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U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities in the Middle East and the Rest of the GlobeRichard Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State Foreign Press Center Briefing Washington, DC June 13, 2003 2:15 P.M. (EDT) MR. DENIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center, and welcome also to the journalists assembled in our New York Foreign Press Center.
This afternoon, we're delighted to be able to welcome to our podium Richard Haass, the Director of the Department of State's Office of Policy Planning. To my own personal regret, this is both the first and the last time that we will be enjoying Dr. Haass here at our podium, since today also marks his last day as Director of Policy Planning. However, he will continue as the President's Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, and, of course, we wish him all the best at the Council on Foreign Relations and hope to be able to welcome him back to our podium in that capacity.
Today Dr. Haass will give an overview of U.S. foreign policy. After a brief opening statement, he'll be glad to take your questions.
Richard.
MR. HAASS: Good afternoon. It will be a brief opening statement, with the emphasis on brief. Let me just give you a very quick overview of U.S. foreign policy now, as I see it, and then I'll take your questions on anything I've mentioned or neglected.
Let me give you what I find a useful way of thinking about it right now, which is that the United States, over the last two-plus years, has embarked on three great enterprises: first ushered in by 9/11, is the war on terrorism; closely associated with that, also after 9/11, came the war in Afghanistan; and the third, more recently, the war against Iraq.
All three of those are something the United States is still involved with, and, obviously, in different ways, but is still very much involved with. These are all, if you will, undertakings rather than events. And we continue to work with others in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and essentially are continuing to do things to make the world a more difficult place for terrorists to operate in.
In the case of Afghanistan, we continue to work there to essentially build up that country and to help it become, if you will, a normal country, able to deal with all of its internal challenges. And Iraq, which is the most recent undertaking, the military phase of Iraq is clearly over. We are now in the transition to what you might call a truly peaceful situation. We're not there yet. And while we haven't had to deal with any sort of large-scale humanitarian challenge, mercifully, we have had to deal with challenges to order, and, obviously, we still have the large undertakings of economic and political reconstruction ahead of us.
And in my view, all three of these enterprises -- the war on terror, the situation in Afghanistan and then in Iraq -- will be with us for some time to come. Again, these are large undertakings involving not simply the United States, but, in all case, others. And I'll come back to that at the end.
A secondary endeavor is that of regional issues. Let me just single out a few first, just for mention, one which has received the most attention of late, obviously, that between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. And there, the goal is, despite the recent violence, to implement and move forward on the roadmap and to persuade Israelis and Palestinians that this is the best, and I believe only, way of moving forward at the present time.
Secondly, a very different kind of regional challenge, which is North Korea and the threat posed by the North. And there, the United States is committed to a diplomatic solution, but it has got to be a diplomatic solution that does not involve the North Koreans being, in any way, a state with nuclear weapons capabilities.
A third area has received less attention of late, and I think that's good news, which is South Asia. And what we have seen in recent weeks and months is a considerable lowering of tensions there. I think considerable credit ought to go to the Indian Prime Minister, to Mr. Vajpayee, for initiating, I believe, an imaginative political process.
We are soon going to have the visit of President Musharraf of Pakistan here to Washington. And I think, again, amidst a lot of the challenges out there and problems, this is an area where, over the last few weeks and months, we've clearly seen progress, and obviously we are committed to doing everything we can to further encouraging normalization between India and Pakistan.
There are other regional challenges I could also mention, one closer to home in Colombia, which is another long-term undertaking of the United States to help this government meet the threat of terrorists who are essentially self-funded, thanks to drug trafficking -- what you might call a post-Cold War insurgency, but no less deadly as a result.
And, again, one could talk about other challenges in Africa and elsewhere, and if you have questions on it I will do my best to answer them, or, if need be, avoid them.
Lastly, a third set of issues, in addition to these three undertakings and the regional challenges, are the global issues. And those are everything from trying to move ahead on the trade front -- obviously the centerpiece of that is the Doha development round -- but also dealing with any number of other global issues. I already mentioned one, which is terrorism, but also proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; trying to deal with and discourage any trafficking in men, women and children, trafficking in persons; looking at questions of dealing with drug trafficking and so forth. But dealing with that whole family, or basket, of issues. You, just over the recent days and weeks, have seen the President of the United States and the Secretary of State place special emphasis on dealing with disease and, in particular, HIV/AIDS.
What I would say along with this is that two things come through when one looks at this menu of challenges facing the United States, other than the obvious one, which is the foreign policy agenda is full, and then some, at the moment.
The first has been in all these endeavors the United States can only succeed, in my view, with partners. For all of our power, the United States does need other countries, does need other organizations and institutions, to work with us in addressing these challenges, whether they're individual countries, whether they're regional challenges, or whether they're global challenges. There is nothing that I have talked about that I believe we can't do better with the participation of other likeminded countries.
And, secondly, in dealing with all these and working with others, we need to use the full range of foreign policy tools. Obviously, a lot of attention from journalists and others is placed on the military tool because it is, ultimately, the most dramatic. It is the one that deals with life and death. But what's interesting to me when one goes through these challenges is the prominence of other tools, in particular, diplomatic, which should not surprise you given that I work with the Department of State, and not just diplomatic use of our foreign assistance, the HIV/AIDS account, the Millennium Challenge Account, and so forth; the use of intelligence resources, the whole connection increasingly of ties between the use of intelligence and the use of military resources.
And what this, again, suggests to me is not only does the United States need to work with others, but the United States needs to, and indeed does, use all the instruments at its disposal. It is in no way a one-dimensional foreign policy, and, indeed, even the military dimension, as we saw in Iraq, does depend upon the creation of a diplomatic context, in the case of Iraq, 1441, and then more recently 1483, which has provided a context in which now it is reasonable to speak about the meaningful participation of other governments in the reconstruction of Iraq.
But let me stop with that broad overview. And, again, questions?
MR. DENIG: Let me ask you to state your questions briefly and identify yourself and your news organizations. We'll go to New York for the first two questions.
New York, your first question, please?
QUESTION: Thank you for giving me the opportunity. My name is Mr. Chan with the Central News Agency of Taiwan.
Recently, when President Bush met with President Hu Jintao of China, he made some statement about a change, a seemingly change of U.S. China policy, saying that the policy from now on will be based on no support for Taiwan independence. I don't know whether that is a policy shift or not because Mr. Haass would be a very authoritative person to interpret this.
Would you say it is a policy shift or not? And if yes, could you tell us what is the real meaning of that shift?
Thank you.
MR. HAASS: That's simple to answer. There has been no policy shift. U.S. policy is still governed by our commitments under the various -- the three communiqués, as well as the Taiwan Relations Act, and there simply has not been a shift in our policy towards Taiwan or toward that entire matter.
QUESTION: Mr. Haass, my name is Abderrahim Foqara from Al Jazeera. I have a couple of questions about U.S. foreign policy and the next election here in the United States, and another question on Iran.
About the election, do you envisage a scenario at all where, given the current situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister Sharon could become an election liability for President Bush?
And, again, about the next election, to what extent do you think that the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which they haven't been found yet, to what extent do you think that may linger on to mar the political fortunes of President Bush next year?
As far as Iran is concerned, do you think the United States will be pushing the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna to refer to the matter of the issue of Iran's weapons of mass destruction to the Security Council, and when that may happen?
MR. HAASS: A follow-up to your follow-up.
On the first, I don't see Prime Minister Sharon being an electoral liability, to use your phrase, and I am hopeful that over the next -- what is it before the election? -- roughly 16, 17, 18 months, that we will be able to see meaningful progress in the Middle East, as suggested or laid out by the roadmap.
I would just say more generally, since you raised the issue, I know in lots of parts of the world people think that American Middle East policy is dictated or dominated or influenced by our political calendar and political calculations. And you can sit there and think me naïve and then some, but based on my experience in this administration it's simply not the case. People bring strong views to this issue, but Middle East policy is simply not determined by people looking at how voters might react.
The question of WMD in Iraq, it's a little bit of a hard hypothetical for me to answer because of my own view based upon all the intelligence that I'm familiar with from before the war. It's my view that we are still highly likely to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. There was considerable intelligence, considerable evidence, strongly suggesting the existence, in particular, of chemical and biological weapons.
And so, my own view, it's more a question of when, rather than if, that material is found, and, if it's not, that a reasonable explanation would be found to account for it; for example, that weapons have been destroyed or something else. So I would be very surprised, indeed if, again, 15, 18 months from now, the situation as regard to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were the same as it is today.
And the third question, I simply don't know the specifics about whether we plan to move the question of Iran's weapons of mass destruction and its nuclear program, in particular, to the Security Council. I would simply say that we have been heartened, we have been encouraged of late, by what I see and what we see as growing signs of international consensus that this is a situation that is clearly undesirable. One has seen stronger statements by the Russian Government, stronger statements by the EU. And what I think we're seeing is that Iran is, to some extent, isolating itself through the revelations about its nuclear programs. And whether at some point we do take it to the UN as a tactical issue, again, I'm simply not sure of. But, again, I do think the larger context is important, that Iranian ambitions in this area, its efforts to date in this area, are clearly unwelcome, to say the least, but not simply by the United States, but by a broad group of other countries.
QUESTION: Hi, Paulo Sotero from Estado de Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mr. Ambassador, I wanted you to just place the visit by the President of Brazil here in Washington, this coming Friday, into this framework of U.S. foreign policy. What are the factors that led the Bush administration to engage the Lula administration in Brazil, and where do you think this is headed to?
MR. HAASS: Let me just preface my answer by saying I think this is an important visit. And U.S.-Brazilian relations, I believe, are potentially Our interest in moving this relationship to a different level -- and by a different level, I mean a relationship which is more structured, more high-level interaction, becomes more the norm rather than the exception -- is because of our mutual interests. It's not a favor to Brazil, if you will. It's a favor to ourselves. And I think it's in the interest of both countries.
Economically, obviously, what happens in Brazil is terribly important, not simply for the United States, not simply for the hemisphere, but for the world. A strong, economically stable, growing Brazil is an important feature in world economic growth. And, obviously, a Brazil that would have economic problems would be a major problem for us all.
Secondly, Brazil is a key country in the hemisphere in tackling hemispheric problems. If the United States and Brazil are able to partner in dealing with problems, whether it's Venezuela or Colombia, or drugs or what-have-you, the odds of successfully meeting the challenge go up exponentially.
Thirdly, Brazil is key globally, and I'd say in two ways: One, obviously, economically; a country like Brazil is an important participant in the Doha development round. And what happens with FTAA will obviously have an important impact on Doha. So I'd say all that.
But also, I would -- I hope I've got this right diplomatically. But let me say, I see Brazil as one of those important countries that -- and other countries like -- I am not sure how you describe it, but it's a major country that I think needs -- and I would look forward to -- well, like I say, I would look forward to it playing a larger international role. And I'd say this of other countries, you know, of comparable size and wealth and all that.
But I think if we are going to succeed at tackling a lot of the global problems of the day, we are going to need to be able to partner with a country such as Brazil. And I would just say, I am heartened by the fact that the Brazilian Government and our government have gotten off to a good start. If you remember -- you're more of an expert than I am -- all these predictions of problems that would come after a Lula victory. Well, I think the good news is what hasn't happened, and these problems have not come to pass.
Economically, it's been a very impressive performance. And, politically, despite some differences on this or that foreign policy issue, this administration and the Brazilian Government are off to a good start. We had the successful visit right after the election. Now, we have the formal visit. But I think this is all to the good. And, again, I'll end where I began, which is, I really do think, to use another metaphor, that we might be opening a new chapter in U.S.-Brazilian relations. And I think that's a positive development for both countries.
QUESTION: Michael Backfisch, German Business Daily, Handelsblatt. Given what you said on Iran, does that mean that the administration is aspiring a multilateral solution, as it does in the case of North Korea? And what's the scenario of increasing pressure in case the Iranian Government should not renounce its nuclear weapons program or its nuclear program in general?
MR. HAASS: Well, I would say any successful policy towards Iran almost has to be, invariably, multilateral. If we want to turn off the flow of technology that could feed an Iranian nuclear weapons program, the United States can't do that by itself. Russia has to be involved, Europe has to be involved. Governments need to police companies. They need to police the flow of individuals, technology, material. So it's got to be multilateral.
And this is not something the United States can do by itself, and that's why we have spent so much time and energy trying to persuade others of the dangers posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons program, particularly given Iran's unfortunate record of being a state sponsor of terrorism. So the answer to that is, yes, it has been, it is and will be, a multilateral effort at its core.
So you ask then, "What happens if this doesn't succeed?" Well, again, I am not comfortable going there. I would just simply say that I think it is succeeding. I think the good news is, as I said before, that there is, I believe, a growing common view that an Iran that develops nuclear weapons is in the interest of no one. It would simply add to the potential for instability in a part of the world that everyone knows has experienced way too much uncertainty and instability already.
I'd also say that, it seems to me, it is an enormous waste of resources for Iran. This is a country that's experience all sorts of economic problems, and the idea that a country such as Iran would be devoting precious resources into the development of weapons of mass destruction seems to me an enormous waste of scarce resources for a country that can ill afford them. And the argument or the suggestion that somehow it's necessary for energy reasons simply doesn't pass the laugh test.
Iran does not need to develop nuclear power, given its fossil fuel resources, and, above all, it's oil resources. So it's unwarranted and I would hope that the Iranians would reconsider their ambitions in this area. In the meantime, I hope the rest of the world finds even greater ways to cooperate, to frustrate any ambitions that may exist.
QUESTION: Sami Nader, Radio SAWA. Mr. Ambassador, I would like if you can tell us something about the mission of Ambassador John Wolf, who is expected to travel to the Middle East this weekend, and the team that he will be heading. What is the number of the team? How are they going to function on the ground? Where will he be based?
MR. HAASS: This is always my fear. Whenever I go on television, it's always my great fear -- not that I am going to be asked general questions because I can always handle general questions -- it's like what is the capital of something, or who is the Prime Minister? And it's always my fear, and you have just asked me one of those questions.
I don't know the details of a lot of those. We are talking about a fairly small team. It's interagency, as we say. It will be people not simply from the State Department, but also, I believe, from the National Security Council, from other parts of the U.S. Government. The purpose of the team is as advertised -- which is, essentially, to monitor the situation. We want to have people on the ground who are observing or monitoring, who report back to Washington exactly what is happening and what is not happening. And that can then factor into our diplomacy for the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor and others, to then inject the findings of Ambassador Wolf and others, into what you might call the diplomatic level.
MR DENIG: I'm going to ask you again to keep our questions short. Let's go to Turkey, second lady in the second row.
QUESTION: Yes, on Monday, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Under Secretary Ambassador Ugur Ziyal will be visiting Washington, will be holding talks with State Department officials, Marc Grossman. And this will be kind of a first visit after what (inaudible) Iraq. Can you elaborate on this?
MR. HAASS: Not a whole lot. The United States and Turkey clearly did not see eye to eye on this situation with Iraq. We were quite disappointed, as you know, with the reaction of the Turkish Government.
That said, the United States and Turkey have continuing interests in Iraq, and, obviously, we want to talk about that. And beyond that, the United States and Turkey have continuing interests beyond Iraq. And it's too important of a relationship to let it all rise and fall on our ability to agree in one area or over one issue.
So, obviously, we have interests dealing and involving NATO. We have interests involving the Middle East beyond Iraq. We have interests economically. We have interests in the Mediterranean, given Turkey's relationship with Greece, given Cyprus. We have interests in Turkey as an example of a democratic state with a country that has a Muslim population.
So it's a broad agenda. But, again, Iraq will be part of it, but, again, not the whole of it.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Said Arikat from Al Quds newspaper.
MR. HAASS: I know your name.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, as you speak, sir, Israel is conducting a raid in Gaza. They are saying that they are using helicopter gunships and even F-16s. They are saying also that three people may have been killed. One of them may be the spiritual leader of Hamas.
Sir, on Tuesday, the President came out with strong words against the targeted assassinations, but he seemed to have backpedaled. There are signs from Israel saying that maybe they're giving them up. That's one, sir.
And, second, how do you define the Arms Export Act in this case? Is Israel using these weapons illegally?
Thank you.
MR. HAASS: It's hard for me to talk in any detail about what you said because I've been in meetings for the last four or five hours so I don't know the latest. I don't know -- I can't characterize the Israeli action so I can't answer the question about it.
Let me say, no one is giving any nods to anybody. That's not the way we operate. You know, we've got one priority right now, which is seeing diplomatic progress towards a two-state solution. But it's been frustrating the last few days, obviously. There's been a horrific loss of life. But it's also been frustrating, by any count, by any measure.
And, you know, what this says to me is -- let me take one step back. This process of moving things along that the roadmap is going to be difficult under the best of circumstances, given the history of the Middle East. If it were otherwise, we would have solved this a long time ago. To carry out the diplomacy against the backdrop of this sort of violence only makes it that much more difficult. It's an added burden that we don't need.
Obviously, the Palestinians have got to do everything in their power to de-legitimize and rein in and prevent acts of violence. We, ourselves, have to work with the Palestinians on an intensive basis to increase Palestinian capacities and capabilities so they can carry out the necessary policing and law enforcement functions.
The Israeli Government has the need to protect its people. It has the right of self-defense. At the same time, I think Israel also needs to weigh this right of self-defense against, also, its enormous interest in seeing this peace process move forward. And it has to ask itself, before it responds, whether its response, whatever it accomplishes in the narrow, whether its response will move the larger effort to bring about peaceful progress, what its impact will be on that.
And it's for that reason, I believe, that the President made the sort of remarks he made the other day, that the feeling was that, again, certain actions set back the larger stake that Israelis, Palestinians and ourselves have in seeing this process move forward.
QUESTION: What about the use of --
MR. HAASS: Again, I don't anything about the details of what happened today. If people feel there are any questions vis-à-vis the provision of U.S. arms, there's mechanisms for reviewing it. But I know nothing about it.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) Turkey's IT News Agency. I just want to go back to Turkey again just briefly.
MR. HAASS: I already told you more than I know, but keep going.
QUESTION: Okay. Is it a priority for U.S. Government to reestablish relations with Turkey? And you said you need partners. I mean, U.S. can only success with partners. Do you think Turkey would be a good partner for U.S. in order to be successful in the Middle East?
Thank you.
MR. HAASS: Let me restate your question, because you said, "Is it a priority for the United States to reestablish relations with Turkey?" We still have relations with Turkey, as you know.
If you mean to improve relations, I would say it's important, for sure. I have long thought Turkey is a key country. And you know the reasons why better than I do, I expect, given its geography, given its history, given its ability to have influence in any number of contexts from Europe to the Middle East to the Caucasus and so forth. It's a vital country. Plus, Turkey as an example, simply Turkey as Turkey, I think will have a significant impact on the future political, economic, social evolution of the Islamic world. It's one of the important models. It's one of the important examples.
So is it important for the United States to see the relationship with Turkey improve? Of course. But, as we know from personal life as well as political life, this is not something we can bring about ourselves. And as I said before, we were obviously disappointed with Turkey's policies, reactions, to the situation in Iraq. It's not up to me to sit here and advise the Turkish Government or the Turkish people what's in their own self-interest. That's for Turks to decide. I would hope, however, that there will be or already is a process of reflection on issues, on decisions that were taken.
And, obviously, we would love to have Turkey as a partner in the Middle East, whether it's dealing with issues of Israel and Palestine, or more broadly Israeli relations with the Arab world, but also questions of Iran, questions of Iraq. It's impossible to deal with these issues without Turkey. Or, to put it more positively, it's an advantage for us, and I believe an advantage for Turkey, for ourselves to be cooperating on them because we each have stakes. And, obviously, we're more likely to take each other's interests into account if we consult closely and if we cooperate whenever possible.
And, again, I'd also add that other area. I think one of the most important issues on the future American foreign policy agenda is this question of the development of the Arab world and the development of the Islamic world. And a lot of these countries, a lot of these economies, a lot of these societies, have essentially missed out on some of the great developments of our era, in terms of democratization, in terms of other growth of markets and the economy.
And the fact that Turkey has been increasingly a market economy, that Turkey is a democratic country where Islamic parties have come to power peacefully and democratically, I think Turkey is an important, if you will, laboratory, or experiment, and I think it's in everyone's interest -- Turkey's interest, our interest, the region's interest -- that Turkey not just succeed, but thrive. And that's what we want.
MR. DENIG: We'll take the gentleman in the back in the blue shirt there.
QUESTION: Jae Hyun Choi of Korean Broadcasting System. My question is: U.S. seems to seek a two-way policy toward North Korea, one with --
MR. HAASS: What policy? I'm sorry.
QUESTION: I mean two-way policy toward North Korea, like one way increasing press on North Korea, and the other way seeking a multilateral dialogue. My question is: On either way, does U.S. put more emphasis?
And the other question is: Is U.S. position is stopping KEDO project any time soon, which is now issue on the trilateral meeting in Hawaii?
MR. HAASS: The latter question, the future of KEDO, is better left to the so-called TCOG meeting. So I'll let me colleague, Mr. Kelly, and others decide it there in private before I announce anything in public.
Your question about our policy towards North Korea, it's almost impossible, I think, for any American official to answer, not because we are hiding something, but simply because, as your question suggests, our policy has various dimensions to it.
And, yes -- and, indeed, I'd even go further and say, but it can only succeed if it has those various dimensions. So it has to be multilateral if we are going to succeed at persuading North Korea to take the course we want, and it also should be multilateral because it's not the United States alone that has stakes here.
Obviously, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia, Australia, other countries have enormous stakes in North Korea's trajectory, shall we say, what it does with weapons of mass destruction, what it does with conventional weapons, with terrorism, how it treats its own people.
So, and what's essentially at the heart of our policy is to try to persuade North Korea to make a set of decisions that would, once again, bring it back, if you will, in the direction of being a citizen of the international community. But by its policies, it's essentially made itself a pariah. And I think -- and we don't know -- you don't know, I don't know, none of us can know -- which direction North Korea's leadership will take it in the future, so I think we have to be prepared for any eventuality. QUESTION: I'm Siegfried Buschschluter, National German Radio. How confident are you, with the benefit of hindsight, that the information, the intelligence you received on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, was accurate, up-to-date and untainted by political considerations? MR. HAASS: I have just recently gone back and reread a lot of it on the expectation I might be asked such a question. And the only answer I can give you is that I am confident that it was untainted by political bias, or whatever word you want to use. And when it comes to the chemical and biological issue, I have got to tell you that there was a lot of intelligence from a lot of years, from a lot of sources. So when you read through it all, it's hard not to come away impressed by the sheer strength and size of the case, which, again, is part of that. It makes it all the more surprising that we have not had more successes yet in locating weapons of mass destruction other than what many of us would maintain is such a discovery in the case of the two mobile vans that we believe were used for biological weapons purposes. But, again, and I distinguish -- and I don't think I'm going too far here -- I distinguish between the chemical and biological, the intelligence related to chemical and biological, which, again, was a powerful case where there was no dissent across the intelligence community, not just this administration but previous administrations. It really was a consensus view But, in particular, the chemical and biological was about as strong of a case as you normally get, and intelligence, an awful lot of points of information, shall we say, and you saw some of them show up in Secretary of State Powell's February 5 UN statement, and so I feel still comfortable with the intelligence case that was prepared. MR. DENIG: Let's go to New York for a question. Do you have a question, New York? QUESTION: My name is (inaudible) and I'm working for (inaudible) of Geneva in Switzerland. I've got two questions. The first one is, on May 1st President Bush said you are seeing a turn of the tide on the war on terror. Since then, we have seen more than 30 kamikaze blowing themselves, especially in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, a country which was exempt from terrorism since then. So my question is: Has the war in Iraq had some counterproductive effects, consequences? And the other one was yesterday there was a vote at the United Nations for Resolution 1487, which exempts the American citizens, among others, from the ICC. Many countries expressed the hope that Washington will review its policy regarding ICC. Is there any chance of that? Thank you. MR. HAASS: On the former question, the first question, about terrorism, I don't believe that the war in Iraq has triggered or stimulated terrorism. I think what we're seeing between Israelis and Palestinians is what you might call local, and, if anything, it's possible -- I don't know how one could argue it, yet one could probably just as easily argue the war in Iraq may have disrupted terrorism to the extent Iraq was at all associated with it, or it simply being a demonstration to the world of American power. But let me just make a larger point about terrorism, which is I think there has been something of a turning of the tide, if one looks at the last few years. And the bottom line is that the world today is a place where it is far more difficult for terrorists to operate successfully than, say, the world before 9/11. If one looks at the implementation of Security Council 1373, if one looks at the cutting off of flows, financial flows, if one looks at intelligence exchanges, if one looks at law enforcement cooperation, the world has essentially networked itself in ways that it just simply wasn't tied up before. And I think that's all to the good and that's impressive. That said, terrorists have not been sitting on their hands. And though they've been clearly set back in Afghanistan and elsewhere, terrorist networks have also, to some extent, come back. And we see some signs of that. So this is a dynamic struggle. It's not one-dimensional. But I do think that, again, to me, the larger story of what the nearly two years, 20 months or so, since 9/11 is that the world has made enormous strides towards increasing counterterrorism cooperation. The ICC -- no, I don't see any sign or any evidence that the administration is going to reconsider its policy. I think there is a consensus that is both broad and deep that the International Criminal Court, as presently structured, is simply flawed, and it simply has too many examples of unchecked judicial and prosecutorial power and people are simply not comfortable, to say the least, with that. QUESTION: Thank you. Bika Mizumoto, TV Asahi, Japan. I would like to go back to North Korea. The Japanese Government just started so-called safety inspections on North Korean ships coming to Japan. Do you think -- do you think it's effective enough, and what kind of steps are you going to take to stop North Korean drug trafficking or exports of missiles? MR. HAASS: The best tool in the effort against that sort of drug trafficking or movement of technologies or goods is intelligence because that's the thing that allows you to, hopefully, prevent it or interdict it, if need be. That's the key. Without intelligence, you can never succeed. You can't have enough ships at sea, or what have you. So if we can't change North Korean behavior, then we have to, again, improve our ability to stop illegal or undesirable things from going in or out. And that's where intelligence is key, where cooperation is key, law enforcement collaboration becomes key. And I think we're beginning to see -- let me put on my academic hat for a second. We're beginning to see greater international agreement about this point, that there needs to be provisions built into international law which would essentially allow greater interdiction of ships and so forth that could be carrying not simply drugs, but people or equipment or technology relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. So I think what we're going to see in coming months and years is greater movement, greater cooperation among states that would actually give them rights and abilities to take physical steps to try to stop these illegal movements of technology and goods. QUESTION: Good afternoon, Mary Robb Teague from Feature Story News. I'd like to know your feelings regarding Burma and, more specifically, the recent decision to ban imported goods to -- from or made in Myanmar. There are quite a bit of people in Washington who think that this may hurt the people from Burma, and I'm wondering how effective you believe these sanctions will be. MR. HAASS: What motivated the policy was, obviously, a sense of outrage over the deterioration in the domestic political situation, and whenever something like this happens, you're forced to look at the available tools. And you begin with political and diplomatic denunciation, and if that doesn't get you very far, and, alas, in this case it didn't get us very far, the question then is what next. So the idea of turning to economic sanctions is a natural next step. And there, what you've got to do -- this is something I've written about a lot in the past -- is you've got to balance, on one hand, the message you're sending, which is the message you want to send -- you want the government to pay a price -- but you don't want to necessarily penalize the people. And there are tradeoffs there. And the more draconian, or effective, if you will, you sometimes make the sanctions, which buttresses your message, you run the danger that you could actually hurt not so much the government but the people, for example, who are making the textiles. And that's the tradeoff in this. So what we have tried to do is come up with a policy that sends a message, that doesn't hurt more seriously more people than anyone wants to. It's not a perfect world, and the choice of instruments, if you will, here is limited. I think what would really help is if others joined in. You know, you asked about the impact. The impact will ultimately go up dramatically if it's not simply the United States. I don't have in front of me a list of Burma's principal trading partners, but obviously it includes Europeans, it includes China and others. And to the extent this action is multilateralized, that Burma realizes that what it's done politically is unacceptable not simply to Americans but is unacceptable to the world community, then I think the government would be much more likely to change directions. So, you know, our goal right now is to multilateralize what has essentially begun relatively unilaterally. QUESTION: Jon Leyne, BBC. At the Aqaba summit, what assurances did the President get from the Israeli leader about whether Israel would not carry out provocative actions? MR. HAASS: I'm not going to get into the details of the consultations, as you describe them, assurances, or anything else. I'll just simply say that we have had conversations with the Israeli Government and we'll continue to have them about what we think makes the most sense in terms of the common goal of seeing progress made towards the realization of the roadmap. And they are going to have to continue to balance, as I said before, the desire to exercise the right of self-defense, the necessary desire to protect Israeli society, with the desire also to see the emergence of a Palestinian leadership that becomes an effective partner for peace. And we will continue conversations with the Israelis about how to translate what I've just said into greater specifics. I'll take one more, then I've got to run back to work. QUESTION: Chris Cockel from the China Post of Taiwan. The U.S. Government has already expressed its opposition to the idea of changing Taiwan's status within the World Trade Organization, but can you tell us what further measures might the U.S. take to ensure that Taiwan's status is not somehow degraded within the organization? Thank you. MR. HAASS: I simply don't know. I don't have a list at my hand, so I apologize. That doesn't count, I guess, as the last question. I've got to do better than that. QUESTION: Yes, my name is Gabor Horvath, with Hungarian Daily Nepszabadsag. Sir, this is your last day at the job. Would you please throw some light on the motives of your departure, and also the timing? And also, looking back at the last couple of years in foreign policy planning, how do you see the balance of power in Washington, D.C.? (Laughter.) MR. HAASS: An appropriate last question. You always get in trouble for taking that extra question, and this is proof of that point. My motives are largely determined by the fact that I got a job offer I couldn't refuse. To be the President of the Council on Foreign Relations is, for someone with my background, an extraordinary opportunity. And what I'll tell you is the truth. Had it not come along, I would have seen out another year and a half in this job, which was my intention when I signed up. But, again, the chance to help lead this organization and to participate in the foreign policy debate from that vantage point is something that I'd always thought about, and when the opportunity finally came around, I decided to say yes. Let me say also one other thing. I don't mean to sound naïve or to spin you. Are there frustrations in Washington? Of course. Are there disagreements in administrations? Of course. This administration didn't invent such things. The next administration will have. The previous one had it. So that's part of the give-and-take of living and working in Washington. You know, you've got strong people in this administration with strongly held views, and, quite honestly, you win some, you lose some, and some you tie. And that's just a fact of life. But my motives here are essentially personal in terms of what came along. And what makes it hard to leave is I'm working for some extraordinary people, including the Secretary of State, and there are some important issues -- you know, what we've been talking about for the last 45 minutes. These are important times. There's a lot of important challenges on our plate. So it's not easy to leave, but what makes it possible for me is, again, the realization that I'm not leaving the field. I feel I'm just going to simply be working a lot of these same questions from a different vantage point in different ways. On the balance of power, as you put it, I assume you mean within Washington as opposed to between the United States and the rest of the world. In terms of who's up, who's down, who's in, who's out, who's winning, who's losing, I leave to you all on a daily basis, and more important, I leave to the historians. You know, it doesn't matter necessarily even how it looks today, but, more important, it doesn't matter at all. What matters is at the end of the day the President gets good advice and makes decisions. And whether in some cases the ultimate decision reflects more the advice of this or that department or this or that advisor is irrelevant, so long as the decision is good. And it may simply be the interplay between and among the various departments or advisors that helps to lead the President to take a decision that history will judge was the right one. So I know it's something of a sport in this town to ask the question you've asked, I understand it's a sport at dinner tables and the rest, and it's part of what makes this town both enjoyable and frustrating. But at the end of the day, it's not the most important thing, and my hunch is the President makes foreign policy and he has a pretty good feel for the various points of view he's getting. And then he has to deal with Congress and he has to deal with the media and he has to deal with other governments and organizations. So I think, if you will, the narrow balance of power theory, or approach, is probably too narrow. And that seems like a perfect place to stop. It is actually my final act in this job, so thank you very much. MR. DENIG: Thank you very much, Dr. Haass. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
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