Lebanon

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Summary

The United States and Lebanon continue to enjoy good relations. Prominent current issues between the United States and Lebanon include progress toward a Lebanon-Israel peace treaty, U.S. aid to Lebanon, and Lebanon’s capacity to stop Hezbollah militia attacks on Israel. The United States supports Lebanon’s independence and favored the end of Israeli and Syrian occupation of parts of Lebanon. Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon on May 23, 2000, and Syria completed withdrawing its forces on April 26, 2005. Regional tensions increased in mid-2006, however, as clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza territory spread to Lebanon. In July, Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel and capture of two Israeli soldiers prompted large-scale Israeli bombing of Hezbollah positions and Lebanese infrastructure. On August 11, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting and created an expanded international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Inter-factional tensions in Lebanon, however, have continued, and a leading Lebanese politician from the anti-Syrian bloc, Pierre Gemayel, was assassinated on November 21, 2006.

Lebanon’s government is based in part on a 1943 agreement (the National Covenant) that called for a Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, and a Shi’ite Muslim Speaker of the National Assembly, and stipulated that the National Assembly seats and civil service jobs be distributed according to a ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims. On August 21, 1990, at the end of a devastating 15-year civil war, Lebanon’s National Assembly adopted the “Taif” reforms (named after the Saudi Arabian city where they were negotiated). The parliament was increased to 128 to be divided evenly between Christians and Muslim-Druze, presidential authority was decreased, and the Speaker’s and the Prime Minister’s authority was increased. President Ilyas Hirawi signed the constitutional amendment implementing the reforms on September 21, 1990.

Since the civil war, Lebanon has held elections for the National Assembly in 1992, 1996, 2000, and, most recently, 2005. The National Assembly elected Emile Lahoud President on October 15, 1998, and extended his term for three years by a constitutional amendment in September 2004. The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who opposed Lahoud’s extension, sparked a political crisis, realignments in Lebanon’s domestic politics, and withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Since June 2005, an independent U.N. commission has been investigating the circumstances of Hariri’s assassination, amid allegations of Syrian involvement, directly or through pro-Syrian Lebanese officials. A U.N. proposal to establish a special tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri case has elicited strong opposition from pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon.

This report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados, and will be updated as significant changes occur in Lebanon or in U.S.-Lebanese relations. Other CRS reports on Lebanon include CRS Report RL33487, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B. Prados.
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Lebanon

Most Recent Developments

The 34-day fighting between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah came to an end after the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701, on August 11, 2006 calling for a “full cessation of hostilities...” Inter-factional tensions in Lebanon, however, have continued. As autumn wore on, Hezbollah began pressing for a larger role in the Lebanese government headed by the anti-Syrian prime minister Siniora. A “victory rally” staged by Hezbollah in late September was followed by increased pressure for the replacement of the Siniora government with a “national unity” government, more than one third of whose members would be members or supporters of Hezbollah (thereby giving Hezbollah effective veto power). In an interview on October 31, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that if a national unity government had not come into being by mid-November, “[w]e will take all available democratic steps to achieve this goal, including resigning from the government.” On November 11, the Hezbollah-led bloc carried out this threat, and its members and supporters resigned from the cabinet, a decision that could cost the Siniora government crucial support within the Shiite community. The proximate causes of the resignation of the six ministers were the breakdown of national unity talks and the recommendation of the U.N. Security Council to establish an international tribunal to try suspects for the February 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a step strongly opposed by Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups who many believe were implicated in the crime.

On November 21, 2006, a key Lebanese politician from the anti-Syrian bloc, Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, was gunned down by unknown assailants. The murder of Gemayel, a scion of one of Lebanon’s leading Christian families and a son of a former Lebanese president, was blamed by many of his supporters on Hezbollah or Syria, both of whom denied complicity.

On November 25, remaining members of the Lebanese cabinet approved the U.N. Security Council proposal to establish an international tribunal to try suspects in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. Pro-Syrian elements decried this step, maintaining that the truncated cabinet lacked a popular mandate to approve the establishment of the tribunal. Also, governmental approval of the tribunal still requires the approval of the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, who has said the decision was improper because of the resignation of the six ministers on November 11. Similarly, parliamentary approval may be difficult to obtain, despite the anti-Syrian majority in parliament, where it would likely be bottled up by the Speaker, Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah.
United States and Lebanon

Overview

The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted in long-standing contacts and interaction beginning well before Lebanon’s emergence as a modern state. Factors contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-American community (a majority of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese origin); the pro-Western orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural ties exemplified by the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position as a partial buffer between Israel and its principal Arab adversary, namely Syria; Lebanon’s democratic and partially Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic role as an interlocutor for the United States within the Arab world.

Two U.S. presidents have described Lebanon as of vital interest to the United States, President Eisenhower in 1958 and President Reagan in 1983. (Public Papers of the Presidents, 1958, pp. 550-551; Public Papers of the Presidents, 1983, vol. II, p. 1501.) Both statements were made in the context of brief U.S. military deployments to Lebanon to help Lebanese authorities counter rebellions supported by radical Arab states with ties to the former Soviet Union. Some would agree that a friendly and independent Lebanon in a strategic but unstable region is vital to U.S. interests. But others might disagree, pointing to the absence of such tangible interests as military bases, oil fields, international waterways, military or industrial strength, or major trading ties. In a broader sense, a ruinous 15-year civil war that created turmoil in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 and that periodically threatened to spill over into adjacent areas of the Middle East illustrated the dangers to U.S. interests posed by instability in this small country.

Lebanon: Demography and Politics

Political Profile

Sectarianism. Lebanon, with a population of 3.8 million, has the most religiously diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 17 recognized religious sects. “Confessionalism,” or the distribution of governmental posts by religious sect, is a long-standing feature of Lebanese political life, despite frequent calls to abolish it. Because of political sensitivities related to power sharing among the various communities, no census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932, when Lebanon was under a French mandate. According to current estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency as of 2005, Muslim groups comprise 59.7% of the population while Christian groups comprise 39.0%, with another 1.3% of assorted religious affiliations. A more detailed but less recent estimate by an expert on the geography and demography of the Middle East gives the following breakdown:

1 Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns, Westview Press, 2000, p. 262. Reflecting 1999 figures, Held uses an estimated total Lebanese population of 3.506 million, to which he (continued...)
Table 1. Lebanon Population and Religious Sects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shi’ite Muslim</td>
<td>1,192,000</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>701,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite Christiana</td>
<td>666,000</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox (Christian)</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian (Christian)</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic (Christian)</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (not exact, due to rounding)</td>
<td>3,506,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church but retain their own rituals.
b. Grouped with Muslims; regarded by some as derived from Shi’ite Islam.
c. A senior Lebanese official stated that there are more Greek Orthodox than Druze in Lebanon. Conversation, February 21, 2006.
d. Armenians are the only sizeable ethnic minority in Lebanon; other Lebanese groups are all ethnic Arab.

Lebanese political parties have developed along religious, geographical, ethnic, and ideological lines and are often associated with prestigious families. Christian groups, especially Maronites, tend to be strong advocates of Lebanese independence and opposed to Syrian and other external influences. Christian parties include the Phalange led by the Gemayel family, and smaller parties led by the Chamoun, Frangieh, and Iddi families. Sunni Muslim parties, historically more Arab nationalist in orientation, include the Independent Nasirite group and a new group, the Futures Party, that has coalesced around anti-Syrian supporters of the recently assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Shi’ite parties include the more moderate Amal under Nabih Berri and the more radical Hezbollah (see below), former rivals but now at least temporarily allied; Druze are largely associated with the Progressive Socialist Party led by the leftist yet feudally based Jumblatt family, now somewhat tenuously aligned with the Futures Party. A religiously mixed group, the Syrian National Social Party (SNSP), favors a union of Syria, Lebanon, and possibly other nearby states. Several of these parties and groupings formerly maintained militias, notably the Lebanese Forces, which were affiliated with the Christian Phalange Party, and the Shi’ite Muslim Hezbollah, which has both a political and a military wing. Most of the militias were disbanded after the civil war, but Hezbollah’s militia continues to function.

**Political Structure and Power Sharing.** Post-civil war Lebanon retains the country’s unique political system, based on power sharing among the diverse religious sectarian communities and political factions that comprise the modern Lebanese state. Under the constitution of 1926, Lebanon is a republic with a

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1 (...continued)
applies the percentages in Table 1.

In 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent from France, leaders of the principal religious communities adopted an unwritten agreement known as the National Covenant, which provided that the President be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim; parliamentary seats were divided on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims. Cabinet posts are generally distributed among the principal sectarian communities, notably Maronites, Greek Orthodox, smaller Christian sects, Druze (a small sect associated with Islam), Sunni Muslims, and Shi’ite Muslims.2 As time passed, the 1943 ratios, which had been based on the country’s sole census conducted in 1932, became less reflective of Lebanese society as Muslims gradually came to outnumber Christians, while within the Muslim community, Shi’ite Muslims came to outnumber Sunni Muslims. Discontent over power sharing imbalances was a major factor in inter-communal tensions and civil strife culminating in the 1975-1990 civil war.

The Civil War and Taif Reforms. At stake in the civil war was control over the political process in Lebanon, the status of Palestinian refugees and militia, and the respective goals of Syria and Israel (see the section below on Foreign Presence in Lebanon). From 1975 to 1990, the civil war killed, wounded, or disabled hundreds of thousands and rendered comparable numbers homeless at one time or another during the fighting. At one point, a terror bombing in October 1983 killed 241 U.S. armed forces personnel, who were part of a short-lived multinational force attempting to keep peace among Palestinian refugees and Lebanese factions. From 1987 until July 1997, the United States banned travel to Lebanon because of the threat of kidnaping and dangers from the ongoing civil war. Lebanon continues to rebuild in the aftermath of the civil war.

The Lebanese parliament elected in 1972 remained in office for 20 years, since it was impossible to elect a new parliament during the civil war. After a prolonged political crisis near the end of the war, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in 1989 in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of the Arab League and adopted a revised power sharing agreement. The so-called Taif Agreement raised the number of seats in parliament from 99 to 108 (later changed to 128), replaced the former 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims in parliament with an even ratio, provided for a proportional distribution of seats among the various Christian and Muslim sub-sects, and left appointment of the prime minister to parliament, subject to the president’s approval. It also addressed the status of Syrian forces in Lebanon, as explained in a section below. Parliamentary elections held in 1992, 1996, and 2000 resulted in pro-Syrian

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majorities, given the presence and influence of Syrian forces in Lebanon ostensibly as part of a peacekeeping force. Though supported by some Lebanese, including many Shi’ite Muslims, the Syrian presence was increasingly resented by other elements of the Lebanese population.

Political Upheaval of 2005

Assassination of Former Prime Minister. By 2004, tensions had increased between the pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and the independent Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a self-made billionaire who had spearheaded the reconstruction of Lebanon after the civil war. Matters came to a head when the Lebanese parliament, apparently under Syrian pressure, adopted a Syrian-backed constitutional amendment extending President Lahoud’s tenure by an additional three years. Hariri, who disagreed with the move, resigned in October 2004, and subsequently aligned himself with an anti-Syrian opposition coalition. Hariri’s assassination in a car bombing on February 14, 2005, blamed by many on Syrian agents, led to widespread protests by an anti-Syrian coalition comprising many members of the Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim communities and counter-demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups including Shi’ites who rallied behind the Hezbollah and Amal parties. Outside Lebanon, the United States and France were particularly vocal in their denunciation of the assassination and a possible Syrian role in it.

Resolution 1595. A statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council on February 25, although it did not mention Syria by name, condemned the assassination and requested the Secretary General “to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act.” In accordance with this request, a U.N. fact-finding team visited Lebanon and concluded that “the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion.”

On April 7, as domestic and international outrage mounted, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the council decided to “establish an international independent investigation Commission (‘the Commission’ or UNIIIC) based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.” Heading the Commission was Detlev Mehlis, described as “a 25-year veteran of the Berlin prosecutor’s office with a record of solving high profile terror cases.” The resolution requested the Commission to complete its work within three months from the date it commences operations, authorized the Secretary General to extend the Commission’s mandate for another period of up to three months, and requested an oral update every two months while the Commission is functioning. The U.N. Secretary General informed members of the Security Council that the Commission was fully operational as of June 16, 2005. On September 8, 2005, the Commission requested a 40-day extension to complete its work. Upon submission of the Commission’s initial report on October 19, the

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Secretary General extended its mandate until December 15 to enable the Commission to pursue further gaps it had identified (see “The Mehlis Commission,” below). On August 30, a U.N. spokeswoman announced that three former heads of Lebanese intelligence agencies and a former Lebanese member of parliament had been identified as suspects in the assassination of Hariri. A subsequent press report describes the suspects as Syrian proxies with close ties to President Lahoud.4

**The First Mehlis Report.** Tensions mounted as reports circulated that Syrian and Lebanese officials would be implicated in the findings of the Mehlis Commission. After encountering initial resistance from Syria, from September 20-23, members of the commission visited Damascus, where they interviewed senior Syrian military and security officials including the last two Syrian chiefs of intelligence in Lebanon, who were widely regarded as the effective viceroy of Lebanon during their respective tenures: Generals Rustom Ghazali and Ghazi Kanaan. Kanaan, who was reassigned to Syria in 2002 and appointed minister of the interior, apparently committed suicide in October 2005. Some observers speculate that Kanaan was killed or forced to commit suicide by Syrian authorities because of what he might reveal — or might have revealed — about Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination or that he chose to take his own life because he feared that he would become the scapegoat for Syrian actions in Lebanon. In actuality, however, Kanaan is not mentioned in the Commission’s report of October 19 (see below).

The 54-page report submitted by the Mehlis Commission represented four months of research in which Commission members interviewed more than 400 persons and reviewed 60,000 documents, identified several suspects, and established various leads. Two central conclusions reached by the Commission deal with the question of culpability, although they do not constitute a conclusive finding:

- It is the Commission’s view that the assassination on 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities.
- ...there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act.... Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.

The Commission report adds that the investigation is not complete and calls for further investigation; states that Syrian authorities, including the foreign minister, while extending limited cooperation, have provided some false or inaccurate information; and calls on Syria to help clarify unresolved questions. Syrian officials, including President Bashar al-Asad, have denied complicity in the Hariri

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4 Hassan M. Fatah, “Lebanon’s President Facing Growing Pressure to Resign,” *New York Times*, Sept. 6, 2005. The press report lists the four as the current head of security, the former head of security, a former military intelligence chief, and a former chief of police.
assassination and said the Mehlis report was biased. On October 29, President Asad said Syria has set up a commission to investigate the assassination.5

Questions have been raised regarding the apparent exclusions in the report of the names of suspects who had been identified in earlier drafts of the report. The principal example appears in Paragraph 96 (page 29) of the report, in which a witness told the Commission that in September 2004 “senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri” and held several follow-up meetings in Syria to plan the crime. An earlier version reportedly listed the names of five of the senior officers, including President Asad’s brother Maher al-Asad and the President’s brother-in-law Asif Shawkat, chief of military intelligence and widely considered the second most powerful official in the regime. Some reporters questioned whether or not the Commission chief Detlev Mehlis had come under pressure to make the report less accusatory. At a news conference on October 21, both Mehlis and Secretary-General Kofi Annan denied this; Mehlis went on to explain that he suppressed the names of the officers when he found out that the Commission’s report was to be made public, because he had only one anonymous source for the specific accusation.6 Maher al-Asad does not appear at all in the official copy of the report and Asif Shawkat appears only once (paragraph 178) when Shawkat allegedly forced an individual 45 days before the assassination to make a tape claiming responsibility for the crime, purportedly in an effort to hide Syrian or Lebanese complicity.

Resolution 1636. On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1636, which requires Syria to cooperate “fully and unconditionally” with the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” By dropping a threat appearing in earlier drafts of specific economic sanctions, the sponsors of the resolution were able to attract support from Russia and China while leaving the door open to the imposition of sanctions at a later date. U.S. officials noted that the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which gives the Council power to impose penalties, including use of military force.7 After temporizing, Syria acceded to a request by the Mehlis Commission to make five Syrian officials available for questioning by the commission at U.N. offices in Vienna, Austria. The Syrians, whose names were not announced, were reportedly intelligence and security officials including the former Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali; meetings took place from December 5 to 7.

More Violence. On December 12, 2005, a car bomb killed Gibran Tueni, a prominent Lebanese journalist and newly elected member of the Lebanese parliament, who had often criticized Syria’s role in Lebanon. Several anti-Syrian Lebanese politicians have blamed Syria, which in turn denied complicity and said the crime was aimed at directing fresh accusations against Syria. Commentators note

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that the explosion occurred only a few hours before the U.N. investigating commission was due to submit an update of its report on the Hariri assassination to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Among other anti-Syrian Lebanese victims of recent major attacks or assassinations were journalists Samir Kassir (June 2, 2005) and Mai Chidiac (September 25, 2005) and politician George Hawi (June 21, 2005). Of these, Chidiac was critically injured and the others were killed.

The Mehlis Follow-On Report. On December 12, the Mehlis commission submitted a follow-on report which states that “[t]he Commission’s conclusions set out in its previous report ... remain valid.” According to the follow-on report, the Commission interviewed additional witnesses (for a total of 500 as of December 12), identified 19 suspects (reportedly including the five Syrian officers interviewed in Vienna), and reviewed additional documentation. Statements by two of the suspects indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been burned. Also, the head of a separate Syrian investigative commission informed the Mehlis Commission that no material regarding the Hariri assassination had been found in Syrian archives. The Mehlis follow-on report further expresses the view that Hussam, the witness who recanted his statement, “is being manipulated by the Syrian authorities.” Analysts are reportedly reviewing the material in an attempt to find material relevant to planning for the assassination. The report stated that “[t]he detailed information [from the additional statements and documents reviewed by the commission] points directly at perpetrators, sponsors and organizers of an organized operation aiming at killing Mr. Hariri, including the recruitment of special agents by the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services.” The report recommended that the commission be extended by an additional six months.

Resolutions 1644 and 1664. On December 15, 2005, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1644, which extended the mandate of the Independent Commission for six months until June 15, 2006, as recommended by the Commission, and requested the Commission to report on its progress at three-month intervals. The Council acknowledged a Lebanese request that suspects be tried by “a tribunal of an international character” and asked the Secretary General to help the Lebanese government identify the nature of such a tribunal (Paragraph 6). The Council also requested the Secretary General to present recommendations to expand the Commission’s mandate to include investigations of other attacks on Lebanese figures (Paragraph 7). In a subsequent Resolution 1664 adopted on March 29, 2006, the Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Lebanon aimed at establishing the requested tribunal. Meanwhile, Mehlis, who wanted to return to his post in Germany, stepped down as Commission chairman in early January 2006 and was replaced by Serge Brammertz, a Belgian prosecutor serving with the International Criminal Court.

Brammertz Progress Reports. On March 14, 2006, Brammertz released his first progress report to the U.N. Security Council. The 25-page document, described by one commentator as more conservative and less detailed than the Mehlis reports (New York Times, March 15, 2006), stated that “[t]he individuals who perpetrated this crime appear to be very ‘professional’ in their approach” and went on to say that “[i]t must be assumed that at least some of those involved were likely experienced in this type of terrorist activity” (Paragraph 33 of the Brammertz report). Syrian spokesmen put a positive interpretation on the report, saying that it “was
realistic and has a lot of professionalism.” President Asad, who had temporized for several months over the Commission’s demand for an interview, agreed to meet Brammertz under a deal that will give the Commission access to individuals, sites, and information, including the head of state (Paragraphs 91-95). Pursuant to these understandings, news media reported that Brammertz met with the Syrian president and vice president in Damascus on April 25; however, the news reports did not give details on the course of the meetings. Earlier, U.S. State Department spokesman J. Adam Ereli told a news briefing audience on March 15 that “we support the work of Investigator Brammertz. He’s continuing the important and invaluable work of his predecessor, Mr. Mehlis.”

Brammertz released his second progress report to the U.N. Security Council on June 14, 2006. Like its predecessor, the June 10 report did not name suspects; however, it described the crime as “a targeted assassination.” Brammertz said the level of assistance provided by Syria to the Commission during the reporting period “has generally been satisfactory,” with that country responding to all requests in a timely manner. Brammertz welcomed and endorsed the request of the Lebanese government for a one-year extension of the Commission’s mandate. On June 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1686, which extended the Commission’s mandate until June 14, 2007 and supported the extension of the Commission’s mandate to offer further technical assistance to Lebanese investigation of other possibly related assassinations during the last two years.

Brammertz completed his third progress report on September 25, 2006, and is scheduled to brief his findings to the U.N. Security Council on September 30. According to news articles, the 22-page report is largely technical in nature but confirms preliminary findings that the attack was perpetrated by a suicide bomber. The commission also reportedly discovered links between the Hariri bombing and 14 other political assassinations in Lebanon. Brammertz said that cooperation from Syria “has remained generally satisfactory” and that the commission has received “ongoing strong support,” even during the 34-day fighting.8 The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, complimented the methodical manner in which Brammertz is proceeding and said “I know that he’s impatient with bureaucratic obstacles and he’s pushing ahead.”9

**Elections of 2005 and Aftermath**

As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under U.S. and international pressure (see below), the Lebanese prepared to hold parliamentary elections without Syrian interference for the first time since 1972. Parliamentary elections, held in four phases between May 29 and June 5, 2005, gave a majority (72 out of 128 seats) to a large, anti-Syrian bloc known as the Bristol Gathering or the March 14 Movement, headed by Saad Hariri, a son of the late prime minister. A second, largely Shi’ite and pro-Syrian bloc grouping Hezbollah and the more moderate Amal organization won 33 seats. A third bloc, the Change and Reform Movement (also known as the Free

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9 Ibid.
Patriotic Movement), consisted of largely Christian supporters of former dissident armed forces chief of staff General Michel Awn, who returned to Lebanon from exile in France in May 2005. Awn’s bloc, which adopted a somewhat equivocal position regarding Syria, gained 21 seats. (See Table 2 below.) Despite Hariri’s success, the electoral pattern resulted in a mixed government, which complicates its abilities to adopt clear policy lines. Hariri associate Fouad Siniora became prime minister and the 24-member cabinet contains 15 Hariri supporters; however, it also contains five supporters of the Shi’ite bloc including for the first time in Lebanese history two members of Hezbollah. Other key pro-Syrians remaining in the government are President Lahoud and veteran parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, who heads the Amal organization (Hezbollah’s junior partner in the Shi’ite coalition) and has held the speakership since 1992.

Siniora continues to face difficulties in working with this mixed government. First, pressure has mounted among anti-Syrian elements for the resignation of President Lahoud with the identification of several of his close associates in the Hariri assassination. Second, the role of the formerly exiled General Awn is uncertain: though long an opponent of the Syrian role in Lebanon, Awn formed tactical alliances with several pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians during the recent elections in an effort to defeat pro-Hariri candidates. On the other hand, Awn’s grouping is not represented in the newly formed cabinet and Awn has said he will form the backbone of an opposition to Siniora’s government. Some observers believe Awn has his eye on the presidency. Third, the inclusion of Hezbollah officials in the cabinet raised further problems; for example, the U.S. State Department, while welcoming the Siniora cabinet, has said it will not deal with an official of Hezbollah, which the U.S. government has listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Fourth, a major stumbling block for the government is a U.N. demand contained in Security Council Resolution 1559 that all militias be disbanded, which in effect refers mainly to Hezbollah. This demand has proven difficult to implement in view of Hezbollah’s strong bloc of supporters in parliament, its paramilitary capabilities, and its support from Syria and Iran. In particular, the enhanced prestige that Hezbollah and its leadership have acquired since the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting in July and August has made it more difficult for the government to put pressure on Hezbollah for disarmament.

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10 General Awn (variant spelling: Aoun), a controversial former armed forces commander and prime minister, rejected the Taif Agreement and ultimately obtained political asylum in France.

11 In early January an anti-Syrian Lebanese political figure described Lahoud’s extension in office as “null and void.” On the other hand, Lahoud’s extension is not without precedent. On two previous occasions, in 1949 and 1995, Lebanon has extended the term of a president. Shi’ite cabinet ministers reportedly refused to attend a cabinet meeting unless President Lahoud was present. Majdoline Hatoum, “Calls for Lahoud’s Resignation Intensify,” The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 4, 2006; Adnan al-Ghoul, “Hizbullah Takes Gloves off in Row with Jumblatt,” The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 16, 2006.
### Table 2. 2005 Parliament: Composition by Major Bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 14 Movement</td>
<td>Saad Hariri Prime Minister: Fouad Siniora</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’ite Bloc (Hezbollah, Amal)</td>
<td>Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah Speaker: Nabih Berri</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>General Michel Awn</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deadlock and Partial Realignments.** Disputes over Lahoud’s status and Hezbollah disarmament led to a cabinet crisis and temporary boycott by Shi’ite cabinet ministers in December 2005. The crisis was temporarily resolved when Prime Minister Siniora stated on February 3, 2006, that “we have never called and will never call the resistance [Hezbollah] by any other name” [thereby avoiding the term “militia” in characterizing Hezbollah]. In the meantime, leaders of two major parliamentary blocs with strongly differing views on Syria and other topics — Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah and Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Awn — held what some describe as a historic meeting in a Beirut church on February 6, 2006. At the meeting, the two adopted a “Paper of Understanding” that called for finding ways to end rampant corruption; drafting a new election law; finding ways to confront issues such as the demarcation of borders and establishment of diplomatic relations with Syria; and disarming Hezbollah guerrillas and Palestinian factions. The parties emphasized that they were not forming an alliance or seeking to terminate other bilateral undertakings involving either of the two parties. Some parties, however, have gone so far as to call the Awn-Nasrallah meeting a “coup,” saying that a meeting between the two leaders who have wide followings in their respective communities “will leave its impact on balances of power that have emerged since Hariri’s assassination.”

**National Dialogue.** On March 2, 2006, 14 Lebanese leaders representing major sectarian communities and political groups convened a National Dialogue conference to address key issues currently dividing Lebanon. The ground-breaking conference, pushed by parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri and other Lebanese politicians, agreed to address such issues as the status of President Lahoud, the international investigation of the Hariri and other assassinations, arms maintained by Hezbollah and Palestinians outside refugee camps, demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border including the disputed Shib’a Farms area (see below), and establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria (which has never taken place). According to press reports, the conferees reached initial agreement on March 13 to disarm Palestinians outside refugee camps and to work to establish diplomatic relations with Syria; however, Syria resisted border demarcation or establishment of diplomatic relations at this time; moreover, the parties were unable

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so far to agree on the status of President Lahoud or disarmament of Hezbollah. Further sessions have been held intermittently, but as of June 8, 2006 the parties had agreed only on a “Code of Honor” pact stipulating that the various parties “respect each other.” The National Dialogue briefly reconvened on June 29 but adjourned until July 25, according to the Speaker of Parliament. (See below.)

**Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon**

**Syria**

Thirty-five thousand Syrian troops entered Lebanon in March 1976, in response to then President Suleiman Frangieh’s appeal to protect the Christians from Muslim and Palestinian militias; later, Syria switched its support away from the main Christian factions. Between May 1988 and June 2001, Syrian forces occupied most of west Beirut and much of eastern and northern Lebanon. Syrian forces did not venture south of a “red line” running east and west across Lebanon near Rashayah, inasmuch as territory south of the line was considered to fall within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operating area.

In October 1989, as part of the Taif agreements, Syria agreed to begin discussions on possible Syrian troop redeployment from Beirut to the eastern Beqaa Valley two years after political reforms were implemented and discuss further withdrawals at that time. Then President Elias Hirawi signed the reforms in September 1990. However, the withdrawal discussions, which according to most interpretations of the Taif Agreement were to have started in September 1992, did not take place, in part because the Lebanese government said it needed more time to establish its authority over the country. Syrian officials maintained that they were waiting for the Lebanese government to complete rebuilding the army and police forces and assume security responsibilities in Lebanon before beginning the withdrawal discussions. In the meantime, Syria and Lebanon signed a treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination in May 1991, which called for creating several joint committees to coordinate policies. Although Syrian troop strength in Lebanon reportedly declined from 35,000-40,000 in the 1980s to approximately 14,000 by early 2005, Syria continued to exercise controlling influence over Lebanon’s domestic politics and regional policies; moreover, its intelligence agents were active in Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 adopted on September 2, 2004, called among other things upon “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.”

The Hariri assassination in February 2005 prompted strong international pressure on the Syrian regime, particularly from the United States and France, to withdraw its forces and intelligence apparatus from Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 1559. On April 26, 2005, the Syrian foreign minister informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the President of the U.N. Security Council that Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon. In his first semi-annual
report on the implementation of Resolution 1559,\(^{13}\) the U.N. Secretary General stated that as of April 26, however, he had not been able to verify full Syrian withdrawal; consequently, he dispatched a U.N. team to verify whether there had been a full Syrian withdrawal. On May 23, the U.N. Secretary General forwarded a report by a team he had sent to Lebanon to verify Syrian withdrawal. The team “found no Syrian military forces, assets or intelligence apparatus in Lebanese territory, with the exception of one Syrian battalion” deployed near the disputed village of Deir Al-Ashayr on the Lebanese-Syrian border. The team also concluded that “no Syrian military intelligence personnel remain in Lebanon in known locations or in military uniform” but added that it was “unable to conclude with certainty that all the intelligence apparatus has been withdrawn.”\(^ {14}\)

On June 10, 2005, following reports of Syrian involvement in attacks on anti-Syrian Lebanese officials and journalists, Secretary General Annan sent the verification team back to Lebanon to see if Syrian intelligence agents were still in the country. The team returned on July 11 and subsequently submitted a report to Annan. In his second semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559, submitted on October 26, 2005, Annan reported that “[o]verall, the team corroborated its earlier conclusion that there was no remaining visible or significant Syrian intelligence presence or activity in Lebanon, though the distinctly close historical and other ties between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon also had to be taken into account when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.” He acknowledged that there were some credible reports that Syrian intelligence continued to influence events in Lebanon but said most of these reports were exaggerated.

On the other hand, the Secretary General noted that other requirements of Resolution 1559 remained to be implemented, particularly disbanding and disarming Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia (notably Hezbollah and several Palestinian groups) and extension of Lebanese government control throughout all of the country.\(^ {15}\) The third semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559, submitted to the Security Council on April 19, 2006, recounted previously reported threats by Syrian officials against Lebanese legislators if they did not vote for extension of President Lahoud’s term. The report says that Syrian forces and intelligence services have effectively left Lebanon, but some other U.N. demands remain unmet, including disarmament of Hezbollah, demarcation of the border, and establishment of diplomatic relations. In an interview with Lally Weymouth published in the May 1, 2006, edition of \textit{Newsweek}, Prime Minister Siniora said “Syria has its men and people in the country: supporters, some politicians and quite a number of Syrian intelligence.”

Syria has long regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence. Some international observers have expressed concern that Syrian leaders might try to


circumvent the effect of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through
contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security
services.16 Attacks on and assassinations of some prominent Lebanese critics of
Syria in addition to Hariri have accentuated these fears. Another remaining question
concerns the ability of the Lebanese security forces to assume responsibility for
maintaining order in areas vacated by Syrian forces. Lebanon’s ground forces
number approximately 70,000 organized into 11 under strength brigades and a few
separate units and armed largely with obsolescent equipment, plus minuscule air and
naval forces, each consisting of about 1,000 personnel.17

Continuing Lebanese-Syrian frictions have led to proposals for mediation. In
January 2006, after a visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister visited Lebanon,
where he floated a joint Saudi-Egyptian proposal reportedly including the following
principal provisions: an end to hostile media campaigns, a ban on provocative
statements by politicians, exchange of diplomatic representation between Lebanon
and Syria (the two countries have never established diplomatic relations), and
coordination of foreign policy. Lebanese reactions have been mixed, and the
Lebanese government has not officially responded to the Saudi initiative.

Israel

In March 1978, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanese territory south of the
Litani River, to destroy Palestinian bases that Israel believed were the source of
attacks against Israelis. Israeli forces withdrew in June 1978, after the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was placed south of the Litani to serve
as a buffer between Israel and the Palestinians (U.N. Security Council Resolution
425, March 19, 1978). In June 1982, Israel mounted a more extensive invasion
designed to root out armed Palestinian guerrillas from southern Lebanon, defeated
Syrian forces in central Lebanon, and advanced as far north as Beirut. As many as
20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese may have perished in the fighting. Israeli forces
completed a phased withdrawal in 1985, but maintained a 9-mile wide security zone
in southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. About 1,000 members of the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) patrolled the zone, backed by a 2,000-3,000 Lebanese militia
called the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which was trained and equipped by Israel.
On its part, Israel continued its air and artillery retaliation against Palestinian and
Lebanese Shi’ite militia and Lebanese armed forces units that attacked IDF and SLA
positions.

In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak fulfilled a 1999 campaign
promise to withdraw Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon.
Barak had hoped to do this in conjunction with a Syrian withdrawal, but the
continued stalemate in Syrian-Israeli talks led Barak to decide to move unilaterally.
Some 500 Hezbollah militia moved into portions of the southern security zone

16 Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, Mar. 31,
2005. Syria also has potential built-in assets through the continued presence of President
Lahoud and parliamentary speaker Berri.

17 Recent estimates appear in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
vacated by the IDF and SLA. Israel gave asylum to approximately 6,700 SLA fighters and their families, while another 1,500 SLA were captured by Hezbollah and turned over to the Lebanese Government to stand trial. Of the 6,700 exiles, many emigrated to Australia, Canada, and Latin America; approximately 2,000 remained in Israel as of mid-2005, where they were later granted the right to Israeli citizenship but few applied.

**The Shib’a Farms.** Syria and the then pro-Syrian Lebanese government asserted that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete because it did not include a 10-square-mile enclave known as the Shib’a Farms near the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian tri-border area. Most third parties maintain that the Shib’a Farms is part of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights and is not part of the Lebanese territory from which Israel was required to withdraw under the 1978 U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 (see above). On June 16, 2000, the U.N. Secretary General informed the Security Council that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with Resolution 425.

Hezbollah, on its part, claimed credit for forcing Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, thereby boosting its credentials within the Arab world. Since May 2000, Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area have been the main focus of Hezbollah attacks. Some analysts believe that Syria, the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah raised the issue of this obscure enclave as a justification for continuing to put military pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights in the aftermath of its withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria denies this. Moreover, Lebanese politicians across the spectrum, including those opposed to Syria, appear to agree that the Farms are Lebanese territory; in his interview with Lally Weymouth, Prime Minister Siniora said the “Sheba (variant spelling) Farms is Lebanese.” Commentators have speculated that through its contacts with Hezbollah, Iran may seek to fill the vacuum left by Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Others doubt that Iran has the means to fill Syria’s former role in Lebanon, noting that unlike Syria, Iran does not have contiguous borders with Lebanon.

**Palestinian and Palestinian-Associated Militia**

Among Lebanon’s largely refugee Palestinian population are several militias, including some “rejectionist groups” opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process. In the past, Palestinian militias in Lebanon were secular and in some cases Marxist in outlook, with little affinity for Islamic fundamentalism. More recently, however, some Palestinians in Lebanon have moved closer to the type of hard-line Sunni Muslim fundamentalism espoused by Osama bin Laden and the late Abu Musab al-

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20 The U.S. State Department estimates Lebanon’s Palestinian population at 200,000 to 400,000. Extension of Lebanese citizenship to Palestinians is opposed by most Lebanese, who fear that such a step would upset Lebanon’s delicate confessional balance. U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Lebanon*. August 2005.
Zarqawi. Some have joined the insurgency in Iraq, while others have sought to turn Lebanon into a recruiting ground for terrorist activities. According to observers, Lebanese authorities have been concerned about two new militias in southern Lebanon with reported ties to bin Laden:

- Jund al-Sham (Army of Greater Syria), composed mainly of Lebanese veterans of the 1980s war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It numbers less than 100.

- Asbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), composed mainly of Palestinians and numbering 300-400.

One Lebanese military official expressed the belief that the two organizations were largely the same and described them as “very dangerous men.” Subsequently, during an interview with Reuters News Wire on September 22, U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte expressed concern that Al Qaeda may be seeking to extend its influence into the Levant area (basically, Lebanon and Syria), despite religious differences between the Sunni Al Qaeda and the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Hezbollah-Israel Confrontation of 2006

Resumption of Violence

As agreement on basic domestic and regional issues continued to elude the Lebanese, the fragile consensus they had achieved in the year following the Hariri assassination began to unravel. Tensions between Israel and the militant Palestinians in the Gaza territory spread to Lebanon in mid-July 2006 as a cycle of violence began between Israel and militants from the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim organization Hezbollah. On July 12, possibly in a gesture of solidarity with the radical Palestinian organization Hamas combating Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah units launched attacks across Israel’s northern border, killing eight Israelis and seizing two Israeli soldiers as hostages. Israel launched widespread air and artillery strikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut International Airport, vowing to continue the attacks until the Israeli hostages are returned. Hezbollah has launched daily attacks on northern Israel with extended-range rockets, penetrating as far as the northern Israeli port of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city, and beyond, to which Israel has responded with air strikes. Military commentators have said that Hezbollah has more than 12,000 largely unguided Katyusha rockets, with ranges of 20-45 miles, but also some more advanced variants of Iranian or Syrian manufacture. Though with limited accuracy, they can cover a wide range of Israeli territory.

Initially, the Israelis used primarily airpower and artillery in their strikes against Hezbollah; however, by mid- to late July, they had carried out some small ground

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operations in southern Lebanon. On July 21, Israel began massing ground forces on the Lebanese border, and the following day, the Israeli Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Dan Halutz said “[w]e shall carry out limited ground operations as necessary in order to strike at the terrorism which strikes at us.” By August 4, Israeli forces in Lebanon reportedly numbered 10,000 and had positioned themselves in or around more than a dozen villages and towns up to four miles inside Lebanon in some locations. On August 9, the Israeli “inner cabinet” agreed to expand the ground offensive in an effort to drive Hezbollah forces across the Litani River and clear a buffer zone in southern Lebanon before international diplomacy might lead to a cease-fire. According to press reports, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense will decide when the new phase of the offensive is to begin and may defer it briefly depending on further diplomatic developments.23

Diplomatic Endeavors

At the G-8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, attendees disagreed over various aspects of the crisis; however, on July 16, they adopted a statement placing blame for the immediate crisis on extremist forces of Hezbollah and the militant Palestinian organization Hamas, but calling on Israel to exercise utmost restraint and avoid casualties among civilians. U.S. officials have been reluctant to support a cease-fire resolution without dealing with “root causes,” which they identify as the actions of Hezbollah. On July 23, two veteran officials from Saudi Arabia, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi Ambassador to the United States and presently chief of the Saudi National Security Council, met with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to propose a cease-fire that would postpone the question of disarming Hezbollah. The U.S. leaders made no public commitment to back this plan; however, the two sides reportedly discussed restoring sovereignty to Lebanon, strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces, and rebuilding the country.24

In late July and early August, diplomatic activity focused on the feasibility of a cease-fire, with U.S. and Israeli officials arguing that conditions must first be in place to assure that a cease-fire would be “sustainable” before formally establishing one. While the issue was under discussion, the Council issued two statements, deploring an Israeli attack on a U.N. observer post and on a building in the Lebanese town of Qana where a number of civilians had sought shelter; also, it adopted Resolution 1697, which extended by one month the mandate of the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, pending study of options for further arrangements in southern Lebanon. On August 5, 2006, the United States and France proposed that


the U.N. Security Council adopt a two-track process consisting of a joint resolution aimed at an initial cease-fire in Lebanon, possibly followed by a second resolution aimed at securing a more lasting peace. The draft cease-fire resolution consists of the following principal terms: “full cessation of hostilities” by Hezbollah and Israeli forces; monitoring of the cease-fire by a U.N. force somewhat larger than the existing 2,000-member U.N. Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); delineation of Lebanon’s border; a buffer zone in southern Lebanon closed to all military forces except the Lebanese Army and the U.N. forces; and a ban on arms shipments to militias and other unauthorized recipients. The proposal envisioned a further stage involving withdrawal of Israeli forces, disarming of Hezbollah, and deployment of a larger international stabilization force, after the establishment of an initial cease-fire.25

**U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.** After extended discussion and debate, the U.N. Security Council on August 11, 2006, unanimously adopted as Resolution 1701 a revised U.S.-French resolution calling for a “full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations.” Among the other terms of the resolution are expansion of the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 2,000 to a maximum of 15,000; deployment of UNIFIL plus a 15,000-member Lebanese Army contingent26 to southern Lebanon to monitor the cease-fire; withdrawal of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon “in parallel” with the deployment of U.N. and Lebanese forces to the south; a ban on delivery of weapons to “any entity or individual” in Lebanon, except the Lebanese Army. The resolution requests the U.N. Secretary General to develop proposals within 30 days for disarmament of militias delineation of Lebanon’s international borders including the disputed Shib’a (Shebaa) Farms enclave. In preambular language, the resolution also emphasizes the need to address the issue of prisoners on both sides. The resolution also calls upon the international community to extend financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including facilitating the safe return of displaced persons.

According to the U.N. Secretary-General, the “cessation of hostilities” called for in Resolution 1701 went into effect on August 14, at 5:00 a.m. GMT. In his first report to the Security Council on implementation of Resolution 1701, the Secretary General noted the leaders of Lebanon and Israel had accepted the resolution and that the parties were generally complying with the cessation of hostilities as of the writing of his report,27 although some of the heaviest fighting in the conflict had taken place during the 48 hours before the cessation of hostilities came into effect. Some other

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26 The Lebanese Prime Minister offered to deploy 15,000 military personnel, and the Lebanese offer is welcomed in the preambular portion of Resolution 1701.

27 U.N. Document S/2006/670, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (For the period 11 to 17 August 2006). The Secretary General noted that “[o]n 12 August, the Government of Lebanon announced its acceptance of resolution 1701 (2006). On 13 August, the Government of Israel announced that it would act according to its obligations as outlined in the resolution.”
terms of the resolution are being carried out. Lebanese Army contingents are
beginning to deploy to some areas of southern Lebanon, and the expanded U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is deploying to southern Lebanon. As of late
September, about 5,000 UNIFIL troops were in Lebanon, representing a moderate
increase in UNIFIL’s former strength of 2,000 but significantly short of the
maximum target figure of 15,000 cited in the resolution. Rules of engagement also
seem open to interpretation, thus complicating a clear definition of actions that
UNIFIL forces are allowed to take.\(^\text{28}\)

**After-Effects of the Fighting**

The 34-day military confrontation between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense
Force in July and August 2006 enhanced the prestige of Hezbollah at the expense of
the Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah acquired a
folk-hero status as his organization was widely hailed both for its military prowess
in the conflict with Israel and for its perceived ability to initiate disaster relief
projects far more quickly and efficiently than the regular governmental organizations.
Even those Lebanese who might be inclined to criticize Hezbollah for precipitating
a crisis that devastated much of southern Lebanon have been muted, at least
temporarily, by Nasrallah’s soaring popularity and Hezbollah’s success in delivering
aid to large numbers of displaced persons and other homeless or destitute Lebanese.\(^\text{29}\)
Similarly, he finds himself in a strong position to withstand pressures to disarm
Hezbollah. Syria too, as a major sponsor of Hezbollah, finds that it has more
maneuver room in dealing with Lebanese issues.

The inevitable comparisons being drawn between Hezbollah effectiveness and
Lebanese government ineptitude raise questions about the future of the Siniora
government and its ability to withstand domestic criticism over its leadership during
the current crisis. Although not all Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah, many
observers believe Sheikh Nasrallah is likely to be heeded to a greater degree in the
post conflict environment in Lebanon; he benefits from his ability to play multiple
roles including military leader, reconstruction czar, and political participant. Despite
his currently favorable image, however, Nasrallah seems reluctant to allow the
situation to escalate into a resumption of civil or border strife.

**Further Tensions**

As autumn wore on, Hezbollah began pressing for a larger role in the Lebanese
government headed by the anti-Syrian prime minister Siniora. A “victory rally”
staged by Hezbollah in late September was followed by increased pressure for the
replacement of the Siniora government with a “national unity” government, more

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than one third of whose members would be members or supporters of Hezbollah.\footnote{A minority of one third of the cabinet seats plus one additional seat would provide the Hezbollah bloc with effective veto power of cabinet decisions; hence, the governing coalition’s refusal to consider this demand. Michael Slackman, “Lebanon Talks Collapse as Shiites Vacate Cabinet,” \textit{The New York Times}, November 12, 2006.} In an interview on October 31, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned that if a national unity government had not come into being by mid-November, “[w]e will take all available democratic steps to achieve this goal, including resigning from the government.” On November 11, the Hezbollah-led bloc carried out this threat, and its ministers and supporters resigned from the cabinet, a decision that could cost the Siniora government crucial support within the Shiite community.\footnote{“Hezbollah Quits Lebanese Cabinet,” \textit{The Washington Post}, November 12, 2006. Five ministers from Hezbollah and its ally Amal resigned, plus a Sunni Muslim minister opposed to Siniora’s policies.} The proximate causes of the resignation of the six ministers were the breakdown of national unity talks and the recommendation of the U.N. Security Council to establish an international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri murder case, a step strongly opposed by Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups. On November 13, following the resignations, a depleted Lebanese cabinet minus the Hezbollah ministers approved a draft law establishing a tribunal. Meanwhile, White House Press Secretary Tony Snow cited “mounting evidence that the Syrian and Iranian governments, Hezbollah and their Lebanese allies are preparing plans to topple Lebanon’s democratically elected government.”\footnote{David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman, “U.S. Reports Plot to Topple Beirut Leaders,” \textit{The New York Times}, Nov. 2, 2006.}

\textbf{The Gemayel Assassination.} Tensions continued to mount in the aftermath of the cabinet resignations, which the March 14 bloc saw as a ploy by the Hezbollah bloc in concert with Syria to block an international tribunal. On November 21, a key Lebanese politician from the anti-Syrian bloc, Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, was gunned down by unknown assailants. The murder of Gemayel, a scion of one of Lebanon’s leading Christian families and a son of a former Lebanese president, was blamed by many of his supporters on Hezbollah or Syria, both of whom denied complicity. Opponents of Syria and Hezbollah turned out in large numbers for Gemayel’s funeral, while Hezbollah leader Nasrallah threatened to hold counter demonstrations protesting the failure of the Siniora government to establish a national unity government with more Hezbollah representation.

Gemayel’s murder may have helped precipitate a further escalation of the controversy over establishing an international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination in 2005. On November 25, 2006, remaining members of the Lebanese cabinet approved the U.N. Security Council proposal to establish the court, in the face of strong opposition from pro-Syrian elements, who maintained that the truncated cabinet lacked a popular mandate to take this step (see above).\footnote{The U.N. proposal for international court is contained in U.N. Security Council document S/2006/893, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, November 15, 2006.} Also, governmental approval of the tribunal still requires the approval of the pro-Syrian
President Emile Lahoud, who has said the decision was improper because of the resignation of the six ministers on November 11. Similarly, parliamentary approval would be difficult to obtain, despite the anti-Syrian majority in parliament, where it would likely be bottled up by the Speaker, Nabih Berri, an ally of Hezbollah.34

**Implications of the Conflict**

Large-scale fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006 and accompanying destruction of large parts of Lebanon’s newly rebuilt infrastructure complicates U.S. support for Lebanon’s reconstruction. In a broader sense, the conflict jeopardizes not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but presents the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma. On one hand, the Administration was sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel’s right of self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting dealt a setback to Administration efforts to support the rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon. As one commentator put it, “the two major agendas of his [Bush’s] presidency — anti-terrorism and the promotion of democracy — are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon.”35 Mounting tension between pro- and anti-U.S. factions in Lebanon during the fall of 2006 and an impasse in attempts by Lebanese parties to reestablish a political dialogue threaten the long-term viability of Lebanon’s political system.

If Lebanon disintegrates through a return to communal civil strife or becomes closely aligned with a radicalized Syria or Iran, U.S. goals could be seriously affected. The United States would lose a promising example of a modernizing pluralist state moving toward a resumption of democratic life and economic reform and quite possibly face a return to the chaos that prevailed in Lebanon during the 15-year civil war. Such conditions would be likely to foster terrorism, unrest on Israel’s border, and other forms of regional instability. Alternatively, the growth of Syrian or Iranian influence or some combination of the two could strengthen regional voices supporting extremist and likely anti-Western views associated with clerical regimes (Iran), totalitarian models (Syria), or a militant stance toward Israel, quite possibly resulting in some type of costly U.S. regional involvement to protect allies or maintain stability.

**U.S.-Lebanese Relations**

**U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon.** The United States has enjoyed good diplomatic relations with Lebanon and has supported its political independence. During the 1975-1990 civil war, the United States expressed concern over the violence and destruction taking place there; provided emergency economic aid, military training, and limited amounts of military equipment; and briefly deployed military forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s, as noted earlier. The United States

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supported and participated in various efforts to bring about a cease-fire during the civil war and subsequent efforts to quiet unrest in southern Lebanon along the Lebanese-Israeli border. In 1996 the United States helped negotiate an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel to avoid targeting civilians and is a member of a five-party force monitoring this agreement. The United States endorsed the U.N. Secretary General’s findings in May 2000 that Israel had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The U.S. Administration reacted strongly to the assassination of the late Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005, criticized the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and demanded withdrawal of Syrian forces; following the assassination.

The United States has welcomed the formation of a new Lebanese government following the withdrawal of Syrian forces. On July 22, 2005, Secretary of State Rice met with President Lahoud, Prime Minister Siniora, and other officials during a brief surprise visit to Lebanon. After a meeting with Siniora, Dr. Rice said, “I think that you cannot find a partner more supportive of Lebanon than the United States. This is a tremendous achievement for the Lebanese people; namely, to be able to control their future by themselves.” On a subsequent trip to Lebanon, however, Ms. Rice declined to meet with President Lahoud. After meeting with President Bush in Washington on April 18, 2006, Prime Minister Siniora said in his Lally Weymouth interview that he asked President Bush for three things: to empower the Lebanese government politically through restoration of all its territories (including the Shib’a Farms); to help build the capabilities of Lebanon’s armed forces and security forces; and to empower the government economically. Subsequent meetings have taken place in the context of the summer 2006 fighting between Israel and Hezbollah and continuing tensions between the various factions during the fall of 2006. President Bush strongly condemned the assassination of Lebanese politician Pierre Gemayel on November 21, 2006, although he stopped short of blaming Syria or any other party directly.  

Role of Congress

Congress has also shown considerable interest in Lebanon and Members have spoken frequently against Syrian domination of the Lebanese scene. For example:

On July 1, 1993, the U.S. Senate passed by voice vote S.Con.Res. 28, which stated that Syria had violated the Taif Agreements (see below) by not withdrawing from Lebanon in September 1992, urged an immediate Syrian withdrawal, and called upon the President to continue withholding aid and support for Syria.

The House of Representatives added an amendment to the State Department Authorization bill, Section 863 of H.R. 1646, in mid-May 2001, which would have cut $600,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to Lebanon unless Lebanon deployed its armed forces to the border with Israel. Section 863 also called upon the President to present a plan to Congress to cut ESF funds if Lebanon did not deploy within six months.

Section 1224 of P.L. 107-228, the Security Assistance Act of 2002, stated that $10 million of the funds available for FY2003 and subsequent years could not be obligated until the President certified to Congress that Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to the internationally recognized Lebanon-Israel border and that Lebanon was asserting its authority over the border area. The amendment (popularly called the “Lantos Amendment” after its initial sponsor) was added to compel Lebanon to exercise control over the border area, displacing Hezbollah forces. Lebanon refused to move to the border until Israel evacuated the Shib’a Farms disputed area. According to unconfirmed sources, the $10 million was held in an escrow account pending discussions among the U.S. Administration, Israel, Lebanon, and Members of Congress.

On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175), which directs the President to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions to Syria if Syria does not meet several demands, including withdrawal from Lebanon and deployment of Lebanon’s armed forces in all parts of Lebanon.

Both houses have passed measures condemning the Hariri assassination, calling for a full investigation, and calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon (for example, H.Res. 91, H.Res. 273, S.Res. 63, and S.Res. 77).

During the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting in July 2006, Congress has appeared to be of one mind and supportive of the President’s position on the current crisis. For more information on legislation introduced during this period, see CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp.

**Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon**

In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon conference, which resulted in a U.S. commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to Lebanon over a five-year period beginning in FY1997 and ending in FY2001 (i.e., $12 million per year mainly in Economic Support Funds (ESF)). Congress increased this amount to $15 million in FY2000 and $35 million in FY2001, reportedly to help Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel’s withdrawal and cope with continuing economic strains. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon has hovered around $35 million in subsequent years.

The Bush Administration requested $35 million in ESF and $700,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) for FY2006. H.R 3057 (the foreign operations appropriations bill for FY2006), which was passed by the House on June 28, 2005, raises the requested ESF amount from $35 million to $40 million, of which $6 million is to be devoted to scholarships and U.S. educational institutions in Lebanon. The Senate version of H.R. 3057, reported on June 30, contained $35 million in ESF, of which $4 million is for educational institutions. During floor debate on July 19, however, the Senate adopted Amendment 1298, which increased ESF to Lebanon by $5 million and provided that an additional $2 million of these funds would be available for scholarships and educational institutions, thereby aligning the Senate figures with those of the House bill. The Senate passed its
version of the bill on July 20. (See Table 3, below, for annual U.S. aid to Lebanon.) The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) contained the $40 million for Lebanon (including $6 million for scholarships). The President signed H.R. 3057 as P.L. 109-102 on November 14, 2005. H.R. 5522, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2007 passed by the House on June 9, 2006, contains $35,500,000 in ESF for Lebanon provided that not less than $6,000,000 will be spent on scholarships and direct support to American educational institutions in Lebanon.

According to the Administration’s original planning (based on $35 million in ESF), ESF for Lebanon in FY2006 is targeted toward three main objectives: economic growth, agriculture, and trade ($22 million); promoting democracy and good governance ($7 million); and protection of the environment ($6 million). IMET programs are designed to increase military professionalism among Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, reduce sectarianism in a major national institution, foster personal working relationships with U.S. military personnel, and offer an alternative to training conducted by Syria and other countries less amenable to U.S. democratic ideals. IMET-funded maritime training will emphasize port security and search and rescue operations.

For the first time since 1984, the Administration has requested FMF funding for Lebanon, $1 million in FY2006 and $4.8 million in FY2007, partly to help improve capabilities of the Internal Security Forces to support the regular Armed Forces in maintaining security and deploying up to the Israeli-Lebanese border in the future.37 On July 28, after the current fighting had begun, a State Department official announced that the Administration is requesting an additional $10 million in military aid to help Lebanese military and security forces in meeting new burdens imposed upon them.

**Post-Conflict U.S. Aid to Lebanon.** To help strengthen the fragile Lebanese government and to help counter Hezbollah efforts, President Bush announced on August 21, 2006, that the United States would provide $230 million to Lebanon (an additional $175 million on top of an earlier pledge of $55 million). According to the U.S. State Department, the President’s initial $55 million pledge came from various re-programmed FY2006 foreign aid funds, including $24 million from the International Famine and Disaster Assistance account, $21 million from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA), $10 million from the P.L. 480 fund (food aid), and $420,000 from the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs account (NADR). At this time, it is unclear where the second tranche of $175 million will come from.

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## Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
(millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Economic Aid (Grants)</th>
<th>Food Aid (Grants)</th>
<th>Military Aid (Loans)</th>
<th>I.M.E.T. (Grants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 - 1980</td>
<td>332.7</td>
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<td>86.2(^b)</td>
<td>123.3(^c)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>52.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>28.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>40.0(^e)</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,070.9</td>
<td>628.4</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>274.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.

I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training  
\(a\). Of the $120.2 million total, $19 million was loans.  
\(b\). Of the $86.2 million total, $28.5 million was loans.  
\(c\). Of the $123.3 million total, $109.5 was loans and $13.8 million was grants.  
\(d\). Includes about $6 million from 1994.  
\(e\). Administration requested $35 million in ESF, increased to $40 million by P.L. 109-102  
\(f\). Plus additional relief/reconstruction funds; sources of funding not yet clear.