Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

SUMMARY

For over a decade, some Members of Congress have expressed reservations about U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping. The Bush Administration’s decision to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping seems to reflect a major concern: that peacekeeping duties are detrimental to military “readiness,” i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nation. Others, however, view peacekeeping and related stability operations as a necessary feature of the United States’ current and possible future U.S. military activities. With the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a “stabilization and reconstruction” operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), concerns about whether U.S. forces are large enough and appropriately configured to carry out that operation over several years dominate that debate. These concerns were heightened by the 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan, where the Administration has limited U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building, as a sanctuary for terrorists and pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations. The number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s. About 29 U.S. servicemembers are serving in five operations under U.N. control. In the Balkans, U.S. troops were withdrawn from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia as a result of the December 2, 2004 end of that mission, but some 1,800 remained with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 30,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In Iraq, some U.S. troops are involved in low-intensity combat while at the same time performing “nation-building” tasks that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops in Afghanistan. DOD refers to the latter two as “stabilization” or “stability” operations.

The military “readiness” issue factored heavily into the debate over peacekeeping from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s. Some policymakers worried that peacekeeping costs were draining funds that DOD used to prepare its forces to defend against a threat to U.S. vital interests, that peacekeeping deployments stressed a force whose size was inadequate to handle such operations, and that troops deployed on such operations lost their facility for combat tasks. In the 108th Congress, the readiness issue morphed into a capabilities issue, which is likely to continue into the 109th Congress, even though peacekeeping deployments are substantially reduced.

With some policymakers and analysts arguing that the uncertainties of the post-September 11 world demand a greater U.S. commitment to curbing ethnic instability, a major issue Congress continues to face is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions — in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take over some of the tasks currently performed by U.S. troops.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Deputy Secretary of Defense requested in August 2005 that the Defense Science Board study the organizational changes needed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct, support and manage the implementation of stability operations.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition (what is “peacekeeping” and, more recently, how does it relate to “stabilization,” “peace enforcement,” “reconstruction” and “nation-building”?) to the broad strategic question (how and when does it serve U.S. interests?) to related practical questions (which tasks, if any, must be performed by the U.S. military and which can be delegated to other entities?).

Recently, congressional attention regarding U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping focuses on three issues. For many Members, the salient issue is whether there is a need for the U.S. military to maintain a long-term peacekeeping, or “stabilization and reconstruction” presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. The second is the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping and related missions in general, and if deployed, the appropriate role for the military in those situation and the roles that should be taken on by U.S. civilian or international forces. The third is a two-sided capabilities issue: to what extent do peacekeeping and related operations impair the U.S. military’s warfighting capability (“readiness”), and, conversely, to what extent should the U.S. armed forces be reorganized to perform peacekeeping effectively so as to alleviate undue stress on the forces?

Although the costs of peacekeeping per se are not as salient an issue as they were in the 1990s, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., the costs over and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime) of the larger contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. Cost issues are not addressed in this issue brief. For more information on incremental costs and on attempts to create more efficient methods of funding contingency operations, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers, and CRS Report RL32141, Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents. For information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.

The Definitional Problem

“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election observers, re-creating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.

The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. To further complicate the problem of definition, as the concept of peacekeeping has become discredited in the United States, the terminology has shifted. For DOD and many analyses aimed at a DOD audiences, many of these same activities are now encompassed under the rubrics of “stabilization” and “reconstruction” operations.

The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional” force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. (For some military analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has some degree of local consent.) Subsequently, U.S. executive branch agencies substituted the term “peace operations” for “peacekeeping.” Since the early 2000s, the Department of Defense more often uses the term “stability” operations to refer to peace operations (although the term also encompasses other non-combat operations, such as counterdrug operations), and undertakes some peace tasks in the context of reconstruction assistance. Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this issue brief.

Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping

The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the 1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the United Nations. Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command. As of August 31, 2005, 29 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs), Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 6 troops), and Haiti (4 troops). Other U.S. forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with U.N. authority. As of the end of 2004, U.S. troops were withdrawn from Bosnia with the December 2 end of the NATO operation there, but some 1,500 remained with the NATO operation in Kosovo, with others supporting them from Macedonia. (Numbers have fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.) Roughly 700 serve in the Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation.
The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not counted as, peacekeeping. Roughly some 30,000 U.S. troops have been serving in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence mission.) On June 7, 2004, South Korean officials announced that the United States intended to withdraw about a third of the 37,000 troops serving at that time by the end of 2005. No U.S. troops serve in the NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, although some 11,000 U.S. troops are present there in other roles, including a few hundred involved in nation-building activities (see section on Afghanistan, below).

While the reduction in U.S. troops involved in peacekeeping, especially U.N. peacekeeping, from the early 1990s responded to perceptions that peacekeeping excessively strained U.S. forces without significantly serving U.S. interests, some analysts continue to argue that greater participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping would be desirable. In June 2005, Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the United Nations, chaired by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell called for greater U.S. support of U.N. operations. The Task Force report recommended that U.N. Member Stats should substantially increase the number of trained and equipped forces for rapid deployment for peace operations and that the Department of Defense should “prepare options for additional means to support U.N. peace operations with logistics, capacity-building assistance, and other means” and “for U.S. engagement in peace operations consistent with U.S. national interests.” It specifically recommended that the United States “should consider upgrading its participation” in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements system, through which countries volunteer capabilities for U.N. peace operations.1

The Bush Administration Policy

Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as President he has been willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. (For a discussion of candidate and President Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report RL31109, NATO: Issues for Congress, by Paul E. Gallis.) During his Administration, Bush has sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Bush Administration sought to minimize forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia dropped steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000 in 2004. U.S. participation ended on December 2, 2004, when the European Union assumed responsibility for the operation. U.S. troops may continue to play some role as NATO continues to support the EU with intelligence and assistance in apprehending indicted war criminals. (See CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Transition.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,800 of the total 17,000 KFOR force from about 36 nations. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.) In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan. For some time, the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls by some analysts for a U.S. role. With some 8,800 troops contributed by about 37 NATO and non-NATO nations as of May 2005 ([http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm]), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N. Chapter VII authorization and is expanding throughout the country. (NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months after ISAF was formed in January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations under British command.) The United States has some 11,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support, training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in ISAF peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”

Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs reservists) and civilians. As of May 2005, the United States operated 11 PRTs, down from 13 the previous month after two U.S. operated PRTs were taken over by ISAF forces. ISAF involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF (by now under NATO) marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the German-led PRT in Kunduz. (As of the end of May 2005, ISAF ran 8 PRTs and two forward support bases and planned to take on two more PRTs in the near future.) Although the U.S. military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts consider it “nation-building.” Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with them. (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, and the section on nation-building below.)
Airlift in Africa. The United States military occasionally provides airlift assistance for peacekeeping missions in Africa. Currently, the United States is participating under NATO in airlifting African Union troops to the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan.

Issues Regarding an Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq. U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are counterinsurgency (i.e., combat) operations but some of which are generally classified as peacekeeping and related stability operations. The type of activities undertaken by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some commanders have noted that their troops are doing a mix of both types of operations. (However, counterinsurgency techniques include humanitarian and political activities which are also carried out in peace operations.)

In the face of what many analysts have perceived as a continuing climate of general lawlessness and insecurity, some critics argue that the United States should deploy a greater number of troops, particularly military police, to provide greater stability. Many argue that an extensive force will be needed for several years to perform a wide spectrum of tasks, particularly providing continuing peacekeeping duties such as providing basic security while Iraqi police and military forces are reconstituted. (See CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, for more information on the U.S. military presence there.)

Apportioning Responsibilities

Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission

Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping operations, and by extension, the related “stabilization” and “reconstruction” tasks of other post-combat environments. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be fighters, while the instincts and skills needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to work in highly-disciplined units and employ higher levels of force are seen as inculcating skills necessary for effective performance.) Another reason is that peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S. military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S. troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks, however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” use of force.

As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the Army field manual on peace operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to those “spoilers” who would disrupt the peace is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S. military participation in peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by military officers who have found that although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”), peace operations
can enhance other non-combat skills necessary for combat operations. A July 2004 Heritage Foundation report, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq by James Jay Carafano, argues that the armed services should create schools designed to teach concepts and practices needed for post-conflict missions.

Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces. Some analysts point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,” U.S. troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S. forces. Others argue that other countries are reluctant to commit forces if the United States does not.

**Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building.** In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building.” Like peacekeeping, nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. (A 2003 RAND report, America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction.)

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities, and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities. They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.

During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of establishing security. These two experiences, which are often regarded as failed or at best inconclusive experiments, stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient use of military resources.

Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement in such tasks, particularly in the absence of other personnel able to undertake such in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizations infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local
populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security situation in an area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367) to use all elements of national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run…”

In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments, armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance. In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and makes them targets of armed opponents. In Afghanistan, humanitarian groups have charged that U.S. soldiers were endangering their workers by wearing civilian dress while undertaking humanitarian activities; some have viewed the U.S. military as “inadequately prepared” for its rural reconstruction efforts there. (Combat role strains relations between America’s military and its NGOs. Humanitarian Affairs Review. Summer 2003, p. 29).

Many have urged that the U.S. military not undertake such projects in Iraq.

**Legislation to Improve Civilian Capabilities**

**Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks.** Several proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced. Among the arguments made in their favor are that they could relieve stress on military forces. No legislation was passed in the 108th Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the proposed ideas were taken into consideration in the State Department’s establishment, in July 2004, of a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS’ function is to develop proposals and mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities, and to improve inter-agency coordination in planning and conduction stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the concept of developing civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction missions. Most recently, the Defense Science Board Summer 2004 study entitled Transition to and from Hostilities supported the development of civilian capabilities. Presented to DOD in December 2004, the study described the stabilization and reconstruction mission as “inescapable, its importance irrefutable” and argued that both DOD and the Department of State need to augment stabilization and reconstruction capabilities and to develop “an extraordinarily close working relationship.” In addition, the study found that the State Department needs “to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not currently possess” and to develop “a more robust capacity to execute such plans.” (pp 38-39. See below for a synopsis of its other findings and recommendations regarding stabilization operations and the link to the Defense Science Board website.)

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69, May 17, 2005), noted the establishment of S/CRS and commended DOD’s “active support of and cooperation with this new office” and
urged DOD “to continue to deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning for and participating in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts. S. 1042, Section 212 directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a field experiment in FY2006 in order “to explore critical challenges” in the planning and execution of military and support activities required in post-conflict situations after major combat operations and to aid in the development of relevant policy, doctrine, training, infrastructure, and organizational structures. Section 212 specifies that participants shall include elements of the Army, the Marine Corps, the Special Operations Command, representatives of DOD policy “elements,” and “appropriate elements of other departments and agencies of the United States Government, and of such elements and forces of coalition nations, as the Secretary considers appropriate....” A report on the experiment is to be submitted by January 31, 2007.

Neither S. 1042 nor the House equivalent, H.R. 1815, includes, however, the Administration’s request for authority to transfer up to $200 million in defense articles, services, training or other support to the Department of State for unforeseen emergencies requiring “immediate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security in that country....” notwithstanding any other provision of law. According to a DOD official, this authority was intended to support S/CRS in carrying out possible activities.

The Bush Administration’s FY2006 budget request includes $24.1 million for the S/CRS operations and $100 million for a no-year contingency Conflict Response Fund that would be administered by S/CRS. (For further details on S/CRS and details tracking relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities.)

Program to Improve International Capabilities

The Bush Administration proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations. GPOI’s primary goal is to train and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to develop gendarmerie forces (also known constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills) to participate in peacekeeping operations. The Administration estimated the U.S. cost at $661 million from FY2005-FY2009. For 2005, Congress appropriated some $100 million for GPOI in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). The Bush Administration has requested $114 million in State Department funding for GPOI in FY2006. (For more information on GPOI and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32773: The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.)

Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy

Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations has taken two different forms. During the 1990s, critics of the commitment of U.S. military personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness debate. As the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the same time as it was downsized significantly — many Members questioned whether U.S. military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting mission to protect U.S. vital interests

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if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of such commitments, particularly in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued that they impaired the military’s capability or “readiness” to defend the nation. Today, those who view peacekeeping operations as a necessary, albeit not primary, role for U.S. armed forces, particularly the Army, have reframed the debate, arguing that the U.S. military should be adequately structured and sized to perform such operations without putting undue stress on individual soldiers and units.

The Readiness Debate

There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of readiness, which was always a subjective and ambiguous concept. Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness problem, if viewed strictly in terms of the readiness ratings that are calculated periodically. That is because the standards that are used to measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness; that is, its ability to fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the state of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their wartime skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations, scores on these measures can decline, as they did in the latter half of the 1990s.

There were a variety of reasons for such declines, some of which were addressed by changes in military practices. First, military personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace operations; second, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially; third, funds for training and equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and fourth, units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals to a peacekeeping operation.

(Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures. Those who believe that peacekeeping and related operations are significant missions and important to U.S. national security have argued that readiness standards should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.)

If one looked at the larger “readiness” problem of the 1990s and early 2000s, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in poor shape, that there were rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military could not recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. Others have argued that peacekeeping was responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there were many contributing factors, such as the strong economy and the advanced age of equipment and spare parts. The area in which peacekeeping most affected readiness are the stresses that frequent deployments placed on certain troops, measured through the increases in operational tempo (optempo), i.e., the pace of a unit’s activities and personnel tempo (perstempo), i.e., the rate of deployments.
Assessing and Adjusting for the Effects of Peacekeeping and Related Operations on Military Forces

The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping operations while retaining its preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors. Most salient among them are the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations.

Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment. In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a major regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully-trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.

The Army took steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as did the Air Force. In recent years, the army addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in the Balkans, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of combat duty units. The Air Force, beginning in 1999, established Air Expeditionary Units to deploy under a predictable rotation system. In some cases, however, these solutions may generate other problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected Guard and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention. (See section on the use of reserves, below.) Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource management could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.

Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Operations

The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers are still debating how best to define the future threats to U.S. security and the appropriate configuration of U.S. military force to counter them. Since the early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and policymakers have questioned whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately sized and structured to perform all the tasks assigned to it. As the deployment strains, noted
in the GAO reports cited above, became evident, many Members have argued that the U.S. military is too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. In response, some urged that the United States reduce or eliminate such missions, others urged changes in the force to better accommodate peacekeeping missions. The Iraq occupation has intensified this debate. (See the Heritage Foundation’s Reducing the Stress on an Overstretched Force by Jack Spencer, August 1, 2003, arguing for the more effective use of uniformed personnel and a reduction of peacekeeping commitments before increasing the number of U.S. troops.)

Debate Over Force Size. Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year has given new prominence to the issue of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in large part because the basic cost of each additional soldier is high, averaging some $100,000 per year for an active duty troop, according to a CBO estimate. Since the mid-1990s, some policymakers and military experts have suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be an appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major theater wars which was then the standard for sizing force structure and also to engage in peacekeeping missions. (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through the year of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000, with fluctuations.) Other policymakers would prefer further cuts in personnel in order to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.

Retired officers have urged an increase in Army personnel. On November 6, 2003, retired Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stoup Jr., a vice president of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the active army should be increased by some 40,000 over the next few years. In the November 2003 edition of AUSA’s Army Magazine, retired General Frederick J. Kroesen argued that the Army should add 100,000 troops: 50,000 “to spell the overworked, overcommitted aviation, military police, engineer, signal, medical, special operations forces and other high demand units,” and 50,000 to train replacements. On January 28, 2004, Secretary of State Rumsfeld invoked emergency powers to authorize the Army to increase temporarily by 30,000.

Congress has recently mandated increases in Army end-strength; they too may be only temporary. The FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287) funded an Army end-strength of 482,400 through regular appropriations and an authorized (H.R. 4200/P.L. 108-375) Army FY2005 end-strength increase of 20,000 (to 502,400) through supplemental appropriations in Title IX. (According to some analysts, the intent of funding the additional slots through Title IX supplemental appropriations was to make clear that they were intended to be temporary, not permanent, additions to the force.) The FY2006 DOD appropriations bill, as reported and passed by the House (H.R. 2863, H.Rept. 109-119), funds the President’s requested Army end-strength of 482,400 through regular personnel appropriations and provides additional (not supplemental) funding for “Army active duty overstrength” in Title IX. The House’s FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) calls for an Army end-strength of 512,400, while that of the Senate Armed Services Committee (S. 1042) calls for 522,400. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?)

Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals. Size is not the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for providing the capabilities needed for military operations and relieving stress on the armed
forces. For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces to increase capabilities for peacekeeping. Despite the “small-scale contingency missions” that became a staple of the 1990s and that many argued would constitute a sizable proportion of future missions, until mid-2003 the Army retained its traditional structure. This structure was built around warfighting divisions of 9,000 - 17,000 (although the number of active duty Army divisions was cut from 18 to ten during the 1990s). Divisions were divided into three brigades of combat forces, and separate units of support personnel. (Support personnel include “combat support” such as artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, military police, signal, and military intelligence, and “combat service support” such as supply, maintenance, transportation, health.) Other support forces are found “above” the division level in the Army’s four corps or elsewhere in the active or reserve force.

For the most part, proposals for reform in the 1990s and early 2000s centered on an increase in the number of personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units, i.e., those most heavily taxed by peacekeeping, which are now stressed by “stability” operations in Iraq, and which to this point have been concentrated in the reserve component. For several years, many military analysts suggested that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the specialties needed for peacekeeping (which some also regard as in short supply for warfighting or war termination periods), and in units sized for peace operations. Civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units were frequently mentioned as specialties that were particularly needed in peace operations, but were in short supply in the active military. As the Army performed increasing numbers of small-scale contingency missions, analysts noticed that such operations were built around one or two maneuver brigades (of 2,000+ to 3,000+ troops) with command and support elements drawn from divisional HQ and elsewhere in the Army. As a result, some analysts recommended the development of “maneuver brigades that are prepared for rapid deployment and autonomous operations.” (RAND, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief, 1998, accessible through [http://www.rand.org] pp 133-134).

**Army Active Duty and Reserve Component Restructuring.** In mid-2003, the Army commenced a restructuring of the Army’s active force and a “rebalancing” of positions between the Army active and reserve forces that officials said eventually would involve some 100,000 positions. (Testimony of the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), January 28, 2004.) Of these, some 10,000 positions were shifted in 2003, another 20,000 were to be shifted in 2004, and 20,000 more changes were scheduled for FY2005, according to testimony of DOD Secretary Rumsfeld before the HASC on February 4, 2004. As of September 2005, plans are to shift the full 100,000 positions by FY2011, according to a Department of Defense source, of which 70,000 will have been shifted by the end of FY2005.

The primary reason stated for these changes was to improve the Army’s warfighting capacity. Nevertheless, the changes were also viewed as enhancing the Army’s ability to carry out a broader range of missions — including peacekeeping and related stability operations, as well as homeland defense — with less stress on the active and reserve forces. One important goal of rebalancing is to reduce reliance on the reserve component during the first 15 days of a “rapid response operation” and to limit reserve mobilization, especially for high demand units, to once every six years.
Over the past decade, but especially since 9/11, the U.S. military has increasingly called upon Army, Air Force, and Navy reserve forces and National Guardsmen for peacekeeping and related operations. (These forces are known collectively as “the reserve,” “reservists,” and “the reserve component.”) These deployments have raised issues regarding the appropriate division of labor between active and reserve forces, and the extent to which reserve forces can be used without jeopardizing their ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel. Until the call-ups for Iraq, the increasing use of involuntary call-ups of reservists for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and elsewhere was largely considered a desirable trend by many analysts. (National Guard generals commanded the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent for its last four years beginning in October 2000, and a National Guard general was appointed commander of the U.S. KFOR contingent in March 2003.) These call-ups were necessary to deploy adequate numbers of personnel with specialized skills required in post-conflict operations and to relieve over-taxed active duty combat personnel. At the same time, the potential effect of repeated mobilizations on recruitment and retention was a source of concern. These concerns were given substance by the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups for duty for homeland defense, the subsequent call-ups related to Afghanistan and Iraq, and the extension of the tours of reservists in Iraq to one year, announced in the fall of 2003.

The following three elements of the current restructuring reflect changes have been proposed to make forces more adept at such operations and have implications for their conduct.

1. The internal restructuring of divisions to make the Army more mobile (i.e., rapidly deployable or “expeditionary”) and versatile. The Army is reconfiguring its ten divisions in order to make the brigade, instead of the division or corps, the Army’s primary unit of organization for conducting combat operations. The reconfiguration incorporates into combat brigades many or all of the support services necessary to make the brigade more self-sufficient on the battlefield. At the same time, the number of combat brigades in each division increases from three to four. (The newly configured brigades are referred to as “units of action.”) Some divisions may maintain additional support personnel in separate brigades to be used for “stabilization” tasks in immediate post-conflict situations. The formation of these brigades seems similar to RAND’s1998 recommendation for rapidly deployable and autonomous maneuver brigades for peacekeeping (see above).

2. The increase in the active Army of high demand/low intensity support personnel in order to support this restructuring and to reduce reliance on and use of the reserve component (as discussed in the section on reserves, above). This increase involves the relocation of such positions from the reserves to the active force, as well as a reshuffling of positions within the active force. For instance, at the start of the restructuring, only one of the Army’s 25 civil affairs (CA) battalions was in the active force, while the others were in the Army Reserve. (Combat battalions range in size from 600 to 900 troops, while civil affairs units are somewhat smaller.) Some CA battalions are now being moved to the active force, although the primary capability will still reside in the Reserve. Besides CA, specialities being increased in the active forces that are especially relevant to peacekeeping and related operations are military police, special operations forces, and certain engineer and transportation capabilities. (General Schoomaker, January 28, 2004 HASC testimony.) The Army is attempting to do this without increasing force size by converting certain combat positions (such as heavy artillery) and other low-demand specialities into support positions.
3. Plans also call for the creation of a few thousand new reserve positions, including positions needed for peacekeeping and related operations, especially military police.

The effect of these changes on the Army’s ability to perform functions from combat to peacekeeping and related operations is open to debate. While some criticize the reforms as short-term measures primarily geared to deal with the demands of several more years in Iraq rather than with the combat realities of future battlefields, others might look at them as insufficient if the Army is to possess the types of forces necessary to carry out peacekeeping and related stability operations as an inevitable component of its future missions. The following further proposals range from relatively narrow reforms to significant restructuring.

**Defense Science Board.** The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, an unclassified version of which was released in December 2004, recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Services “to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability” that would meet to the extent possible the criteria it had set forth. The Board recommended that stabilization be treated as an “explicit mission in DOD force planning and not as a lesser included case” and that stabilization and reconstruction operations “should be given more weight in planning and programming the future force ....” The Board judged that the “Army is moving in the right direction with its current initiatives: instituting modularity; restructuring the force to increase military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other capabilities needed for S&R operations; and rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve components.” It recommended, however, that the Army should appoint a senior officer as an advocate “to ensure that S&R operations receive the same consideration for resources as other, more traditional, mission areas...” It also judged that S&R operations would benefit “if the Army can define modules of S&R capabilities well below the brigade level” and recommended that the Army experiment with “innovative concepts of task organization and solutions at the battalion and brigade level.” (Quotes from pp 45-46 and 47. The document is available through the Defense Science Board website, [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb)). The Board was tasked in August 2005 with a further study on the organizational changes needed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the rest of DOD to conduct, support, and manage stability operations.

**NDU 2003 Proposal: New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands.** The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU) released, in November 2003, a proposal to redesign the U.S. government’s structures for planning, organizing, and carrying out stability and reconstruction operations. A major focus of *Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations* (accessible through [http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html)), is a proposal for greater integration of civilian and military capabilities. On the military side, this would require the creation of two new joint (i.e., composed of members from all military services) “Stabilization and Reconstruction” commands, one with two permanent HQ units located in the active-duty force, the other located in the reserves but with an active duty HQ unit. Battalion-sized units would be assigned on a rotating basis to the commands, and would be maintained at a readiness level for immediate deployment. (The study estimates the number of troops necessary for a small stabilization and reconstruction contingency operation at 5,000; for a medium-sized operation at 15,000; and for a large operation at 30,000.) The study also proposed a reorganization of military forces to consolidate specialized high demand personnel needed for such operations and to transfer some of them from reserve to active duty status. The high
demand specialties the report mentioned were military police, civil affairs, construction engineering, medical, and psychological operations (psyops) personnel.

**Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage Foundation.** The U.S. military has long resisted the concept of dedicated peacekeeping units, fearing that they might divert resources from the rest of the force and arguing that they would become substandard as good soldiers would not choose to make a career of secondary missions. Nevertheless, the idea of creating dedicated forces within the U.S. military has been advanced by some who believe that peacekeeping and related stabilization missions will be a feature of future U.S. security policy and that the creation of dedicated units would enhance the United States’ ability to successfully conduct such missions by developing personnel experienced in such operations. The July 2004 Heritage Foundation report, *Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq*, argues that the United States should not only reorganize and retrain existing combat forces to better equip them to perform occupational tasks and assist other nations in improving post-conflict capabilities, but also “build organizations and supporting programs [within the armed forces] specifically designed to conduct post-conflict duties.” (p. 8) Another option would be to establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military services, but this might prove costly.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has twice examined proposals for dedicated peacekeeping units. In a 1999 study, the CBO examined four hypothetical options for restructuring U.S. forces to perform peace operations with less stress, three of involved dedicated brigades. The proposals differed in the extent to which they would enhance peacekeeping capabilities. Disadvantages also varied, but in general those that involved no change in the size of the force would decrease warfighting ability while those that involved an increase would be more costly. (Both the December 1999 study, *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations*, and the May 2005 study, *Options for Restructuring the Army*, discussed below are accessible through [http://www.cbo.gov.])

In its May 2005 study, a proposal for a dedicated divisions was among the eight options that the CBO examined to address perceived problems with the Army’s capacity to conduct warfighting and peacekeeping operations, its reliance on reserves, and its ability to deploy rapidly. This option proposed converting two current Army divisions, along with their associated support unit into five “Stabilization and Reconstruction” divisions (four active and one in the reserves). The CBO judged that this option might provide a qualitative advantage as “the mix of soldiers in each S&R division [to include military police, engineers, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units] might be superior to the Army’s current combat forces for peacekeeping, given their specialties and the historical demand for those types of units in peacekeeping missions.” (p. 33) The CBO noted, however, that it was unable to determine the appropriate mix of combat soldiers, needed to establish secure conditions, and other types of forces. It would also require a slightly lower level of reserve mobilization to sustain extended deployments, and would decrease future investment and annual operation and support costs. On the other hand, this option “would be less capable of fighting multiple wars simultaneously” because it would have six fewer combat brigades and “might have to send fewer forces to any given conflict.” (p. 33)
### DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005

(Millions of current year dollars)

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<td>—</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,606.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>5,983.3</td>
<td>3,272.1</td>
<td>3,075.6</td>
<td>3,601.5</td>
<td>5,981.9</td>
<td>4,481.8</td>
<td>4,050.0</td>
<td>3,243.5</td>
<td>56,072.0</td>
<td>63,217.9</td>
<td>68,844.0</td>
<td>221,823.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003; FY2004; and FY2005 (est) provided by the DOD Comptroller’s Office, June 24, 2005. The FY2005 figures are from the FY2005 Supplemental Request of February 2005 and do not reflect approximately $31.6 billion in other support and related costs applicable to OIF and OEF.

**Notes:** This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations (including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic), Provide Promise (humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there as incremental costs. NA=Not Available.