Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

Updated January 30, 2006

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

SUMMARY

The second session of the 109th Congress may well face decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a broad doctrinal term of which a major subset is peace operations. A November 28, 2005 Department of Defense (DOD) directive that designates stability operations as “core missions” of the U.S. military marks a major shift on the future necessity of performing peacekeeping and related stability operations (also known as stabilization and reconstruction operations).

For over a decade, some Members of Congress expressed reservations about U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations. The Bush Administration initially opposed such missions and took steps to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping. This action reflected a major concern of the 1990s: that peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to military “readiness,” i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nation. Many perceived these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces, better left to other nations while the U.S. military concentrated on operations requiring high intensity combat skills. Others thought that the United States should adjust force size and structure to accommodate the missions.

The events of 9/11/2001 brought new concerns to the fore and highlighted the value to U.S. national security of ensuring stability around the world. The 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan, where the Administration has limited U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building, as a sanctuary for terrorists and pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist. In 2003, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a “stabilization and reconstruction” operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), reinforced the argument.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations. The number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s. About 29 U.S. servicemembers are serving in five operations under U.N. control. In the Balkans, U.S. troops were withdrawn from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia as a result of the December 2, 2004 end of that mission, but some 1,800 remained with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 30,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In Iraq, some U.S. troops are involved in low-intensity combat while at the same time performing “nation-building” tasks that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops in Afghanistan. DOD refers to the latter two as “stabilization” or “stability” operations.

With some policymakers and analysts arguing that the uncertainties of the post-September 11 world demand a greater U.S. commitment to curbing ethnic instability, a major issue Congress continues to face is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions — in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take on more of the burden.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive setting forth a new DOD policy regarding stability operations. Administration plans, announced January 18, 2006, to eliminate six National Guard combat brigades in order to create new support positions would create more of the types of forces deemed necessary for stability operations.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, issued November 28, 2005, sets forth a radically new policy regarding missions known as “stability” operations, a major subset of which are peacekeeping and other peace operations. The Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations designates stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission.” By elevating stability missions to the same priority level as combat missions, DOD seems to acknowledge expectations that future operations will regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and to assist with reconstruction during those transitions. For several years, some military officers and defense analysts have argued that such efforts required the systematic development of doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities to enable the armed forces to perform those operations proficiently, as well as the reconfiguration and acquisition of organizations, personnel, facilities, and materiel to support them.

The U.S. military, particularly the Army, has made many adjustments over the past several years to enable troops to perform more effectively in peacekeeping operations in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Nevertheless, events in Iraq since the United States invaded in 2003 have reinforced arguments that still greater efforts must be made to raise the possibilities for successful transitions. The directive provides the basis for instituting significant changes and dedicating substantial resources to prepare troops to perform proficiently in such missions, although the eventual effect on armed services is not known. It calls for changes in a wide variety of areas, some of which could be implemented in short order, others of which would take considerable time. There are still areas where the directive lays out policy, but DOD currently is unsure of the steps that it will take to implement it. DOD may bring to Congress several requests for changes in laws, authorities and regulations necessary to implement the directive, as well as for additional funding.

Questions for the second session of the 109th Congress range from basic (i.e., what is “peacekeeping” and how does it relate to “stability operations,” “stabilization and reconstruction,” and “nation-building”?) to strategic (how and when do such efforts serve U.S. interests?). Practical questions include: What tasks must be performed by the U.S. military in such operations and which can be delegated to other entities? and How should the U.S. armed forces be resized, reorganized, educated, trained and equipped to perform these operations effectively without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions? This
issue brief will provide an overview of these issues and references to other sources which explore them.¹

The Definitional Problem

Over the past decade and a half, there has been an evolution in the vocabulary used to refer to activities that are undertaken to maintain, enforce, promote and enhance the possibilities for peace in unstable environments. “Peacekeeping” has been the traditional generic term for the operations undertaken for those purposes by the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations. More recently, in an attempt to capture their ambiguity and complexity, and perhaps also to avoid the stigma of failure attached to peacekeeping, they have become known as “stabilization and reconstruction” operations, or, more simply, “stability” operations. Use of any term with the world “peace” created a semantic dilemma, conveying the misleading impression that an operation is without risk, when in fact, peacekeeping operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. As knowledge increased about the conditions needed to establish peace, operations increasingly included extensive nation-building (or state-building as some prefer to call it) components to build or reform government structures.

The term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when U.N. peacekeeping mostly fit a narrow definition: providing an “interpositional” force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed, but it continued to be used as the range of activities grew. In 1992, the U.N. began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of activities in securing and keeping peace. It created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force to maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.² “Peacebuilding” was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions (including re-creating police or civil defense forces), election-monitoring, and promotion of political participation and human rights. Organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts can be a part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States participated with significant forces in several such operations either as part of a U.N. or NATO force or leading a multilateral

¹ Although the costs of peacekeeping assistance and participation are not as salient an issue as in the 1990s, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., costs over and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime) of the larger stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. This issue brief does not address cost issues. For more information on incremental costs and attempts to create more efficient methods of funding such operations, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers; and CRS Report RL32141, Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents. For information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.

² (For some analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has a degree of local consent.)
coalition force: Bosnia (from 1992-2004), Haiti (1994-1996 and again in 2004), and Somalia (1992-1994). These were generally referred to by the generic term of “peacekeeping” by Congress, even though U.S. executive branch agencies replaced “peacekeeping” with “peace operations” as the generic term.

Recently, such operations have been referred to by an Army doctrinal term “stability operations” that also encompasses the diverse missions of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This may be a more precise terms for such operations, as many include not only peace operations (i.e., peacekeeping and peace enforcement), but also related missions such as humanitarian and civic assistance, counterterrorism, counter-drug, and counter-insurgency (i.e., foreign internal defense) efforts. Stability operations are sometimes referred to “Phase IV” or “post-conflict” operations, although reoccurrences of conflict are often possible. The November 2005 DOD stability operations directive cites the specific tasks of rebuilding indigenous institutions (including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems) necessary to stabilize a situation; reviving or building the private sector, including bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure, and developing representative government institutions as among those tasks that are performed in stability operations. These tasks are also part of the continuum of activities that fall under the term “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) which also has been used to describe these complex operations.

**Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Missions**

**Reduced Numbers Serve in Peacekeeping Missions**

The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the 1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the U.N. Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command. As of November 30, 2005, 29 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs), Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 6 troops), and Haiti (4 troops). Other U.S. forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with U.N. authority. As of the end of 2004, U.S. troops were withdrawn from Bosnia with the December 2 end of the NATO operation there, but some 1,500 remained with the NATO operation in Kosovo, with others supporting them from Macedonia. (Numbers have fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.) Roughly 700 serve in the Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation. Less than 100 are attached to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

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3 The other types of operations are security assistance, support to insurgencies, noncombatant evacuations, arms control and shows of force.
The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not counted as, peacekeeping. Roughly some 30,000 U.S. troops have been serving in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence mission.) On June 7, 2004, South Korean officials announced that the United States intended to withdraw about a third of the 37,000 troops serving at that time by the end of 2005. Less than 100 U.S. troops are attached to the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, providing various forms of U.S. assistance for ISAF peacekeeping. (Some 11,000 U.S. troops are present in Afghanistan in other roles, however, including a few hundred involved in nation-building activities. See section on Afghanistan, below.)

The Bush Administration’s Policy

Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as President he has been willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. (For a discussion of candidate and President Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report RL31109, NATO: Issues for Congress.) During his Administration, Bush has sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Bush Administration sought to minimize forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia dropped steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004. U.S. participation ended on December 2, 2004, when the European Union assumed responsibility for the operation. U.S. troops may continue to play some role as NATO continues to support the EU with intelligence and assistance in apprehending indicted war criminals. (See CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Transition.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,800 of the total 17,000 KFOR force from about 36 nations. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.) In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan. For some time, the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls
by some analysts for a U.S. role. With some 8,800 troops contributed by about 37 NATO and non-NATO nations as of May 2005 ([http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm)), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N. Chapter VII authorization and is expanding throughout the country. (NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months after ISAF was formed in January 2002 as an *ad hoc* coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under British command.) The United States has some 11,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support, training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in ISAF peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”

Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs reservists) and civilians. As of May 2005, the United States operated 11 PRTs, down from 13 the previous month after two U.S. operated PRTs were taken over by ISAF forces. ISAF involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF (by now under NATO) marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the German-led PRT in Konduz. (As of the end of May 2005, ISAF ran 8 PRTs and two forward support bases and planned to take on two more PRTs in the near future.) Although the U.S. military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts consider it “nation-building.” Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with them. (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, the United States Institute of Peace’s Special Report 147, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, and the section on nation-building below.)

**Airlift in Africa.** The United States military occasionally provides airlift assistance for peacekeeping missions in Africa. For instance, the United States has participated under NATO in airlifting African Union troops to the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan.

**The Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq.** U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are counterinsurgency operations, but some of which are generally classified as peacekeeping duties. The activities undertaken by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some commanders have noted that their troops are doing a mix of both types of operations. (For more on this presence, see CRS Report RL31701, *Iraq: U.S. Military Operations*; and CRS Report RL31339, *Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.*)

**Apportioning Responsibilities**

**Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building.** In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed
in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building,” and if it does, how it should prepare for it. Like peacekeeping, nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. (A 2003 RAND report, *America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and S&R.)

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities, and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities. They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.

During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of establishing security. These two experiences stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient use of military resources.

Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement in such tasks, particularly when others are not available to undertake them in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizations infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security situation in an area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367) to use all elements of national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run....”

In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments, armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance. In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in
the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and makes them targets of armed opponents. Because of that, humanitarian groups have objected to the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are well established in Afghanistan and are being set up in Iraq.

**Stability Operations Directive’s Mandates to Improve Military Capabilities**

**Military Personnel and Contractors.** The directive reflects longstanding concerns that the U.S. armed services may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations, in particular peace operations. The directive calls on the department to identify the personnel needed for such operations and to develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DOD personnel with relevant skills. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to recommend all necessary changes in laws, authorities, and regulations to accomplish this. In particular, the directive reflects concern about developing enough foreign area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel. These specialties have long been noted as having insufficient personnel to meet the demands of the decade. The Defense Science Board Task Force charged with examining needed changes for *Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD*, as its September 2005 report is named, recommended that DOD develop special recruiting strategies, “targeted at mid-career, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills actually needed for stability operations” to recruit suitable Civil Affairs officers.

Certain points of the directive also suggest that DOD may wish to depend on contractors for any additional personnel needed in stability operations. In addition to the mandate mentioned above that would bring former DOD personnel into the mix of persons participating in stability operations, the directive mandates a check for adequate oversight of contracts in stability operations and in the ability of U.S. commanders in foreign countries to obtain contract support quickly. The DSB Task Force on institutionalizing stability operations labeled the private sector as DOD’s “fifth force provider” for stability operations (in addition to the four branches of the armed services) and recommended that DOD design a new institution that would effectively use the private sector in stability operations.

**Stability Operations Curricula.** The directive calls on DOD to ensure that military schools and training centers incorporate stability operations curricula in joint and individual service education and training programs at all levels. It particularly calls for developing and incorporating instruction for foreign language capabilities and regional area expertise, including “long-term immersion in foreign societies.” It would also broaden the exposure of military personnel to U.S. and international civilians with whom they would work in stability operations by providing them with tours of duty in other U.S. agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

**Inter-Agency and International Participation in Education and Training.** Responding to calls to enhance the ability of the wide variety of participants in stability operations to work together, the directive provides a number of ways to incorporate military personnel and civilians of many backgrounds in education and training courses, including personnel from U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private sector.
sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercises. It also proposes that DOD ensure that instructors and students from elsewhere in the U.S. government be able to receive or provide instruction in stability operations at military schools.

Training Other Nations’ Security Forces. The directive also calls for DOD to support the development of other countries’ security forces in order to ensure security domestically and to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere. This includes helping such forces, including police forces, develop “the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors...” The Senate has introduced legislation regarding this point, as a floor amendment to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006, which is now in conference. DOD objects to the amendment as adopted, preferring an earlier version which gave it greater flexibility and leadership for train and equip activities.

Improving Coordination. The directive calls for the creation of “a stability operations center to coordinate operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.” The U.S. military has two institutions currently devoted exclusively to such operations, neither of which serves a coordinating function: the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Naval Post-Graduate School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Study (CSRS). PKSOI assists with the development of Army doctrine at the strategic (i.e., the leadership and planning) and operational levels, and helps the Army’s senior leadership develop operational concepts. It works with the UN, U.S. government interagency groups, inter-service groups, and foreign militaries. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/] CSRS’s mission, according to its website, is “to educate the full spectrum of actors” involved in S&R activities through educational, research, and outreach activities. [http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/].

Legislation to Improve Civilian Capabilities

Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks. Several proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced. No legislation was passed in the 108th Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the proposed ideas were taken into consideration in the State Department’s establishment, in July 2004, of a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS’ function is to develop mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities, and to improve inter-agency coordination in planning and conducting S&R operations. (For further details on S/CRS and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities.)

Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the concept of developing civilian capabilities for S&R missions. Most recently, the DSB’s Summer 2004 summer study entitled Transition to and from Hostilities supported the development of civilian capabilities. According to the unclassified version published in December 2004, the study described the S&R mission as “inescapable, its importance irrefutable” and argued that both DOD and the Department of State need to augment S&R capabilities and to develop “an extraordinarily close working relationship.” In addition, the study found that the State Department needs “to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not currently possess” and to develop “a more robust capacity to execute such
plans.” (pp 38-39. See below for a synopsis of its other findings and recommendations regarding stabilization operations. The report can be accessed through the DSB website [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb].) The follow-up September 2005 DSB study on institutionalizing stability operations expressed concern that S/CRS “is not getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed.” If DOD actions in critical areas where there is an overlap between DOD and civilian responsibilities “are not complemented by growth of capabilities in other agencies, the overall U.S. ability to conduct successful stability operations will be far less than it should be.” (pp. 5-6.)

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69), commended DOD’s “active support of and cooperation with” S/CRS and urged DOD “to continue to deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts. Neither S. 1042 nor the House equivalent, H.R. 1815, includes, however, the Administration’s request for authority to transfer up to $200 million in defense articles, services, training or other support to the Department of State for unforeseen emergencies requiring “immediate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security in that country...” notwithstanding any other provision of law. According to a DOD official, this authority was intended to support S/CRS in carrying out possible activities.

Improving International Capabilities

The Global Peace Operations Initiative. The Bush Administration proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations. GPOI’s primary goal is to train and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to develop gendarme forces (also known constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills) to participate in peacekeeping operations. The Administration estimated the U.S. cost at $661 million from FY2005-FY2009. For 2005, Congress appropriated some $100 million for GPOI in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). The Bush Administration requested $114 million in State Department funding for GPOI in FY2006. (For more information on GPOI and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.)

Greater U.S. Support of U.N. Missions Urged by Congressionally-Appointed Panel. While the reduction in U.S. troops involved in peacekeeping, especially U.N. peacekeeping, from the early 1990s responded to perceptions that peacekeeping excessively strained U.S. forces without significantly serving U.S. interests, some analysts continue to argue that greater participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping would be desirable. In June 2005, the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the U.N., chaired by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, called for greater U.S. support of U.N. operations. The Task Force report recommended that U.N. Member States should substantially increase the number of trained and equipped forces for rapid deployment for peace operations and that the Department of Defense should “prepare options for additional means to support U.N. peace operations with logistics, capacity-building assistance, and other means” and “for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with U.S. national interests.” It specifically recommended that the United States “consider upgrading its participation” in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements
There were a variety of reasons for declines in the ratings which measured combat readiness in the 1990s, some of which were addressed by changes in military practices: (1) military personnel could not practice all their combat skills while engaged in peacekeeping operations; (2) in the 1990s, the U.S. military performed these operations at the same time the armed forces, particularly the army, were reduced substantially; (3) funds for training and equipment were diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and (4) units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals. If one looked at the larger readiness problem of the 1990s and early 2000s, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in poor shape, that spare parts were in short supply, and that the military could not recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.

Some military analysts argue that the U.N. does not necessarily need more U.S. troops to place in field-level observer slots in U.N. missions. What is needed, they say, are staff officers at the headquarters command level whose training and mindset enables them to think proactively about dealing with developing problems. Others believe that U.S. soldiers with engineering and skills using advanced communications technologies would also be useful.

Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy

Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping and related stability operations has taken two different forms. During the 1990s, critics of the commitment of U.S. military personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness debate. As the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the same time as it was downsized significantly — many Members questioned whether U.S. military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting mission if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of non-combat commitments, particularly in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued that they impaired the military’s capability or “readiness” to defend the nation. More recently, those who view such missions as a necessary role for U.S. armed forces have reframed the debate, arguing that the services should be structured and sized to perform such operations without undue stress on soldiers and units. In addition, they recommend that readiness ratings encompass the armed forces’ preparedness not only for combat, but also for stability operations. (The 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations stated that the forthcoming Defense Readiness Reporting System could provide the framework for monitoring readiness in both combat and stability operations, if it were so employed.)

Assessing and Adjusting U.S. Forces for Stability Missions

The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping and related stability operations while retaining its preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors. Most salient among them are the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the

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4 There were a variety of reasons for declines in the ratings which measured combat readiness in the 1990s, some of which were addressed by changes in military practices: (1) military personnel could not practice all their combat skills while engaged in peacekeeping operations; (2) in the 1990s, the U.S. military performed these operations at the same time the armed forces, particularly the army, were reduced substantially; (3) funds for training and equipment were diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and (4) units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals. If one looked at the larger readiness problem of the 1990s and early 2000s, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in poor shape, that spare parts were in short supply, and that the military could not recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.
size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations.

**Deployment Strains.** The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.5

The Army took steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as did the Air Force. In recent years, the army addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in the Balkans, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of active combat duty units. The Air Force, beginning in 1999, established Air Expeditionary Units to deploy under a predictable rotation system. In some cases, however, these solutions generate other problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected Guard and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention. Some analysts suggest that more resource management reforms could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.

**Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations**

The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform. Since the early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and policymakers have questioned whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately sized and structured to perform all the tasks assigned to it. As the deployment strains, noted in the GAO reports cited above, became evident, many Members argued that the U.S. military was too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. The continued stresses on the force of extended U.S. presences in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has intensified this debate. The November 2005 stability operations directive points to possible increases in the numbers of certain specialities in high demand in peacekeeping and related stability operations (i.e., civil affairs officers, foreign area specialists, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel) as mentioned above, but no further changes in size or structure. Others have urged more extensive changes in the force to better accommodate such missions.

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5 In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily”stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of an major regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully-trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
Debate Over Force Size. Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as long as needed, and to carry out a full range of possible concurrent future missions has given new prominence to the issue of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in large part because the basic cost of each additional soldier is high, averaging some $100,000 per year for an active duty troop, according to a CBO estimate. Since the mid-1990s, some policymakers and military experts have suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be a more appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major theater wars (which was then the standard for sizing force structure) and also to engage in peacekeeping missions. (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through the year of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000, with fluctuations.) Other policymakers would prefer further cuts in personnel in order to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems. The September 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations notes that DOD lacks “a sizing concept” that would enable the department to prepare “for concurrent domestic stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which will call upon some of the same resource base.” (p. 11.)

Beginning in FY2005, Congress has mandated increases in Army end-strength, which had been set at 480,000 for several years; these increases too may be only temporary. The FY2006 DOD appropriations bill conference report (H.R. 2863, H.Rept. 109-359), funds the President’s requested active duty Army end-strength of 482,400 through regular personnel appropriations and provides an additional $4.7 billion for the Army personnel account in Title IX. The House’s FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) calls for an Army end-strength of 512,400, while that of the Senate Armed Services Committee (S. 1042) calls for 522,400. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?)

Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals. Size is not the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for providing the capabilities needed for stability operations and relieving stress on the armed forces. For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces to increase capabilities for peacekeeping and related operations. Despite the “small-scale contingency missions” that became a staple of the 1990s and that many argued would constitute a sizable proportion of future missions, until mid-2003 the Army retained its traditional structure. This structure was built around warfighting divisions of 9,000-17,000 (although the number of active duty Army divisions was cut from 18 to ten during the 1990s). Divisions were divided into three brigades of combat forces, and separate units of support personnel. (Support personnel include “combat support” such as artillery, engineer, military police, signal, and military intelligence, and “combat service support” such as supply, maintenance, transportation, health.) Support forces are also found “above” the division level in the Army’s four corps or elsewhere in the active and reserve forces.

For the most part, proposals for reform in the 1990s and early 2000s centered on an increase in the number of personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units (i.e., those most heavily taxed by peacekeeping), which are now stressed by “stability” operations in Iraq, and which to this point have been concentrated in the reserve component. For several years, many military analysts suggested that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the specialties needed for peacekeeping (which some also regard as in short supply for warfighting or war termination periods), and in units sized for peace operations. Civil
affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units were frequently mentioned as specialties that were particularly needed in peace operations (i.e., three of the six listed as important stability operations specialties by the November 2005 stability operations directive), but were in short supply in the active military. As the Army performed increasing numbers of small-scale peacekeeping missions, analysts noticed that such operations were built around one or two “maneuver brigades” (of 2,000+ to 3,000+ troops) with command and support elements drawn from divisional HQ and elsewhere in the Army, and recommended formalizing such arrangements by creating rapidly deployable and autonomous maneuver brigades for peacekeeping. (RAND, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief, 1998, accessible through [http://www.rand.org] pp. 133-134.)

Army Active Duty and Reserve Component Restructuring. In mid-2003, the Army commenced a restructuring of the Army’s active force and a “rebalancing” of positions between the Army active and reserve forces that officials said eventually would involve some 100,000 positions. (Testimony of the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), January 28, 2004.) Of these, some 10,000 positions were shifted in 2003, another 20,000 were to be shifted in 2004, and 20,000 more changes were scheduled for FY2005, according to testimony of DOD Secretary Rumsfeld before the HASC on February 4, 2004. As of September 2005, plans are to shift the full 100,000 positions by FY2011, according to a Department of Defense source, of which 70,000 will have been shifted by the end of FY2005. The primary reason stated for these changes was to improve the Army’s warfighting capacity. Nevertheless, the changes were also viewed as enhancing the Army’s ability to carry out a broader range of missions — including peacekeeping and related stability operations, as well as homeland defense — with less stress on the active and reserve forces. One goal of rebalancing is to reduce reliance on the reserve component during the first 15 days of a “rapid response operation” and to limit reserve mobilization, especially for high demand units, to once every six years.

Over the past decade, but especially since 9/11, the U.S. military has increasingly called upon Army, Air Force, and Navy reserve forces and National Guardsmen for peacekeeping and related operations. (These forces are known collectively as “the reserve,” “reservists,” and “the reserve component.”) These deployments raised issues regarding the appropriate division of labor between active and reserve forces, and the extent to which reserve forces can be used without jeopardizing their ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel. Until the call-ups for Iraq, the increasing use of involuntary call-ups of reservists for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and elsewhere was largely considered a desirable trend by many analysts. (National Guard generals commanded the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent for its last four years beginning in October 2000, and a National Guard general was appointed commander of the U.S. KFOR contingent in March 2003.) These call-ups were necessary to deploy adequate numbers of personnel with specialized skills required in post-conflict operations and to relieve over-taxed active duty combat personnel. At the same time, the potential effect of repeated mobilizations on recruitment and retention was a source of concern. These concerns were given substance by the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups for duty for homeland defense, the subsequent call-ups related to Afghanistan and Iraq, and the extension of the tours of reservists in Iraq to one year, announced in the fall of 2003.

The following three elements of the current restructuring reflect changes that have been proposed to make forces more adept at such operations.
1. The internal restructuring of divisions to make the Army more mobile (i.e., rapidly deployable or “expeditionary”) and versatile. The Army is reconfiguring its ten divisions in order to make the brigade, instead of the division or corps, the Army’s primary unit of organization for combat operations. The reconfiguration incorporates into combat brigades many or all of the support services necessary to make the brigade more self-sufficient on the battlefield. At the same time, the number of combat brigades in each division increases from three to four. Some divisions may maintain additional support personnel in separate brigades to be used for stabilization tasks in immediate post-conflict situations. The formation of these brigades seems similar to RAND’s 1998 recommendation (see above).

2. The increase in the active Army of high demand/low intensity support personnel in order to support this restructuring and to reduce reliance on and use of the reserve component (as discussed in the section on reserves, above). This increase involves the relocation of such positions from the reserves to the active force, as well as a reshuffling of positions within the active force. For instance, at the start of the restructuring, only one of the Army’s 25 civil affairs (CA) battalions was in the active force, while the others were in the Army Reserve. (Combat battalions range in size from 600 to 900 troops, while civil affairs units are somewhat smaller.) Some CA battalions are now being moved to the active force, although the primary capability will still reside in the Reserve. Besides CA, specialities being increased in the active forces that are especially relevant to peacekeeping and related operations are military police, special operations forces, and certain engineer and transportation capabilities. (General Schoomaker, January 28, 2004 HASC testimony.) The Army is attempting to do this without increasing force size by converting certain combat positions (such as heavy artillery) and other low-demand specialities into support positions.

3. The creation of a few thousand new reserve positions, including positions needed for peacekeeping and related operations, especially military police. On January 18, 2006, the Army announced that it was cutting six National Guard combat brigades in order to create brigades of support personnel such as engineers, military police, and civil affairs soldiers. Although the support personnel were identified as appropriate for homeland defense missions, according to press reports, they are also the forces desired for stability operations.

The effect of these changes on the Army’s ability to perform functions from combat to peacekeeping and related operations is open to debate. Some criticize the reforms as short-term measures meant to deal with the demands an extended presence in Iraq rather than with the combat realities of future battlefields, others might look at them as insufficient if the Army is to possess the types of forces necessary to carry out stability operations, in addition to combat and homeland security operations, as a component of its future missions. The following further proposals range from relatively narrow reforms to significant restructuring.

Defense Science Board. The unclassified version of the DSB 2004 Summer Study recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Services “to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability” that would meet to the extent possible the criteria it had set forth. It judged that S&R operations would benefit “if the Army can define modules of S&R capabilities well below the brigade level” and recommended that the Army experiment with “innovative concepts of task organization and solutions at the battalion and brigade level.” (Quotes from pp. 45-46 and 47.)
**NDU 2003 Proposal: New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands.** The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU) released, in November 2003, a proposal to redesign the U.S. government’s structures for planning, organizing, and carrying out stability and reconstruction operations. A major focus of *Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations* (accessible through [http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html)), is a proposal for greater integration of civilian and military capabilities. On the military side, this would require the creation of two new joint S&R commands, one with two permanent HQ units located in the active-duty force, the other located in the reserves but with an active duty HQ unit. Battalion-sized units would be assigned on a rotating basis to the commands, and would be immediately deployable. The study also proposed reorganizing military forces to consolidate specialized high demand personnel and to transfer some of them from reserve to active duty status. The high demand specialties the report mentioned were military police, civil affairs, construction engineering, medical, and psychological operations (psyops) personnel.

**Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage Foundation.** The U.S. military has long resisted the concept of dedicated peacekeeping units, fearing that they (1) might divert resources badly needed elsewhere and (2) they might become substandard units as good soldiers would not choose to make a career of secondary missions. Nevertheless, the idea of creating dedicated forces has been advanced by those who believe they would enhance the United States’ ability to conduct such missions by developing personnel experienced in such operations. The July 2004 Heritage Foundation report, *Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq*, argues that the United States should not only reorganize and retrain existing combat forces to better equip them to perform stability tasks and to assist other nations in improving post-conflict capabilities, but also “build organizations and supporting programs [within the armed forces] specifically designed to conduct post-conflict duties.” (p. 8) Another option would be to establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military services, but this might prove costly.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has twice examined proposals for dedicated peacekeeping units. In a 1999 study, the CBO examined three such options and found in general that those that involved no change in the force size would decrease warfighting ability, while those that involved an increase would be more costly. (The December 1999 study, *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations*, and the May 2005 study discussed below, *Options for Restructuring the Army*, are accessible through [http://www.cbo.gov](http://www.cbo.gov).) In the latter study, the CBO examined a proposal to convert two Army divisions, along with their associated support units into five S&R divisions (four active and one in the reserves). The CBO judged that this option might provide a qualitative advantage as “the mix of soldiers in each S&R division [to include military police, engineers, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units] might be superior to the Army’s current combat forces for peacekeeping, given their specialities and the historical demand for those types of units in peacekeeping missions.” (p. 33) An Army thus structured “would be less capable of fighting multiple wars simultaneously” because it would have fewer combat brigades (p. 33).
### DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005
(Millions of current year dollars)

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<tr>
<td>IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge</td>
<td>2,231.7</td>
<td>2,087.5</td>
<td>1,792.8</td>
<td>1,431.2</td>
<td>1,381.8</td>
<td>1,213.4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*</td>
<td>784.0</td>
<td>288.3</td>
<td>195.0</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>932.9</td>
<td>742.2</td>
<td>667.8</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>14,405.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bosnia</strong></td>
<td>784.0</td>
<td>2,520.0</td>
<td>2,282.5</td>
<td>1,962.7</td>
<td>1,586.6</td>
<td>1,483.1</td>
<td>1,292.6</td>
<td>932.9</td>
<td>742.2</td>
<td>667.8</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>14,405.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals of Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor and Liberia</strong></td>
<td>2,458.2</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,606.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>5,983.3</td>
<td>3,272.1</td>
<td>3,076.5</td>
<td>3,601.5</td>
<td>5,981.9</td>
<td>4,481.8</td>
<td>4,050.0</td>
<td>3,243.5</td>
<td>56,072.0</td>
<td>63,217.9</td>
<td>68,844.0</td>
<td>221,823.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005 (est) provided by the DOD Comptroller’s Office, June 24, 2005. The FY2005 figures are from the FY2005 Supplemental Request of February 2005 and do not reflect approximately $31.6 billion in other support and related costs applicable to OIF and OEF.

**Notes:** This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations (including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRD (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise (humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there as incremental costs. NA=Not Available.