The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

The Administration has requested $102.6 million in FY2007 funds for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-year program with planned U.S. contributions of some $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. Its primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI also supports an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI is promoting the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises in Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the initiative.

GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997-FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI’s predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration’s African Crisis Operations Training (ACOTA). (The term ACOTA is now used to refer to GPOI’s training program in Africa). Through mid-2005, the United States trained troops from nine African nations — Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal. Subsequently, three African nations were added to the roster: Gabon, South Africa, and Zambia, and a fourth, Nigeria, is scheduled to join the program in 2006. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998-FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account’s Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).

In mid-2005, the Administration began expanding the geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America and Europe with funding from supplemental funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). It also has established a communications network in Asia.

Congressional action on FY2006 foreign operations legislation left uncertain the amount of FY2006 GPOI funding. The Administration request was $114.4 million. In FY2006 foreign operations appropriations, Congress did not allocate a specific amount for GPOI and funded the total State Department PKO account, which contains GPOI funds, at $20 million under the Administration’s request.

A major issue for the second session of the 109th Congress may be whether international training efforts through GPOI and its predecessor programs are having the desired effect. Results of a study contracted by the State Department in September 2005 and currently underway may influence Congressional opinion. Another issue may that may concern Members is whether the State Department exercises sufficient control and oversight over private contractors.

This report will be updated as events warrant.
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The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

Background

The Bush Administration has requested $102.6 million in FY2007 State Department funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The Administration launched the five-year (FY2005-FY2009) $660 million initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and “gendarmes” (police with military skills, a.k.a. constabulary police), as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them. While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over a decade, it has provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.1

The United States previously provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is now the term used to refer to the Africa training component of GPOI.

Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC’s section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program - with more and better exercises and more equipment - as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world. Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.

The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account, also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out

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1 The term “peacekeeping” is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)operations.
under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such terms and conditions as he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)

GPOI Purposes and Activities

In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.

GPOI Goals and Needs

To accomplish these ends, GPOI, has three major goals:

- Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained by all participating countries, according to a State Department official.)

- Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section below); and

- Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.

Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information among donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is accomplished through donors meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate

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2 The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the “voluntary” peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).

3 For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.
The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse” meetings in May and December 2004.4

**Demand for Peacekeepers.** For many analysts, continued efforts to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in Africa. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.

As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel — roughly 24,000 of 47,000 — in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa’s military contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.

African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d’Ivoire. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but Sudan eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.

**Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces.** A second capability in short supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.5 Several countries have such forces, i.e., the

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4 The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse” meetings in May and December 2004.

5 Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples’ movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions “to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes” and to “stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;” and the dispersal of “unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances.” *(Text: The Clinton Administration (continued...)*
Italian *carabinieri*, the French *gendarmerie*, and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, among others. In the United States these are referred to as constabulary forces.

**U.S. Peacekeeping Training in Africa**

Since 1996, the United States has provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA, which as of 2005 was subsumed under GPOI. From its inception through FY2005, the United States trained troops from nine African nations — Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal. (It also trained a small number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.) The United States also provides non-lethal equipment to the militaries which it trains. Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field training.

During FY2005, some 11,000 African troops were trained and a total of 14,000 are expected to be trained with FY2005 funds. This included the training of six battalions from Senegal which were subsequently deployed to specific peacekeeping

5 (...continued)

*White Paper on Peace Operations*, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as “formed units” (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS Report RL32321, *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions*, by Nina M. Serafino.

6 ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, *Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa*. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted online at [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html]. ACOTA also put greater emphasis on the “train the trainer” aspect. As of 2005, training packages included Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.

7 Ugandan troops were trained briefly under ACRI. That training was halted because of Ugandan involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

8 This includes communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.

9 MPRI and Northrup Grummon Information Technology (NGIT) are both qualified to bid for State Department contracts. According to a State Department official, many of the trainers provided by the private contractors are military retirees or reservists.
missions, and three battalions from Botswana who anticipated deployment. Training for a 7th Senegalese battalion and a battalion from a new partner, Gabon, began training in FY2005 and continued training into FY2006. Predeployment training began in November 2005 for Mali and Senegal. Also during FY2006, ACOTA will sponsor training for Benin, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique, as well as for two new African partners, South Africa and Zambia. Military personnel from a third new partner, Nigeria, will join the program in November 2005 as part of an observation team and later, in March and April 2006, Nigerian personal will receive “train the trainer” training. Another battalion from Gabon will be trained in February and March 2006.

Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled $83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at $8 million in FY2003, $15 million in FY2004, and $14.88 million for FY2005.

Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries has been provided through the EIPC, a “train the trainer” program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed under the GPOI rubric. EIPC provides assistance to selected countries — some 31 as of early 2005 — by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation’s institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding, which is provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, has totaled about $33.3 million, including an estimated $1.79 million in spending in FY2005.

Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program

The State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” training and equipping program in mid-July 2005, and as of late 2005 was still setting up the program. “Beyond Africa” activities will extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe and Asia. (As in Africa, some equipment is provided during training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops are not provided with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.)

In Central America, GPOI funds will be used to train and equip soldiers from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. They are also being used to upgrade an existing facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. The intention is to stand up a battalion of about 600 Central American troops.

10 The Senegalese have been trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.

11 The Department of Defense transferred the $80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J Section 117) supplemental appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005. Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days after the State Department notified Congress of its spending plans.
In Europe, GPOI funds will be used for bilateral training of soldiers from the Ukraine, Albania, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The funds will also be used to provide pre-deployment training for a “South East Europe Brigade” (SEE BRIG) of soldiers from Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Macedonia in preparation for their participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan.

In Asia, GPOI will train, equip, and provide some logistical support to soldiers from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand. GPOI funds are also being used to expand the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) communications capabilities by installing software and hardware in the peacekeeping centers of these four countries.

**Foreign Response and Contributions**

G8 leaders\(^\text{12}\) endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, adopting an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.”\(^\text{13}\) (This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-baines, France.\(^\text{14}\)) As indicated by the GPOI “clearinghouse” concept, several G8 countries already have significant programs in Africa. In addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004; the European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center.

**The Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).**

In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a joint sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training gendarme forces even before the United States Congress had provided funding for U.S. support for the school. Italian carabinieri, who are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in providing constabulary forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations,\(^\text{15}\) established the Center of Excellence

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\(^{12}\) G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits.

\(^{13}\) Text available at [http://www.g8usa.gov/d_061004c.htm].


\(^{15}\) According to *Carabinieri* officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 carabinieri were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, (continued...)
for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) at Vicenza in March 2005. Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of 130-plus person staff for the “train the trainer” program. The U.S. contribution of $10 million for the school’s operation and training programs was transferred to Italy in late September 2005. CoESPU’s goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.16

The first CoESPU class graduated on December 7, 2005. About 40 senior officers (staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels to Colonels and their civilian equivalents) attended the high level, four-and-a-half week course (approximately 150 classroom hours) for training in international organizations, international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police units for international peace support operations. The first class consisted of officers from Kenya, Jordan, Cameroon, Morocco, India, and Senegal. CoESPU intends to offer four high level courses per year.

A pilot course to train about 100 junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (sergeant majors to captains and the civilian equivalents) began on January 13, 2006. This seven-week course covers the materials taught in the high level course with an emphasis on training in the more practical aspects, including check point procedures, VIP security and escorts, high risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense techniques. CoESPU plans to offer five such middle management courses per year. Students from Cameroon, India, Kenya, Jordan, Morocco and Senegal are participating in this course.

CoESPU is also developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order to serve as an interactive resource for SPUs. It intends to develop a coherent and comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater training exercises.

**FY2005 GPOI Funding and Activities**

**Funding and Allocations**

Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was submitted to

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15 (...continued)
and Palestine.

16 The data in this sentence and the following three paragraphs was provided by CoESPU officials in October 2005, except for the list of countries participating in the course beginning in January 2006, which was taken from a dispatch of the Italian news agency, ANSA, “Esercito: Ufficiali PS Paesi Afroasiatici a Lezione di Pace,” posted on the Carabinieri website, [http://www.carabinieri.it].
Congress. To fund the initiative at $100 million in FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be contained in the DOD budget and the remaining 20% be ACOTA funds in the State Department budget. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI, because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget would divert funds from U.S. troops. GPOI’s strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers and appropriators.

Of the $96.7 million in GPOI funding that Congress provided for FY2005,17 State Department plans called for over a third (about $35 million) to be spent on Africa programs (i.e., for training African troops in peacekeeping and for support to headquarters of African organizations) and about one-fifth ($20 million) for “Beyond Africa” training. (Training expenditures include the cost of equipment used during training.) A little under a third ($29 million) was to be spent on the acquisition and storage of equipment for distribution to trained troops when they deploy to missions and for other deployment support, and the remainder for other purposes. The following chart provides a breakdown of plans, by region and function, as of August 2005. (Total does not add due to rounding.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa Training</td>
<td>$29.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Headquarters Support</td>
<td>$ 6.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America Training</td>
<td>$ 6.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Training</td>
<td>$ 8.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Training</td>
<td>$ 5.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Acquisition and Storage</td>
<td>$26.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment Support</td>
<td>$ 5.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Gendarme School (COESPU) Support</td>
<td>$10.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measuring Effectiveness</td>
<td>$ 0.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 At the end of 2004, Congress provided GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). Section 117 of Division J (“Other Matters”) provided that “$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense” to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account. The authority was provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, except section 551 of Division D (the Foreign Operations appropriations section of the bill), i.e., the “Leahy Amendment” which prohibits the training of military units credibly accused of gross violations of human rights. (A State Department official said that the “notwithstanding” language was requested to provide an exemption from FAA Section 660, which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police.) Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contains the $20 million in State Department PKO funding for ACOTA and the nearly $1.8 million in EPIC funding that are now subsumed under GPOI.
Congressional Action on FY2006 Funding

The Bush Administration requested $114.4 million for FY2006 funding. The following summarizes Congressional action on that request.

Appropriations

The House FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057, (as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 109-152, on June 24 and passed on June 28), contains $96.4 million for GPOI. The Committee explained that it had provided $18 million less than the request not because it disapproved of GPOI, but because it did not expect that all $63 million indicated for equipment and transportation outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. According to the report, “the Committee is supportive of the effort to expand the number of peace support troops and gendarme units for multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations. The Committee believes that through this effort, the United States can reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops for these operations.”

The Senate version of H.R. 3057 (as reported June 30 and passed July 20), contains $114.0 million for GPOI. (The Senate Appropriations Committee report, S. Rept 109-96, states that this sum is equal to the request, although the original request was $114.4 million, as stated in the House report.) Through report language, the Senate Appropriations Committee would require the Secretary of State to submit detailed reports on the use of the fund within 90 days of enactment and quarterly thereafter: “The report shall describe, at a minimum: all countries and regional organizations receiving assistance under this heading; major end items procured; services or training provided or purchased; operation and maintenance services and contracts, to include logistics and commodities purchased: the procurement of ordnance or ammunition; a description of any U.S. military organization providing training or assistance; and, the status and description of each foreign unit receiving training.”

The conference version of the bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed into law November 14, 2005) does not earmark funding for GPOI or for any other program contained in the PKO account. The conference version funds the full PKO account at $175.0 million, slightly less than both the House ($175.8 million) version and a full $20 million less than the Senate version’s $195.8 million, which was the same as the Administration’s FY2006 budget request. The PKO account is subject to the reporting requirement of Section 584, which mandates that the Secretary of State provide the Appropriations Committees a report on the obligation and expenditure of its funds no later than April 1, 2006.

Authorization

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee version of the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35, reported on March 10, 2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would authorize $114.4 million for FY2006 and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601, H.Rept. 109-168, as reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13, 2005 and passed on July 20) does not mention
GPOI and does not detail accounts in such a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill before Congress adjourned in December.

**Issues for the 109th Congress**

As GPOI enters its third year, Members of Congress may raise four possible issues for Congressional consideration. These are:

**Are International Training Efforts through GPOI and Its Predecessor Programs Having the Desired Effect?** Members wonder whether the GPOI program is meeting its goal of providing well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations. There are two aspects of particular concern: (1) is the training provided sufficient to enable soldiers (or police in the case of COESPU training) to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks effectively, and (2) are the soldiers (and police) trained under GPOI actually deployed to international peacekeeping operations? In an effort to measure results, the State Department awarded in September 2005 a contract to DFI International to develop a system to evaluate GPOI and to monitor its results against that “metrics” system.

**Can the State Department Exercise Sufficient Control and Oversight of Private Contractors?** Because of the need for a large number of U.S. soldiers to train Iraqi and Afghani national armies, private contractors are likely to continue to provide the bulk of military training to GPOI participants. Although private contractors can offer advantages, such as specialized local knowledge, in training situations, occasional problems have arisen with the use of military and police contractors abroad in other types of operations. Members may wish to consider whether the State Department can enforce appropriate professional standards and a code of conduct.