U.S. Foreign Policy

That said, you know, there will be differences. But a lot will depend upon which Democrat, if there is one, and who he or she appoints. It also depends upon the situation. Imagine this person comes in and there's another 9/11-type attack soon after that person takes office. That would obviously shape the situation. Or imagine this person, a month after this individual enters the Oval Office, the head of the CIA walks in and says, "We have hard information that North Korea, or Iran, have crossed some threshold of capability."

So foreign policy is not something you carry into the Oval Office with you and then it unfolds. It just -- you're inevitably also reactive. But that said, all things being equal, all things being equal, I would think, in general, you would see a slight shift towards probably greater, you know, at least -- how would I put it -- the tone of foreign policy, some of the, the tone of foreign policy would probably move in a slightly more multilateral direction. But again, even that I wouldn't necessarily read too much into because if you remember under Mr. Clinton, when there was a vote in the Senate about the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court, and when those issues were up there was no support, even when you had a Democratic President and a larger Democratic presence in the Congress than you have today.

So I wouldn't -- American foreign policy, the changes tend to be somewhat limited because there's a -- there are powerful forces of continuity, given that whoever comes in inherits alliance relationships, international commitments, and the like. They also inherit a certain world. And when you come in, the Middle East is likely to look, you know, pretty similar to the way it looked the day before. And the same is the relationship between India and Pakistan and the rest. So the scope for change tends to be somewhat narrow. It's one of the reasons that U.S. foreign policy, you know, over these last 50 or 60 years has probably had more continuity in it than change.

I'd just say two things though, at the risk of slightly contradicting myself. One is, dramatic events can create larger openings, and 9/11 was a dramatic event. So when dramatic events happen, I think probably social scientists would say, they open up the potential for discontinuities. They open up the potential for slightly larger breaks in the patterns of foreign policy, and second, and I can -- here, I can draw on my own experience -- I've worked in four Administrations: Carter, Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II, -- people matter. The President matters and the senior people the President appoints matter.

So even though there's -- the world in some ways -- everything I said about the nature of the world and the nature of continuity -- it almost, it gives you -- how would I put it -- a range for American foreign policy. But depending upon who gets elected and who that person appoints, I actually think, within that range, you could have quite a lot of variation. And we've seen that. So elections do matter, and then the appointments the President makes do matter.

Sir.

QUESTION: Leonard Pehrson, I'm with the Swedish paper Sydsvenska Dagbladet. Do you see that the ongoing intense foreign policy debate is really taking root among the general public so it could become a decisive theme in the Presidential election and, I mean not just in the sense that the taxpayers' money is going to Iraq?

MR. HAASS: That's an interesting question. I don't think most Americans, at the end of the day, are going home and debating pre-emptive uses of force to be perfectly honest. I'll let you decide whether that's a good thing or a bad thing. But on the other hand, there is a greater interest in foreign policy than, than you've seen for a couple of reasons. One is homeland security and terrorism. People feel affected by it, though even there, there's a difference between people living in this city, in Washington and people, say, who live on the West Coast.

But people feel affected by foreign policy in other ways because of the reserves and how so many young American men and women are getting called up. It's very disruptive to families, communities, businesses, so people see the connections more between foreign policy and you're seeing it in the trade area. You know, we've lost, what, two and a half million jobs over the last two, three years. And rightly or wrongly, lots of people are pointing their finger at foreign imports and so forth. And again, people are drawing connections.

So however good or bad the economy is this time, you will not have a Democratic challenger who basically stands up and says, "It's the economy, stupid." You're not going to have people downgrading the role of foreign policy. I think whoever the Democratic challenger is, he or she is going to have to demonstrate that they can be a Commander-in-Chief, and address foreign policy issues effectively.

But, you know, do I think the American debate about foreign policy is where is should be? No. And again, Lisa, I expect, talked to you at some length about outreach. You know, part of our job here is addressing the interests of our members. Part of our job here is addressing the interests of what I would call the foreign policy elite: American journalists, members of Congress, members of the Administration, the people who pick up every two months an issue of Foreign Affairs. And there's lots of those -- 100,000 Americans subscribe to Foreign Affairs.

The -- but I think -- you know, that leaves, if you add all those people up, you've still got about 279 million or so Americans out there. And part of our challenge is to reach them. And that's where the Web comes in, the Internet, the website comes in. We're looking more at what we can do in the way of teaching materials to help reach students. We're looking at what more we can do in getting on local media: TV, radio -- not just New York or, you know, but local things around the, around the country. We're looking at what we can do with documentary films.

We are interested in increasing the -- how would I put it -- the level of popular participation in the foreign policy debate. I think it's essential. And I think things are moving in that direction. There is much greater interest, in part because, I think, people have figured out that in a global world, despite the fact we're the most powerful country, we are, we are fundamentally affected by what happens out there. Or to put it in another way, foreign policy isn't foreign anymore. What happens out there affects what happens here, and people are seeing the connections in ways they never understood before.

So I think the opportunity is there in ways that, ten years ago, just simply did not exist. Ten years ago, you had to spend 90 percent of your time banging on the door saying, "Foreign policy matters. Please pay attention to me." And now you don't. I think people -- so I think it's a much more receptive audience than was the case before.

I have time for a few more. We've got one, two, three, four --

Sir.

QUESTION: Daigo Kubota, for TV Asahi, Japanese Television. I sort of have three questions.

MR. HAASS: Why don't we do one because there are a few other people who want to ask questions.

QUESTION: Okay, then, the most important question --

MR. HAASS: But I'll be in Japan this weekend so I can answer questions there.

QUESTION: Oh. Okay. The -- President Bush went to APEC and he met with the President of China, and he said that we won't go with a non-aggression pact treaty, a non-aggression treaty with North Korea, but he said that you would go with a, sort of like a joint communiqué among the six countries with sort of some kind of a non-aggression word inside. But, having the President saying those -- saying that, how do you think, how do you think that this North Korean issue will play out in the end?

MR. HAASS: In my old job I used to say I was in charge of policy planning not policy predicting. You know, I have no idea how it's going to turn out. But I think we've potentially made an interesting shift. By we, I mean the United States. The fact that the President is now talking about some sort of a multilateral commitment to North Korea that would obviously be conditioned on North Korea satisfying the concerns of the six and others about their nuclear activities. That, to me, sets the stage for diplomacy. And quite honestly, for the last two and a half years we haven't gotten that far. We -- either there was not much diplomacy, no communication, or we were debating about what we used to call the shape of the table -- whether it be bilateral, multilateral, six-party, what have you.

What I am heartened by is that we are now, I think, finally into the substance of this. You know, knowing what I know about the issues and knowing what I know about North Korea, I would not sit breathlessly by your telephone waiting for instant developments. I think this will be a long, hard, difficult road to go down. And what makes it more difficult is not simply the difficulty of negotiating the issues, but we're not negotiating in a vacuum. We have to also make sure that while this process goes on that the situation on the ground does not get worse. So by that I mean it's going to be difficult to negotiate any agreement, but what could be also a problem is what North Korea does in the meantime. You can't have a situation where you're talking about these issues and suddenly North Korea is taking significant steps in the nuclear area. So this is going to be extremely, extremely difficult. We shouldn't kid ourselves.

Sir.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) In your opinion, how can evolute (sic) the relations between Europe and United States, considering the will of French and Germans to affirm original point of view and majorist (sic) spirit?

MR. HAASS: You know, getting U.S.-European relations somewhat back on track, you know, is not going to be easy. On the other hand, there's areas now where we are cooperating. We're cooperating on the war on terrorism. We are cooperating in Afghanistan, where NATO has taken the lead. So I don't think the relationship is in a crisis. We just had the vote in the United Nations. We all have a common stake in Iraq, despite the differences about how we got to where we are. So we've got this group here, again, Larry Summers and Henry Kissinger are leading, that will be offering their opinions on all this.

But again, almost -- I guess I'd put it this way. It's so clearly in the interests of the United States and Europe to work out their differences. There's no way that we, alone, despite our power, can deal with the regional and global challenges that we face. And the most capable pool of potential partners is in Europe.

So it's manifestly in the American interest to work out a better relationship with Europe. It's also manifestly in Europe's interest to work out a better relationship with us. I mean, Europe doesn't succeed if America fails in Iraq. And Europe lacks certain capabilities to address many global problems by itself. I think it's important for Europeans to get rid of the notion, to reject the notion that you hear sometimes coming out of Paris of the idea of Europe as a counterweight or reestablishing a multi-polar world. We don't need Europe balancing the United States; we need Europe working with the United States.

On the other hand, the United States -- it's incumbent on the United States to show some flexibility. You know, we have to be willing to meet Europeans halfway, to take their views into account, that that partnership cannot mean, simply, the United States decides and Europe then has to do whatever it is we choose. So, obviously there has to be a bit of give and take. But it's so clearly in our interest to succeed in the Doha Development Round, to succeed in Iraq, to succeed with Iran, to succeed in the Middle East, you know, I could just go down the list.

So, you know, I haven't seen anything, which leads me to think that we have a crisis. I haven't seen anything, which leads me to think that cooperation's impossible, but it is going to mean some flexibility on our part, some realism on the Europeans' part. And I hope it comes about. But I can't predict whether it will. I can make the case for it, I just can't predict it.

I have time for about two or three more. One, two, three, that's it. Sir.

QUESTION: Evgeny Umerenkov of Russian paper Komsomolskaya Pravda. What is the Council's approach to Chechen problem, and what is your opinion, would Chechen issue become obstacle for U.S.-Russian relations in the future?

MR. HAASS: Again, there's no Council position on Chechnya or anything else. My own personal view is that Russia has every right to want to keep Chechnya in Russia, but Russia is unwise in how it often goes about it. And I think some Russian tactics and policies have proven counterproductive. They've proven heavy-handed and they've raised all sorts of human rights and other questions. So, to put it another way, I'm sympathetic with Russian goals, but not Russian means.

How much of a problem is it for U.S.-Russian relations? That's an interesting question. It is a problem. On the other hand, I think the challenge for U.S.-Russian relations is that despite the fact, say, we may disagree somewhat over Chechnya, it's not in either of our interests to allow that disagreement to interfere with our cooperation, say, vis-à-vis North Korea or vis-à-vis Iran. And I think that's true of a lot of relationships. China is the same thing.

I think we have to learn how to disagree and not be in a situation where one area of disagreement gets in the way of all the areas of potential agreement. We don't have that luxury. That would be self-defeating for both of us. So that's -- so I think we need to get to the point where we can speak directly to you about Chechnya. I even -- you know, I would hope the day would come around where potentially you would say to us. "We're willing to work with you again, we would accept some of your diplomatic efforts." I suggested as much in a speech in my previous job, but the Russian Government never took me up on the offer.

The, but -- whether it's Chechnya or something else, in any one of these complicated relationships, like U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, U.S.-Europe, U.S.-India -- you name it -- these multi-dimensional relationships, there will be inevitable areas of disagreement. And the diplomatic challenge is not to let the inevitable areas of disagreement spill over and overwhelm either areas of agreement or areas of potential cooperation. And that's how diplomats ought to earn their living.

Sir.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) from (inaudible). Coming back to your last response about relation between Europe and United States, don't you think there is a deep crisis between France and United States when one of the main newspaper of this country describe France as an enemy?

MR. HAASS: It wasn't the main newspaper. It was simply a columnist in the newspaper. I don't see France as an enemy. And historically, I have seen France as a country that had a very independent foreign policy, but can normally be counted upon in serious situations.

What was so distressing to me about French policy in Iraq earlier this year was not that France disagreed with us, but that France opposed us. And I thought that was a step too far. It's one thing for allies to disagree, but I thought France took its disagreement too far in opposing us. And that, to me, was inconsistent with its obligations as an ally. And that is something that we have to work through. But no, France is not an enemy. That's silly, and it's a dangerous way of thinking. Again, it's very much in both countries' interests that we rebuild this relationship. And again, we are working together in places like Afghanistan or we have worked together at times recently in the Middle East, we have worked together at times in Africa, in the war on terrorism, so there's nothing inevitable about Franco-American disagreement.

And I probably -- on both sides, I think the rhetoric's gotten too hot and I think the time has come, you know, to cool it down and to -- and I'm glad to see that you've had the revival of, you know, some diplomatic contacts. And as recently as this morning, as I was walking down the street to work, I ran into your ambassador and one of your ministers. So French -- Franco-American relations in New York, at least, are alive and well.

There was one gentleman here that gets the last question. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Jae-Ho Kim, Chosun Ilbo newspaper in South Korea. I have follow-up question concerning the North Korea issue. Do you think the North Korea is willing to give up the nuclear weapons? And if the North Korea does not accept the America's and six countries' proposal and does not give up the nuclear weapons, what should America do to deal with the nuclear weapons issue?

MR. HAASS: It's always hard to predict the future. North Korea might be the single hardest case to predict the future. It is -- you know, most countries, the decision-making -- very few countries are transparent. Some are translucent. North Korea is opaque. I find it just about impossible to read North Korea, to interpret, to -- much less to predict North Korea, so I can't tell you. North -- and anyone who does tell you, I wouldn't listen to what they're going to do.

They may -- they may decide they want to bargain away their nuclear capabilities in exchange for diplomatic and economic and other sorts of support. They may decide not to. They may decide the their nuclear weapons represent their lifeline, and somehow their grand insurance policy. I don't know. I think, though, we need to test that and we need to find out.

I'm not comfortable standing up here and saying, you know, about hypotheticals -- I would just simply say, I do not like the idea of living in a world where North Korea has a large number of nuclear weapons. I don't want to live in a world where North Korea either potentially uses them on the Peninsula or starts giving away nuclear material or weapons to organizations or states as a way of earning hard currency. Now, we've seen North Korea do this with drugs. We've seen them doing it with missiles and technology, so I wouldn't rule anything out.

So to me, this is the most serious near-term national security challenge we face. To me, this is -- this is at the top of my list of national security challenges the United States faces in the world. And there are some ways this could evolve -- and I use the word "unacceptable" very carefully. I am a former diplomat, so when I use the world "unacceptable," I mean the word "unacceptable."

There are certain scenarios involving North Korea that I would think are potentially unacceptable. And we don't want to get to that point, because all the options, if you get to that point, are bad. All the options are potentially very costly for the United States, for the Republic of Korea, for China, for Japan, for Russia and everyone else. And that's why it is so much in our collective interest to at least explore diplomacy to see if it's possible to get North Korea to pull back from this nuclear brink, because if it won't, then we are faced with some terrible options. Living with it's a terrible option, and doing something about it is also an extremely costly option.

But we could be there. And that's why, again, I am heartened -- coming back to your question -- by the fact that I feel that we will -- we are finally getting to the point, diplomatically, where we can test North Korea in answer to your question. We'll find out the answer. And then once we have an answer, then we can decide what we're prepared to live with and what we're prepared to do.

I apologize. I've got a 4:30. I want to again thank you for coming in here. I really appreciate the interest and I hope -- I hope it's not the last time we see you within these walls. But thank you very much.

(Applause.)