10:30 A.M. EDT
Real Audio of Briefing
MR. DENIG: Good morning and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. A warm welcome, also, to journalists assembled in the New York Foreign Press Center. It's a pleasure this morning to be able to welcome to our podium Ambassador Edward Djerejian, the Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world. As you know, this group was set up at the request of Congress, and it's a subgroup of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.
Ambassador Djerejian has agreed to come over here today to brief us and to answer questions on the report of his group, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace," and I hope that you all found copies of it out front over the last few days and again today.
He'll have a brief opening statement, then he’ll will be delighted to take your questions.
Ambassador Djerejian.
MR. DJEREJIAN: Thank you very much. It's good to see some familiar faces here in the audience.
I will not go into a detailed summation of the findings because I did give a full press conference to the State Department. I know many of you who were there and I know it was beamed here, to the Foreign Press Center. So I think in the short period of time we have, I think it would be best for me to just make some opening comments and then open it up to discussion and your questions.
First, I'm very proud of the work that my advisory group accomplished in a short, three months in producing this very detailed and substantive report. We were mandated by Congress, by Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia, his subcommittee, to prepare this report because of the concern over the image of the United States. But beyond the image, the surveys and the polls that show that there is an increasing level of opposition, especially in the Arab and Muslim countries, to what they perceive to be our policies and that a question arose, "Are we effectively communicating and dialoguing with the Arab and Muslim world?"
I put together a bipartisan group, people who are both Democrats and Republicans, chose the people on the basis of their competence in the various fields: communications, area expertise, et cetera. And everyone volunteered their services for the public service. And we spent the whole summer -- we traveled to Arab countries; we traveled to Turkey; we traveled to Senegal; we traveled to France, engaged with the Muslim community there; in London to see the regional Arab networks in London and the papers; and also, we had discussions through Digital Video Conferencing with Indonesia and Pakistan. And we contacted, literally, hundreds of people here. So it was quite an extensive effort.
And basically, the major conclusion -- substantive conclusion -- I just want to put forward this morning, there's no question that in the aftermath of the Cold War and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11th of 2001, the United States of America is engaged in a major struggle to what we call in our report: to expand the zone of tolerance and to marginalize extremists -- the extremists, be they secular or religious, be they Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu -- the goal is to really expand the zone of tolerance throughout the world.
Our mandate is the Arab and Muslim world, and especially in this part of the world. We also recognize that while the conduct of policy is the primary determinant of the success or failure in this struggle, the role of public diplomacy has taken on critical importance in the effort to understand, inform, engage and influence people in this important region of the world.
At a critical time in our nation's history, the apparatus of public diplomacy has proven inadequate, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. The fault, we make the point, lies not in the dedicated men and women who are serving here in Washington and in the field in the public diplomacy function, but with a system that has become outmoded, lacking both strategic direction and resources.
The good news, we found, is that the Executive Branch -- I met with the highest-level officials in the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, Defense Department, USAID -- that they are ready to meet the challenge. They are sensitive to the issue and the problem, and of course, Congress is abundantly aware of the issue since they mandated us.
So the solutions that we advocate match these times. There's no question in the minds of our group that we are engaged in a long-term struggle, a battle of ideas against the forces of extremism; again, let me repeat: whether they're secular or religious. So we called for a dramatic transformation of public diplomacy, the way the U.S. communicates its values and policies to enhance our national security.
And then, what we found, of course -- that I know you as journalists, especially from the region, know so well -- is that there is across-the-board very positive attitudes that have been confirmed by all surveys in polling in terms of what America stands for in terms of its values, in terms of its system. We spoke with one Iranian woman who said, "My God, who can have anything against life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?"
The values that America represents are highly regarded because they're considered to be common values, universal values, in the Arab and Muslim world. And so this is a very productive factor.
The problems occur in terms of perceptions and attitudes toward our policies. And so there's this interesting gap, if you will, between negative attitudes toward policies and positive attitudes toward American values. We fully acknowledge, I want to stress that public diplomacy is only part of the picture, but our mandate was strictly limited to public diplomacy. We were not mandated to advise the United States Administration or Congress on our policies.
So we have called for a new strategic direction. And by that we mean a fundamental reorganization of how our strategy toward public diplomacy is conducted, and we call for the creation of a special counselor to the President, a person that would be close to the President -- it goes back to the old days of the Edward R. Murrows and the Leonard Marks, someone the President has and trusts, who is there, virtually next to the key policy makers in the White House. And as this person sees the policy being formed, his or her input into that is, "Mr. President, this is the way it's going to be read out in the world. This is the way we should convey the message," and get this interaction between people who are creating the policy and people who have the responsibility of how the message should be crafted. That's very important.
Edward R. Murrow is known for his famous statement, "Mr. President, I have to be in on the take-offs and the crash landings." And that's exactly -- we think it's very important to create this position, and you have the details in the report.
We also make very clear that this commitment has to come from the President of the United States, himself, to the whole bureaucracy to ensure that public diplomacy is given the importance it needs. And as you've seen in the report, we call for reinvigorating the National Security Council Public Diplomacy coordinating process, making that meaningful. It's been moribund in the last few months. And in the State Department, really reinforcing the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and we have some very specific recommendations in that, including creating a unit within that office that would be concentrating on the Arab and Muslim countries, that would be monitoring the Arab media, the press, the satellite television programs and being aware of the discourse, the discussions, the commentary, the analysis that is coming from this important part of the world, and then being better able to understand what is being said about us and then how we can appropriately respond in a more coherent manner. We call that the Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications Unit.
One of the key findings is that our public diplomacy programs are very, very inadequately funded. We did an analysis, and I refer you to the report, that out of the $500-odd million dollars that goes to the public diplomacy side -- because an equal chunk that goes to broadcasting to bring it up to the billion dollar level -- but of the $500, when you parse it down, and we did a lot of diligent accounting on this, only about $150 million goes to the Arab and Muslim countries. And then when we parsed that down and looked at salaries and overhead, we realized that in what's left in public diplomacy outreach is $25 million for the entire Arab and Muslim world, which is what we put in the report -- absurdly inadequate.
But we did not approach this task as just coming in saying, "We have to spend more money." We analyzed what the situation -- we determined that the funding is inadequate. But before we did that, we analyzed the strategic picture. Why do we need an effective public diplomacy program in this part of the world? And we give a strategic course of direction that is in the report itself.
The other thing, of course, you've seen in the report is that we're urging a total reinvigoration of language training in the Foreign Service. We have on the books about 56 or 58 Arabists at the professional level of speaking. But when we took a hard look at that, a close look at that, we came up with the startling figure: only five who can actually get on Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiyya or on one of your networks, or actually engage fluently in Arabic at a professional level, which is required.
That has to change because this is a long-term relationship with the Arab and Muslim world and we simply have to bring up our Foreign Service Officers to the point where they are speaking not only Arabic, but Farsi, Urdu, Bahasa, Indonesian, Pashto, and the languages, all the languages, the key languages of the area.
So I'm not going to go any further. This is a very rich report in terms of its content and its recommendations, and what I would like to do is, let me make one further comment.
One of the major things we found when were in the region is that all over -- Arab countries, Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia, Pakistan -- in the daily discourse and discussions and debates and commentaries that are being made about us Americans, the United States, we are simply not present in any significant manner.
Now, I think that's a two-way street and a two-way responsibility. It's our responsibility in the first place, but also the responsibility of the media and the communications outlets of the region. Dialogue means two people. It means a two-way discussion. But I was struck, and you've probably read this in the newspapers because it's been often quoted now since, but, we watched Al-Arabiyya, and they had this program called "The Americanization of Islam." Think of that title. "The Americanization of Islam." That's a very provocative title. As if there, the (inaudible), there's is a conspiracy of America to Americanize Islam.
Well, for two hours, during this talk show program, people were coming and talking about this conspiracy. There was not one person, not one Arab-speaking person who knew America, who could give a context -- “By the way, the Americans do practice freedom of religion” -- or make any statement that this thesis might be not what it seems to be. And that's just one example. But I think it's important for us to be present in those discussions in a more significant way. And at the end of the day, the whole thrust of this report is about just that.
So thank you very much. I'll take your question.
MR. DENIG: As usual, we'll ask you to please use the microphone; identify yourself and your news organization. Let's start up front here with Khaled.
QUESTION: [Khaled Dawoud.] Mr. Djerejian, I mean, I read part of your report and again, you know, you've emphasized the issue of policy vs. image. But at the end of the day, I mean, people in the Arab world will not change their minds about the United States as long as it doesn't change its policy in Palestine or the issue of Iraq, so whatever, you know, public diplomacy you're going to do. So how do you suggest overcoming this problem?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, let me suggest this to you. Again, I've got to be clear. We were not mandated to make recommendations to the Administration on policy, but -- and as we say in the report, policy is the major determinate. There is no question about it. But at the same time, let's say policy forms 80 percent of people's perceptions about us. There is that other 20 percent, which is the message -- the manner in which that message is conveyed, the content of that message, the effectiveness of the dialogue; and public diplomacy is the expression of American values and policies.
And, therefore, if you have an effective public diplomacy program, you're engaged in conveying your ideas, getting ideas back, engaged in the very serious dialogue with this very important audience which we're generalizing, which is so differentiated -- and that's one of the things we put in our report.
You cannot talk about the Muslim world without differentiating each country as to its differences -- within each country, there are differences. But, still, this engagement is a two-way street and here is where public diplomacy, effectively pursued, can feed back into the policymaking process. And when you know what the attitudes are of people, that can also inform the formulation of policy. And that has to be done much more effectively.
The other comment I'd like to make to respond to your question is that, let's put aside today's issues on the Palestinian issue or on Iraq. If you looked at the general thrust of American policies in the Middle East and in the Muslim world, what are they? I find, and our group found, that they are highly, highly important and positive policies.
Conflict resolution: now, the debate is on how we're conducting the conflict resolution in the Arab-Israeli context. Conflict resolution in the Arab-Israeli context, in Kashmir, Western Sahara, for example. The United States plays a leading role in trying to resolve conflicts. The debate is how we are trying to, in each specific case, what our policies are. But the positive element is that the United States is engaged in conflict resolution.
The second -- one of the other major thrusts of policy is promoting political participation and freedom of expression throughout the world, but especially in this part of the world – this is a very key requirement for the prosperity and the development of the Middle East and the Muslim countries.
We promote what we believe in, and that's part of the expression of our values: political participation with the model of democracy, but without the arrogance of saying that, you know, people have to adopt our democracy; economic reforms; anti-corruption campaigns; privatization of the economies so that the people can get jobs, that people have a sense of a future for themselves and their children; our assistance programs, our USAID programs -- everything we've talk about, everything we are; the Middle East Partnership Initiative that the State Department is doing in terms of promoting economic and social advancement.
Because one of the principal positions of the United States is that human dignity is not the monopoly of the elite. And yet, we know that in this part of the world there are very serious issues of governance and of economic stagnation.
So that's another thrust of American policy, and I could go on -- free trade zones, human rights, the rights of women. So, when you talk about American policies and American values, it's not just the specifics of what we're doing on these critically important issues that we mentioned, be it Iraq, be it the Arab-Israeli issue, but it's a bigger picture.
QUESTION: Aziz Fahmy, MBC. Welcome back, Mr. Ambassador. What really hurts that we hear American officials say why they hate us, as it is a big mystery. They are not able to understand. You lived in the region. You know how much America is loved in the region. There's only one problem, which is everybody would point to about the foreign policy, so the -- I understand that you will not talk about the political part, but in terms of their expressing that it -- as if this dislike or resentment is a mystery, that they don't understand it, so what I would like if you can address is that is there a denial here, or -- and when you came back, was your conclusion -- and you talked to American officials, what did they say to you? What was their reaction?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I did brief at the White House, the National Security Council, Secretary Powell, certainly Congressman Wolf, and what I'm very bolstered by is that there's a total realistic recognition of what the issue is. And I don't think that anyone that I've talked with doesn't understand what the problems are, at the same time trying to resolve them.
But when you ask the question of, "Why do they hate us," I think the question one should ask is who are we talking about? Who hates us? We know that America is still looked upon by the vast majority in the Muslim world as a model in many ways in the principal positions I've talked about in terms of democracy and freedom and economic prosperity, equality of economic opportunity.
But we have to ask the question: Who hates us? The people who hate us are pretty well known. They are the extremists. They do not represent the mainstream of the populations of this part of the world.
I think that when you look at someone like Usama bin Laden, my own view of Usama bin Laden is that he was the author and struck at the United States on September 11th as the symbol that he wanted to strike at, but that his more immediate objective were the regimes in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in Cairo; that he has a political agenda. These political Islamists, whatever we call them -- extremists, these terrorists -- have a political agenda, and that is to seize political power and establish a regime that they have defined as a pure Islamist regime that would have its own agenda. They do not represent the majority of the peoples in this region. So you have to ask the question: Who hates us?
And then secondly, when I said the basic challenge is to expand the zone of tolerance and moderation and to marginalize the extremists, that's exactly what I'm talking about. So we know, and I would answer your question by saying that I think Americans understand that when people say, "Why do they hate us?" People are saying, "We know -- we have a pretty good idea who hates us and who has different views."
QUESTION: Thank you. Welcome back, Ambassador.
MR. DJEREJIAN: Thank you.
QUESTION: My name is George Hismeh. I'm writing for The Daily Star of Beirut, Lebanon. Let me -- I am glad you brought up the question of -- the hate question. Why would the president make such a wide brush accusation? Why do the Arabs hate us? I know he didn't use the word "Arab." But why do they hate us? Same thing like using the word "crusade."
I think public diplomacy should not only be limited to what you do in the area, to what our officials here -- how they present the Arab world to the American public is very, very important point.
The other question that I have for you is: Was there a period in your older experience where public diplomacy was doing well? I'm just curious whether you can point that out?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, to your first comment, this report basically does state that there has to be strategic coordination from Washington on public diplomacy. The context or the content of the President's policies have to be put together in a much more coordinated, coherent way, and then delivered from Washington, from the United States, and in the field.
In terms of your second question, I think one of the highlights of public diplomacy was during the Cold War when we had this ideological battle with communism, and we had created the United States Information Agency. You had people like Edward R. Murrow. And you had a cause, a real battle of ideas, with a superpower adversary, and when you looked at our programs, and you looked at our exchanges, you looked at what the Voice of America did, what Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Liberty did, it was a very successful program. It was a very successful program.
And what happened is that with the collapse of communism, you know, there is the theory out there that it was the end of history that the world had now gone into a period where everything is going to be dull and we're all going to become sort of liberal democracies, and history is over.
Well, surprise. History is not over. And we are now faced with this challenge that I described, especially, coming from the Arab and Muslim world, where we're in the battle of ideas. And the battle of ideas is really with the extremists. It's really, I believe, with the extremists who consider the West as being profane and themselves as being sacred.
I think if you look -- and I'm not going to try to comment on Islam -- but [based on] my limited readings and study of Islam, Islam is a religion of tolerance and peace. And in my analysis, there is absolutely no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. And therefore, what we're talking about are the extremists within the Muslim world, who have their own agenda -- and it's a political agenda.
QUESTION: My name is Said Arikat from Al Quds newspaper. Ambassador Djerejian, why this insistence on only the extremists? I could tell you about my own family, who are all American-educated. They are very secular, you know? They really cherish American values and so on, and there is a lot of frustration -- you know, a lot of frustration with American policy.
I think this is really the basis of the whole thing. I mean, yesterday's column, in his column yesterday, Thomas Friedman says that the Bush team, "And that the Bush team is in Sharon's pocket so deep that you can't find them." And if Thomas Friedman can make that deduction, I can assure you that Palestinians will make that deduction, and the Arabs will make that deduction. They can perceive it.
And because -- what, they see that, on the one hand, that Administration comes out, or that Secretary Powell comes out and says, "We are going to punish Israel. We are going to deduct from the loan guarantees." And then, you know, why at the 11th hour, you know, one minute before midnight, they go and they inform Congress, "We're not going to do that."
So there is a great deal of mistrust. I mean, you know, this is not really a question. But I think the issue that really needs to be tackled is the policy issue. That is probably more important than anything. I don't think that there is the resentment only with the extremists, but also with the wider -- people who really do cherish American values.
MR. DJEREJIAN: No, I understand your comment. And if you read our report -- and especially the analytic part of our report in the front part -- you'll see we basically acknowledge that there is great frustration and there is opposition to policies, but there is also a great deal of frustration in this part of the world because of the economic, social, and even political circumstances in which the people in the region live.
Let's be honest. It's not only American policy. But there are very critical issues of political governance, economic development, opportunities, corruption, and so it's both what's happening within these societies, and what's happening in terms of these crises -- like the Arab-Israeli crisis or Kashmir, Iraq -- that cause the -- what you're saying many more people other than the extremists, to be frustrated, and we recognize that.
But I personally feel bolstered that there is a great deal of common ground for America to engage with the middle, with the large bulk of the population of this region. And our recommendations in this report really are a template for how the United States can do this more effectively.
QUESTION: Thomas Gorguissian, An Nahar, Lebanon. Mr. Ambassador --
MR. DJEREJIAN: Are you going to ask your question in Armenian, or are you going to --
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Or in Hebrew, you know?
So my question is related to these recommendations. And, mainly, it seems that you need more "bureaucracy" or people involved in the business of public diplomacy. And the second is allocation -- the allocation of more money. And is this my misunderstanding of what's going on?
MR. DJEREJIAN: No, what's missing from your comment is that we are not just another task force, commission or advisory group, who's saying, “throw more money at it, throw more people at it.” What we did first was to analyze what is the strategic situation we find ourselves in, in terms of United States and the Muslim world.
Secondly, what is the challenge that we have? And we determined that it is truly a strategic challenge. This is a battle for ideas.
And, third, we looked at, very clinically, and very analytically, at the human resources and the financial resources, and we came out with these stunning findings on how little is actually allocated to this part of the world.
And so I would not like you to leave with the impression that this is a group that just said “throw money at it and throw people at it,” no. When we're saying "throwing people at it," we're saying, it's the quality of the people that you have to train: linguists, regional experts, people who are attuned to the culture of the region, and have fluency in the language. This is a very urgent requirement and we have a specific requirement of training Arabic speakers, 300 in a couple of years, and then another -- so it's not just that.
QUESTION: Well, can I follow up to your question? Do you have a timeframe in your mind? Because it seems that it's a long-term project what you are talking about; and especially, I had the chance to follow this "public diplomacy," in the last 10, 15 years, and it seems that they come to square one again, you know?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, that's a good question. First, I think what makes our group a bit different is that we're mandated by Congress, and that Congress also introduced supplemental language stating that the appropriations committee will not make any decisions on further funding of U.S. public diplomacy programs until my advisory groups' report was published, and the Administration has reacted to it.
So that gives us a, I think, a space in which the recommendations will be taken under serious consideration, and the Administration has an opportunity, with Congress, to determine what should be done, what shouldn't be done, along the lines of our recommendations. And there are short-term things that can be done, in this report, and longer term.
QUESTION: Hoda Tawfik, correspondent Al Ahram newspaper. My question is, of course you did a good job, you exposed what really is happening in the area, but in your opinion, how would your conclusions and what you put in the report affect and better the policy of the Administration on major problems, like the Middle East problem, like Iraq, like all this? You think it can help to better the policy or not?
MR. DJEREJIAN: I do believe that policy and public diplomacy are absolutely closely linked to one another. And therefore; I think that if you do have an effective public diplomacy program along the lines that we advocate, with strategic direction, with people out there really doing important things and engaging, the feedback that comes back to Washington from the opinions, the attitudes of the people -- not just the extremists, but the people -- I think can have a beneficial impact on the formulation of policy in a more coherent manner. So I do think that public diplomacy and policy are inexorably linked, and I think that can have a positive impact.
QUESTION: George Hismeh, The Daily Star of Beirut, Lebanon. You cited two cases of U.S. involvement in conflict resolution: Kashmir, and Western Sahara.
MR. DJEREJIAN: And the Arab-Israeli.
QUESTION: And Arab-Israel. Okay. You didn't have much success in these cases. How do you explain that?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, let's take the Arab-Israeli conflict.
QUESTION: Kashmir, what about Kashmir?
MR. DJEREJIAN: Or Kashmir. All right, Kashmir, but okay.
I mean, these are -- it's sort of like Cyprus. All these issues are extremely, extremely difficult. And it takes, sometimes, decades to come to a solution. But there has to be a great deal of determination, patience and political will on the part of all the parties to resolve these issues. And I think if you look at -- well, let me take the Arab-Israeli conflict because I know you're not interested in it. (Laughter.) But if you take the Arab-Israeli conflict, look what America has achieved historically in this.
If you take it from the Disengagement Agreements -- let's just talk about the Disengagement Agreements in '73, '74, Nixon and Kissinger; if you take it up to Camp David with President Carter; if you take it up to the Madrid Peace Conference that we did in the first Bush Administration, the first time we got the Arabs and the Israelis to enter into direct negotiations. The United States did that. And we put a framework that remains to this day, the framework of peace between the Arabs and Israelis, which we all know.
So when you ask me, you know, "What have you accomplished?" Well, we have accomplished a lot. But it is unfortunately and tragically unfinished business, like many of these conflicts are. But America plays a very important role in all of this, and I think that when we engage -- no, when we engage and when we engage and the opportunity is there -- because you just can't do it alone -- the parties have to be willing. The parties also have to have the political will to come to an agreement. Then we'd see results.
So I would not just leave the impression, George, that we haven't achieved anything. On the contrary, I think we have achieved a great deal. I mean, even the Western Sahara, you have my former and current boss, James A. Baker, III, who has done a heroic effort on the Western Sahara, but these issues are very, very difficult.
MR. DENIG: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
MR. DJEREJIAN: Thank you.
