| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
U.S. Customs Service Counterrorism Efforts at Home and AbroadRobert C. Bonner, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service Foreign Press Center Briefing Washington, DC January 14, 2003
2:09 P.M. (EST)
Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045, USA. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202) 824-0520. MODERATOR: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. As you know, since September 11th of 2001, the United States government has been engaged in a very concerted effort, both within the United States and overseas with friends and allies, to counter the threat of terrorism that is truly a threat to all of us. And certainly one of the very important agencies within the United States that is involved in this effort is the U.S. Customs Agency. And so we're delighted to have with us today the commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, Mr. Robert Bonner, who will brief today on the efforts that the U.S. Customs Service is making both at home and abroad in the counterterrorism effort. Mr. Bonner? MR. BONNER: Thank you, Paul, and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me just start off with some comments, and then I'll entertain questions from the press. Although we're 16 months removed now from the attacks of September the 11th, the threat of international terrorism is every bit as real and immediate and dangerous as it was then, if not actually more so. And we must remember that the threat from terrorism is a multinational threat. It certainly is a threat that knows no boundaries. The terrorist attacks in Bali and in Kenya and off the coast of Yemen and elsewhere around the globe remind us that the terrorist threat is one that we must all confront. It's important that we maintain a sense of urgency and action, the same sense of urgency and action that galvanized the United States and most of the nations of the world against international terrorism on 9/11. At the United States Customs Service, combatting terrorism is the number-one priority. It has been the highest priority of United States Customs since 9/11, and we're doing everything that we reasonably and responsibly can, both here in the United States and abroad, to protect the United States, but also to protect the global trading system from the terrorist threat. And as we do this, we're also making sure that legitimate trade and travel continues without undue or costly delays. One of our efforts is the advance manifest regulation or so- called 24-hour rule, which requires that shippers and ocean carriers provide U.S. Customs with manifest information for oceangoing cargo containers 24 hours in advance of lading. And that means 24 hours before a cargo container is loaded on board a vessel for shipment to the United States. This rule enables us to analyze the information and identify potential terrorist threats before the vessel sails, not after it arrives. U.S. Customs has been talking about the 24-hour rule for many, many months. We issued the proposed 24-hour rule in early August of last year, and that was followed by a 45-day comment period on the rule. We then considered the comments and, after making some modifications, issued a final regulation on October 31st, 2002. Even after we issued the final regulation on October 31st of last year, we delayed implementation for 90 days -- three months -- including a 60-day penalty-free period. This grace period for the 24- hour rule expires on February 1st of this year; that is in about two weeks. Although some still may desire some more time, I believe that we have provided sufficient time for the changes in business practices needed in order to comply with the 24-hour rule. Let's remember the reason for this rule. It's not just a rule that protects the United States, it is a rule that protects trade between all trading nations that trade with the United States. It is a rule that ultimately helps protect the economies of all nations of the world. As I've said before, this is an issue of national security, and Customs intends to take compliance seriously. We applaud the efforts of those shippers and carriers that have taken the implementation of the 24-hour rule seriously, and many, many have. But we caution those that have not. On February 2nd, the United States Customs Service will begin enforcing the 24-hour rule. Data that is incomplete or late will not be tolerated from carriers or shippers. And when I say incomplete data, I include the descriptions of cargo. Vague, non- descriptions, such as "freight, all kinds," usually abbreviated FAK, or other blank descriptions are no longer acceptable; they're no longer acceptable on February 2nd for sure, and thereafter. Where there is no description and where Customs was not provided with the data 24 hours before the lading of the cargo container, the loading of that container, U.S. Customs will begin denying permits to unload in the United States, and that will start on February 2nd and thereafter. We will indicate to the carriers, the shipping companies, our intent to deny permits to unload, and we will expect cooperation from the carriers to deny loading at the foreign ports to those who do not comply with the rule. In addition to denying unloading permits, Customs will also use its authority to impose penalties to secure rapid compliance with the rule. The U.S. Customs Service actions on February 2nd will be the first step in a process of ratcheting up the denials of unloading permits to ensure compliance over the course of the next several weeks thereafter. And I'll -- let me say this, I am optimistic that compliance with the 24-hour rule can be and will be achieved quickly. Now, let me also mention before opening it up for questions the status of the Container Security Initiative, or what's sometimes called CSI. The 24-hour rule applies to shipments -- just so you understand this -- the 24-hour rule applies to shipments of cargo containers from all ports outside the Untied States to ports of the United States. It is not limited to CSI ports. However, implementation of the 24-hour rule will help to ensure the success of the Container Security Initiative currently being implemented or about to be implemented at many ports around the world. CSI is a U.S. Customs Service program or initiative to prevent containerized shipping, which is the primary system of global trade, from being exploited by terrorists. With CSI, the U.S. Customs Service has entered into partnerships with other governments to identify high-risk cargo containers and pre- screen those containers for terrorist weapons at the port of departure instead of the port of arrival. Getting the manifest information on the containers in advance of their loading is essential to this process because it provides the risk-targeting data needed to identify high-risk containers -- high-risk containers for the potential threat of terrorist or terrorist weapons. Just one year ago -- actually, it was last January, CSI was merely an idea or a concept for safeguarding the global trading system and by so doing, the global economy. Now, one year later, almost one year to the date that we first discussed the Container Security Initiative as a policy concept, CSI has become a reality. Ten countries representing 70 -- sorry, strike that -- ten countries representing 17 of the top 20 ports that ship cargo container to the United States have agreed to and are implementing the Container Security Initiative. And soon, after we have substantially implemented the Container Security Initiative at many of the top 20, CSI will be expanded beyond the top 20 ports. The most recent country to sign a declaration to implement CSI is Spain, which signed last week, here in Washington D.C., by the way. Other countries participating in CSI with the United States are in Europe, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the U.K. And in Asia, they include Singapore, Japan, China, as well as the special administrative region of Hong Kong. I'd like to note, by the way, that the Container Security Initiative, the CSI concept, actually was pioneered between Canada and the United States with regard to cargo containers arriving by sea in Canada that were in transshipment to the United States through the ports of Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, and also vice versa; containers that were arriving in the United States through the port of Newark and Seattle that were in transit to Canada. So in addition to all of the nations I just mentioned that have joined the Container Security Initiative, other nations and other ports are eager to do so, and I will -- I expect soon will be joining the CSI program because they recognize, as we do, that CSI is a critical tool for safeguarding the global economy against the terrorist threat as well as better safeguarding their seaports and ours against terrorist exploitation. The early success of CSI is a result of outstanding cooperative efforts between countries on a bilateral basis. But I should note that nultinational organizations such as the World Customs Organization and the G-8 have also endorsed the principles of the Container Security Initiative. This kind of cooperation in addressing the terrorist threat is imperative for success in the global campaign against terrorism. The terrorist threat impacts all of us, and the world community must work together to conquer it. Now, the two initiatives that I've mentioned this afternoon, the 24-hour rule and CSI are just two of the counterterrorism efforts or initiatives the United States Customs is involved in. For example, we're also involved in taking the offensive with respect to terrorist financing through Operation Greenquest, which is a multi-agency federal -- U.S. federal task force aimed at identifying and disrupting the sources and systems used to finance international terrorists. We're making progress, but we must not let down our guard. And I can tell every one of you here that all of the men and women of the Customs Service are continuing to do more. We are more determined than ever in our mission, which is not only to protect our borders, but to protect the movement of global trade. So, with that -- with those introductory remarks, I'll entertain questions from members of the press. Q Thanks. Jim Berger from Washington Trade Daily. On the CSI, has the European community's challenge to the member states about signing the various CSI agreements bilaterally have any -- have had any impact on the CSI initiative? And secondly, what's wrong with negotiating this initiative with the European Council itself? MR. BONNER: Well, first of all, let me answer the first part of that question. Many of the member nations of the EC, for reasons of their own security, have joined with the United States and U.S. Customs to implement the Container Security Initiative. It is the only initiative that has been put forward to better protect the movement of global trade in the primary system or means of moving global trade, which is containerized shipping. So in that sense, it is disappointing that the EC, the European Commission, has indicated or sent a notice out threatening to bring infringement proceedings against the member nations of the EC that have joined in the Container Security Initiative. On the other hand, you know, this is essentially -- for the most part, it's an internal issue between the EC and its member nations. I can say at this juncture, by the way, that certainly it has had no impact on our moving forward with the Container Security Initiative, both the implementation of CSI in all ports of the world, or all countries of the world that have signed CSI, including the European nations that have signed CSI. CSI is already operational in Rotterdam and Le Havre. It will soon be operational in Bremerhaven and Hamburg, as well as Felixstowe, La Spezia, and Genoa in Italy. So it hasn't had -- I'm confident it will not have an impact, it certainly hasn't had an impact, and I certainly hope that it would not have an impact, because I believe the EC, the European Commission would also agree, that it is certainly imperative that all of us work together to improve the security of the movement of trade between Europe and the United States, as well as other areas of the world and the United States. Now, having said that, let me also say that we had discussions with the EC, with the European Commission, and the appropriate -- I think these are the division of the EC that's called TAXUD. We've had discussions; we're continuing to have discussions. And as I've said many times, we would certainly support an overarching agreement between the European Union or the EC and the United States that recognizes the Container Security Initiative and recognizes the implementation of that initiative in the countries of the EU. Let me make one further point, by the way, if I could on this subject, and that is that the -- I have heard the EC express a concern that the implementation of CSI has created imbalances, or competitive imbalances between ports of the -- that are within the member nations of the European Union. First of all, I have seen absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support that assertion by the EC. But I have taken it -- we have been mindful of that concern. And one of the things that we have done, because we are mindful of the concern that's been expressed, is to say that we are prepared, as we are, to expand the CSI program to all of the ports of Europe that send -- that ship significant quantities of cargo containers to the United States and that have the technology to do the kind of security screening that's required by CSI. So to the extent that there are other ports within Europe that are ready and willing and have the equipment and are prepared to step up to the plate here, we would welcome that. We have never -- we have -- I have said repeatedly we have never intended to limit CSI to the top 20 ports in terms of shipments of cargo containers to the United States. In fact, we would like to expand it to include as many ports of the world, whether they're in Europe or Asia or elsewhere, as possible, and as rapidly as possible. Q Thank you. Sonia Schott, Globovision, Venezuela. You didn't mention Latin America. I just want to know more specific about Venezuela. And also note the issue corruption, how to fight corruption. Thank you. MR. BONNER: Okay. Well, first of all, the reason I didn't mention Latin America is that -- I don't know whether this is surprising or not, but when you take the seagoing cargo containers that are shipped to the United States and you -- as we did a year ago, and we essentially made a determination as to which were the largest 20 container ports of the world that ship those containers to the U.S. -- it's roughly about 6 million cargo containers a year -- we determined if you just took the top 20, that all of those ports, as it turned out, were either in Asia or Europe. There's obviously a lot of trade with Latin America. Obviously we have a lot of trade with Mexico, much of which moves across our border, our land border by tractor-trailer truck and by rail. But the initial goal was simply to take the top 20 and to get CSI in place and implemented as rapidly as possible. And that's because if you just take the top 20, they constitute -- over two-thirds -- 68 percent -- of all the cargo containers that arrive in the United States originate from or are transshipped through those top 20 ports. So we started, we -- we thought there was -- we needed a logical place to start CSI, and it seemed logical to me that we would start with the top 20. But as soon as we have CSI implemented in most, many or most of the top 20 ports, it is our intention to go to what I'll call phase two of CSI, and that is to expand CSI to other ports of the world that ship significant cargo containers to the United States, that have or will acquire the equipment -- a lot of this is large-scale X-ray machines -- to rapidly screen for security purposes cargo containers, and otherwise have the infrastructure in place to implement the Container Security Initiative. And right now, we're in the process of identifying essentially the next 20 ports beyond the top 20. And then we're going to be moving very rapidly, as quickly as possible, to expand CSI to this additional group of ports. Within that framework, certainly there are going to be a number of ports within Latin America that will be considered for this phase two. But we haven't made any decisions yet. We're just in the process now of, one, completing the implementation of the first phase, if you will, which is most of the top 20, and then moving to identify and to expand the Container Security Initiative program to a large number of additional ports, phase two. Q Thanks. Pablo Bachelet with Reuters. Continuing on Latin America, you did mention that Mexico is a very important border: lots of commerce going on. What have you been doing lately to increase the security along that border? And continuing with Mexico, this 24-hour advance notice of the paperwork that needs to be put in place, the advance bill of lading, I guess, does that also apply to Mexico in any sort of way? How would that be implemented? That's one question. The second question is, I understand you're leading a U.S. delegation to El Salvador for a security summit for Latin America. I was wondering if you could tell us a little bit more about that and what you expect to get out of that. MR. BONNER: Yeah. Let me -- that seems to me like it's three questions. Let me start with the second one, actually, first, which is, how would the 24-hour rule that applies to oceangoing cargo containers apply to Mexico? And the reality is, there are almost no containers to speak of -- it's negligible -- that move from Mexican ports to the United States. So it would have very little application to Mexico. Almost all of our commerce with Mexico, very much like Canada, moves across the land border. So it presents different issues. So they are issues different than the 24-hour rule, which applies only to oceangoing cargo containers. That's not to say there aren't security issues with respect to our mutual border with Mexico. There certainly are. What are we doing with respect to those? We have instituted, under the leadership of Governor Ridge, in his capacity as the department -- the director of the Office of Homeland Security, we have initiated essentially smart border discussions with the government of Mexico. And we started those -- if memory serves me, this goes back to probably November of 2001. And we have at U.S. Customs -- working with Mexican government authorities, which have included the Mexican Customs Administration, as well as some other Mexican customs agencies, we have formed various working groups and -- to do a number of things. One is -- just to name a couple of them, one is to make strides, and we have made great strides with the government of Mexico in terms of the exchange of information, and including information that is very pertinent in terms of our ability to better secure the movement of both cargo and people with respect to the terrorist threat. In fact, this is, in my judgment -- and I go back some ways with dealing with the Mexican government -- this level of information exchange that we've developed is unprecedented. The second thing that we're doing with the government of Mexico is, we are looking at a way to develop a program that would add significant additional security for the movement of goods across the Mexican border, but at the same time with sufficient security that we could reduce the level of inspections at the border. And we've actually implemented a program with the Canadian government. We're still working on this implementing a -- what I'll call a smart border initiative that would facilitate the movement of goods across our mutual border. We're making progress on it -- we're not there, yet. There are some issues that we have to deal with with the government of Mexico. And with Mexico, there's some realities. And one reality is that there's still an extraordinary flow of illegal drugs across the border from Mexico into the United States. But we've made some good progress on that issue, and we are working toward developing a -- potentially a prototype of a more secure yet a greater facilitation of commercial movement. We're trying to develop something to put it into place at one of the principal commercial crossings from Mexico into the U.S.; that's at Otay Mesa, California. Still a ways to go on that, however. But we're working a number of issues. We are also coordinating just the border ports of entry better with the government of Mexico so that the Customs port director at the various ports of entry on the Mexican border is in consultation with his or her counterpart on the Mexican side, just to control what the hours of operations will be at ports of entry and that sort of thing. So just on a practical level, there's some increased practical cooperation. So there are a number of things we've been working on. And I am pleased with the progress we've made. We've had continual ongoing working groups on a host of issues with the Mexican government, principally, from U.S. Customs; this has been with Mexican Customs. And we have been meeting regularly and making some progress on a number of the issues such as I've outlined. There is a third part of your question, and that's El Salvador. I am, at the request of Secretary Powell, I am going to lead the U.S. delegation to a counterterrorism group that exists and has held several regional meetings under the auspices of, and it's part of, the Organization of American States. And the purpose of this conference is to meet and further anti-terrorism initiatives and issues that can be undertaken within the Western hemisphere. And that conference is going to take place -- I've forgotten the exact days, but it's coming up fairly soon. It's going to be down in San Salvador. So I'm looking forward to leading the U.S. delegation, and I'm cautiously optimistic that we're going to continue to make some progress on a number of fronts with respect to measures that can be taken to better improve the security of the entire hemisphere against the terrorist threat. Q Martin Vallieres, La Presse, Montreal. Business leaders in Canada are asking the Canadian government to initiate talks, maybe with the U.S. government, as to some kind of -- that could lead to some kind of custom unification between the two countries, something that would go further than NAFTA, can be kind of attached to NAFTA. Do you see this as a realistic proposition, something that could be feasible, or it's something that is way too far-fetched? MR. BONNER: First of all, who -- just let me get the front part of the question. You started with whose discussion? Q Business leaders in Canada. MR. BONNER: Business leaders. We've had a very active process through the Smart Border accord that was initiated between Deputy Prime Minister Manley and Governor Ridge back in December of 2001. This has led to many discussions between U.S. Customs Service and the CCRA, the customs -- Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency -- as well as -- many of these discussions have also included the CIC and the INS as well. So there have been a whole range of issues that have been discussed. And as I think you're aware, essentially, the Ridge-Manley Smart Border accord was 30 specific action items. And if you go through those items, it is -- it's remarkable how many we've been able to accomplish, because we've been able to accomplish many of these action items that involved our two customs agencies. Now, having said that by just way of brief background, the question is, can we do more to better secure our mutual border? I'm confident that we can. I'm also confident that the best approach to doing that is to take some of the pressure -- as much of the pressure as we possibly can -- off the physical border itself. And there are a number of ways to do that. But one of the things being discussed is the concept of shared facilities between U.S. Customs and CCRA. One of the concepts sort of within that is what's sometimes referred to as reverse inspections, which is, among other things, to protect some very important infrastructure that exists between the U.S. and Canada, specifically the bridges, like the Ambassador Bridge and the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, that are so important to the commerce between our two countries that we actually consider essentially doing the U.S. Customs inspection on the Canadian side, and CCRA doing the Canadian customs and border inspection on the U.S. side of the border. All of these things are being discussed. Certainly I'm not here saying that anybody said, "Go," that this should be done. But they're certainly being actively discussed. And the issue right now, in terms of furthering these, I think there are two issues. One is, there's sort of the political issue in both countries, and that is, is there -- are we, in our relationship -- let's say Canada and the United States, are we sufficiently mature in our relationship that we could, for example, do something that the French and the British have done with respect to the tunnel, which is that French customs and border authorities are stationed in the United Kingdom, in England, on the other side of the tunnel, and U.K. customs and border authorities are stationed in France. And I would say to you -- and they have a legal framework to do this. And I would just say to you that if the French and British have figured out a way that they can do this, I am absolutely confident that the United States and Canada ought to be able to do it. But we have to -- there is -- it is coming up with the appropriate legal framework that would permit this to happen. And it's still being actively discussed, and I'm -- at this point, I guess I'm not going to venture any statement as to whether it will happen or not. I don't know. But we're discussing it, we're discussing it seriously, because I think both sides want to do everything we can to increase security against the terrorist threat, but at the same time not do things that are -- actually, let me put it this way: Do things that relieve the pressure on the border. And this could possibly be helpful to that end. Q Commissioner, I have two questions. One deals with those ports that have not yet come under the CSI. I think you said 17 of the top 20 have at this point, from 10 countries. Can you identify those which -- from the top 20 which have not yet become part of the security initiative? And is there some hope that they will soon? I guess maybe it would be helpful to identify what countries those are in. And then my second question is a different subject altogether. That is manpower and personnel and costs. Can you talk a little bit about the costs of this program and particularly where are you finding the people to put agents all over the world? MR. BONNER: Yeah, let me address both of those. First of all, of the top 20 ports that were identified -- and this is in terms of the volume of cargo shipped to the United States -- the -- I think we may have a handout in the press package here, but let me just say that the ports that -- the top -- ports of the top 20 of that have signed on and are implementing CSI include the largest port in terms of shipment of cargo containers to the U.S., Hong Kong, followed by Shanghai, Singapore. All these three ports have signed on, are part of CSI. I'll mention the three that haven't in a moment. They include Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Tokyo, Genoa, Yantian, Antwerp, Nagoya, La Havre, Hamburg, La Spezia, Felixstowe; Algeciras, which is in Spain; Kobe and Yokohama. So all of those 17 -- those are the 17 of the top 20. The three ports that -- of the top 20 that have not entered into an agreement and begun implementing CSI are Pusan, which is in South Korea; a port in Thailand called Laem Chabang -- I think I'm -- you may need a spelling on that one -- and Kaohsiung, which is in -- on Taiwan. So those are the three that remain. And there -- this isn't a question of -- in my judgment, of any unwillingness or resistance. This is just a matter of how quickly can we get to all of the top 20 CSI ports. I will say this: that I think that I'm reasonably optimistic that we will have nearly all of the top 20, certainly 19 of the top 20, as part of CSI, perhaps before the end of the month. So it's not as if we're not very close to completing the top 20. I think we're going to be -- we're going to be there relatively soon. Now, the other question was manpower and cost involved with CSI. And it is true that for U.S. Customs, part of the Container Security Initiative, in addition to -- well, part of it is stationing a small number of U.S. Customs personnel in the CSI ports. And this is not to do the screening, or the inspections, but this is to work with the host nation, essentially with respect to the targeting of a high risk container. And part of what we do, part of what we bring to CSI along with our handful of people in each one of these CSI ports, is our automated targeting system, all of our vast database with respect to how do you -- of information to analyze and to make judgments and determinations with respect to working with our host nation counterparts, with respect to which cargo containers pose a potential risk. And then it's -- part of CSI is a commitment by the host nation that it will do the screening of those cargo containers. And by screening, we want to do it rapidly, and therefore using high technology, or technology such as radiation detection scanners as well as large-scale, what we call NII, but it's large-scale X-ray or gamma ray machines, to run the container through. And to -- in most -- nearly all cases to eliminate that container as a threat. But if it's a high risk container, it requires further security screening. So in any event, how do we -- how are we doing it? We are -- right now we are essentially re-allocating some of our personnel. Obviously there's a lot training programs that go with this, but re- allocating some of our personnel that have -- that are -- that have experience and expertise in targeting to the CSI program. The numbers aren't -- they are not overwhelming. I mean, U.S. Customs Service has approximately 22,000 employees. About 9,000 of these are U.S. Customs inspectors. There are another 3,500 that are Customs special agents and the like. So we are an agency that is able to, at this juncture, to absorb the manpower commitment and resource commitment that we have. We also are -- of course, there are costs associated with travel and housing with respect to assignments to CSI ports. And I have made the appropriate reallocations of our budget, because none of this was in the Customs budget for last year, which was FY '02; none of it's in the budget for FY '03, even if that budget, as it will, gets enacted by Congress, which -- it still hasn't acted. But we are essentially finding the money because this is a priority program for the president as part of his national homeland security strategy. It's a priority program, clearly, for U.S. Customs Service. So we're finding a way to do it, and we'll continue to do that. This becomes the -- though the budgetary aspects of this become more difficult as we expand CSI further, and so we'll need to deal with that issue as we move to what I've described as phase two of expanding the Container Security Initiative beyond the top 20 foreign ports. Q (Name and affiliation off mike.) I wanted to know, how is the cooperation going with Italy? And if in the future all the ports will be concerned by this agreement. Thank you. MR. BONNER: Well, the cooperation with Italy is excellent. I had the head of the Italian Customs Agency -- I'm going to mispronounce his name -- it's Mario Guaiana -- that's close. But you'll make sure that I pronounce it correctly. But he is a -- first of all, we have, personally, a very good relationship. He has been here to Washington. We signed the Container Security Initiative here in Washington not that long ago; I believe it was in December, early December. I've also had a chance to meet personally again with the head of Italian Customs, most recently at the Policy Commission meeting of the World Customs Organization in Istanbul. So the relationship is absolutely excellent between our two customs agencies, and we are moving forward rapidly to begin the implementation of the Container Security Initiative, initially at Genoa and La Spezia, which are two of the top 20 ports. But I certainly believe that once we have implemented CSI in those two ports, we are interested in seeing if we can't expand CSI to Gioia Tauro and possibly Livorno. MODERATOR: Is there a last question? (Pause.) MR. BONNER: Well -- MODERATOR: Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner. MR. BONNER: Thanks. Have a good day. Bridget (sp), have a good day. Good to see you. Copyright (c)2002 by Federal News Service, Inc., 620 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please email Jack Graeme at info@fnsg.com or call (202)824-0520. |