military-types say, "cut to the chase" and get to the point a little more quickly without that diplomatic language and dance that I now do in my pinstripe suit, and so maybe we talk a little more directly and that helps the negotiation. It's a good point, and I'm hoping some academic will explore it when we've passed this by five years and you can look back disinterestedly. But it may be an interesting point to pursue.
On the negotiation itself, the Sudanese party set the deadline of the end of the year themselves. They've missed it, but they've done a lot of good work. They have proved that this is serious. They're still engaged today in a very serious engagement, and we're hoping that they can still come to a rapid conclusion in the next several days. It's not impossible. They've done that kind of work. They've come up with a wealth-sharing agreement, which essentially divides the oil wealth of Sudan 50/50. Again, you need to be an accountant to understand the details.
But the fact that the negotiating people have gone to that level of detail. This is not an artist's concept where I write "50/50" on the board. This is a case where they've gone through the Sudanese national budget, they've gone through the oil revenues and they know exactly what they're talking about in terms of money. So when they say 50/50, it is very detailed where that money comes from. There won't be dispute about whether or not this $1 million is there or the $2 million is there.
So it's serious work, which is why it took as long as it did. And it's serious business. But it's the kind of business that if you expect a real political partnership to run a government in the modern world, that they should get down to that detail and they did. And we were quite pleasantly surprised. I think if they had given us the big 50/50 splashy agreement, we'd have been happy. But they went beyond that, and there's actually the level of detail and attention that they know exactly what they mean by this. It's not a case where I or the IGAD partners or Kenya or someone else will have to come in and interpret what I remember you said. No, they know exactly what they said and they've put it down on a piece of paper.
That same approach is causing the negotiations to take a little longer than we would like. But we Americans are always in a hurry, and this is an African negotiation, and it's a Sudanese negotiation that has to end the right way. And I think there's a real chance that it can end in the next several days the right way. They know the issues. They know what the answers to the questions are. The political choices that have to be made are among the answers that they know exist. It's not a case where they have to think through the subject matter anymore. They have to decide in the endgame what they're going to trade for what. What's the real political answer? That's the place they're at. This is not a technology issue anymore. This is a practical political issue. So they can do this in the next several days.
On the area -- the three areas, they've made some pretty serious advancements there. They've talked about autonomy and other things for these areas and compensation for what's happened in the areas to heal them up. Don't forget, at the end of the day, what we're all hoping to come out of this is a unified Sudan, but a unified Sudan that's bound up its wounds. And there are wounds. There are grievous wounds that will take time to bind up.
And that's what this debate about the three areas is really about. It's about reconciliation and how that's going to happen, and what kind of assurances are given to the people that have been damaged over a period of 20 years.
So your president makes a good point. We all know about negotiation. And taking a strong position in public is one of the keys to many negotiations. So we hope, at the end of the day that we'll come to an accommodation that works for Sudan. There are no fixed positions in this. Our objective in this has been what we said from the beginning, it's to get a just peace in Sudan that would begin to bind up the wounds. The South has been most aggrieved in this process and needs the most attention, but the entire system does. And that's what we were after as Americans. But the Sudanese need the same thing, and so the negotiations, really, is about a better Sudan, and that's where we are.
Am I optimistic about tomorrow? Not necessarily tomorrow. Am I optimistic about the next 30 days? Absolutely. I think this agreement is at that point where it's inevitable. The question is timing, not if they will get there, but when. And I'm optimistic it can be done quickly.
QUESTION: Is the signing in Washington?
MR. SNYDER: The signing in Washington is not our place. This is an IGAD negotiation. The partners should decide where the signing takes place. You know, Nairobi makes more sense to me. They're the ones that did the work. But if somebody decides it's better to do it in the United States, it's better to do it in London, it's better to do it in Oslo, it's better to do it in Addis because that's where the AAU headquarters is, that's for the parties to decide.
What needs to be done is, it needs to be done in a public forum that commits the parties in a very splashy way, but splashy in the good sense of commitment before the audience, before the world, before their own communities, that this is a real deal. That can be done in Nairobi. It can be done in Naivasha with modern technology. It could be done in Washington, London, Oslo. We don't care. That's not the point of this. It's up to the parties.
MR. DENIG: Okay. We'll take the gentleman in the first row, please.
QUESTION: Adu-Asare, AfricaNewscast.com. Would you think that the United States could have done a little bit more in Liberia than it has done up to this point?
MR. SNYDER: I don't like to prejudice relative success. I think it's come out as well as we hoped it could in the sense of Gyude Bryunt's government seems to be standing up. The DDR, faulty though it may be, is underway. The parties seem to be complying with what they said they'd do. The UN is ramping up. The United States commitment in the form of $200 million is on the table. The commitment of our Secretary of State to co-host the donors conference in February with Kofi Annan is in place. So we're in good shape.
Could we have done it better? I'm a military man and I never let the perfect become the enemy of the good enough. And I think what we've done in Liberia is better than good enough. It may not be perfect, but we're okay where we are, and I can go from here to success for Liberia.
QUESTION: I'm talking about putting troops on the ground.
MR. SNYDER: We put the troops on the ground, as you'll recall, in a fashion that got us to where we are. And they did go on the ground when it was necessary, and they did show up off the horizon.
Again, these are relative value judgments. You know, I'm an old army colonel, and I found long ago that you don't second-guess the company commander if you come out of the battle okay. And we came out of this okay. Liberia is in the place we need it to be.
Would I have done some things differently? Maybe on the diplomatic side, maybe on the military side, but that's what graduate students are for. Let them write about this after the fact. Right now, we got to where we needed to be, so I'm satisfied.
MR. DENIG: All right. Let's go to the front row here, please.
QUESTION: Why not a lady this time?
MR. DENIG: Because I go back and forth (inaudible). Thank you. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Charlie Cobb with allAfrica.com.
An important piece of this Administration's efforts around trade and development has been AGOA, and AGOA 3 is now on the table in the former House and Senate bills. But we detect from African diplomats here in the city some concern that the Administration, despite, at least the President expressed support for an extension of AGOA, that Administration efforts, particularly with regard to the Congress, have not been very energetic. They attribute that to some dissatisfaction, particularly on the Hill, with the African stance at Cancun. And this is some sort of reprisal.
PARTICIPANT: A cosmic payback.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Does the administration support this legislation now in Congress, both in terms of the extension and in terms of the crucial issue of third-country fabrics? And secondly, are these diplomats right, that you all haven't been very energetic?
MR. SNYDER: I'd like to blame it on some grand plan, and retaliation for what happened in Cancun, that's not what it's about. What happened at Cancun is unfortunate in many ways. We wound up talking to each other in ideological terms instead of conducting a dialogue in which progress was possible. But AGOA legislation is not affected by that, trust me. As an insider on this, this is not what it's about.
Where are we on the AGOA 3 issue? There's different bills, as you know, in the House and the Senate. And the Africa Bureau, traditionally, is the junkyard dog of the State Department. And we like to wait until the 11th hour to spot what we like best. And this debate is underway about what's best; features that are changing; proposals that are changing. The African governments aren't complete in weighing in yet. And the Africans need to weigh in. They need to be a block on this thing. It impacts them as much as us.
At the end of the day, I'm hoping we will get legislation that we will openly support. We're not there yet, but that's not because we don't intend to get there. It's, again, because, like it or not, the Africa Bureau's style, and the Africa Bureau includes the USTR on some of these issues, is to wait and see what develops. And it's early yet and we haven't had the State of the Union yet. And a trade bill is a tough thing in an election year. But don't count us out on this game yet. The game is still early.
MR. DENIG: Okay, let's take the lady in the first row, please.
QUESTION: Adam Ouologuem with the African Sun Times. When you talk about conflicts, you didn't talk about the one going on in the Ivory Coast, Cote d'Ivoire. Do you think can put an emphasis on what's going on there? And coming back to AGOA, do you think from a country member of African, West African Economic Union can get the membership to AGOA very soon? Like the cotton-producing country? Mali, which is my country, is among them, but Burkina Faso is too much restricted. So what should they do to get into AGOA?
MR. SNYDER: Let me take the easy question first. Cote d'Ivoire and the United Nations peacekeeping operation. We're actually very supportive of what's going on in Cote d'Ivoire and we're particularly pleased that the Government of France, together with parties that are seeking peace, have stepped up to the problem and made it possible for the UN to intervene in a more effective way.
As you know, there's a debate now in the United Nations Security Council about how to enhance the peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire. And we will be in support of an enhancement of that operation. We haven't finished debating the details, but the issue is not whether or not we think the peacekeeping operation is good in Cote d'Ivoire and whether or not what the parties have done to make peace is good or not. The question is how much more and what would make it better.
We're engaged in this; we're committed to this, and we're hoping to help refine what comes out of it. So it's not a case of us thinking Cote d'Ivoire doesn't need the assistance. It's a case of what's the most effective assistance. And we'll be there once we finish this debate. And I think it will be in a way in which everybody is pleased.
On the issue of who gets to be new members of AGOA, Burkina Faso came very close. I think Burkina Faso, with a few minor moves to do with regional stability and threats to regional stability, will make it into the AGOA round the next time. Most of West Africa has gotten in. This is meant to be fairly wide open to everybody.
But there are standards and we are trying to enforce them. And Burkina Faso came very close this last time and I'm optimistic the next time they'll get there. And again, it had to do with a gray area call. Some countries aren't even close to the gray area; most of West Africa's in.
I think the Burkinabe, especially under the energetic advice and support of our Ambassador on the ground, Ambassador Holmes, will get there the next time.
MR. DENIG: Okay, let's go to the gentleman in the back, please.
QUESTION: Chuck Corey, Washington File to Africa. Could you expand a little bit on the recent additions and deletions from AGOA eligibility? I believe Eritrea and CAR were dropped from the list and Angola was added.
MR. SNYDER: CAR is the easiest one. The coup was a 508 kind of coup, taking down a legitimate government. A legitimate, democratically elected-government hasn't replaced it and there are standards. They're not exalted. Having military governments, it seems to me, in Africa in this day and age, is unacceptable to Africa, never mind to us. And so that's why the CAR is not in the game. Eritrea, it's got to do with human rights violations and warnings we've issued to them over time, that they need to become what we hoped they would be when they got independence, the dynamic engine of growth in the Horn of Africa.
And given the unfortunate problems that have arisen internally on human rights, freedom of the press and other things, it lends us to question their commitment to economic development of a standard size. When violations are going on like this, will contracts be honored? If you don't honor contracts, how can you have investment? There's that kind of question on the table, and we did issue warning letters beforehand.
Can they get in? Yes, they can. Eritrea could very easily reverse where they are now, and we hope they will, and we're looking forward to bringing them back in. But right now, there are standards, and they're not particularly egregious, but some people have managed to fall aside.
The Angolans, finally, we have a miracle after all this time. UNITA is inside the system. Major political developments there led us to take a look at this. Some specific promises that will be acted, hopefully, in the near-term on transparency to do with oil and other things are about to take place.
We’re hoping for an announcement of an election, in which UNITA and other parties will be permitted to take place, and we're convinced that the government is moving in that direction. And so we decided, and it was a near thing, but we decided that Angola was welcome in. And we'll see if they continue to remain eligible because they do do these things that we're hoping they will do in the short-term. And we have every expectation they will.
So there is your candidates and what happened with them.
MR. DENIG: We'll take the lady there, please.
QUESTION: Thank you. Hi, I'm Nneoma Ukeje-Eloagu of This Day newspapers, Nigeria and South Africa, but my question is on Nigeria. There has been a recent warning on travel -- an update on travel warning to Nigeria. I wondered if that was based on a domestic assessment in the situation, a domestic situation, or is it part of the global picture on counterterrorism, especially in light of efforts in West Africa?
MR. SNYDER: It's a little of both. I mean, Nigeria has had some internal problems. As you know, there have been problems up in the western states. There have been general terrorist threats throughout the region. You had this unfortunate problem that has nothing to do with terrorism on one of the airlines, all of which leads us to warn Americans that they need to be careful when they go to Nigeria because of the general situation across the board.
This is not currently the kind of place that somebody that's unsophisticated should go. And that's really what our travel warnings are about. In this case, there's a terrorist dimension that has to do with a global problem that's come up. I won't be more specific than that. But I think it can be resolved, hopefully.
MR. DENIG: We'll take the lady in the back please.
QUESTION: My name is Adanech from Voice of America, Horn of Africa, Africa Division. As you know, the Ethio-Eritrea border demarcation has been postponed indefinitely. But we hear there are some diplomatic activities right now. Could you please tell us what those activities are?
And my second question would be do you see any hope in preventing another war between the two countries?
MR. SNYDER: I think we all need to remember that the Eritrean-Ethiopia Border Commission was the answer to the problem that the parties selected, that Ethiopia and Eritrea selected. And what we've been saying all along is that the parties need to do what they say they would do.
They agreed in the beginning that they would honor and respect what the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Commission came up with, and they need to get on with that. The diplomatic activities in the region are aimed at resolving the broader situation. Deputy Assistant Secretary Yamamoto was just out there, and those are bilateral relations between the United States and Ethiopia and Eritrea. We have a broad agenda with both your countries, global war on terrorism is among them, the border dispute is not, except to say that we're friends, and if you can come up with a workable solution in which we can help ease the pain of adjusting to what you said you would do, in other words, the outcome of the EEBC, we're prepared to help that.
But it's up to you to tell us. It's not up to us to solve this problem. This is a problem between you. It's bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. We're friends, we value you both, and we'd like to be helpful, but we are not going to resolve this situation. You have chosen a path. We agreed with you with what you chose. But you need to walk down the path.
In terms of the UN's efforts, we're very supportive of Mr. Axworthy. He's a reputable gentleman that's done this before, and he's going to lend his good offices to help the parties come to the proper conclusion. And in that area, if he comes up with a suggestion for us to help in some fashion, we'll take a look at it.
But again, it's for the parties to resolve, and the UN is doing the appropriate thing. They've named a special representative. Secretary General Annan is cognizant of this problem because we are afraid this could deteriorate into a war, which is a total waste of humanity, in the case of the Horn, as the first war was. And so we're hoping that Axworthy succeeds. But it's ultimately on the parties to do this.
We're hoping this will move beyond it -- that was the reason our Deputy Assistant Secretary went out -- to a dialogue. It's natural that Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, for that matter, and Kenya are bound together in the Horn and they should have decent relations with each other, but real economic relations. Massawa and Assab should be the obvious ways out for most Ethiopian traffic, as well as Djibouti. But there needs to be peace and there needs to be a dialogue between the parties, as opposed to hostility, and we are hoping to advance things in that manner.
We're not there yet, but we're optimistic. I'm a diplomat. I'm paid to be optimistic. But I think there's reason to hope, given the people's decent relations, that we can get past this problem.
MR. DENIG: Okay, let's go to South Africa in the middle, please.
QUESTION: Deon Lamprecht of Media 24 in South Africa.
On the eve of President Bush's visit to Africa last year, there was quite a bit of emphasis from Secretary Powell and the President himself on the role that South Africa should play in bringing Zimbabwe back to heel.
There was some implied criticism after President Bush met with Mbeki. The message was that the U.S. would be happy to leave the handling of South Africa to Mbeki, or the decision on how South Africa should handle Zimbabwe to South Africa.
Is that still the view? Has there been any progress at all, from your point of view in the role that South Africa could or should play in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe?
MR. SNYDER: I think our general view, and it's true in this case, as well, that the best ones to come up with the best solution in the immediate crises like this are the people themselves. If that's not possible, the region is the one that gives the best advice. And ultimately, anyone that's concerned and says there are standards in the world has a role to play.
And so when the Zimbabwe internal parties failed to resolve this crisis and it got worse, and it began to bleed over the borders economically and with refugees and other things, we were hoping for the region to step up. And we've seen South Africa do great things in the region.
I remember the early intervention in Lesotho against a military coup, in which Botswana joined South Africa in saying that the standard in southern Africa is, there will not be a military regime. That's the old Africa. That's the old world. It doesn't count here anymore.
We've seen South Africa step up to the plate in Burundi. The efforts of President Mandela, and, at the time, President Clinton and others to bring the Burundi crisis to where it is today where it's very close to resolution is, in a large part, due to South Africa's energetic diplomacy, and in the fact that you stepped up and sent troops.
We were hoping that we would get that kind of heavy weight, given the neighbor relationship and the economic interdependence between yourselves and Zimbabwe. We were hoping we would get that African insight. I think we still are. I think we're hoping that President Mbeki will be able to quietly and effectively get President Mugabe to see that what's going on is destroying Zimbabwe. It's not advancing his agency in any way that makes sense, either in the region, certainly not in the country, and to the broader world at-large.
The Commonwealth actions, I think, say that the broader world community across the world sees that what's going on in Zimbabwe is a step beyond the norm. We're still hoping that President Mbeki will step up. We continued our sanctions and other things, but ultimately, this problem will turn, I suspect, because the region ultimately weighs in and says this is not acceptable anymore. There needs to be a real dialogue. The opposition needs to be respected, rights need to be restored.
Land reform makes sense, but not land reform that winds up being another form of patronage and corruption. That's not legitimate land reform. So even to hide behind that issue is thin drool these days, and that's what we've been saying. But it counts much more when the neighbors say it because they face some of the same problems.
It's nice for us to sit back here in a nice air conditioned studio in Washington and talk about land reform in Zimbabwe, but it's different when South Africa, when Mozambique, when Angola speaks about land reform in Africa. It carries more weight, and it should. And that's what we're hoping works. We're hoping that President Mbeki will win, like he's won in Burundi, and he won earlier on Lesotho. The jury is still out. But unfortunately, with a tragedy unfolding like this, time is of the essence, and we're hoping that he takes a reenergized look.
MR. DENIG: Last, very quick question from Japan.
QUESTION: Well, this may not be so quick. But I'm Hiro Aida with Japan's Kyodo News. And in terms of well, coordinated efforts for a global partnership between Japan and the United States for assisting in developing world, are there any specific areas of assistance or specific -- well, countries where -- or African region where U.S. and Japan -- well, this year, to cooperate?
And we heard a lot about so called, you know, trade is more important than just assistance to development, and we heard a lot about so called trade facilitations or, a kind of a trade capacity building. What happened to those efforts, well, a couple of years ago? I'm just wondering.
MR. SNYDER: I think we're hoping that Japan does become more actively engaged in Africa. We're certainly looking forward to Japan showing up at the Liberia Donors Conference. We're definitely looking for a Japanese partner in Liberia. We'd welcome Japan's participation anywhere that she would choose to participate.
Certainly, I'm sure the French would welcome her assistance in Cote D'Ivoire, as would the people of the Cote D'Ivoire for a number of reasons. You've been a little more economically active on the eastern coast of Africa, in Mozambique and other places, and Lord knows that the opportunities in places like Mozambique for developmental assistance, but also for trade, are vast and we would hope to see Japan there and perhaps in places like Tanzania where post-Cold War, old alliances are gone and new friends are there, but not in the significant way they might be. And we would hope that Japan takes a look at these things.
In terms of the trade enhancements we were looking at, AGOA has really been successful. This last conference that I went to was no more the high-minded political rhetoric that we heard at the first go-round, or that we even heard in the second meeting in Mauritius. This was more about, how do we get it done? Things are happening. Textile advancements are taking place. One of the unintended consequences, I think, of AGOA is automotive assembly in South Africa. But that's what trade and investment is about. The pleasant surprise is where statistics change for reasons you didn't expect, but in ways that are helpful to the process. And we are hoping that Japan joins us in that kind of thing. We're working on free trade areas in southern Africa. That kind of activity from Japan would be more than welcome by us and certainly by the Africans.
Thanks a lot. I've got to run off.
MR. DENIG: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
