2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

3:00 P.M. (EST)

Real Audio of Briefing

MR. DENIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. I'm delighted to be able to welcome for our briefing this afternoon, Paul Simons, the Acting Assistant Secretary from the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Department of State.

Today's briefing will be, in effect, a rollout of the 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. I hope that some or all of you saw that we had CDs with the report out front. If not, please help yourself on the way out. It's on the small table there. Secretary Simons will have a brief opening statement on the report, and then we'll be very glad to take your questions.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Thank you very much, and I'd like to extend my thanks to all of you for participating this afternoon in this briefing. We're here to talk a little bit about the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, otherwise known as the INCSR. This report is the executive branch's annual report to Congress that addresses the narcotics control performance of all the countries that have received INL assistance in the past two fiscal years. It focuses special attention on the major drug-producing and drug transit countries while it also reports on Europe and central Asia and on those countries that could become sources or transit points for drugs significantly affecting the United States. By law, the INCSR must also report on the actions of the major money-laundering countries and the major precursor chemical-producing countries.

Over the past 15 years, as a result of a lot of dedicated work by my colleagues, some of whom are here with me today, the INCSR has become, in our view, the standard reference work for anyone following U.S.-international narcotics and drug control policies. It's really the only U.S. government publication that provides a comprehensive annual analysis of international money laundering and precursor chemical control issues. And the analyses and the data in the country chapters play key roles in the President's international drug certification decisions. And as many of you know, the President made his decisions on drug certification several weeks ago.

Before opening up to questions from you, let me say a few words about the situation in Colombia, because we did have some developments that took place subsequent to the publication of the INCSR. And the major development in Colombia was the decline that was recorded during 2002 in coca cultivation and production figures. According to the estimates that we released last Thursday, there was a 15 percent reduction in coca cultivation acreage in Colombia last year. Coca cultivation fell to 144,000 hectares. At the same time, estimated coca production fell from 795 metric tons down to 680 metric tons. Our estimates also show that cultivation in the two key coca-growing regions in which we have focused our aerial eradication efforts, which are the provinces of Putumayo and Caqueta declined over 50 percent last year. During the course of last year, we sprayed more than 120,000 hectares of coca, and we plan to spray the remaining coca crop this year in 2003 up to as much as 200,000 hectares.

The 2002 reduction in this Colombia coca crop was the first time in a decade that we have seen this type of reduction and we believe that if we can sustain this effort, working with the Colombian government, that there will be continued significant declines in coca cultivation which will impact on the price and availability of cocaine here in the U.S. market. At the same time, continued progress in Colombia will enable us to deny huge profits to the criminal organizations in Colombia who feed on terrorism. The total Andean coca crop, according to our estimates, went down by about eight percent in 2002, when you factor in the 15 percent decline in Colombia with slight increases realized in Peru and Bolivia. Generally speaking, we believe that the Peruvian and Bolivian Governments are maintaining the pace of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development, and they're continuing to consolidate the gains that were made in the 1990s in terms of denarcotizing their economies. So it's important, we believe, for the U.S., as we make the kind of progress that we're starting to make in Colombia, to maintain also the momentum in both Peru and Bolivia.

In addition to touching on the situation in the Andean countries, let me also say a few words about the financial crimes section of the INCSR. While money laundering remains the primary focus of that section, this year's report also increases its focus on terrorist financing. The reasons for this are twofold. First, terrorists and their supporters often employ the same methods and exploit the same financial systems as money launderers. And second, the tools that are used by the international community to combat terrorist financing are in many ways similar to the means used to deter money laundering.

And the report goes on in some detail to explain how the United States Government, in cooperation with partner countries and multilateral organizations, made significant progress toward strengthening financial systems against abuse by money launderers and financiers of terrorism. As I mentioned, the INCSR details this process in some length. For example, the United States was an active participant in the 31-member Financial Action Task Force, or FATF organization, whose efforts led to the removal of eight countries from the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list. The U.S. also worked closely with the United Nations Global Program Against Money Laundering, and we actively supported regional anti-money laundering organizations in order to evaluate and enhance the ability of financial systems around the world to deter illicit activities.

Finally, the INCSR report details the work of several U.S. Government agencies in providing bilateral training and assistance on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing issues. The report also discusses in some length money laundering and terrorist financing trends and recent law enforcement cases enabling government and private-sector officials to stay abreast of the latest methods used to launder illicit funds and finance terrorism.

Finally, this report, which is the product of consultations with numerous government agencies and U.S. embassies around the world, contains statistical information on almost 200 countries and territories, describing in detail their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. These reports serve as analysis of the various ways by which governments have risen to the challenge of fighting money laundering and terrorist financing.

That concludes my presentation, and I'm happy to take any of your questions.

QUESTION: R. Finney, Radio Free Asia. I wonder whether you could say something about the drug trafficking situation in North Korea and Laos. And then with special regard to Laos, whether you think their problem with opium production is going to affect their NTR status at all.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Let me begin to address this and if you need additional details, I may call on my colleagues here. With respect to North Korea, our major concern with respect to North Korea has been the North Korean's role as a source of methamphetamines into the market in Japan. Japanese authorities have been very concerned about this for a number of years. Despite close and careful monitoring of North Korea by many law enforcement and foreign affairs agencies, we have not been able to determine the extent to which the North Korean state, per se, may be involved in drug manufacturing and trafficking affecting the U.S. And that, for example, is the reason that North Korea has not been put on the drug Majors list. However, the continuing seizures in Japan and Taiwan of methamphetamine and heroin with links to North Korea are definitely a matter of great concern. And we've had quite a bit of operational coordination with the government of Japan on this issue.

With respect to Laos, I think I may ask one of my colleagues to say a few words. John, do you want to come --

MR. UNDERRINER: With regard to the drug situation in Laos, as maybe you're aware, Laos is the third largest producer of illicit opium, although far behind Afghanistan and Burma, the top two. We, the United States, have a bilateral counternarcotics assistance program ongoing with Laos on alternative development and counternarcotics law enforcement that has made some progress. We're looking for more. But, for example production of, or potential production this year of illicit opium dropped about 10-15 percent, so there is some progress.

With regard to your question about how it might affect NTR status, Normal Trade Relations status for Laos, that is something that is in the process of an interagency review and is not something that I'd be able to give any more comment on at this point.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Let me mention one more word on Laos. Another area of concern beyond what John described that we're tracking pretty closely is the use of Laos by the methamphetamine producers in Burma as a transit route for methamphetamine going down into Thailand. I mean, one of our great frustrations in working the drug issue over the years in Laos has been the weak existing law enforcement infrastructure that has allowed third parties such as the Burmese take advantage. Weak border controls, weak security at the borders, weak control over the territory. And this has created to some extent a bit of a security vacuum, which may have allowed the rather large Burmese methamphetamine industry to take advantage of. And so we're taking a close look at the ability of the Burmese to supply the entire Southeast Asian market in part by using Laos as a transit country. It's another area we're looking at above and beyond some of the issues associated with opium cultivation that have been traditionally a concern with Laos.

QUESTION: Okay, and what was the name of that gentleman that just spoke?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Mr. Underriner.

QUESTION: Thank you. Sonia Schott from Globovision Venezuela. Mr. Simon, my question is on Venezuela, of course. Which incident has the political crisis in Venezuela, in terms of cooperation in the fight against drugs, there is anything to improve? Thank you.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Venezuela is an extremely important transit country for cocaine shipments going out of Colombia to the U.S. market, and we have been working over the years with the government of Venezuela. The political crisis has made it more difficult to sustain that cooperation, but I think that we will continue to look to Venezuela to act aggressively on interdicting drug supplies through Colombia. Also, one of the results of the latest analyses of the Colombian coca cultivation is that some of that cultivation has moved more in the direction of the Venezuela border. And so I think there may be in the future increasing pressure on Venezuela, increasing pressure to act as a transit zone as the cultivation moves closer to Venezuela. So I think it will be important not only for us to work with the government of Venezuela, but for the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela to work closer together on a whole range of issues associated with drug trafficking, associated with the refuge, finding refuge for drug traffickers across the border, on issues associated with border control. So we have a very large agenda with Venezuela on drug control, drug trafficking.

QUESTION: This is Nestor Ikeda, Associated Press reporter for Latin America. I have two questions on Latin America. The first one on the plane interdiction program. As you know, the Secretary Powell has promised while visiting Bogota in December that this program would restart middle January. And what is the current approach of the U.S. administration for restarting the program?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Actually, the Secretary indicated, cause I was with him on that trip, that the program would resume as soon as possible into the next year, and we are working very closely with the government of Colombia to get that program up and running as soon as possible. Since the Secretary's visit, we've held two rounds of negotiations with the government of Colombia. The reason that we need to negotiate with the Government of Colombia is that in 2001, after the Peruvian, after the plane was shot down in Peru, the unfortunate accident, Congress modified the U.S. legislation and put into place a series of stricter safety regulations that would need to be followed before the United States could again participate in an aerial interdiction program. So what we are working out now with the Colombian government is a bilateral agreement that would put into place those additional safety requirements. And we are moving very quickly on this. But it will require changes in the way the Colombians operate their program and changes in the way that we support the Colombians to conform to this legislation. So we are working with the Colombians on the agreement. We are also in the process of training Colombian crews and pilots on the new techniques, and in a couple of weeks we will send another team down to Colombia, because under the terms of the legislation, before we can take the agreement to the President, we have to certify that the new procedures are actually up and running and are in place. So we're following through on the regulations of the law, and we expect to have the program up and running very soon.

QUESTION: The second question sir. And it is about Honduras and Guatemala. If you read the opinions you have written in the report, you would find the opinions on Honduras almost exactly the same as you did write on Guatemala. But on the Guatemala was decertified. Why did you spare Honduras from that qualification?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Let me say a few words about Guatemala first. Guatemala had been a longstanding cooperating country with the United States on counterdrug activities. Guatemala's one of the largest cocaine transit countries in the world. Perhaps as much as 200 tons of cocaine passes through Guatemala every year en route to the U.S. market. So Guatemala was a very important partner in our drug interdiction efforts in Central America. And over the last couple years, we had seen in the case of Guatemala a severe deterioration in the level of cooperation and it was directly related to an increase in corruption in the law enforcement agencies. So our ability to work with the government on the drug issue declined, and we really didn't have effective counterpart agencies that we could work with. And this had an impact on our ability to interdict drugs coming into the U.S. and seizures were down and it was, it became very difficult to work with the Guatemalan Government, and largely for that reason, the President took the decision to decertify Guatemala this year, although a national interest waiver was provided so that cooperation, economic cooperation, could continue. We are hopeful that the Guatemalan government will begin to address these issues, resolve some of the problems they have with their institutions, and move aggressively in a positive direction to get this cooperation up and running.

I don't have any specific information at my fingertips on Honduras, but I do know that we have had a good level of cooperation with the Honduran government, that we've been able to work with them, and the issue of their cooperation has not been one that has been brought to my attention.

QUESTION: Hi. Martin Vallierers, Canadian newspaper La Presse. You mention in your report here that U.S. has, seems to be concerned with possible plans in Canada to decriminalize cannabis possession for personal use. All indications are that the Canadian Government could move on this within a matter of months. What should Canadian expect maybe, in term of reaction or anything from your group, because there's been suggestion before that maybe something could be ordered to the border agencies of the U.S. if such a thing would happen in Canada.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Well certainly, we are concerned with these trends in Canada that are moving in the direction of legalization of marijuana, and we've taken this up, issue up at various levels of the Canadian government. It's been a subject that Director Walters has raised directly with his counterparts. So the discussion of this, including in the President's letter, certification letter, was a continuation of the discussion that we've had with the Canadians over the past several years on this topic. So I don't really have anything new to add at this point on the question.

QUESTION: Fernando Canzian from Folha de Sao Paulo, Brazil. The part of the report concerning Brazil seems to be very positive. Shows a lot of progress between Brazilian officials and Americans, but while we are all talking here, the Brazilian army is spattering Rio de Janeiro for the Carnival season because the drug dealers took all over the place and they are terrorizing the city, the last week, and now they are, you know, ruling everything. Do you have any comments to do on that?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Well, I think we've had a very good level, as you mentioned, of bilateral cooperation between our law enforcement agencies with the government of Brazil. We're stepping up that level of cooperation, our assistance has increased substantially in the last couple of years. So on the issue of bilateral cooperation, it's excellent.

I think you do point out that the drug traffickers in Brazil have become a serious problem in terms of the overall level of crime in some of the large cities in Brazil. And also, we have noted and we've discussed with the government of Brazil a related issue, which is, the consumption of cocaine in Brazil has increased in the past several years. So there's a demand, there's a supply factor here and there's also a demand factor operating. I mean, this is not dissimilar to what we see in a lot of other countries that were originally transit countries. Brazil was originally purely a transit country for cocaine going on to Europe, but the traffickers in the course of performing these transit operations develop an internal market. A very similar situation in Thailand. Thailand originally was a transit country for heroin going to the United States and methamphetamine, but the traffickers developed an internal market inside Thailand, and now they have a major consumption problem. Same problem in central Asia. Originally, central Asia was a transit area for heroin going to Europe. Now, central Asia has a consumption problem because the traffickers created a domestic market.

I think this is what is going on in Brazil. So you have a law enforcement problem that's created by the traffickers having developed an internal market. And I think it has to be addressed as, basically as an internal law enforcement issue.

QUESTION: Let me add just one thing. The main drug dealer in Brazil, that's called Fernajib Ilomar (ph), he is now in prison. But still, he's ruling the traffic. Do you have any comments to do about this?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: I don't really have anything on that issue.

QUESTION: Jose Puertas, Agence France-Presse. Just a follow up to the airplane interdiction question. You said you're working on a bilateral agreement with Colombia. And what about Peru? Is Peru going to be left out of this program at all, or what?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Certainly our initial focus is on Colombia at this point. We've gotten further along with Colombia. The Colombian government was very interested in getting this program up and running quickly. We had high-level discussions, so our initial efforts were to get the program up and running as quickly as possible with Colombia. With Peru, we have begun to do some training, but we have not yet begun negotiations on a bilateral agreement.

QUESTION: Charlene Porter with the Washington File. There's kind of an inconsistency here that I'd hope you can clarify for me. On the one hand, in the overview report, in the general tone of your remarks, you said we're making some very critical progress in attacking some of these problems, working with other nations. But then in another section of the report back here called, "Next Step," you're also talking about how the drug trafficking organizations are getting better and better and more professional. So, you know, if you would characterize this seeming contradiction. I mean, is this, the (inaudible) battle that continually pushing the rock up the hill, or what?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Well, certainly I think the drug trafficking organizations will always attempt to adapt and to some extent, we will always be in a position of trying to get ahead of them. I think it's important to note, though, that there are a number of countries around the world, at least the producer countries, who have approached this problem head on, and who have been able to eliminate or drastically reduce production and have been able to stick to that commitment. And they aren't necessarily countries that have a lot of money. I'm thinking in particular of Pakistan, which has essentially eliminated opium production. It took them 20 years, but they were successful in doing so. I'm thinking of Thailand that has also eliminated opium production, although it's still a transit country, as is Pakistan. I'm thinking of Bolivia and Peru which, while they haven't completely eliminated coca cultivation, have drastically reduced it during the course of the '90s, and in each, in all of these countries, the drug lords and drug traffickers were marginalized, but this required a combination of very strong political will, required vigorous law enforcement efforts, required a strong interdiction effort, required alternative development programs to provide alternative livelihoods to farmers, and it required a fair amount of time. But these countries are not wealthy countries, but they made the political decision that drugs were doing great damage to their societies, and so they pushed on it and they were successful. So there are a number of countries, there are other countries that have been at threat of becoming drug producers, but that have been able to keep the drug, at least on the cultivation side, out for the time being. Venezuela is one, Ecuador.

So there have been some success stories out there, and one of the real benefits from reducing the narcotics presence in the countries is the ability to prevent narcotics from skewing the economy, from skewing the legal system, skewing the political system, skewing the system of incentives, and there's, I think, many of these governments have recognized that there's a long-term benefit.

The other way in which I think the drugs issue has shifted over the years is that, and I mentioned this before, but practically all of these countries now have a major internal drug consumption problems, many of which are far graver than the problems here in the United States in terms of percentage of the population affected by drugs, drug consumption. So, we really have been able to form partnerships with many countries that in the past were viewed largely as supplier countries. Now these are countries that have drug consumption problems that are creating major challenges for law enforcement and for the health authorities in those countries. So I think the pattern really has shifted over the years.

QUESTION: Dmitry Kirsanov, Russian news agency TASS. Quite paradoxical, with the removal of Taliban and Al-Qaida from the power in Afghanistan seemed to only worsen the situation with the illicit opium and heroin production in Afghanistan. Could you possibly describe the specific measures that the U.S. administration is taking to improve the situation in this sphere in Afghanistan. And, because my personal impression is that poppy growing remains the main source of money for Afghan farmers. And finally, sir, what are your estimates? Do you think the situation in the year 2003 will be even worse than in 2002 in Afghanistan with this regard?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Thank you for your question. First, let me note that we did spend, with the Deputy Secretary in Moscow, half a day discussing the Afghan drugs issues at the most senior level with Russian law enforcement, foreign ministry, and other officials just one month ago. So we're working very closely with our Russian colleagues to address the problem. We are very conscious of the fact that Russia is a major market for Afghan opium, and that the resumption of opium cultivation in Afghanistan has a very serious impact on Russia as well as on the central Asian states. So we're actually working now with Russia and with a variety of central Asian states to strengthen law enforcement, to strengthen institutional development, to provide some of these central Asian states with drug control authorities and legislation and some kind of basic capability to go after the Afghan opium as it makes its way up towards Russia.

As far as internal to Afghanistan, we have worked very closely with the Karzai government, with the UN, and with the British who have the international lead on Afghan counternarcotics. The British and the Afghans have put together an action plan that addresses all of the key issues. It addresses interdiction, it addresses, eradication, alternative development, institution building, demand reduction. And so, I think we all, in the international community have a pretty good idea of what needs to be done in Afghanistan to get the situation under control. The problem there is, I mean, there are a number of problems. But, you're really starting from a very low base in terms of law enforcement capability. You don't have an existing police force. You don't have an anti-narcotics force, you don't have an anti-narcotics authority. To its credit, the Karzai government has prohibited the cultivation, production, and trading of drugs, but its ability to exercise that prohibition really depends on these institutions getting up and running.

So we're providing financing, we're working with the Germans to develop the police force, we're working with the UN on building up counternarcotics institutions, we're working with the British on developing alternative livelihoods for farmers. But again, the economy is on its back, too. There's been a drought. It's going to take some time. So, I don't have a crystal ball for this year as far as what's going to happen, but I can say that we believe the Afghan Government, within the range of the capabilities that it has is very dedicated to working on counternarcotics, and certainly wants to deemphasize the role that opium plays in the Afghan economy. We're working with them, we're looking for ways that we can support them. We have, Congress has provided us some resources to do that. And, but it's a major challenge, and all of the tools are not in place quite yet, but we're working very hard on this, and we're working with Russia as well.

QUESTION: Are countries like China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, major transit countries? Thank you.

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: China is on the Majors List as a major transit country. The situation in China has also changed substantially over the years. China now has a huge internal drug consumption problem, and we’ve been able to cooperate a lot more with the Chinese now in terms of drug enforcement, because the Chinese see it in their own interest. So we’re working very closely with the Chinese government. We’re working on interrupting the flow of heroin that comes up from Burma to China that has created a large problem of heroin addiction in southern Chinese provinces. So we’re working very cooperatively with Chinese law enforcement to try to get a handle on that issue.

We’re also working with the Chinese on the methamphetamine issue. China’s a major producer and exporter of methamphetamines to all of east Asia and some of that also goes into the U.S. market.

So those are two areas we’re working with the government of China on. But I would emphasize again that I think the cooperation has improved in part because the Chinese recognize this as a shared, as a shared problem.

QUESTION: Viviana Avila from Caracol TV, Colombia. Local authorities in Colombia have said that the statistics of the report are wrong, because in Putumayo and Caqueta, the statistics are falling down only because the problem has moved into the region of Narino. Do you have any comments on that, and how could stop the production of coca in order that the problem doesn’t go to another regions of the country?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: Well, this year, as I mentioned, is the first year that we’ve been able to show countrywide that cultivation has gone down by about 15 percent. And I mentioned that most of that decline occurred in Putumayo and Caqueta. There was some increase in some of the provinces farther east. Actually, Narino also went down. But Guaviare went up a little bit, and the province of Vichada, which is the one on the Venezuelan border. But for the first time, the eradication exceeded the new growth. In previous years there had been some eradication, but the cocaleros were always able to replant faster than the eradication. Now, for the first time, we’ve seen that the eradication effort can get ahead of the replanting. And so that’s a good sign. And also, that really reflected only the final four months of last year, when the eradication effort was increased substantially and there was a fumigation of about 60,000 hectares in the final four months of 2002. So if that pace can be maintained, we believe that the overall cultivation can continue to be reduced in 2003, and that that will begin to have an impact on the market. So we feel that it’s a good signal that the overall cultivation went down, but that we need to build on that by continuing to eradicate at this accelerated pace. Does that answer the question?

QUESTION: This is Pablo Bachelet, Reuters Correspondent for Latin America over here. Actually following up on her question, I don’t know if you actually addressed -- I’d like to know why is coca production going up in Peru and Bolivia. Is it because of your more aggressive efforts in Colombia? Does this lead us to a question of repeating what happened in the 1990s when Peru and Bolivia were big producers, and it got moved into Colombia as those countries eradicated their own production?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: That’s a good question. I don’t think the increase in 2002, which was rather small -- Bolivia went from 20- to 24,000 hectares and Peru went from 34- to 36,000 hectares, so it was a small increase. And I don’t believe that you can correlate that necessarily to what was going on in Colombia. But there’s no question that over time, if the program in Colombia continues to be successful, and we build on the achievements that occurred last year, that there will be additional pressures throughout the region. And that is the reason that we have approached this problem from the start as a regional initiative. And we’re working very closely with, and we’re providing resources to, both Peru and Bolivia to make sure they maintain the pace of eradication, they’re continuing to eradicate, this is very important that they continue to maintain the interdiction efforts, and that they continue to provide alternative development resources for their farmers. So we think it’s very important that we maintain those activities in those countries so that they stay the course. They have consolidated these improvements. They are recognizing internally the benefits to their country from having largely rid their country of drug traffickers. But we need to make sure that they continue to stay the course as these pressures build.

QUESTION: My name is Kashiyana, I'm with Japanese newspaper Sankei. You said earlier -- my question regarding with North Korea. You mentioned earlier that you could not find out any exact evidence which indicated the North Korean government is involved with methamphetamine production or smuggling. However, it's still a great concern. I wondered why you think it's still a great concern. Moreover, do you have any indication of any circumstantial evidence which indicates that North Korea or Turkey the border would be an issue or not?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: No, I don't think we have the evidence that the North Korean authorities per se are involved. But it's a matter of great concern because we do know from the seizures and from our cooperation with Japanese law enforcement that North Koreans are heavily involved in this methamphetamine trade, and this is creating a lot of problems not just for Japan but for all the countries in this part of Asia. So we're concerned because we know that North Korea is the source of much of these methamphetamines. So that's -- and we know that, through our law enforcement cooperation, that this is a matter of concern to a lot of the countries in that part of the world.

QUESTION: Sawaki of Tokyo Shimbun. My question is on Burma. The military government of Burma is saying that they are trying an effort to eliminate the opium and other drug productions. And they have taken various measures including the arrest of opium lord Khun Sa, which took place years ago, or introducing substitute crops. However, Burma is still one of the major producers of opium. And I'm wondering why. Do you see any -- do you think that the federal government is secretly supporting the local producers who have the power over de facto autonomy in remote areas?

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIMONS: I think the situation in Burma is difficult. As you know, we decertified Burma again this year. We did see some decrease in the cultivation and production of opium. That's been a trend that's been going on for a number of years in Burma. But at the same time, we saw a large methamphetamine production that appeared to be continuing. We did not see an increase in the seizures, particularly for methamphetamines. We saw some cooperation with the regional states, including China, on the issue of heroin. But we still saw Burmese drug production having major destabilizing impact all throughout Southeast Asia. We also did not see evidence that the government of Burma was taking significant steps to curb involvement in narcotics by the largest, most powerful and most important trafficking organizations. And so, even though the government increased pressure on some of those groups, including the Wa army, to end opium production, the major Wa traffickers still appear to operate freely, and we continue to be concerned with their involvement in methamphetamine production and trafficking.