Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Updated January 24, 2006

Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Historical Background

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
  Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
  Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom

Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
  Russia’s Role

Obstacles to Peace and Independence
  Regional Tensions and Conflicts

Democratization and Human Rights
  Democracy Pledges

Security and Arms Control
  Weapons of Mass Destruction

Trade and Investment
  Energy Resources

Aid Overview

LEGISLATION
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

SUMMARY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union.

Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding.

After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development. Administration policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability.

The Administration’s policy goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the security and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Some have called for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some have disputed the importance of energy resources to U.S. national security. Others point to civil and ethnic tensions in the region as possibly endangering U.S. lives and investments. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of “Silk Road” language in late 1999 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states.

Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 was signed into law on November 14, 2005 (H.R. 3057; P.L. 109-102). The conferees (H.Rept. 109-265) call for $25 million in Freedom Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25 million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to Tajikistan, $5 million to Turkmenistan, and $20 million to Uzbekistan. The law continues prior year language conditioning aid to the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on progress in democratization and respect for human rights, and adds that the Uzbek government should permit an international investigation of the mid-2005 violence against civilians in Andijon.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On January 16, 2006, Uzbek officials announced that Uzbekistan was banning local operations of the U.S.-based non-governmental organization Freedom House, which advocates democratization and human rights worldwide. Among the reasons for the ban were faulty registration documents and financial reports.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Historical Background

Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language); and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they gained independence. (See CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan, all by Jim Nichol.)

Central Asia: Basic Facts

| Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi. |
| Population: 56.9 million (2004 est., Commonwealth of Independent States Statistics Committee), somewhat less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.1 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.1 m.; Tajikistan: 6.8 m.; Turkmenistan: 4.8 m.; Uzbekistan: 25.1 m. |
| Gross Domestic Product: $76.1 billion in 2004; per capita GDP is about $1,337; poverty is rampant. Kazakhstan: $40.7 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $2.2 b.; Tajikistan: $2.1 b.; Turkmenistan: $19.2 b.; Uzbekistan: $11.9 b. (CIS and national statistics, current prices; Turkmenistan’s reported GDP is considered by many observers to be inflated). |

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, then-President George H.W.Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act” (FSA) to Congress, which was amended and signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the types and levels of U.S. involvement in the region. Some argue that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are crucial to U.S. interests. At least until recently, others argued that Uzbekistan is the...
“linchpin” of the region (it is the most populous regional state and is centrally located, shaping the range and scope of regional cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention. In general, however, advocates of U.S. involvement support bolstering reforms and stability in the region. Such advocates argue that political turmoil and the growth of terrorist enclaves in Central Asia can produce spillover effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They stress that such U.S. influence will help alleviate social tensions exploited by Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents. Similarly, U.S. aid and investment is viewed as strengthening the independence of the Central Asian states and forestalling Russian or Chinese attempts to subjugate them.

Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001, but aspects of these views could gain more credence if Afghanistan becomes more stable. These observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. At least until the coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (see below, Democratization), these observers argued that the United States should not try to foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation, and trade outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights, and urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive states. A few observers point to instability in the region as a reason to eschew deeper U.S. involvement such as military access that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.

Post-September 11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development. According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June 2002, the September 11 attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism. After September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban) (see also below, Security).

Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan joined later).
Uzbekistan subsequently decided not to send troops to Iraq, but Kazakhstan has deployed 27 military engineers to Iraq who are engaged in de-mining and water purification.

**Fostering Pro-Western Orientations**

The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns of other moderate Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, *Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests*, by Jim Nichol.)

**Russia’s Role.** During most of the 1990s, U.S. administrations generally viewed a democratizing Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing authoritarian tendencies in Russia since Vladimir Putin became its president in 2000, the Bush Administration has emphasized that Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, the United States long has stressed to Russia that it not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian states is not threatened.

The long-term impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Central Asian states may depend upon the durability and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countervailing policies, and the fate of Afghanistan. Prior to the September 2001 attacks, Putin had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the growth of U.S. influence. Among Russia’s reasons for acquiescing to increased U.S. and coalition presence in the region after the September 2001 attacks were its interests in boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hopes of regaining influence in Afghanistan. More recently, Russia has appeared to step up efforts to counter U.S. influence.

Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with Central Asia. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin has tried to retard or reverse. In 1999, Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan, the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. However, Russia has appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long retained about 12,000 Federal Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik conscripts, and 7,800 Russian troops of the 201st motorized rifle division (*The Military Balance 2004-2005*). Russia’s efforts to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged on for years, as Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. In October 2004, the
basing agreement was signed, formalizing Russia’s largest military presence abroad, besides its Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Tajikistan demanded full control over border policing. Russia announced on June 14, 2005, that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik troops. Since then, more drugs are transiting the region, according to some Russian critics of the handover.

In a seeming shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. In April 2000, Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces to combat terrorism and hinted that such forces might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the U.N. Marking mutual concern, Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed at their June 2000 summit to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism. A May 2001 CST summit approved the creation of a Central Asian rapid reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in Tajikistan comprising most of the force. CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Moscow, with a branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional intelligence gathering. The ATC sponsored an exercise in August 2005 at Kazakhstan’s Aktau seaport that focused on combating threats to energy transport on the Caspian Sea.

Perhaps to counteract the increased U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russia in September 2003 signed a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The nearly two dozen Russian aircraft and several hundred troops at the base also serve as part of the Central Asian rapid reaction force. The base is a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s Manas airbase, which some observers view as a clear sign of Putin’s drive to constrain U.S. regional influence. In July 2005, Russia announced that it would double its 300-strong troop deployment, but reportedly the base’s poor infrastructure has delayed this move. Taking advantage of Uzbekistan’s souring relations with many Western countries (see below), Russia signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan in November 2005 that contains provisions similar to those in the CST that call for mutual defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party.

Some observers suggest that the gratitude of the Central Asian states toward the United States — for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan — has declined over time. Reasons may include perceptions that the United States has not adequately addressed economic distress and drug trafficking. Also, Russia is pledging robust security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction with its support. Russia’s efforts have benefitted too from growing concerns among Central Asia’s authoritarian leaders that the United States advocates democratic “revolutions” to replace them.

Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia are being reasserted as its economy improves and may constitute its most effective lever of influence. Russia seeks to counter Western business and gain substantial influence over energy resources through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory. After an Energy Cooperation Statement was signed at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would accept a Western role in the Caspian region, including construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Subsequently, however, Russian officials tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade Kazakhstan not to commit to use the BTC pipeline.

**Obstacles to Peace and Independence**

**Regional Tensions and Conflicts.** The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and emerging national identities pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. Emerging national identities compete with those of the clan, family, region, and Islam. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley is shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The central governments have struggled to gain control over administrative subunits. Most observers agree that the term “Central Asia” currently denotes a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it is clear that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and sparsely-populated region will need more integration in order to develop.

Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, and such tensions are potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the CST Organization, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia, the United States, and China, although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem to provide motivation for cooperation. In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO, and in 2003 the SCO Anti-Terrorism Center was established there.

**The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan.** Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and rebel leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The United States has pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild. Some observers point to events in the city of Andijon in Uzbekistan (see below) as indicating that similar conflicts could engulf other Central Asian states where major segments of the population are disenfranchised and poverty-stricken.
The 1999 and 2000 Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Jama Namanganiy, the co-leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below), headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. According to the State Department, the IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.

The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan. A series of explosions in Tashkent in February 1999 were among early signs that the government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and wounded 100 to 351 people. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (co-leader of the IMU) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death sentences. The suspects said in court that they received terrorist training in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Namanganiy. In 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year prison sentence. Solikh denied membership in IMU, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in the bombings.

On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks were launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed responsibility for the violence. In subsequent trials, the alleged attackers were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in Uzbekistan) and of attempting to overthrow the government. The first national trial of fifteen suspects (all of whom confessed their guilt) ended in August 2004, with sentences of 11-16 years in prison. Some of the defendants testified that they belonged to IJG and were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU member Najmiddin Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked him to Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. Over 100 individuals reportedly were convicted in various trials. On July 30, 2004, explosions occurred at the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against Uzbek and other “apostate” governments. A Kazakh security official in late 2004 announced the apprehension of several IJG members. He alleged that the IJG had ties to Al Qaeda; had other cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and was planning assassinations (see also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol).

In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden,
resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. According to *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, IMU forces assisting the Taliban and Al Qaeda against coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major losses, and Namanganity was probably killed. CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, that IJG “has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.” On May 25, 2005, the State Department designated IJG as a global terrorist group, and on June 1, 2005, the U.N. Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.

**The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan.** Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to demand the end of a trial of 23 prominent local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the accused. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings. President Islam Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late on May 13. The United States and others in the international community have called for an international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has rejected. On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan (see also CRS Report RS22161, *Unrest in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications*, by Jim Nichol).

The first major trial of fifteen alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest began in September 2005. According to testimony, the governments of the United States and Kyrgyzstan helped finance and support the terrorist coup attempt to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Fergana Valley, and international media colluded with local human rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this attempt. Many Uzbek opposition party members and representatives of independent media and NGOs have been arrested. Partly in response, Congress has amplified calls for conditioning aid to Uzbekistan on its compliance with democratic and human rights principles (see below, *Legislation*).

**Democratization and Human Rights**

A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. The United States has worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who lead in the five states (even in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the current presidents were once lower-level party officials). Particularly since September 11, 2001, the United States has attempted to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in the region with its interests in regional support for the Global War on Terrorism. In articles on May 1 and December 31, 2005, the *New York Times* alleged that the Administration might be sending suspected terrorists in its custody to Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “rendition.” The Administration states that it receives assurances that these suspects will not be tortured.
Possible scenarios of political development in Central Asia have ranged from continued rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites to violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less democratic and Western-oriented political systems have been considered less likely by many observers. Some have suggested that such a scenario might be conceivable in Kyrgyzstan, because of the slightly wider scope of civil liberties in that country compared to the rest of Central Asia. All the Central Asian leaders have remained in power by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by eliminating possible contenders. Besides the recent coup in Kyrgyzstan (see below), there have been alleged coup attempts in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and the leaders in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan face rising popular protests. In December 2005, the NGO Freedom House gave Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan its lowest possible ratings on political rights and civil liberties, including them among such countries as North Korea, Libya, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and Myanmar.

Popular protests in Kyrgyzstan against a tainted legislative election and economic distress resulted in President Akayev’s relatively peaceful overthrow on March 24, 2005. Some observers hailed this coup as a third instance of a so-called “democratic revolution” in Eurasia, like those in Georgia and Ukraine, and the first in Central Asia. (See also CRS Report RL32864, Cou ple in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications, by Jim Nichol.)

Democracy Pledges. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President Bush. In March 2002, a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S. visit, Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.”

Despite such democracy pledges, the states have made little progress in democratization and respect for human rights, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as the most repressive, while Kazakhstan (and Kyrgyzstan under Akayev) increasingly limited what free expression and other rights they permitted during the 1990s. Tajikistan experienced many human rights abuses during its civil war, and the government appears in recent months to be backtracking on respect for human rights. Non-favored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses in all the states. Unfair elections increase political alienation and violence aimed against the regimes. In its June 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department placed Uzbekistan on a “Tier 2 Watch List,” for having problems as a source country for human trafficking that they are making some progress in addressing. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were taken off the watch list but were listed (as was Kyrgyzstan) as “Tier 2” countries that have human trafficking problems they are addressing.

Among U.N. actions, the United States, Russia, and other countries in December 2003 approved a General Assembly resolution urging Turkmenistan to implement human rights reforms as suggested by the OSCE and to permit prison visits. The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in March 2003 completed a draft report that concluded that police and prison officials in Uzbekistan systematically employed torture and other coercive means to obtain confessions and as punishment. In November 2005, a U.N. committee approved a draft
resolution for consideration by the General Assembly to condemn the Uzbek government’s violence against civilians in Andijon and subsequent apparently arbitrary arrests and to call on it to permit an international investigation (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Russia voted against the resolution). The Uzbek representative termed the resolution a “political” attack launched by some EU members of the United Nations.

In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7) forbade FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting its commitments to democratize and respect human rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbade assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights record during the preceding six months. Unlike the case with Uzbekistan, the legislation permitted the Secretary to waive the requirement on national security grounds. The Secretary reported in May 2003, that Uzbekistan was making such progress, and in July 2003, that Kazakhstan was making progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress. These conditions were retained in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (P.L. 108-199), while clarifying that the prohibition covered assistance to the central government of Uzbekistan and specifying that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a “genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and media. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005, including Foreign Operations (P.L. 108-447, Section 578) and Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-102) retained the conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

In mid-2004, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that, despite some “encouraging progress” in respecting human rights, up to $18 million in military and economic aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld because of “lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners on the ground” (in contrast, progress was reported regarding Kazakhstan). International Military Education and Training (IMET) and FMF programs, which are conditioned on respect for human rights, were among those affected. The State Department reprogrammed or used notwithstanding authority (after consultation with Congress) to expend some of the funds, so that about $8.5 million was ultimately withheld. During an August 2004 visit to Uzbekistan, Gen. Myers criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and not “productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence (see also below, Weapons of Mass Destruction).

For FY2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reported to Congress on May 12, 2005, that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but she waived aid restrictions on national security grounds. The Secretary of State in FY2005 did not determine and report to Congress that Uzbekistan was making significant progress in respecting human rights, so Section 578 aid restrictions remained in place.

Among recent elections, incumbent Kazakh President Nazarbayev won another term with 91% of the vote in a five-man race on December 4, 2005. Many observers credited economic growth in the country and some recent increases in wages and pensions as bolstering his popularity. Observers from the OSCE, COE, and the European Parliament assessed the election as progressive but still falling short of a free and fair race. Problems included restrictions on campaigning and harassment of opposition candidates.
Security and Arms Control

The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the security of Central Asia. The development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-September 11, 2001, facilitated the cooperation of the states in OEF. According to then-Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.” While denying that U.S. basing was permanent, Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control. Kyrgyzstan, Crouch related, became a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2005, U.S. troops reportedly number about 1,500). Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; just before the pullout, U.S. troops reportedly numbered less than 900), a base for German units at Termez (in late 2004, German troops reportedly numbered over 300), and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez. Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling and hosted a French force (France reported 130 troops there in early 2005; they were pulled out in November 2005). Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and other support.

To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the March 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Declaration on the Strategic Partnership included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan.

Although U.S. security assistance was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, such aid has lessened somewhat since then as a percentage of all aid, particularly in FY2004-FY2005 after some aid to Uzbekistan was cut (see below). Security and law enforcement aid was $187.55 million in FY2002 (31% of all such aid to Eurasia), $101.5 million (33%) in FY2003, and $132.5 million (11.2%) in FY2004. Over the period from FY1992-FY2004, security and law enforcement aid accounted for a little over one-fifth of all budgeted assistance to Central Asia. Economic and humanitarian aid was more, accounting for over three-fifths of budgeted assistance to Central Asia. Security and law enforcement aid included FMF, IMET, and EDA programs and border security aid to combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and WMD. To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan, the emergency supplemental for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provided $242 million for Central Asia and Afghanistan.

In addition to aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department provides coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan, including base rents and landing and overflight fees (overall authority and funding have been provided in FY2002-FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations and maintenance). According to one report, the United States has paid $28 million in rent, landing, and takeoff fees at Manas; $114 million for fuel, and $17 million to Kyrgyz contractors. In addition, the local economy has benefitted from an estimated $4 million in expenditures by base personnel. Uzbekistan received a payment of $15.7 million for use of K2 and associated services, and the Defense Department in September 2005 announced an intention to pay another $23
million, raising objections from some in Congress and elsewhere that the payment “rewarded” Uzbekistan despite its lack of reform. On October 5, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold on the payment. Despite congressional concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in November 2005.

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement in Central Asia. It cooperates with the European Command (USEUCOM), on the Caspian [Sea] Guard program, launched in 2003, to enhance and coordinate security assistance provided by U.S. agencies to establish an “integrated airspace, maritime and border control regime” for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A related hydrocarbons initiative provides maritime security, crisis response, and consequence management aid to help the Caspian regional states protect their pipelines and other energy transport to the West. Russia has appeared to counter U.S. maritime security aid by boosting the capabilities of its Caspian Sea Flotilla and by urging the littoral states to coordinate their naval activities with Russia’s.

All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997. A June 2004 NATO summit communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

According to some reports, the Defense Department has been considering possibly setting up long-term military facilities in Central Asia termed Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs; they might contain pre-positioned equipment and be managed by private contractors, and few if any U.S. military personnel may be present). The Overseas Basing Commission, in its May 2005 Report, acknowledged that U.S. national security might be enhanced by future CSLs in Central Asia but urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that would require long-term U.S. presence.”

**Closure of Karshi-Khanabad.** On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; see below, Regional Tensions) that called for coalition members supporting operations in Afghanistan “to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence in those countries.” The language seemed to target U.S. and coalition bases in Central Asia. Despite signing this declaration, none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for the closing of U.S. and other coalition bases. However, after the United States, the U.N., and others interceded so that refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased anti-terrorism operations (to support Afghanistan) at K2. Uzbekistan reportedly also informed Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, and Sweden in mid-November that their basing and overflight privileges would be suspended, after the European Union denied travel visas to Uzbek officials who were implicated in violence in Andijon. Germany was allowed to continue operations at a small base at Termez. During Secretary Rice’s October 11, 2005, visit to Kyrgyzstan, President Bakiyev pledged that airbase operations there could continue until stability was firmly established in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan allegedly has requested $200 million per year for use of the base.
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.

After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven bombers destroyed with U.S. aid in 1998). On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. The United States reported that 147 silos had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty has been set up to facilitate verification and compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of WMD. S.Res. 122, approved on May 25, 2005, commends Kazakhstan for eliminating its nuclear weapons.

Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling facilities, and nuclear waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, many of which reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft. Also, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalination facility. Shut down in 1999, it had nearly 300 metric tons of uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools (three tons of which were weapons-grade). In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor. CTR aid was used to facilitate the transport of eleven kilograms of uranium in fuel rods from Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004. CTR and Energy Department funds have been used in Kazakhstan to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove some strains to the United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists. CTR funding was used to dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility. CTR aid also was used to eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an island in the Aral Sea. Both these projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research.

The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 1306) provided for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in Sec.1203 of P.L. 103-160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certified that the waiver was necessary for national security and submitted a report outlining why the waiver was necessary and how he planned to promote future compliance with the restrictions on CTR aid. The waiver authority, exercisable each fiscal year, expired at the end of FY2005. (The six restrictions in P.L. 103-160 include a call for CTR recipients to observe internationally recognized human rights.) On December 30, 2003 (for FY2004), and on December 14, 2004 (for FY2005), President explained that Uzbekistan’s human rights problems necessitated a
waiver. Defense Authorizations for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) provide an indefinite waiver authority, exercisable annually (see below, Legislation).

**Trade and Investment**

The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states, but bilateral investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration.

The emergence of Central Asia as a “new silk road” of trade and commerce is challenged by corruption, inadequate roads, punitive tariffs, border tensions, and the uncertain respect for contracts. All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could yield export earnings, but these challenges scare off major foreign investment (except for some investment in the energy sector) to revamp, develop, or market the resources. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport. Uzbekistan’s state-controlled cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower.

**Energy Resources.** U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a recent interest. President Bush’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report suggests that greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends U.S. support for building the BTC pipeline and an Azerbaijan-Turkey gas pipeline, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy development.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Kazakhstan possesses the Caspian region’s largest proven oil reserves at 9-29 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 65 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). Some U.S. energy firms and other private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent months by harsher government terms, taxes, and fines. Turkmenistan possesses about 101tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE, among the largest in the world. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth
largest natural gas producer (See also CRS Report RS21190, *Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects*, by Bernard A. Gelb).

The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing export pipelines. Russian shareholders have a controlling interest in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which in 2001 completed a 930-mile pipeline that initially carried 560,000 bpd of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. In December 1997, Turkmenistan opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran. Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in 2003 on supplying Russia about 200 billion cubic feet of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009, perhaps then tying up a large part of Turkmenistan’s production. Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the beginning of 2005 in an attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments. In early 2006, it appeared that Turkmenistan was again requesting higher gas prices from Russia. In October 2005, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed in principle to ship some Kazakh oil through the BTC pipeline, giving Kazakhstan an export route not transiting Russia. The first Kazakh oil export pipeline not transiting Russia was completed at the end of 2005, from Atyrau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian seacoast to the Xinjiang region of China, with a capacity of 200,000 bpd.

**Aid Overview**

For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much more aid each year to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from the FSA account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2004 amounted to $3.4 billion, about 13% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid). Although subsequent aid amounts appear less in absolute amounts, they appear to loom larger as percentages of the total FSA and other Function 150 aid to Eurasia.

Appearing to reflect concern about human rights, lessening interest in the region, and a push to reduce spending, Congress approved $99 million in FSA aid for the states of Central Asia for FY2006, $17.5 million below the presidential request (P.L. 109-102). Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial institutions that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia
(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Asian Country</th>
<th>Cumulative Funds Budgeted FY1992-FY2004&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>FY2004 Budgeted&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>FY2005 Estimate&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>FY2006 Request&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,125.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>36.974</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>749.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>35.738</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>612.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>37.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>237.34</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>645.96</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>37.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,439.75&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>166.3</td>
<td>175.8</td>
<td>155.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> FSA and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.

<sup>b</sup> Central Asian Regional funds are included in the total.

<sup>c</sup> FSA and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds; in FY2004 and thereafter, funding for exchanges is excluded.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-265) agreed to in the House on November 4, 2005, and in the Senate on November 10, 2005. Signed into law November 14, 2005. Conference report called for $25 million in Freedom Support Act aid to Kazakhstan, $25 million to Kyrgyzstan, $24 million to Tajikistan, $5 million to Turkmenistan, and $20 million to Uzbekistan. It continued prior year language conditioning aid to the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on progress in democratization and respect for human rights and added a condition that the Uzbek government should permit an international investigation of violence against civilians in Andijon. It conditioned aid to Kyrgyzstan on a report by the Secretary of State on whether the Kyrgyz government is forcibly returning Uzbeks who have fled violence and political persecution. The conferees recommended no Foreign Military Financing aid for Uzbekistan.

P.L. 109-148, H.R. 2863

P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815/S. 1042
indefinitely extends presidential authority to annually waive conditions on Comprehensive Threat Reduction assistance.

**H.Res. 545 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S.Res. 295 (Lugar)**

**H.Con.Res. 187 (Ros-Lehtinen)**

**H.R. 3545 (William Delahunt)**

**H.R. 3189 (Christopher Smith)**

**Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan**

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)