Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues

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SUMMARY

Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic reform under way in Jordan, the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s concerns over the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other regional states. Following the 9/11 attacks, Jordan issued bans on banking operations linked to terrorist activities and pursued individuals linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization. Jordan also sent military medical and mine clearing units to Afghanistan in December 2001 to support the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, and a field hospital to Iraq in April 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Jordan is also helping train Iraqi police and military personnel in Iraq’s newly organized security forces. Jordan has been targeted on several occasions by Al Qaeda affiliates, most recently on November 9, 2005, when near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in the Jordanian capital of Amman killed 58 persons. A group allied with bin Laden and known as “Al Qaeda in Iraq”, headed by Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility.

On October 24, 2000, the United States and Jordan signed a free trade agreement. On September 28, 2001, President Bush signed a bill to implement the agreement (H.R. 2603) as P.L. 107-43.

In each of the five fiscal years 1998 through 2002, Jordan received approximately $225 million in annual U.S. assistance. Jordan received $450 million in FY2003, plus over a billion dollars in a supplemental to help Jordan deal with added expenses resulting from the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.

The Administration requested $250 million in economic assistance and $206 million in military assistance for Jordan in FY2004 and FY2005. These amounts were included in consolidated appropriations acts for these two fiscal years (P.L. 108-199, January 23, 2004, and P.L. 108-447, December 8, 2004). In addition, the Administration requested $100 million in economic assistance for Jordan in FY2004 supplemental funds and $200 million (split evenly between economic and military assistance) for Jordan in FY2005 supplemental funds. These amounts were included in supplemental appropriations for the two fiscal years (P.L. 108-106, November 6, 2003, and P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005).

The Administration requested $250 million in economic and $206 million in military aid for Jordan in FY2006. These amounts were contained in both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2006. Military aid was increased slightly to $210 million in the conference report (H.Rept. 109-265), which the President signed on November 14, 2005 as P.L. 109-102.
**MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

On November 15, 2005, in the aftermath of three suicide bombings of western-owned hotels in Jordan, King Abdullah accepted the resignations of the chief of the royal court (a position roughly similar to the White House chief of staff), the national security advisor, and nine other special advisors to the King. The official announcement of these changes did not mention the bombings and press reports indicate that some of the changes had been expected for several months as part of a plan to restructure the royal court, but an unnamed Jordanian official said these moves may have been accelerated as a result of the bombings. On November 28, King Abdullah swore in a new cabinet under soldier-turned-diplomat Marouf al-Bakhit; the cabinet received a vote of confidence from the Jordanian parliament on December 20.

On January 8, 2006, the lower house of the Jordanian parliament passed a measure providing immunity to U.S. citizens and U.S. employees in Jordan from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. The measure had already been passed by the upper house.

**BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS**

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Iraq.

**Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest**

**Stability of the Regime and Succession**

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River (the “West Bank” territory; see below). The original “East Bank” Jordanians, through probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population, in many
cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and some are at most lukewarm in their support for the Jordanian regime.¹

Jordan is an hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, upon the latter’s death after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the rank of Major General. There is currently no designated Crown Prince; however, under Article 28 of the Jordanian constitution, the King’s 11-year-old son Prince Hussein is next in line of succession to the throne. King Abdullah has won approval for his energetic and hands-on style of governing; however, some Jordanians, notably Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists, are opposed to his policies of cooperating with the United States on issues such as Iraq and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Course of Domestic Reforms

Political. Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Building on his father’s legacy, King Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations with Israel. The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62 seats in the 110-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies of King Abdullah. However, the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which had boycotted the previous elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six sympathizers. Six seats in the lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a member of the IAF. The IAF also participated in municipal elections for the capital city of Amman, held on July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest against what IAF spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures. The U.S. State Department, in its most recent annual report on human rights (covering the year 2004), credits the Jordanian government with respecting citizens’ rights in some areas but notes

¹ A commentator recently estimated that 67% of the population is of Palestinian descent. Tom Pepper, “Building a Safe Haven,” Middle East Economic Digest, July 22-28, 2005.
some abuses, particularly by police and security forces. Recent changes to press and penal laws have broadened freedom of the press, but some restrictions remain.

**Economic.** Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has undertaken various measures in the last few years to improve its economy. Since April 2000, when Jordan joined the World Trade Organization, the country has carried out various legislative and regulatory reforms. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces are slow economic growth, declining living standards, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range. After sluggish economic growth during much of the 1990s, Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 4% to 5% during the 2000-2002 timeframe; GDP growth subsequently dropped to 3.2% in 2003, due in part to the effect of the Iraq war on tourism and other sectors of Jordan’s economy, but rose to an estimated 5.4% in 2004. The London-based Economic Intelligence Unit forecasts GDP growth of 5.5% in 2005 and 2006. Jordan’s external debt was $8.4 billion in 2004 (up from $7.6 billion in 2003), representing about 75.7% of GDP in 2004 (down from 81.3% in 2003).\(^2\) In recent unpopular measures dictated by budgetary pressures, the government has cut subsidies on fuels twice, in July and September 2005, effectively raising the price of various fuels by increments ranging from 8% to 59%, in an effort to correct the impact of burgeoning oil prices.

**Recent Governmental Changes.** On November 15, 2005, in the aftermath of suicide bombings at three Jordanian hotels (discussed below), the King accepted the resignations of the chief of the royal court (a position roughly similar to the White House chief of staff), the national security advisor, and nine other special advisors to the King. The official announcement of these changes did not mention the bombings and press reports indicate that some of the changes had been expected for several months as part of a plan to restructure the royal court. An unnamed senior Jordanian official told Reuters news agency that these moves “may have been speeded up by the tragic events [i.e., the hotel bombings] but the decision itself has nothing to do with it.”

In further changes apparently linked to the hotel bombings, on November 27 King Abdullah swore in a new cabinet under veteran soldier-turned-diplomat Marouf al-Bakhit, with a mandate to launch an all-out war on terrorism. Bakhit, who had recently served as ambassador to Turkey and Israel and briefly after the hotel bombings as director of national security, expressed a commitment to reform, commenting that “reform and security are compatible.” On December 20 the cabinet won a vote of confidence from the 110-member Jordanian lower house of parliament by 86 to 20, with one abstention and three absentees.

**Professional Associations.** Jordan’s 14 professional associations consisting of approximately 130,000 members have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and nationalist groups opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S. policies on Iraq. The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations. More recently, the government has circulated a draft law which alters the electoral procedures for professional associations in a way that would dilute the influence of Islamist candidates and prohibit ties

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\(^2\) These data come from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Jordan, September 2005; and the CIA World Factbook 2005.
The law was debated in parliament but not enacted during the summer of 2005. On August 24, Prime Minister Badran told reporters that the government would not withdraw the controversial bill but that the bill would include some unspecified amendments.

**Jordan and the War on Terrorism**

Jordan has taken various steps to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism. On October 9, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Jordanian government issued an amendment to terrorism laws banning any banking operations “linked to terrorism activities,” along with banning border infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping, telecommunications, and computer systems. In December 2001, during the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, Jordan sent approximately 200 military medical personnel to Afghanistan to set up a 50-bed field hospital in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Jordanian Army mine-clearing unit, also deployed to Afghanistan during December, helped clear 70,000 square meters of territory including a key air base of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. According to the State Department’s most recent annual report on terrorism (published April 27, 2005), “Jordan continued its strong support for the global war on terrorism in 2004.” In particular, Jordanian authorities have arrested and prosecuted individuals linked to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization and to a bin Laden associate, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been associated with several terrorist acts in Jordan.

**Murder of a U.S. Diplomat.** Zarqawi has been linked to the murder on October 28, 2002, of Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program in Jordan, who was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was leaving for work. Press reports on May 12, 2003, indicated that a Jordanian military prosecutor charged 11 men with “plotting to carry out terrorist activities leading to the death of an individual” [presumably referring to Mr. Foley]. Five of the accused pleaded innocent in court proceedings on July 8, 2003; the other six were tried in absentia. According to press reports (New York Times, April 6 and 7, 2004) a Jordanian military court convicted and sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant. Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi.

**Plot, 2004.** Zarqawi has also been linked to a reported plot by a terrorist cell to launch a chemical attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman, with large-scale casualties. According to press reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited Iraq, where he

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obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack. The plot was reportedly foiled by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of operations mounted in late April 2004.

Abortive Rocket Attack, 2005. On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S. amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with bin Laden or his associate Zarqawi: the Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam and the terrorist group Al Qaeda in Iraq, headed by Zarqawi. On August 22, Jordanian television reported the arrest of a Syrian suspect, noting that three other suspects had escaped to Iraq. Some analysts have speculated that this attack is an indication that Zarqawi may be expanding his operations to target Arab regimes with close relations to the United States.

Hotel Bombings. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq headed by Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the act, according to a statement on a website often used by Zarqawi’s organization. The statement alleged that four Iraqis including a married couple, whom it described as “martyrdom seekers,” carried out the planning and implementation of the bombing. Jordanian authorities arrested the woman, Sajida Mubarak al-Rishawi, who survived when her explosive belt failed to detonate. Ms. Rishawi, whose videotaped confession was broadcast on Jordan’s state-run television on November 13, was the sister of three Iraqi insurgents who were killed in previous encounters with U.S. forces in Iraq; one of them was a top deputy to Zarqawi. Jordanian officials blamed Zarqawi’s organization but have not formally identified the nationality of the perpetrators. In a CNN interview on November 12, King Abdullah speculated that the perpetrators might have crossed into Jordan from Syria or Iraq.

Some commentators believe Zarqawi, though allied with bin Laden, has established his organization as a competitive force to Al-Qaeda and is seeking to expand the range of his organization’s operations beyond Iraq to target regional governments that support the U.S.-led campaign in Iraq and mount attacks on Israel as well. However, many Jordanians, even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and have denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned, were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, Jordan’s Minister of the Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or

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5 A Jordanian security source said “interrogations have proven beyond doubt” that the perpetrators had been in touch with Zarqawi. “Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Jordan says Iraqi-based group behind rocket attack,” Reuters, Aug. 22, 2005.

a house to foreigners. An official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun drafting new and tougher anti-terrorism laws which will probably be ready for parliamentary debate early in 2006.

Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations

Peace Agreements and Normalization. Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Subsequently, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).

Opposition to Normalization. King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and professional organizations (see above). Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far. Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists, but courts have upheld their right to publish them.

Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations. Jordan supports current Middle East peace plans, including a land-for-peace initiative proposed by Saudi then-Crown Prince Abdullah and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002; and the Road Map, a three-phase process released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) on April 30, 2003, in an effort to jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On June 4, 2003, King Abdullah hosted a summit conference at the Red Sea port of Aqaba attended by President Bush and the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers, where attendees discussed steps to implement the Road Map. Despite the subsequent breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian talks, King Abdullah continued to press for resumption of negotiations. Jordan initially opposed an Israeli proposal to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and four West Bank towns, but later expressed support as long as the withdrawal was part of the Road Map process. At a conference on February 8, 2005, hosted by Egyptian President Mubarak and attended by the leaders of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, Mubarak and King Abdullah issued a joint statement that hailed the spirit of cooperation shown at the conference by Israeli and Palestinian leaders and expressed hopes for further progress on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace tracks as well. On February 20, 2005, Jordan sent a new ambassador, Marouf al-Bakhit, to Israel after a four-year vacancy.

in the post during the Palestinian uprising \textit{(intifada)} against Israeli occupation. (As noted above, Bakhit was reassigned as director of national security after the hotel bombings and appointed prime minister on November 27.) More recently, in an interview with Israel Broadcasting Authority TV Channel One on September 9, 2005, shortly after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and four small West settlements (see below), King Abdullah commented that “Gaza has given us an opportunity, and Jordan is ready to step up to the plate and work alongside the Israelis and the Palestinians to really think of tomorrow.” He mentioned a previously discussed project to increase water supplies by a canal linking the Red Sea with the Dead Sea (“the Red-Dead Canal”).

**The West Bank and East Jerusalem.** The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty does not address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan in 1950 but occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East Jerusalem (except as noted below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian rather than Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. The late King Hussein decided in August 1988 “to disengage our legal and administrative relations with the West Bank,” but he and King Abdullah remained involved in Palestinian issues. Gaza never came under Jordanian control and has not figured significantly in Israeli-Jordanian discussions until recently, as noted above.

**Jerusalem.** On a related issue, Palestinian leaders have taken exception to Article 9 of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty, which states that Israel “respects the historical role of the Hashemite Kingdom [of Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem” and “will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” The late Palestinian leader Arafat asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.” In a speech to a Washington, DC audience on May 13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing for a shared city open to all faiths.”

**Training and Deployments.** During his comments to the press on May 6, 2004, King Abdullah told President Bush that “Jordan is ready to do its part in assisting the Palestinian Authority to rebuild its capability and assume full control of the security situation.” Jordanian officials have suggested that Jordan would consider training Palestinian police to maintain security in Gaza and parts of the West Bank if Israel continued efforts to implement the Road Map. In an interview with Lally Weymouth published in the \textit{Washington Post} on May 22, 2005, the King commented that “[w]e in Jordan are trying to assist in training Palestinian policemen,” as are the Americans and Egyptians. In addition, according to Jordanian officials, Jordan has offered to deploy a group of 1,500 Palestinians comprising the “Badr Brigade,” officially part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization but trained by the Jordanian Armed Forces, to the West Bank to help with internal security.\footnote{Communication from a Jordanian official, October 7, 2005. See also Joshua Mitnick, “West Bank Plan Eyes Jordanians on Patrol,” \textit{Washington Times}, July 5, 2005.}

**Hamas and Rejectionist Groups.** On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces closed offices used by the fundamentalist Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late King Hussein had tolerated to some degree, on the grounds that the offices were registered as businesses but were conducting illegal political activity. In November 1999, authorities announced that the Hamas offices would be closed permanently. However, King Abdullah...
condemned the Israeli missile strike that killed Hamas spiritual leader Ahmad Yasin in Gaza on March 22, 2004, commenting that “[t]his crime will lead to more escalation, violence and instability.”

Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations

Iraq: Jordanian Policy Toward the War and Its Aftermath. Though not in favor of military action against Iraq, Jordan informally provided logistical support to the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein in the spring of 2003. Since mid-2003, Jordan has broadened contacts with the U.S.-sponsored interim government in Iraq, assisted in the reconstruction of Iraq, and conducted training at Jordanian installations for selected units of a new Iraqi army and police force. Jordan strongly supported the elections held in Iraq on January 30, 2005, for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), under a timetable adopted early in 2004. Jordanian leaders have been concerned, however, that the growing power of Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim majority could lead to a wider role for Iran in influencing Iraqi affairs. In December 2004, King Abdullah (a Sunni Muslim) expressed concern that Iran was trying to manipulate Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims in an effort to bring about an Islamic republic similar to the Iranian model in Iraq. He has also voiced concern over the possibility of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict within the region. The King has been careful to point out that the leaders of Jordan “do not have a problem with Shi’ites” and has emphasized that his concerns are political, not religious. During a meeting on January 16, 2006, the prime ministers of Jordan and Turkey agreed on the need to preserve Iraqi unity and called for an Iraqi national government that represents all Iraqis.

Iraq Training and Troop Support. In a September 2003 interview, the King said Jordan would train approximately 30,000 Iraqi police and military personnel in Jordan, pointing out that he did not plan to send Jordanian trainers to Iraq in view of the sensitivities involved. In a subsequent interview with Defense News published on February 9, 2004, King Abdullah explained that Iraqi army personnel are being trained by the Jordanian Army, while Iraqi police training is a joint venture with private sector companies. According another Defense News article on the same date, more than 35,000 military and police personnel, slightly more than the earlier figure cited by King Abdullah, will undergo training in Jordan. Training of Iraqi police cadets is being conducted at six police training academies, five of which are in Iraq and one of which is at Muwaqqar, Jordan, east of Amman. This center, known as the Jordan International Police Training Center, has instructors from 15 countries,

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9 In an interview with Reuters news wire on March 6, 2003, then Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher said “[w]e’ve made it clear Jordan is not going to participate in a war and will not be a launching pad for war against Iraq.” For reports of Jordanian logistical assistance to the U.S.-led coalition, see David Filipov, “U.S. Troops Deployed in Jordan,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003; Emily Wax, “Mubarak Warns of Rise in Militancy,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003. Jordan also sent a 55-bed field hospital to Iraq.


11 The King is also alleged to have spoken of a possible Shi’ite “crescent” extending from Iran through Iraqi, Syria, and Lebanon. See text of an interview published in the Spring 2005 issue of The Middle East Quarterly, pp. 75-76.
including Jordan. According to Jordanian officials, as of October 7, 2005, a total of 35,000 Iraqi police cadets are undergoing six-week training courses in Jordan; approximately two thirds have completed their training and returned to Iraq. Earlier, as of January 2005, approximately 1,650 Iraqi soldiers, including 50 women, had graduated from a training program at the Jordanian Military Academy at Zarqa, 17 miles north of Amman. Previously, in an interview with Al-Arabiyya TV on August 3, 2004, King Abdullah mentioned that Jordan had sent military equipment to the reconstituted Iraq army, including more than 150 armored vehicles.

In his The Middle East Quarterly interview, King Abdullah said he planned to use some Iraqi troops who had undergone training in Jordan as instructors for future Iraqi trainees in Jordan’s training program. He also suggested joint training cycles in which Jordanian and Iraqi military units would be matched and conduct training exercises together, as well as a possible Jordanian role in establishing an Iraqi air force.

Suicide Bombing in Iraq, 2005. On February 28, 2005, a suicide bomber killed an estimated 118 people in the southern Iraqi town of Hilla. Newspapers have identified the perpetrator as Raed Mansour al-Banna, a Jordanian with alleged links to Zarqawi’s group. Reports that Banna’s family and friends in Jordan had celebrated his action fueled anti-Jordan demonstrations in Iraq and protests by Iraqi officials, despite condemnations of the bombing by Jordanian officials. Following mounting tensions, Iraq and Jordan briefly withdrew their top diplomats from each other’s capitals on March 20. King Abdullah sent his charge d’affaires, Dimai Haddad, back to Baghdad on the following day in an effort to ease bilateral tensions. A visit by Iraq’s transitional President Jalal Talabani on May 7 eased tensions further and resulted in the return of the Iraqi ambassador to Jordan. (Iraq is represented by an ambassador in Amman, while at the time Jordan has been represented by a charge d’affaires in Baghdad since 2003. On June 22, 2005, Jordan’s foreign minister announced that Jordan will send an ambassador to Baghdad in the near future.) Some frictions continue, as is evidenced by Iraqi spokesman Laith Kubbah’s allegation that members of Saddam Hussein’s family and former Iraqi officials currently in exile in Jordan are providing financial and media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize the banned Ba’th Party in Iraq. Also, Iraq has demanded that Jordan extradite former Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim Sha’lan, whom Iraqi authorities accuse of embezzlement and who is reportedly in Jordan. In a news conference on October 3, 2005, Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher disclaimed any Jordanian involvement in the Sha’lan case and denied that Jordan has been asked to extradite him. After the triple bombings of Jordanian
hotels in November 2005 by terrorists from Iraq, Deputy Prime Minister Muasher told a news conference that there is on-going cooperation between Jordan and Iraq on terrorism.

**Sources of Oil Supply.** During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil products from Iraq. Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments were made in commodities rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from Jordan to Iraq. These transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program; however, the United Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that it had no other source of oil, and U.S. administrations waived legislation that would have penalized Jordan for these transactions on this basis. After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan received some oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a temporary basis. According to Jordan’s foreign minister, Saudi Arabia made a commitment to supply Jordan with 50% of its oil needs (50,000 barrels per day) until March 2004. A Jordanian spokesperson, quoted in the Jordanian press on May 6, 2004, said Saudi Arabia had decided to extend the oil grant to Jordan for one year. Saudi Arabia terminated the shipments (which had been gratis) in April 2005, and Jordan has been obtaining its oil needs (100,000 barrels per day) from Saudi Arabia at international market prices. To ease the financial burden on Jordan, Saudi Arabia is providing Jordan with $20 million per month in direct support, but these payments will be terminated on April 30, 2006.

**Other Issues.** In his *Washington Post* interview of May 22, 2005, King Abdullah said Jordan is reviewing the case of former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, now a deputy prime minister of Iraq, who was convicted by a Jordanian military court in 1992 of embezzlement. The King said he had been asked by Iraqi transitional President Jalal Talabani to look into this matter.

**Other Regional Relations**

**Relations with Iran.** Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran was promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan. There were indications of a warming trend between the two countries during mid-2004, however, at least on the commercial level. During a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3, 2004 — the first by a Jordanian ruler in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade and security. Also, according to the Iranian news agency, the leaders “welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council, and described it as a step towards handing over the power to the Iraqi people.” Asked about Iran’s nuclear program during his September 28, 2004 interview, then Foreign Minister Muasher reiterated Jordan’s view that there should be a nuclear freeze in the Middle East including “Israel, Iran, and the others.” Responding to another question, concerning Iranian activity in Iraq, Muasher said “[w]e have always asked all neighboring countries not to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs....” (As noted above, Jordanian officials have expressed concern about possible Iranian manipulation of the Iraqi political scene.)
Aid and Funding Levels

**Previous and Recent Aid.** The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2003 amounted to approximately $7 billion, including $4 billion in economic aid and $3 billion in military aid. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid funding. The United States has markedly increased its aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain domestic stability, and pursue normalization with Israel. Between FY1998 and FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to Jordan were approximately $150 million and $75 million, respectively. In addition to annual aid funds, at the request of the Clinton Administration, Jordan received $300 million as part of a special package spread over FY1999 and FY2000 to support the Wye River agreement, a U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian agreement that the late King Hussein had helped negotiate in 1998. Also, at the request of the Bush Administration, Jordan received an additional $125 million in a supplemental FY2002 appropriation for U.S. allies supporting the U.S. campaign against terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In FY2003, the aid to Jordan was almost doubled, amounting to $250 million in economic and $198 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received $700 million in economic and $406 million in military assistance in supplemental funding, to help offset the effects of the war with Iraq on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security. **Table 1** shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance to Jordan since 1990.

**FY2004 Assistance.** In its budget request for FY2004, the Administration requested $250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan. These amounts were included in S. 1426, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004, which was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2003 (S.Rept. 108-106). The House version, H.R. 2800, reported by the House Appropriations Committee on July 21, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-222) and passed on July 24 by 370-50 (Roll no. 429), contained the requested level of ESF, and it recommended the requested level of FMF in report language. The Senate subsequently passed its own version of H.R. 2800 by voice vote on October 30, 2003. Provisions of H.R. 2800 were incorporated into H.R. 2673, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2004. The accompanying conference report (H.Rept. 108-401, November 25, 2003) contained the requested levels of ESF and FMF for Jordan. The conference report was agreed to by the House on December 8, 2003, and the Senate on January 22, 2004; the bill was signed into law as P.L. 108-199 on January 23, 2004.

Also, on November 6, 2003, the President signed H.R. 3289, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, as P.L. 108-106. This act contains an additional $100 million for Jordan in ESF.

**FY2005 Assistance.** The Administration requested $250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan in FY2005, in addition to small amounts for IMET, de-mining operations, and Peace Corps (see **Table 1**). H.R. 4818, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2005, passed by the House by 365-41 on July 15, 2004 (Roll no. 390), contains $250 million in ESF for Jordan. Meanwhile, the House Committee on
Appropriations had recommended full funding of the Administration’s ESF and FMF requests for Jordan in accompanying report language (H.Rept. 108-599, July 13, 2004). A Senate bill, S. 2812, reported on September 16, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-346), provided the amounts requested by the Administration. The Senate bill also stated that of the ESF funds available to Jordan, $5,000,000, should be made available to a charitable institution, the Rosary Sisters Hospital in Jordan. The Senate then passed its own version of H.R. 4818, after substituting the language in S. 2812, on September 23, 2004, by voice vote. The conference report (H.Rept. 108-792, November 20, 2004) contained the economic and military aid amounts requested by the Administration; it dropped the $5 million earmark for the Rosary Sisters Hospital because of Jordanian concerns over the impact this would have on the overall assistance program for Jordan. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill was included as Division D of H.R. 4818, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2005, which was signed by the President as P.L. 108-447 on December 8, 2004.

The Administration requested $100 million in ESF and $100 million in FMF for Jordan as part of an emergency supplemental appropriation bill for FY2005, in recognition of Jordan’s assistance in the war on terrorism and the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. These amounts are contained in H.R. 1268, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY2005, which was signed by the President as P.L. 109-13 on May 11, 2005.

**FY2006 Assistance.** For FY2006, the Administration has requested for Jordan the same amounts it requested in FY2005: $250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2006, contain the amounts requested by the Administration. The respective versions of this bill were passed by the House on June 28, 2005 (by 393-32, Roll no. 335) and the Senate on July 20, 2005 (98-1, Recorded Vote number 197). The conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) increased FMF slightly to $210 million; the House agreed to the conference report on November 4 (by 358-39, Roll no. 569) and the Senate agreed to it on November 10 (by 91-0, Recorded Vote number 320). The President signed the bill on November 14 as P.L. 109-102.

**Other Funds.** In addition to the preceding funds specifically earmarked for Jordan, the last three emergency supplemental bills contain funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation states for logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations: $1.4 billion in FY2003; $1.15 billion in FY2004; and $1.37 billion in FY2005. Also, the FY2005 supplemental contains $99 million to assist Jordan in establishing a regional training center to help regional military forces, security forces, and individuals in meeting existing and emerging threats.

**Trade Issues**

Jordan ranked 69th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United States in 2004, up slightly from 74th in 2003. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from $317 million to $531 million between 2000 and 2004, and Jordan’s exports to the United States increased even more notably from $73 million to $1,093 million during the same period. Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and appliances, vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main exports to the United States included clothing and accessories, precious stones, and precious metals. Two recent measures, in particular, have
helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S. investment in Jordan.

Free Trade Agreement. On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and King Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which will eliminate duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released on September 26, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, then President Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement. On July 23, then U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the possible use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.

Qualifying Industrial Zones. An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act amended previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt. QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan and Israel. Since 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative has designated thirteen industrial parks in Jordan as QIZs, of which three are publicly operated and ten are privately owned. Seven of these QIZs are active; three are not yet active; and two are in the process of becoming active, according to a fact sheet provided by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington on August 21, 2003. A joint Israeli-Jordanian committee including an observer from the United States approves products produced in the QIZs and certifies their eligibility for duty free entry into the United States. According to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance, QIZ exports amounted to $582 million in the year 2003. Even with the establishment of the QIZs, however, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade. According to recent estimates, Israeli annual exports to Jordan and imports from Jordan are running at approximately $31.7 million and $34.2 million respectively, while comparable figures a

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16 According to the U.S. State Department, the QIZs have created more than 40,000 new jobs in Jordan, mainly for women. U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, “U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Spurs Jordan’s Economic Growth,” October 16, 2003. According to local Jordanian press reports and international economists, approximately 40% to 50% of QIZ-related jobs are filled by expatriate workers, mainly from southern Asia.

17 Interview with Mohammed Abu Hammour, Jordan Finance Minister, Middle East Economic Digest, July 2-8, 2004, p. 8.
decade ago were $20.5 million and $29.9 million respectively. For additional information, see CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East?, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp.

**Reform and Development Initiatives**

King Abdullah and other senior Jordanian officials have repeatedly emphasized that change is necessary for Jordan’s survival but that a reform process should be internally driven. On March 11, 2004, then Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher told a Washington audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars that “[w]e do not differ over the content of this reform” but went on to say that such a program should not be “imposed, or perceived to be imposed, in any way, from the outside.” The King subsequently formed a National Agenda Committee headed by Dr. Muasher (now Deputy Prime Minister) to develop a road map to reforming economic and political life. An article in the Beirut-based *Daily Star* on November 16, 2005 indicates that the committee will shortly release a 10-year plan for comprehensive reform of eight sectors: education, infrastructure, employment, social welfare, finances, judiciary, investment, and political development. According to the article, political development has been the most controversial, pitting liberal reformists against conservative and traditional forces. Meanwhile, Jordan has also been the recipient of several grants under the U.S.-sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program for projects in the political, economic, educational, and women’s fields.

**Armed Forces Modernization**

**Military Equipment.** The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces, which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian military forces, though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of Jordan’s neighboring forces. In 1996, under Section 572, P.L. 104-107 (the FY1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act), Congress approved a drawdown of $100 million, mainly in ground force equipment from U.S. stocks (including 50 M60A3 tanks), to enhance Jordan’s ability to maintain border security and implement terms of the peace treaty with Israel. Most of this equipment was delivered in December 1996. In addition, during 1996, the United States agreed to lease 16 refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft to Jordan at a cost of approximately $220 million (most of which represents the cost of upgrading the aircraft), with title passing to Jordan after five years. Deliveries of the aircraft were completed in early 1998. The aircraft transfer was funded through a combination of foreign military financing (FMF) allocations to Jordan over a four-year period ($150 million), plus $70 million in additional FMF funds contained in the FY1996 omnibus continuing appropriations bill (P.L. 104-134).

More recently, with regard to the three Patriot anti-missile batteries delivered to Jordan by the United States in early 2003, Jordan’s Prime Minister stated on February 25, 2003, that Jordan requested these weapons from the United States after Russia was unable to deliver S-300 surface-to-air missiles originally requested by Jordan. On November 19, 2004, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a potential sale of 50 U.S. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMS) and associated equipment to Jordan to enhance the

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defense capability of Jordan’s F-16 fighter aircraft and provide for increased interoperability with U.S. forces.

**Military Cooperation.** A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. Combined training exercises by U.S. and Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan, at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often. These have included fairly large scale training activities involving special forces, air defense, communications, fighter aircraft, and other military units, together with an annual month-long exercise with U.S. Navy and Marine units called “Infinite Moonlight.” In early 2002, at U.S. request, Jordan reportedly began a training program to help Yemeni forces in countering terrorism. The above-mentioned courses conducted by Jordan for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the United States under a program called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.19

Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, then President Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on November 13, 1996. According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases, the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium munitions.”

Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2005, bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing the ICC from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned. This act contains waiver authority in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies of the United States. A similar provision is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006. Jordan signed such an agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004; however, the Jordanian lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special session of parliament on July 14, 2005. Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to Jordan for six months. (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on February 10, 2005, though PD-2005-20.) On January 8, 2006, however, the lower house reversed its July 2005 vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel and U.S. employees working in Jordan. The bill had already been endorsed by the upper house, and the King is expected to sign it.

Table 1. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year (FY)</th>
<th>Economic Assistance</th>
<th>Military Assistance</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp</td>
<td>FMF* IMET**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>35.0 0 0 0</td>
<td>20.0 1.3</td>
<td>56.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>30.0 0 0 0</td>
<td>20.0 0.6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>5.0 30.0 0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9.0 15.0 4.0 0</td>
<td>9.0 0.8</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>7.2 15.0 6.7 0</td>
<td>7.3 1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1999 (Wye)</td>
<td>50.0 0 0 0</td>
<td>50.0 0</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>150.0 0 0 1.7</td>
<td>75.0 1.6</td>
<td>228.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000 (Wye)</td>
<td>50.0 0 0 0</td>
<td>150.0 0</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>150.0 0 0 1.7</td>
<td>75.0 1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2002 (Suppl.)</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>250.0 0 0 1.0</td>
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<td>2003 (Suppl.)</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2004 (Suppl.)</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>250.0 0 0 1.6</td>
<td>206.0 3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 (Suppl.)</td>
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<td>100.0 0</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>210.0 3.0</td>
<td>464.60</td>
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</table>

Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining assistance. Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in FY2001 (never acted upon by Congress).

*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program

b. Released in late July 1993.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i. Administration’s request for FY2006, with FMF slightly increased by the conference report on P.L. 109-102.