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MODERATOR: Welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center, and welcome to our colleagues in New York. We're very pleased to have with us John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Today's briefing is on "Emerging Transatlantic Drug Threats." Mr. Walters will have an opening statement to make. After that he'll be glad to take your questions.
MR. WALTERS: Thank you very much. Thank you for coming. I wanted to try to give you a brief summary of what we've seen as major trends because the problems of drugs has changed and become much more dynamic in the last two years especially. This both gives us greater -- some new challenges. It also makes it more imperative that we respond to the areas of threat today and not look to the past, which may be misleading.
I recently traveled to Lisbon and Brussels to discuss changes in global cocaine flow from this hemisphere. We are, some of you know, experiencing a decline in cocaine in the United States. We've had a 21 percent increase in price per pure gram of cocaine in the United States between January and December of 2007. The overall purity on the street for retail sales has dropped about 10 percent. There's been a 19 percent decrease in cocaine positives in the workforce of the United States in workplace drug testing, which is now millions of millions of tests each year. There's been a 19 percent drop in the year 2007 for which we have last data.
Cooperation, particularly with Colombia and Mexico, has obviously played a key role in this production in the United States. But Canada and several European nations, including France, the UK and Netherlands have been particularly important partners in attacking the drug flow in the transit zone between South America and the United States with a cooperation of nations in that region.
The reductions and the speed with which they have been achieved indicate the vulnerabilities in some of the trafficking networks. And the challenge of our current situation is to attack them and push them down in ever greater force.
The European governments have been concerned that the success in the western hemisphere would contribute to what they're seeing already as a cocaine threat in Europe. The removals of cocaine from the western hemisphere to Europe have increased significantly over the last three or four years. There has been reports in a number of the countries of increased use, the U.K., Spain and others.
There has been concern that they're now have been seizures in other parts of the central European nations as well as in nations along the Mediterranean that are not on the Atlantic Coast as well as in Eastern Europe as well.
The goal obviously is to not let these be established. The way you get a gigantic drug problem is to establish not only users but a cadre of the addicted in larger and larger numbers who are the large volume consumers and become and an enormous reservoir for the marketing of this product.
Our goal, of course, is not just to move cocaine out of the United States into Europe or even into Africa, which you've now seen increasing seizures in Africa as a secondary route going into Europe as a result probably, we believe, of pressure applied by some of the European nations.
The increasing changes, as are reflected in some of the materials we handed out, is somewhat a different launch point coming into Europe, increasing use of Venezuela as a flow vector through -- into the Caribbean, into Hispaniola particularly, but then also as a launch point for maritime movement into Africa and into Europe. A number of the European nations are looking at trying to strengthen relationships with western African nations that are being targeted to try to strengthen their ability to respond.
Obviously, it would be important to try to attack this not just at the widest end of the funnel but at the narrowest end of the funnel, and we remain in our effort to try to work more effectively with Venezuela.
Nonetheless, there's been an estimate in 2007 of 250 metric tons have departed Venezuela, an 89 percent increase compared to 2005. Overall, the volume and the number of cocaine movement events departing Venezuela toward Europe and Africa increased to 167 percent in volume and 56 percent in known events. The concern here is that events may not be as clear given the wider area of movement into not only Europe but into Africa. About a quarter of the cocaine that departed Venezuela estimated is going to Europe.
Obviously, this is not good for any nation, and the United States has had I think a remarkable history of working with nations, even that we have political disagreements with. I don't think in this hemisphere we have any more and longer sustained disagreement than with Cuba, but we have managed to share information about drug flows in order to cut off this problem.
Obviously, drugs, drug mafias, the addiction and the corruption that this flow causes is not good for any nation, not good for the United States, not good for Europe or Africa and not good for Venezuela.
We remain willing to work with Venezuelan Government, but the increasing flow at this time is of particular concern because of the vulnerabilities that are obvious in parts of West Africa and in the potential huge water and airways that go into Europe.
We're offering some assistance. I met with the Interdiction Coordination Center in Lisbon, the so called MAOT, and we are working to share more information directly from our interdiction operations and intelligence center at JATF-South in Key West. We are looking at passing more actionable intelligence and exchanging personnel to make the real-time movement of information even more effective and to, therefore, increase some of the risk to these movements.
I also spoke, when I was in Europe, to European nations about Opium and Heroin. It's not coming from this hemisphere but from Afghanistan. I followed up that part of the trip by actually being in Afghanistan for part of the week and talking to officials there and looking at some of the programs in Nangarhar Province that has been a focus of growth over time.
We are pleased that there has been some progress in this area in regard to trying to establish the basic infrastructure in a very poor and war-torn part of the world to attack this. We're not happy, obviously, that the amount of heroin coming out of Afghanistan has become kind of historic in its magnitude. The early indications from the rapid assessment done by the UN is that the 2008 crop is likely to be roughly in the ballpark of 2007 but, of course, 2007 was historic in its magnitude.
What's happening, as some of you may know, is there's kind of two parts to the story in Afghanistan. More and more of the 34 provinces are becoming poppy free. And especially in the north and the eastern part of Afghanistan there were 12 poppy free provinces declared by the UN in 2006. There are 15 in 2007. And the rapid assessments suggest there may be more, maybe as many as 23 of the 34 are free or low poppy.
What's happened, of course, there's been a concentration of poppy cultivation in the southwestern part of the country, also where the greatest violence is. Again, I think it's very important that we understand what's happening here. And we have not been clear, I believe, as an international community and we need your help, obviously, as the people who help citizens and political leaders understand.
What's happening in the south is not a failure of alternative development. I was in Helmand Province last year. What's happening is the irrigated and -- and for centuries the most productive part of the Helmand River Valley for Agricultural Production is being cannibalized into poppy cultivation. Wall-to-wall irrigated fields have been converted to poppy. And what's happening is not that there is -- there has been the most alternative development for the longest number of years, as I said centuries, has been converted. Now there is a shortage of food no doubt contributed to by the fact that wheat was torn up and other food crops were torn up to produce poppy. You can't eat poppy. You can't eat opium. And what now we need to do is to help to reinforce the effort to provide institutions that combat trafficking and this dangerous trend in Afghanistan.
The United States has tried to help. We'll continue to expand that assistance. Between 2001 and 2008 we'll spend $20.4 billion in Afghanistan. The European Union is now spending 452 million Euros on 57 projects in Afghanistan. There will be a donors meeting in a short time to try to look at longer-term support. Obviously, we need to help gain security and control against the opium.
I saw General McNeil, the ISAF Commander, just a few days ago in an interview talking about progress is being made against the insurgency and warning that now looks like we're likely to be more effective in securing the country against the insurgency than we are against the Opium, and we could lose the country because of the poppy problem if we're not careful.
I think we're all acutely concerned about that, and we'll continue to work with the Afghan Government and with the international community to help to focus this in a productive manner.
That's my opening comments. I'll be happy to talk about any of these or other issues.
MODERATOR: I'd just like to remind everyone to please wait for the microphone, state your name and your news organization.
QUESTION: Mr. Walters, my name is Gregorio Meraz. I'm a reporter from Televisa News Network. Mexico's still suffering a lot of violence because the war between cartels and the actions of the federal government. We'd like to know what is your assessment up-to-date for what is going on there. And do you believe that the Mexican cartels are expanding their violence and activities to Central American countries like Guatemala?
MR. WALTERS: I think it's a danger. I was just the end of the last week in Houston and Laredo and met with U.S. enforcement personnel. But increasingly we've been able to create liaison relationships as never before with Mexican law enforcement and security agencies.
We've had a long number of talks. A couple of months ago, I was in Mexico with Attorney General Medina Mora talking about prosecutions. We're trying to harmonize prosecutions along the border as well.
The violence is -- unfortunately, we have learned in Colombia, in our own cities, when crime and especially violent drug mafias get established, when you challenge them violence is usually the result. They first try to attack the source of this greater risk and intimidate and destroy it.
And the second dimension of that violence is that they prey on each other, and that's what happening in some of these areas. The territory for the movement through highways of drugs, of other contraband movement, illegal trafficking in persons, the receiving of guns and money from the north, south, is a kind of taxing of a criminal kind that happens. So they try to take over each other's territory as a way of getting resources.
The violence in Laredo-Nuevo Laredo areas, thank God down through the efforts both of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and military presence in Mexico along the border. Some of that violence has moved west, and there has been, of course, increased violence recently in the Tijuana area. We are working to try to help share information and attack these organizations on both sides.
As I say, their strength comes from the money of U.S. drug users. There's no question about that. We understand that. We're pleased the drug use has been down. We're pleased that that will help to reduce some of that strength. We are working to attack the guns that have been used and continue to be used to kill Mexican -- brave Mexican men and women who are standing up against these groups. We want to accelerate that. We are putting ATF agents along the border and working with Mexican officials to trace and identify groups moving arms.
We are working, I think, more effectively to share information, as I say, about the movement of drugs, but there's a lot more work to do. We think there's a critical need for resources in addition to the resources that President Calderon has already deployed. As you know, he and President Bush have presented -- we presented to Congress the Merida Initiative. The first $550 million is before Congress right now. I've been meeting with members Congress. There's been a pretty favorable response.
We're trying to make sure we get all the resources involved. There's been a debate a bit about some of the components of the package. I personally believe the most important parts are not the most expensive parts. They're the help with protecting individuals, training and equipment to protect prosecutors, judges, law enforcement officials who have been at risk, the ability to communicate to security, the ability to have non-intrusive inspection equipment, the ability to share information effectively.
Unfortunately, the biggest cost items are aircraft. But again that doesn't mean they're not important. Today, when you have vulnerable populations that can be picked out of large places (inaudible) Mexico and the United States, is a big country. And if you're going to move protective forces there -- if you're going to cavalry, they don't ride horses anymore, they ride helicopters. And if you're not going to call the cavalry, you're going to ask brave men and women to stand up and get killed. You're not going to get very many people very long to do that if it's suicidal.
And so what we need to remember when we have a debate up here that this is not about some kind of bigoted view about whether hard side or soft side or helicopters are good or computers are good. We need a package that works for the Calderon Government, and that's what we've been working with him on.
Obviously, Congress can have some of its own views. It's got to make the final decision. But we've been trying to help make clear why the package is the way it is and to move it quickly. We hope that the action on the war supplemental, which this is now a part of, for the first traunche will move. And as you mentioned Central America, you probably know that there's million of the $550 million is devoted to additional cooperation with Central America and there's more in the subsequent two traunches.
QUESTION: But do you believe they are moving to Central American countries?
MR. WALTERS: I think there is no question there's been greater coordination in Central America. And, of course, they will continue to move. The pressure on the -- especially the arrival and the operations in Mexico will cause them to try to work around those. And that's why I think it's very, very important the leadership that President Calderon has shown in reaching out to Central American countries, and we have been working with him on that, to build a multinational response to a transnational threat.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up?
MR. WALTERS: Sure.
QUESTION: Do you plan to increase the number of federal attorneys along the border to process (inaudible)?
MR. WALTERS: I think the Deputy Attorney General last week announced the first group of new Assistant U.S. Attorneys that are going to go there. We have additional requested in the President's Fiscal Year '09 budget for the Justice Department. And when we were working with Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora, what he proposed to us was a cooperative agreement so that if we capture individuals who are smuggling, that we create, as we have with some of the illegal human trafficking cases, the ability to transfer information that can be used in a Mexican court if we decide we're not going to adjudicate people for whatever reason in the United States. In other words, we are going to punish you either in the United States or in Mexico if you try to use the border as a shield for criminal activity. That's never been done before frankly. That's a remarkable change. It shows where we are and what the opportunities are.
Yes, ma'am
QUESTION: Thank you. Sonia Schott with Radio Valera, Venezuela. Mr. Walters, I would like to know what is your position regarding the coca leaves? Is it the same as cocaine? Because there is a proposal coming from the Bolivian Government trying to change the perception or misperception on coca leaves which, by the way, is endorsed by the Venezuelan Government and I think the European Union.
And my second one, very quickly, you mentioned in your report that Venezuela's amount of cocaine departing from Venezuela is increasing. Is it because Venezuela is not working with the Drug Enforcement Administration anymore? Because Venezuela claims she is doing properly. It's fighting the drug trafficking. So what is the truth? Thank you.
MR. WALTERS: Let me take the first part first. I know there's been talk about finding industrial or other forms of marketing coca or coca products. The fact of the matter is there's way too much coca in the Andes. And that's why -- and the cocaine that comes from it is the problem. It's a problem in the Andes. It's a problem in Venezuela. It's a problem in Europe. It's a problem in the United States. It's a problem in Africa. It's a problem in the Caribbean. It's a problem in Mexico.
So if this is a non-destructive, legitimate use for this, there is vastly more raw material than is being used now. There are traditional uses, of course as you know, of chewing and coca tea. It has been used as an ingredient in various forms over the years in things like soda pop and other things. But the fact of the matter is the much promised industrialization of this is largely mythical. There isn't any great market for coca toothpaste or coca -- I don't know -- you come up with it -- or other kinds of products here.
The fact of the matter is we need to control this because it's being used for illegal purposes. The most violent forms of mafias and crimes and dependent on the addiction and the self-destructive -- nobody's exporting coca tea to Europe. They're exporting cocaine and it's being turned into crack in some cases. This same plague is going to into Brazil and is going into, no doubt, communities in Venezuela. No place has been a transit area for any period of time without developing its own consumption problem.
Mexico's experiencing this. As is I was in the Dominican Republic. These flows coming in the Dominic Republic -- these organizations are paying Dominican citizens who are helping them in cocaine, and they are selling it and giving it at cheaper and cheaper prices to the young people of the Dominican Republic, devastating a country that doesn't have the resources to easily respond. We're working them to do that.
So the fact of the matter is, I think this is kind of a silly side argument that I know has been advanced by Mr. Morales and others about well, there's this great opportunity for legitimate business. It's not there. It's not likely to be there. I think everybody knows that that looks at this. You know that; I know that. Frankly, I think that Mr. Morales and I think President Chavez knows this as well.
So, on the issue of cooperation, again I understand how nations can have different agencies they want to cooperate with, different countries they want to cooperate with this. That's their right. And what we care about most of all, obviously, is the effective cooperation in the region and that can take various forms. But effective cooperation isn't happening now.
This flow is moving through the border regions with Venezuela largely unmolested. This flow is moving up out of the air fields of parts of northern Venezuela. And they're not clandestine strips; they're moving out of controlled, municipal airports. They can't do that without corruption. They can't do that unmolested without somebody deciding or being impeded and trying to stop it. They can't move in the volume they're moving through seaports.
Again, look it, you have Venezuela sitting beside Colombia. Colombia is a place that's still struggling but is carrying on a serious effort against cocaine. That includes arresting people involved in major operations in some of the remote areas that are going on. It involves going after corruption. Yes, corruption occurs when you have this kind of flow. But the question isn't whether you're going to have corruption; the question is what do you do about it? Do you go after it? Do you go through the wrenching process of finding people who are supposed to serve the government, and when they betray that trust, removing them? That's not going on in Venezuela. There's no evidence of that. I don't see that in the press of Venezuela. It needs to go on.
And again, our goal is not to criticize; our goal is to engage that cooperation again. It existed at one time. There's no reason, even if we have political differences -- I intentionally brought up the example of Cuba. Is there another country in this hemisphere that we've had more political differences with that we still have the ability to cooperate with on this because we know it's not good for any country. And so I think it's an opportunity.
One of the things I talked to the Europeans about is whether their relationships with the Venezuelan Government can be used to help to get that cooperation, because right now -- look, we have had a remarkable coincidence of things produce the shortages of cocaine in the United States. They can be continued in Colombia, in Mexico, strengthening some of these institutions. But we are going to create a problem for Europe and Africa and Venezuela, and part of the Caribbean if we do not attack that new vector that has been caused by the pressure, and that is not our goal. And we have a unique opportunity to crush the mafias that have been such a cancer in this hemisphere in a more direct way. It won't happen overnight, but it can happen in a couple of years quite dramatically. And we want to see if that doesn't occur.
QUESTION: Any sign that problem is occurring from Venezuela? Any sign from Venezuela that this situation could probably change in the near future?
MR. WALTERS: I haven't seen it. We're waiting for it. Usually when in bring this up I get denounced. But again, look, as you said -- I mean you asked, "What's the truth?" The reason you asked that, I believe, is because we all believe, and the reason I think people go into journalism is they believe you can lie about it, you can (inaudible), you can pretend you don't see, but at the end of the day the truth is a fundamental and powerful thing.
Ronald Reagan used to say "Facts are stubborn things." And I really do think that it's about how fast we come to grips with this before it gets -- I mean thing about the consequences of massive penetration of weak West African countries by cocaine and by other drug trafficking. Think about the kind of money that can be created for further destabilizing countries that are already not very stable and are already racked with poverty. Think about the consequences for Europe of having that whole new area of relationship being used as a conduit for these poisons and others coming into Europe. The implications are very far reaching.
And the fact is we know from experience, we know from what we see now, this is going to happen if it's not checked. So it's time to act and not wish we had to five years from now when the damage is at a much, much greater level.
MODERATOR: It looks like our New York office has a question. Why don't we go to New York.
QUESTION: Good afternoon. Lalit Jha from Pajhwok, Afghan News. Can you help us understand why the status is so far in Afghanistan to combat drug trafficking and production of Opium has seen (inaudible) Afghanistan so far?
MR. WALTERS: Well, I think the -- I'm sorry, the short answer to that -- sorry, you got cut off there at the end. Did you say something else?
QUESTION: Yeah, is it because the different (inaudible) stakeholders in Afghanistan that there's no (inaudible) distinctive lacking there?
MR. WALTERS: Look, I think there's a variety of ways of analyzing this. I would say -- I would not minimize the progress that's happening in the eastern and northern part of the country. As I say, I went to Nangarhar, as you probably know, a traditional growing area. We're going back years. Some of these people are new. Places like Helmand were not big production areas. But if you want to say where has this been engrained in the, you know, economics and the social fabric, Nangarhar is the place. It's bounced up and down quite dramatically, dropping down ninety-some percent. And now it's quite -- it looks like it's quite low this year.
So again, we can do something about this, and we are doing something about this in some of the key provinces. Maybe a majority of provinces are now poppy free at the end of this year. We'll see. We hope that's the case.
The problem is in the places where the violence is the greatest, where the establishment of corruption, frankly, is the greatest is where this is continuing. And I think we also have not been clear. I believe when I'm talking with my European colleague and talking with even people sometimes in the press, the view here is there's a poor, starving farmer who's planting poppy because they need to feed their family. It's almost never the case that that is the decision maker.
What's happening is share croppers are people who are working the land of large land owners or people who are intimidated by the Taliban or by al-Qaeda by -- they plant poppy, and if you eradicate poppy, we'll come and kill your family. Where there's lack of security, there's more poppy. Where there's lack of enforcement of attacks against those who are corrupt.
Now what we need to do then, we not only need security forces which, of course, are a prerequisite -- to not have people killed when they stand up for law and order -- but we need courts. We need courts that are protected, and we need prosecutors that are protected.
We've been working with European community members, with the Afghan Government to create a tribunal. It hasn't worked very well. It started out with some capacity, but then the ability to control intimidation broke down. If you don't have courts -- even if you have police, all they do is arrest and let go. That just weakens the rule of law. And it encourages, you know, justice from the barrel of a gun, which is not the goal and not the future of Afghanistan.
So I do think we need to build capacity, and I do think -- it may sound like an excuse, but I also think it's very important, as you know, to acquaint the world with the fact that the institutional foundation in Afghanistan is not what it is in South America even or not what it is in Europe. It's a place that has been devastated. It's a place that has suffered enormous poverty and continues to suffer that.
So the building of these institutions requires a little more patience than certainly we and the Europeans sometimes want to put into this. I think we've now begun to recognize this, but we need to stay with it. And we will have some setbacks, we will have some institutions that will not grow at the rate we want. But we're going to have to -- and we are committed to continue to build that capacity in Afghanistan.
I think the most encouraging part is where there's greater security, there's less poppy. People do not -- my view, I don't know what your view is as being an Afghan is, the people of Afghanistan do not want to grow this crop. They know it's immoral. They know it's corrupting. They know that the future of their children in their country is not in becoming a narco state. If you want schools, if you want a real opportunity for your family to grow, if you want a life that's not controlled by guys with guns coming to your home whenever they feel like it, you'll have to side with the Afghan Government and the international community. That's what they want.
But wanting it doesn't make it happen. Creating the institutional structures that give them that base and alternative is what's needed. And right now that's focused, because it has to be, on the most violent terrorists there. We're making some progress. There's been talk about the lack of a spring offensive. But we need to also build behind that, and there's been sometimes a reluctance to build counter-narcotics programs and efforts behind the security efforts thinking that we alienate the population when we suggest that the poppy can't grow in the amount that it is now.
I don't think that's what's happening. The most peaceful provinces are also the ones that, generally speaking, have very little or no poppy. So I think there's a greater recognition that the poppy funds support the terrorists. It supports the political interest of the terrorists, the economic interests of those who are enemies of the government, and as we get security I hope we can follow through and continue to reduce the poppy. But it's still much too large, and I would say the jury's still out on whether we'll get there.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Sergio Gomez, from El Tiempo of Colombia. There's an increase of almost 40 percent in the amount of drugs being trafficked in the western hemisphere. Is there any indication that that is attributed to an increase in production? Are you -- do you have any raw data from Colombia, Bolivia about increasing production, because that's a pretty significant number. I think it's the highest number I've ever seen.
MR. WALTERS: I'm not sure it's the highest number ever reported. Again, we have some data. Maybe it's not in that packet. We'll give you what is the current estimate for the three major growing countries, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. These don't all come out at the same time because the analysis of the surveys takes a different amount of time.
Again, I think it's important when we -- to understand the basis of the different sources of data. The production data is what I would call a maximum potential production data. That is we try to get an estimate of how much is growing. And if every area -- if the amount of area we see under cultivation were to produce what we believe is the maximum a field could produce, that's what we have as a potential production. We do not try to create a low estimate. We try to create a this is the biggest threat we could possibly face.
That has become, as you no doubt know, a particular problem in Colombia because in the past this was a recent way to go about it because essentially fields were planted and unmolested for the whole year. When Colombia begins to, as it has, eradicate these through aerial or manual eradication, 130, 150,000 hectors of an estimated 130, 150,000 hectors, there is -- there has to be enormous reconstitution in that process. We know that same number of fields cannot produce at the rate that we thought previously.
The problem is for us we can't reliably tell you what the reduction is on production in those fields because, you know, traffickers are not nice enough to tell us we only got 30 percent or we only 50 percent of the estimated output of last year. So we have continued to report the maximum production.
Now what the does is it's been a big source of contention for you trying to say and for us to say well, is the program working. Is eradication working or is it not working? As they try to reconstitute and spread out, it looks like they are overwhelming the eradication efforts. We don't actually believe that's the case. We think that the overall flow is probably lessened because of the reconstitution problem. But because we can't create a model that accurately tells you what the effect of a molested versus an unmolested coca cultivation infrastructure is, we can't tell you that. So we've continued to tell what the maximum potential production is.
Now the second -- the flow data you have is based on actual events for the most part that we have seen. And then the estimate of the volume is based on an average of -- for example, the (inaudible) that we seize or the small aircraft of a particular type that we seize, what's the average load. And even if we don't seize it, we compute a flow value to it. That's a different source of data.
So I would say the movement data you have is generally speaking based on, and we can give you the specifics here if you're interested in that level of detail, on actual events and actual flow. The actual production is based on estimated maximum potential production, and it will -- we know we will tend to over estimate the amount that's coming but it's -- again, we have to err on one side or the other. We're making sure we're not accused of distorting for the sake of defending policy on the number.
Now I grant you when I talk to Colombian government officials they don't understand why we're distorting for the sake of undermining the effectiveness of policy. But the fact of the matter is we're trying to maintain a consistent methodology here which has been hard as this moves and changes.
You've suffered with this as well as we have, I know, and I wish I had a simple answer for it. But again, we're telling you what we know. We're telling you what we see. We're telling you what the methodology is. We're telling you how it changes from year to year even when we can't entirely capture that in the data. But the fact of the matter is what we can capture now, and I think which is undeniable is, there's less cocaine in the United States for a longer period of time than we've ever experienced in 20 years. We've never had over a year of declines in evidence of positives as well as the increase in price decline in purity on samples that are on the street.
I know there's been a debate over whether or not you can actually see that. But again, as this goes on for longer and longer periods of time, it becomes undeniable that the ability to move cocaine not just because of what's happening in Colombia but also what's happening in -- also what's happening in Mexico is quite dramatic. And our challenge is not to see if we can do that, our challenge is to see if we can keep it moving and make it even more profound.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: Thank you. I'm Gloria de la Torre from Caracol TV, Colombia. And I would like to know how -- what has been the role that President Chavez has been playing in this no cooperation issue. And also I would like to know is there some information or some situation with Ecuador in the drug trafficking issue?
MR. WALTERS: Well, you're asking two questions there. I don't know what the motivation of President Chavez is in regard to reduction and the continued lack of cooperation. I can tell you that when he broke the process of cooperation, as he pointed out, what was happening was DEA and his officials were looking at corruption inside institutions and that's always embarrassing. It's embarrassing when you find it within your own government institutions. It's certainly embarrassing when you're working with a foreign government. I know these are sensitivities.
We've managed to work with other foreign governments about those sensitivities. But I don't think there's anything that is more difficult to work in this issue than the problem of corruption. But corruption comes with drugs and mafias. I mean if they don't get you with a gun, they get you with the money, and that's their goal. So you have to deal with that. And if you don't see people working corruption, if you don't see stories, if you don't break stories about corruption and the institutions going after corruption, then the government is colluding, and it's not facing the facts, and it's not aggressively attacking the problem.
So when you have this kind of penetration, I think you know there's a kind of clear indication as to whether or not you're being serious. And ultimately it's not just a seizure, it's not just an action, it's not just an operation, it's are you systematically breaking down the ability of these organizations, who inevitably try to collude and suborn government officials and security officials.
On the issue of Ecuador, we have had, of course, some of the effort by some of the illegal groups to use Ecuador and to use Ecuadorian personnel and Ecuadorian fishing boats in transit. We have worked in agreement with Ecuadorian officials in the past that has helped on the interdiction side. We're all respecting sovereignty. There obviously have been, as a result of the operation against Mr. Reyes , there has been a considerable amount of back-and-forth about Ecuador and about the situation along the border.
Obviously, the problem, again, is these groups seek to use ungoverned or semi-governed spaces as a way of operating. It's not good for Colombia. It's not good for Ecuador. It's not good for Venezuela. It's not good for the United States. It's not good for Mexico.
The key is not whether or not we're going to point fingers at each other about are you letting this happen on the border. The key, and that's what I think is the challenge is always to say, this is our common threat, how can we overcome the differences in laws or of sensitivities and make the -- a common enemy the target and not each other.
We're still struggling with that, I think, in some areas. But then there's no question that when we work more effectively -- I mean look at the change that the Calderon Government has made in the situation for traffickers. Yes, there's more violence, but there's also no question -- and why is President Calderon's popularity so high? He won a very close election. Because he's taking on a fundamental security issue that Mexicans understand is the obstacle to the future they want for their children and their country. He's taking on the destruction of institutions and rule of law and the control of massive areas of the country or challenge to the control of the areas by mafias.
It's not easy. It's ugly. It's horrible the suffering you witness here. But there's no alternative to end that suffering and to end that threat. So I think that's what anybody -- you all look at this as a hemispheric as well as a global issue. You see what the fact is. We sometimes want to pull the covers over our head and not look at serious things, especially in government. It wants to tell everybody it's going to be easy, it's all going to be a matter of if you just will it, it's going to happen. No, people have to put their lives on the line. People have to put their political prestige on the line. People have to suffer the indignity of corruption stories. I frankly think that that's a part of telling whether or not people are actually dealing with it.
QUESTION: A follow up. But how do you see the role that the Ecuadorian Government is playing in this situation with Colombia with the FARC, because the Colombian Government has said many times that the Ecuadorian Government is like supporting FARC and letting them to have camps in their country. So how do you understand that? How do read it?
MR. WALTERS: Well, again, I think it's a little more complicated than, you know, either simple collusion or not. I think there have obviously been areas along the border there, and I'm not an expert on it but I spent some time trying to become somewhat knowledgeable here -- there are parts of these border areas that are not controlled by security forces. I mean Colombia has trouble because the FARC operates in those areas. Ecuador has trouble because the FARC operates in those areas. And I think we both know in a way that's undeniable since the Reyes operation, well, there's a lot of FARC infrastructure in this area and it was on the Ecuadorian side of the border. So I don't think that's deniable anymore in case people wanted to deny it in the past.
The question is what are we going to do about it? And how are we going to prevent the FARC, which obviously now -- and we haven't seen everything that's -- that has been collected in these computers and other things, how much effort there was to use border areas, to use relationships with a variety of the countries in the area to foster the strength and supply and money and support for the FARC and what the implications of that are. We're still going to see that. I know there are still international bodies that are working to look at this media to see what kind of international law may be brought to bear.
So again, some of it's weakness. And that's just -- again, the traffickers go to a place where the risk is lower. So they look for places that remote and difficult to govern. We need to try to help and the nations need to try to help to take away those places of vacuum and bring the rule of law. That's, I think, been the great achievement of President Uribe is extending the government preferences to more and more municipalities.
Now is he done? No, but the fact is the FARC is now -- the AUC has substantially demobilized and they're now going after those who want to revert back. And the FARC is now deserting at numbers that are unprecedented. And again, they're not coming in with new equipment and shiny uniforms. They're tattered. They don't have shoes. They're starving. The FARC is being pressed as never before.
Now we have an opportunity to close this down. But we have to make sure that we don't let it squirt out through Venezuela into another sustained hemispheric problem.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Jose Diaz with Reforma Newspaper from Mexico. My question could sound a little bit basic, but how -- who is trafficking towards Africa and Europe? What kind of organizations? Are we talking about the big Mexican and Colombian cartels, or are we talking about Caribbean dealers? Who is really doing this? And if you have percentages, that would be very helpful.
MR. WALTERS: It's not a basic question. I've learned also in this business I think it's very important to kind of rethink what you think is going on as things change, because a lot -- many times the things that we observe are never responded to by "we don't know." They're usually over explained, and at least some of those explanations are completely off the mark.
What I have heard from people I met with in Europe, especially who have been working in Africa, is that they are seeing Venezuelan organizations in Africa; they are seeing some Colombian organizations in Africa. They have seen to a lesser extent some Mexican organizations, but I don't think I saw those as much in Africa as in the Spanish and Portuguese vector.
There have been concerns about also flow to, especially in the case of Portugal, come up from Brazil because we know of the known concern. We have not seen as much of that. We have the ability to take, seize the cocaine and to analyze it, and we have a pretty good, we think, so called signature about what the source country is. Most of this seems
-- appears to be cocaine that was grown and processed in Colombia. Once in a while we see cocaine in various vectors that is Peruvian. Generally speaking, I think the assumption is that Bolivian cocaine, which is not trivial, is going into Argentina and Brazil and some of the southern cone.
So the organizations that are being established in these places are largely coming from the initial source countries or the transit countries of Colombia and Venezuela and Mexico. But again, there are obviously established criminal organizations in Africa itself that have been involved in a variety of contraband smuggling. Morocco has been the largest single producer of hashish and has had cannabis cultivation at a wide amount and has been flowing that into Europe.
Again, I remind you the Cali and the Medellin cartel that became so powerful with cocaine were able to do that because they were initially marijuana smugglers into the eastern part of the United States. They had established distribution routes in Miami, in New York especially. And when they began to be able to move cocaine, which was being then grown from coca in Bolivia and Peru, they shoved it through that pipeline. So the danger is there's an established pipeline for a variety of smuggling and contraband. There are established criminal organizations that are operating at a certain level that this can be made to be a gigantic problem with the amount of money they can make with cocaine in the European environment.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: The Vice President of Colombia has said that the money from the drug dealers is behind the suspension of the extradition of the extradition of the big drug dealer from the paramilitary. How does your office receive this suspension of the extradition of (inaudible) and others like paramilitary leaders? And do you think the money from the narco traffic is behind that? Nathalia Orozco - RCN, Colombia.
MR. WALTERS: I have to beg off on two counts. One, because there is an ongoing U.S. case with regard to the extradition, it's inappropriate for me, as a White House official, to comment on the individual facts in these cases. And second, I think it's more appropriate in regard to the issues in regard to Colombia in this case to let the Colombian officials respond.
But again, we continue to seek those who are indicted in the United States for crimes involving the harm to American citizens. We will continue to work with the Colombian Government on this. I will point out, as what you know, which is there is no government on Earth that has been as cooperative as President Uribe's Government with almost 600 extraditions since he took office in 2002.
So again, we have had a remarkable relationship with the government of Colombia to go after serious and dangerous individuals, and we are grateful for that.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Jose Lopez, the Mexican news agency. On Mexico, the State Department recently updated its warning for traveling to Mexico basically saying that there's a war between the fighting factions of the cartels. Something you've talked about before.
MR. WALTERS: Even the State Department reads the newspaper.
QUESTION: So I'm wondering, what's your assessment of the situation in Mexico in terms of the violence? Is it going to get worse before it gets better? Are you doing anything to help Mexico other than the Merida Initiative? And secondly on this initiative, what's the status of your efforts because Congress doesn't seem to be in a hurry to pass anything?
MR. WALTERS: Well, as all of you know who are from countries that have a legislative and executive branch, the legislative branch is an independent body and sets its own time goals and own timetables. And I've -- it's not appropriate for me to kind of handicap the date with which Congress will act.
I will say that the first part of the Merida money is in the supplemental. We need to continue to conduct the war in Iraq in Afghanistan. I don't think there's any doubt that money will be passed. Precisely when in the next month or two, I don't know. But I do believe that everybody agrees. And certainly the people I've met with in Congress believe this will be passed.
It's not the only money. I think it's very important to have that additional resource here at such a critical time with such a critical ally facing such a threat. Although, as you no doubt know, we also have been cooperating with the Mexican Government as never before, trying to both share information to bring joint targeting along the border to groups that are operating on both sides.
When I was in Texas, we were looking at the continuing effort to try to take out some of the hugely violent assassin groups, the so called Zetas and some of these other groups that have been terrorizing and killing people on both sides of the border and with some success. I think the Laredo, Nuevo Laredo have been -- experienced a decline partly because of the success of the enforcement effort by the Mexican Government as well as the cooperation with the U.S. Government.
We're looking at expanding that cooperation in terms of, obviously as I mentioned, cutting off guns, doing a better job hopefully in cutting off some of the money. But also as we increase our security along the border, which is continuing, we're making it harder to move some of these drugs into the country.
We are also working to continue within the existing money, which is much smaller than the Merida increase we're asking for, to help with training and equipping Mexican officials especially with regard to security of officials and law enforcement personnel, especially in regard to communications and handling of information. But there's no question we could have a more extensively resourced program if we get the Merida money, and that's why want it as soon as possible.
But again, I can't tell you what the exact amount is going to be. We want the full amount and I'm working to defend the full amount. I don't think anybody's questioned that this is a good investment at this point in time. The question is really -- the remaining -- what you hear and what I read in the paper is what's the mix of parts of the overall package and what does that do to the overall number.
Again, we're actively engaged. I'm meeting -- I've met with over 25 appropriators and authorizers on the foreign ops monies about this. I've had a very good response from the ones I've met with, very positive. Democrats and Republicans, they understand this is important.
The one debated issue is has been how much for the expensive matter of helicopters. Again, we're going to go back and try to help people understand yes, helicopters are expensive, and no one in the world that I know of that actually works on this, myself included, would buy a helicopter if he didn't need it. It looks cool. It's a gigantic expensive, ongoing logistical problem to manage. And you have to be a wealthy country like the United States and have the money of countries like Mexico and now with the additional strength Colombia to run these kinds of pieces of equipment. But when you need a helicopter to land in a remote area where there's no landing strip to make people safe or to extract people who are under threat, there is no substitute for a helicopter. And so nobody is buying things that are frivolous but, as I said, the cavalry does not ride horses today and you need the cavalry to save people who are under such threat.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Thanks. Andrei Sitov from TASS. And thanks for a very fascinating briefing. TASS is a Russian news agency, so a change of region.
Everybody tells me that --
MR. WALTERS: I'm an old guy. I remember when TASS was a soviet --
QUESTION: It's still the same name. We made the mistake of believing that it should be retained as a trademark.
Anyways, everybody is telling me that there is a good ongoing cooperation between our drug enforcement agencies. Actually, the Russian equivalent of the DEA recently sent a permanent representative here to work in Washington.
But the praises of that are very hard to find. And on the other hand, you look at the news stories and the hottest news story on that front is the DEA role in the arrest of Victor Bout, the Russian entrepreneur in Thailand.
So my question to you is why did the DEA play a lead role in that arrest? Was there an extradition request made for Mr. Bout from the United States? Has it been made physically, because there's been conflicting reports? And how do you see this case to proceed?
And on the more general picture that I started with, can you give me any proof, any specific evidence that this cooperation really does go on? And for instance, were the Russians among the countries that you asked to put pressure on Venezuela? Thank you.
MR. WALTERS: I did not meet with Russian officials when I was in Europe. So the last part of your question, I did not talk to them about Venezuela. I have met with my Russian counterpart. A couple of years ago we met and I met with other Russian control officials in Washington and in Vienna where we worked to make sure that the existing international agreements remained strong and, if anything, are strengthened.
Yes, I do believe that the cooperation with Russia could be stronger. I do think that we could work on a number of dimensions more fully. We'd like to try to do that. I will say that, obviously, the flow from Afghanistan has been a critical issue because of the heroin coming into Russia. And we are working, and DEA has had the lead in terms of law enforcement relationship, to work to share information and work with Russia on the countries surrounding Afghanistan to create stronger institutions. And Russia has made investments, and I know has also helped in providing personnel and has explored additional help in Afghanistan. Obviously, the history here makes it a little harder for Russia and Afghanistan then it might for other nations.
In terms of the specific case, again, I have to tell you that because there's an ongoing case here and I work in the White House, it's inappropriate for me to comment on the specific case that you raised a question about. I'm sorry.
I will say I think it's been in the press, though, that the connection from DEA to this case had to do with an investigation they were doing in connection with drugs in South America. So it happened to arise and they followed up that particular lead.
We're always better when -- to get to the heart of your question -- we're always better when we can work more effectively with other countries. It's sometimes difficult because of past history. It's sometimes difficult because the legal systems are not easy to harmonize. But I think what we've learned, and the dramatic changes you see with Colombia, the dramatic changes you see with Mexico, the dramatic changes you even see with some of the Central American and Caribbean countries has been a recognition of the fact that you can work together on technical and law enforcement matters in a way that's not embarrassing. That's not a compromise of sovereignty; it makes you stronger.
We've never had the level of operational integration as we do in the Caribbean in the transit zone even with Canada on drug issues, on --with the U.K., with the Netherlands, with France, the center in Portugal and the use of forces in Spain and the EU have been a remarkable change from what was before. In some cases they are using military ships with law enforcement personnel placed on them, even from another country, to be able to carry out arrests and follow jurisprudence.
We're changing the way we think the law can work to allow us to protect our citizens more effectively. We should do -- we need to do more of that even with Russia. If I -- again, I feel I somewhat need to apologize myself because you learn in my job not only is the United States an incredibly big place when you try to work with everybody in different places, but the world is even a bigger place. And you know, I spend an awful lot of time traveling not just to try to make these trips -- just -- you know, I say hello and we have a nice chat and then -- you need to follow through. You need to have sustained relationships. Right now I think most of that is through things like the DEA that have personnel on the ground that can work.
I recognize that we could be even more robust. And we're working, I think, with Russia to look at precursor chemicals and the movement of some of the other efforts we've had as Russia has worked on money laundering and other programs.
So again, I think it's growing, some places less visibly for obvious reasons. But yeah, we need to do more of this. And I hope that in the coming years we will be able to match the true reaches of the threat, because then we can change it.
The biggest obstacle we've had is the cynicism - we can't do anything about this. And what you see here in the United States for the first time is a recognition that we can have teenage drug use go down, which we've had by 24 percent in six years. We can see -- we can have -- we can even control the supply. People thought the supply was something you made gestures at, you really didn't make any difference because you had an uncompromising addict population that would do anything to get the drugs. We can change supply. We just have to have a proportional response to the threat, and that requires us to enlist as many allies as we can, and that includes Russia.
MODERATOR: Unfortunately, we're out of time. So we're going to have to end here. Thank you, Mr. Walters.
MR. WALTERS: Thank you. Thank you, all.
