Summary

President Juan Manuel Santos took office in August 2010 in Colombia after winning 69% of the vote in a runoff election held in June 2010. Santos defeated Colombian Green Party candidate Antanas Mockus. In his first months in office, President Santos has taken the country in a new direction, building on the accomplishments of his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe, who served for two terms, pursuing social, economic and political reforms in a program he calls “democratic prosperity.” Santos has strengthened relations with neighboring countries, including Venezuela and Ecuador, which had been strained under Uribe. Early indications are that he wants to broaden the scope of U.S.-Colombian relations to include issues such as energy and technology. Former President Uribe pursued an aggressive plan to address Colombia’s decades long conflict with the country’s leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitary groups and to reduce the production of illicit drugs. Uribe is credited with restoring public security and creating a stable environment for investment.

In recent years, Colombia, in close cooperation with the United States through a strategy known as Plan Colombia, has made significant progress in reestablishing government control over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities, and reducing poverty. The improving security conditions and the weakening of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas are evidence that the strategy is working, according to supporters. Critics, however, argue that while pursuing these security gains, U.S. policy has not rigorously promoted human rights, provided for sustainable economic alternatives for drug crop farmers, or reduced the amount of drugs available in the United States.

This report provides an overview of recent political developments in Colombia. It reviews the administration of President Uribe (2002-2010), continuing into the election of President Juan Manuel Santos and his first months in office. The report then provides background on the long-standing conflict with internal armed groups that has marked Colombia’s modern development, examining the roots of the conflict and its major actors as well as their present status. The report considers ongoing challenges such as human rights, demobilization and displacement, drug trends, and Colombia’s regional relations. It outlines the National Consolidation Plan which updates Plan Colombia with a whole-of-government approach to eliminate the insurgency, and it describes the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement. The report raises some of the major policy issues that the U.S. Congress has had, and will continue to pursue, in relation to U.S.-Colombia policy, such as the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement.
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Recent Developments

On February 21, 2011, Mario Uribe Escobar, second cousin to former President Uribe and a close political ally, was found guilty and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison for having links to the country’s paramilitaries. Uribe, who served as President of the Colombian Senate, is the highest ranking elected official sentenced by the Colombian Supreme Court in their ongoing investigation of the para-politics scandal that alleges ties between illegal paramilitaries and Colombian politicians. (For more, see “Para-political Scandal.”)

On January 6, 2011, President Juan Manuel Santos extended a state of emergency originally declared in early December 2010 to cope with severe flooding that killed more than 300 Colombians and displaced more than 2.2 million. He described the natural disaster as Colombia’s worst in recent history.

On December 13, 2010, the Colombian Congress’s lower chamber approved a victims’ reparation and land restitution bill (the “Victims Law”). The bill proposes to compensate victims of the internal conflict, including victims of the government’s security forces, and reform the redistribution of lands to those who were forcibly displaced.

On November 26, 2010, Colombia restored full diplomatic relations with Ecuador after they had been severed in March 2008 following Colombia’s bombing of a FARC camp inside Ecuador’s territory. (For more see “Relations with Venezuela and Ecuador.”)

On October 25-26, 2010, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg initiated a High-Level Partnership Dialogue and announced the establishment of three working groups on human rights and good governance, energy, and science and technology.

On September 23, 2010, the Colombian government announced that an air raid and cross-service military operation had killed top FARC commander Victor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez or “Mono Jojoy” in his encampment in the department of Meta. This was a major setback for the FARC as Suárez was the operational leader of the organization’s powerful Eastern bloc. (For more see “Current Status of the FARC.”)

On August 17, 2010, Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was unconstitutional because it had not obtained required congressional ratification. (For more background, see “U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement.”)

On August 7, 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was inaugurated president of Colombia.

On July 22, 2010, the outgoing Uribe government presented evidence at a special meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) that the government of Venezuela was harboring members of two guerrilla groups, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), in several camps located inside its territory.

For earlier developments in 2010, see the Appendix at the end of this report.
Introduction

U.S. policy toward Colombia takes place in the context of three decades of concern over the large volume of illegal drugs from Colombia available in the United States and elsewhere in the world. In June 2000, the United States approved increased assistance to Colombia as part of what had been initially a six-year plan called Plan Colombia, and it has provided over $7 billion in assistance from FY2000 to FY2010. In addition to the larger debate over the role the United States should play in supporting Colombia’s ongoing struggle against drug trafficking and illegally armed groups, Congress has repeatedly expressed concern with a number of other policy issues. These include continuing allegations of human rights abuses; the health and environmental consequences of aerial eradication for drug control; the progress of alternative development to replace drug crops with non-drug crops; judicial reform and rule of law programs; and the level of risk to U.S. personnel working in Colombia.1

Concerns in the 112th Congress regarding Colombia and U.S. policy are likely to continue those of prior sessions: funding levels for Plan Colombia and its follow on strategies, trade, and human rights. In FY2010, Congress reduced foreign operations funding for Plan Colombia by about 3%. Congress sought an almost even balance between social and economic aid (including rule of law programs) and security-related assistance (i.e., equipment and training to the Colombian military and police). In the FY2011 request, the Obama Administration asked for 8% less than what was enacted in FY2010 with the balance between “soft-side” traditional development assistance and “hard-side” security and counternarcotics assistance closer to 50/50. The Administration’s FY2012 request for foreign operations lowers the amount requested for Colombia to roughly $400 million.

Supporters of the current U.S. policy towards Colombia point to the progress that has been made in improving security conditions in Colombia and in weakening the FARC guerrillas. They favor maintaining the current level of security assistance to Colombia in order to help Colombian security forces continue to combat the FARC and ELN, solidify their control throughout rural areas, and eradicate illicit narcotics. They also believe that guerrilla forces regularly cross borders using neighboring countries’ territory for refuge and supplies, and that this has a potentially destabilizing effect in the region.

Opponents of current U.S. policy in Colombia respond that the counterdrug program uses a repressive approach to curbing drug production that has provoked a negative popular reaction in rural areas. They argue for halting aerial fumigation of drug crops, limiting aid to the Colombian military, and stressing interdiction rather than eradication so that the direct costs to peasant producers are less. Some critics of U.S. policy support a policy that focuses largely on economic and social aid to combat what they consider to be the conflict’s root causes, curbs human rights abuses by paramilitary groups and security forces, provides support for a negotiated end to the fighting, and reduces illicit drug demand in the United States.

Some Members of Congress, acknowledging the progress in security conditions in Colombia, have expressed concerns about labor activist killings and labor rights; extrajudicial killings of Colombian civilians by the Colombian military; and the para-political scandal (linking

1 Prior to the July 2008 rescue of three U.S. defense contractors who were held hostage by the FARC, securing the release of those hostages had been a key issue of congressional concern.
Colombian politicians with paramilitaries). These concerns have delayed action on the pending U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). In both his 2010 and 2011 State of the Union addresses, President Barack Obama has mentioned the importance of opening foreign markets to U.S. exports, and the importance of strengthening U.S. trade relations with Colombia. It is possible the 112th Congress will consider implementing legislation for the CFTA signed by both countries in 2006. The pending trade agreement is discussed at the end of the report.²

**Background**

Colombia is a South American nation of roughly 45 million people, the third-most populous country in Latin America. It is an ethnically diverse nation—58% of the population is mestizo, 20% white, 14% mulatto, 4% black, 3% black-Amerindian, and 1% Amerindian.³ Colombia has one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, yet it has been plagued by violence and a conflict that has lasted over 40 years. The country’s rugged terrain historically made it difficult to establish state control over large swaths of the nation’s territory. High rates of poverty have also contributed to social upheaval in the country. In 2009, approximately 46% of Colombians lived in poverty, down from 54% in 2002.⁴ Colombia’s ability to reduce poverty in recent years is partly due to increases in the country’s economic growth rates, which reached 7.5% in 2007.⁵ Security improvements and a more stable economy have attracted foreign direct investment (FDI), which grew from roughly $6.5 billion in 2006 to some $9 billion in 2007, largely in the oil, manufacturing and mining sectors. Nevertheless, income inequality and land ownership concentration are still significant problems.⁶

Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia’s conflict by providing earnings to both left- and right-wing armed groups. The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both of which kidnap individuals for ransom, commit serious human rights violations, and carry out terrorist activities. Most of the rightist paramilitary groups were coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which disbanded in 2006 after more than 30,000 of its members demobilized. Members of the AUC were accused of gross human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in their fight against the FARC and ELN. New illegally armed groups, including criminal bands some of which include re-armed paramilitaries, are now a problem in Colombian cities and towns.


⁴ The statistics, rounded to the nearest whole number, are from the Colombia National Planning Department, the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), and Misión para el Empalme de las Series de Empleo, Probreza y Desigualdad (MESEP) as reported in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s (ECLAC) *Social Panorama of Latin America 2010 Briefing Paper*, November 2010. ECLAC reported that 54% of Colombians lived in poverty in 2002, with 20% living in indigence. By 2009, those poverty and indigence rates fell to 46% and 17%, respectively.


⁶ ECLAC reports that Colombia is now the fourth most unequal society in Latin America and the Caribbean, after Bolivia, Brazil, and Honduras. Colombia also has one of the most unequal land tenure patterns in Latin America, with 0.4% of land holders owning 61% of registered rural property. See ECLAC, *Social Panorama 2006*; J.D. Jaramillo, *El Recurso Suelo y la Competitividad del Sector Agrario Colombiano*, 2004.
Colombia is a democratic nation with a bicameral legislature. The Liberal and Conservative parties, which dominated Colombian politics from the 19th century through much of the 20th century, have been weakened by their perceived inability to resolve the roots of violence in Colombia. In 2002, Colombians elected an independent, Álvaro Uribe, as president, largely because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia. The major political parties represented in the Colombian Congress include the Liberal, Conservative, Alternative Democratic Pole, National Unity, and Radical Change parties, and several smaller political movements.

The Uribe Years (2002 – 2010)

During his first term (2002-2006), President Uribe began to fulfill his campaign promises to address the paramilitary problem, defeat leftist guerrilla insurgents, and combat narcotics trafficking. He took a hard-line approach to negotiations with illegally armed groups, declaring that the government would only negotiate with those groups who were willing to give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire. These included paramilitary groups with which former President Pastrana had refused to negotiate. Negotiations with the AUC paramilitaries resulted in a July 15, 2003, agreement in which the AUC agreed to demobilize its members by the end of 2005. President Uribe endorsed a controversial Justice and Peace Law that provided a framework for those demobilizations. Uribe also built up the Colombian military and police, which stepped up their counternarcotics operations and activities against the FARC. High public approval ratings, largely due to reductions in violence as a result of his security policies, prompted Colombia to amend its constitution in 2005 to permit Uribe to run for reelection.

On August 7, 2006, Álvaro Uribe was sworn in for his second term as president. Pro-Uribe parties had won a majority in both houses of congress in the elections of March 2006, giving President Uribe a strong mandate. His government improved the security situation in Colombia, demobilized the AUC, and made headway in defeating the FARC and ELN. According to U.S. State Department figures, kidnappings in Colombia declined by 83%, homicides by 40%, and terrorist attacks by 76% between 2002 through 2008. Police are now present in all of Colombia’s 1,099 municipalities, including areas from which they had been ousted by guerrilla groups. President Uribe oversaw the demobilization and disarmament of more than 31,000 AUC paramilitaries, although the demobilization process has been criticized for failing to provide adequate punishments for perpetrators and provide reparations to victims of paramilitary violence. On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military raided a FARC camp in Ecuador killing a top FARC leader and capturing his computer files. This was followed by the July 2, 2008, rescue of 15 hostages long held by the FARC, including three U.S. defense contractors and a former Colombian presidential candidate.

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9 The dramatic hostage rescue took place during the period when Juan Manuel Santos was defense minister in the Uribe government. Shortly after his inauguration, President Santos approved a raid on September 23, 2010 that resulted in another government victory over the FARC, the killing of commander Jorge Briceño (or “Mono Jojoy”).
Figure 1. Map of Colombia

Source: CRS.
Despite this progress under the Uribe government, Colombia faces serious challenges. While the FARC’s numbers are dramatically reduced, it still has thousands of fighters capable of carrying out terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and other illicit activities.\(^{10}\) Not all paramilitaries demobilized, and others have returned to paramilitary and criminal activities since demobilizing. One weakness of the demobilization program has been the difficulty reintegrating demobilized forces into law-abiding civilian life.\(^{11}\) Moreover, a new generation of paramilitaries is forming that is more criminal than political in nature.\(^{12}\) An estimated 4,000 to 9,000 new fighters have formed and as many as 15% to 20% of the troops of the new paramilitary groups may consist of former combatants.\(^{13}\)

Although former President Uribe has not been personally implicated, the Colombian Supreme Court is investigating suspected links between Colombian politicians, many from pro-Uribe parties, and paramilitary groups. Since the 2006 elections, there have been several scandals involving extrajudicial killings by Colombian security forces.\(^{14}\) The latest of these scandals broke in October 2008 when 27 soldiers and military officers (including three generals) were fired over the discovery that 13 murdered civilians had been dressed by their killers in order to appear to be guerilla fighters to increase military body counts (the “false positives” scandal).\(^{15}\) As a result, General Mario Montoya, the commander of the Colombian army, stepped down on November 4, 2008.

Drug production and trafficking continue to generate many millions of dollars annually for illicit groups. As a result of the conflict and drug-related violence, Colombia has one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world with more than 3 million displaced since 1997. While the number of newly displaced in 2009 differs considerably between government estimates and those of NGOs, both assessments have recorded a downward trend in 2009 over the prior year.

President Uribe’s high approval ratings led many of his supporters to urge him to seek a third presidential term. For Uribe to be reelected, the Colombian constitution would have had to be amended again (as it was in 2005) to allow him to seek a third term. For months the 2010 presidential election campaign was virtually suspended as Colombians anticipated the possibility of President Uribe running for a third term. While his supporters urged him to run and polls indicated he would easily win both the required referendum and the election, the president was

\(^{10}\) The FARC is believed responsible for more than half of the cocaine entering the United States, according to the November 2008 “Background Note on Colombia,” by the U.S. Department of State.


\(^{13}\) Chris Kraul, “New gangs run Colombians off their land; The government says paramilitary groups no longer exist. But more and more people are being displaced,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 2008; “Militias March again,” *The Economist*, October 31, 2009.


\(^{15}\) In addition to the 27 officers dismissed in October 2008, 24 other officers were subsequently dismissed under the Commander of the Armed Force’s discretion toal authority, bringing to a total of 51 members of the Colombian armed forces dismissed in connection with the Soacha murders. See U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces,” September 8, 2009.
criticized both domestically and internationally for ambitions for a third term that could potentially undermine Colombia’s democratic institutions, erode constitutional checks and balances, and continue to concentrate power in the executive. But on February 26, 2010, Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled 7 to 2 to deny a referendum to allow President Uribe to run for reelection. President Uribe immediately stated that he “accepted and respected” the court’s decision, removing himself as a candidate in the 2010 race.

2010 Congressional and Presidential Elections

Legislative elections for the entire 268-member bicameral Congress took place on March 14, 2010. The elections were the least violent of recent times with a high turnout of more than 13 million voters. Voters gave a strong victory to pro-Uribe parties, indicating their support for continuing President Uribe’s democratic security policies. Two parties in the pro-Uribe coalition, the National Unity Party (also known as the Partido de la U or the U Party) and the Conservative Party, won the most seats. The pro-Uribe coalition secured a majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives.

Observers thought this election outcome was a good sign for presidential candidate Juan Manuel Santos (see box), who headed the National Unity party and had been leading in the polls. However, the field of candidates for president was complex. A successful candidate had to win at least 50% of the votes cast, or compete and win in a runoff held on June 20. Antanas Mockus, Green Party candidate and twice former mayor of Bogotá, rose dramatically in popularity between March and May 2010. Other presidential hopefuls included Naomi Sanín of the Conservative Party, Gustavo Petro of the leftwing Democratic Pole; Germán Vargas Lleras, a right wing Senator who split with Uribe over his bid for a third term; and Rafael Pardo of the Liberal Party.

Juan Manuel Santos

Santos served as defense minister under President Uribe (2006-2009) and in two previous governments as finance minister and minister of trade. As Uribe’s defense minister he oversaw some of the strongest blows against the FARC guerrillas including the 2008 bombing raid inside Ecuador that killed a senior FARC commander, and the July 2008 rescue of 15 prized hostages, including a Colombian presidential candidate and three American defense contractors.

Born in 1951, Santos comes from a well-known political family in Colombia, owners of the leading newspaper El Tiempo where he worked briefly as a journalist. His great Uncle, Eduardo Santos, from the Liberal Party, served as President (1938-1942). Santos is trained as an economist and studied at the University of Kansas and Harvard University, and the London School of Economics.


17 “Uribe acepta el fallo y asegura que seguiará trabajando por su país ‘desde cualquier trinchera,’” ABC, February 27, 2010.

18 In addition, a new party—National Integration Party, PIN—formed in November 2009 by relatives and ideological supporters of politicians under investigation for links to the paramilitaries did well in the legislative elections, winning eight seats in the Senate and 12 seats in the lower chamber. See Juan Forero, “Colombia voters elect political novices with possible links to death squads,” Washington Post, March 17, 2010.

19 While Santos served as Uribe’s defense minister during some of the government’s biggest victories, he also had poor relations with Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez and led the Colombian military when the so-called “false positives” scandal broke. See, Adam Isacson, “The Next Colombia,” Open democracy.net at http://www.opendemocracy.net/adam-isacson/next-colombia, March 31, 2010.

20 Ibid.
In the May 30, 2010, election, Santos received more than twice as many votes as did Mockus in an election in which slightly over 49% of eligible Colombians voted. The results were: Juan Manuel Santos (46.6%); Antanas Mockus (21.5%); Germán Vargas Lleras (10.1%); Gustavo Petro (9.2%); Noemí Sanín (6.1%) and Rafael Pardo (4.4%). Although Santos came close to winning the majority of votes that were needed to be a first round winner, he had to compete in the June 20 runoff against second-highest vote-getter Antanas Mockus. In the ensuing weeks, Santos won the backing of nearly every candidate who responded to his call to create a government of national unity giving him a strongly favorable position. Mockus fared poorly in the debates and refused to accept a formal alliance with the leftwing Democratic Pole party.

The Santos Election and New Administration

On June 20, 2010, Santos won the Colombian presidency by the largest margin in recent history. Santos won 69% of the vote and Mockus received 28%. Santos’s landslide victory earned him the backing of a unity coalition made up of approximately 80% of the newly-elected Congress, a stronger mandate than even Uribe had following his two elections. When President Santos was inaugurated on August 7, 2010, he pledged to continue the successful security strategies of his predecessor while pursuing democratic, economic, and social reforms. He stated that the door to negotiations to end the armed conflict was not shut. Over the course of his first months in office, President Santos has led a unity government and retained high popularity ratings, reaching 90% in December 2010 according to some polls.

In his first half year in office, President Santos and his Vice President Angelino Garzón have promoted a more rigorous protection of human rights and—breaking with the Uribe administration—denounced threats against human rights defenders. President Santos has reached out to the judiciary in Colombia, ameliorating tensions that had grown between former President Uribe and the Supreme Court. The Santos administration has proposed legislation to address the plight of Colombia’s large internally displaced population. The Victim’s Bill would compensate victims of the internal conflict (including victims of state forces) and restore land to those who were forcibly displaced. The legislation passed the Chamber of Representatives in December 2010 but has yet to pass the Senate. Many observers are eager to see if these new policy approaches of the Santos administration will result in actual changes on the ground. In addition, the new administration faced a natural disaster in Colombia. Following heavy rains and flooding at the end of 2010, the Santos administration took emergency fiscal measures to promote reconstruction after thousands of homes and important infrastructure were destroyed and farmland was inundated. In the 112th Congress, H.Res. 77 (Mack) introduced on February 8, 2011, would express solidarity with the victims of the flooding in Colombia.
Colombia’s Internal Conflict

Roots of the Conflict

Colombia has a long tradition of civilian democratic rule, yet has been plagued by violence throughout its history. This violence has its roots in a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory, and a long history of poverty and inequality. Conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties led to two bloody civil wars—The War of a Thousand Days (1899-1903) and The Violence (1946 to 1957)—that killed hundreds of thousands of Colombians. While a power sharing agreement (the so-called National Front pact) between the Liberal and Conservative parties ended the civil war in 1957, it did not address the root causes of the violence. Numerous leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing paramilitaries formed in the 1980s when wealthy landowners organized to protect themselves from the leftist guerrillas. The shift of cocaine production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence, and provided a source of revenue for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. The main paramilitary organization, the AUC, began demobilization in 2003 and disbanded in 2006. Major armed groups today are the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the new generation of paramilitary groups.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

The FARC can trace its roots to armed peasant self-defense groups that had emerged during “the Violence” of the 1940-50s. By the 1960s, those groups—located in the remote, mountainous regions between Bogotá and Cali—had developed into a regional guerrilla movement. In 1964, the guerrillas announced the formation of the FARC, a group dedicated to rural insurgency. The FARC is the oldest, largest, and best-equipped and financed guerrilla organization in Latin America. It mainly operates in rural areas, but has shown its ability to strike in urban areas, including Bogotá. It conducts bombings, murders, mortar attacks, kidnappings, extortion, and hijackings mainly against Colombian targets. The FARC is fully engaged in the drug trade, including cultivation, taxation of drug crops, and distribution, from which it reaps significant profits. In recent years, the FARC has increased its activities along Colombia’s borders with Ecuador and Venezuela.

The Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) entered peace negotiations with the FARC in which FARC was granted control of a Switzerland-size territorial refuge during the peace process. With continued FARC military activity, including kidnapping a Colombian senator, President Pastrana halted the negotiations and ordered the military to retake control of the designated territory. During the inauguration of President Uribe on August 7, 2002, the FARC launched a mortar attack on the presidential palace that killed 21 residents of a nearby neighborhood.

(...continued)


In mid-2003, the Colombian military’s *Plan Patriota* campaign to recapture FARC-held territory, began operations with a largely successful effort to secure the capital and environs of Bogotá. In 2004, military operations by up to 17,000 troops, tried to regain territory from FARC in the southern and eastern regions of the country. The FARC responded with a tactical withdrawal, but launched a counter-offensive in February 2005. The conflict with the FARC has largely remained in the countryside. The FARC was unable to disrupt President Uribe’s August 7, 2006, inauguration. In 2006 the FARC controlled an estimated 30% of Colombian territory.\(^\text{27}\) *Plan Patriota* reduced FARC ranks, recaptured land held by the FARC, and confiscated large amounts of material used to process cocaine. Despite these advances, critics pointed out that large numbers of civilians were displaced during the campaign.

**Colombia’s March 2008 Raid of a FARC Camp in Ecuador**

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military bombed a FARC camp in Ecuador, killing at least 25 people; among them were Raúl Reyes, the terrorist groups’ second-highest commander (whose real name is reportedly Luis Edgar Devia Silva), four Mexican students visiting the camp, and one Ecuadorian citizen reportedly tied to the FARC.\(^\text{28}\) This was the first time in the Colombian military’s 44-year struggle against the FARC insurgency that it had killed a member of the FARC’s seven-member ruling secretariat. A few days later, Ivan Rios, another member of the FARC’s secretariat, was murdered by his own security agent. These high-level killings, followed by a FARC announcement in May 2008 that its top commander, Manuel Marulanda, died in March of a heart attack, dealt a significant blow to the FARC.

During the raid in Ecuador, information recovered from captured laptops suggested Venezuela was providing support for the FARC, including information that the Chávez government was planning to provide millions of dollars in assistance to the FARC for weapons purchases. The files also included information that President Rafael Correa of Ecuador received campaign donations from the FARC in 2006. Both Chávez and Correa vigorously rejected these claims. Venezuelan officials dismissed the data as having been fabricated even though Interpol verified in May 2008 that the files had not been tampered with since they were seized. In a welcome turn of events, on June 8, 2008, President Chávez called for the FARC to release all hostages unconditionally and to cease military operations maintaining that guerrilla warfare “has passed into history,” signaling a major change in his public stance.\(^\text{29}\)

Tensions persisted between Colombia and Ecuador until relations began to improve in the fall of 2009, and culminated in an exchange of Ambassadors in November 2010. Colombian-Venezuelan relations, which were often strained between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and former President Uribe, have grown much closer under the Santos government. (For more, see “Colombia and Regional Security.”)


**Hostage Releases, Escapes, and the July 2008 Hostage Rescue**

Since 2007, prisoner escapes, hostage deaths, and later hostage releases have focused international attention on the plight of hundreds of hostages held by the FARC. In April 2007, Colombian police officer Jhon Frank Pinchao escaped after eight years in FARC custody. In June 2007, 11 departmental deputies who had been held since 2002 were reportedly executed by the FARC.30 In August 2007, President Uribe authorized leftist Senator Piedad Córdoba and Venezuelan President Chávez to begin a dialogue with the FARC to secure the release of some 45 high-profile hostages, including the three American contractors held since 2003. Negotiations stalled in November 2007 due to the FARC’s failure to provide proof of life of the hostages and allegations that President Chávez inappropriately contacted the head of the Colombian Army. However, the Colombian government found over a dozen proof of life videos, including videos of the three American contractors, in a November 2007 raid on the FARC. In December 2007, Fernando Araujo, a former minister of development, escaped from the FARC after being held hostage for more than six years. From February through July 2008, Araujo served as Colombia’s foreign minister.

Six hostage releases occurred during early 2008. In January 2008, two hostages were released to a delegation led by President Chávez and the Colombian government was able to reunite one of the hostages with her son born in captivity who the FARC had turned over to the Colombian foster care system. A day after the two hostages’ release, Chávez’s call for the international community to no longer label the FARC and the ELN as terrorist groups prompted widespread condemnation. Nevertheless, his role in the release of hostages continued. On February 27, 2008, the FARC released four former members of the Colombian Congress to Venezuelan officials in Colombian territory.

On July 2, 2008, after months of planning and tracking the FARC, the Colombian military successfully tricked the FARC into releasing 15 prized hostages. Those hostages included three U.S. defense contractors—Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell—held since February 2003 and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, held since February 2002. This successful bloodless rescue was widely cited as an example of the Colombian military’s increasing professionalism and intelligence capabilities, which was largely a result of years of U.S. training and security assistance programs provided through Plan Colombia.31 Some press reports indicate that the United States provided millions of dollars to help Colombia find and rescue the hostages, including providing tactical support and training by the U.S. military, and technical assistance supplied by a unit of planners, intelligence analysts, and hostage negotiators based in Bogotá.32

**Current Status of the FARC**

Many analysts hailed the successful July 2008 hostage rescue as evidence that the FARC was disintegrating, but others maintained that conclusion was premature. The FARC lost three of its top commanders in 2008 and suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of the Colombian military. Their communications systems were infiltrated, their leadership was in disarray, and many

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guerrilla units were reported running short of supplies. Demobilization of FARC combatants rose sharply in 2007 to 2,480 from less than half that number the prior year. In 2008, 3,027 FARC combatants were reported demobilized. Many rebels reportedly hoped to take advantage of the Colombian government’s offer to allow the Justice and Peace Law’s provisions to apply to those who surrender. FARC demobilizations, however, decreased in 2009 by about 30% to 2,128. Although the FARC, now led by Alfonso Cano, has indicated some willingness to negotiate with the Santos government, their position continues to weaken.

On the other hand, despite many reverses the FARC remains a serious security threat. While the FARC’s leadership is no longer in complete control, the group remains committed to its goal of overthrowing the state. While this is highly unlikely given the FARC’s current status, over its 47-year history the FARC has demonstrated a capacity to revive and recover from setbacks.

According to one recent report, the FARC, adapting to pressure from the Colombian military, appears to have once again resorted to guerrilla warfare, deepened its involvement in the drug trade in Colombia and other countries, widely deployed antipersonnel mines, and conducted coerced recruitment in impoverished communities, particularly of minors. The average age of a FARC recruit is reportedly just under 12 years old.

FARC had hoped that the government would exchange captured FARC guerrillas for hostages it held, but the Uribe government never complied. Beginning in 2008, the FARC unilaterally released some hostages in an attempt to win some popular support. In March 2009, the FARC released their last foreign hostage, a 69-year-old Swedish national who had suffered a stroke during captivity. According to the U.S. Department of State, between January 1, 2009, and November 30, 2009, the FARC voluntarily released 15 hostages. In March 2010, the FARC unilaterally released two of their high-value “exchangeable” hostages: Corporal Jesu Daniel Calvo Sánchez, who had been in captivity for 11 months, and Sergeant Pablo Emilio Moncayo, who had spent 12 years in captivity, one of the world’s longest-held hostages. Following the unilateral release of Moncayo on March 30, 2010, there were a few calls for a humanitarian exchange between the government of Colombia and the FARC primarily by the government’s leftist critics. Unilateral releases, however, continued as the Santos government settled in. In February 2011, the FARC released six more hostages in operations coordinated by former Senator Piedad Córdoba with international assistance. The remaining FARC “exchangeable” hostages

38 Ibid. The ICG reports the average age of a recruit today is estimated to be 11.8 years.
39 The Uribe government has not ruled out an exchange, but it has always objected to a FARC pre-condition that any hostage-exchange talks take place in a small demilitarized zone. Relay in a communication from Adam Isacson, April 2010.
42 Robert Munks, “Colombian FARC Frees Final Two Hostages in Unilateral Release,” IHS Global Insight Daily (continued...)
are reportedly 15 members of the Colombian security forces. The FARC hopes to exchange these individuals for some 500 imprisoned FARC combatants they consider political prisoners. In addition, the FARC continues to kidnap, and it holds a disputed number of other kidnap victims beyond its “exchangeable” hostages.

The Santos administration has kept up strong pressure on the FARC. In September 2010, the Colombian military and police conducted a bombing raid on the camp of FARC military strategist Jorge Briceño (also known as “Mono Jojoy”), killing him and several other FARC guerrillas. Briceño was the operational second-in-command of the FARC and a member of the ruling Secretariat. FARC forces have declined by approximately half since 2001 to just under 8,000 today, according to the Colombian government.

National Liberation Army (ELN)

The smaller ELN was formed in 1965, inspired by the ideas of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. With a membership today estimated at under 1,300, it is less active than the FARC, but has still been able to carry out high profile kidnappings and bombings. In addition to terrorizing the rural civilian population, the ELN has targeted the country’s infrastructure, especially its oil and electricity sectors. Its operations are mainly located in the rural areas of the north, northeast, the Middle Magdalena Valley, and along the Venezuelan border. The ELN earns funds from the taxation of illegal crops, extortion, attacks on the Caño-Limón pipeline, and kidnapping for ransom. Its size and military strength have been dramatically reduced since the late 1990s. One measure is the reduction in sabotage attacks on the Caño-Limón pipeline from 171 attacks in 2001 to only five attacks in 2009.

In recent years, the ELN has shown more willingness to attempt peace negotiations with the government. In December 2003, President Uribe revealed that he had met with an ELN leader to discuss peace initiatives, but a subsequent ELN statement ruled out any possibility of demobilization. However, in 2004, the ELN and the Colombian government accepted an offer from Mexican President Vicente Fox to facilitate peace negotiations. In June 2004, Mexico named Andres Valencia, a former Mexican ambassador to Israel, as its facilitator. Meetings

(...continued)

Analysis, February 17, 2011.


46 Communication with an official at the Embassy of Colombia, January 19, 2011. In the early 2000s, the FARC had as many as 16,000 to 20,000 fighters.

47 According to the Colombian Embassy, the number of ELN force is estimated to be 1,250. Communication with the Embassy of Colombia, January 19, 2011.


between Valencia and the ELN occurred, but the rebel group rejected Uribe’s offer of a cease-fire.\(^{50}\) In April 2005, the ELN rejected further Mexican facilitation after Mexico voted to condemn Cuba at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The Colombian government and the ELN held several rounds of exploratory talks in Havana, Cuba between December 2005 and August 2007. In June 2008, the ELN announced that it would not continue negotiating with the Uribe government for the time being. Former President Uribe responded by ordering the Colombian military to step up its operations against the ELN.\(^{51}\)

### Paramilitaries

Paramilitary groups originated in the 1980s when wealthy ranchers and farmers, including drug traffickers, organized armed groups to protect themselves from kidnappings and extortion plots by the FARC and ELN. The largest paramilitary organization, the AUC, was formed in 1997 as an umbrella organization for a number of local and regional paramilitary groups operating in the country. As discussed in more detail below, the AUC disbanded in 2006. Not all paramilitary groups had joined the AUC umbrella. The AUC massacred and assassinated suspected insurgent supporters and directly engaged the FARC and ELN in military battles. The Armed Forces of Colombia have long been accused of turning a blind eye to these activities. The AUC, like the FARC, earned most of its funding from drug trafficking. *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism* estimated that in 2006 paramilitaries handled 40% of Colombian cocaine exports.\(^{52}\)

On July 15, 2003, the AUC agreed with the Colombian government to demobilize its troops by the end of 2005. At that time, the State Department estimated that there were between 8,000 and 11,000 members of the AUC, although some press reports estimated up to 20,000. The demobilization, begun in 2004, officially ended in April 2006. By that time, over 30,000 AUC members had demobilized and turned in over 17,000 weapons.\(^{53}\) AUC leaders remained at large until August 2006 when President Uribe ordered them to surrender to the government to benefit from the provisions of the Peace and Justice Law.\(^{54}\)

Not all paramilitaries demobilized, and still others have returned to paramilitary activities since demobilizing. Some former AUC members continue to be active in the drug trade in spite of the demobilization process.\(^{55}\) The U.S. State Department and U.N. both note that the new illegal groups do not share the political objectives of the AUC, which sought to defeat leftist guerrillas, and has shifted to purely criminal purposes such as drug trafficking. Despite their ad-hoc nature, the new illegal groups—labeled “criminal gangs” or *bandas criminales* or BACRIM by the Colombian government and some analysts—pose a threat to Colombian civilians. The Uribe government took steps to combat them, but Human Rights Watch and others argued that the Uribe

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\(^{54}\) Vicente Castaño, brother of AUC founder Carlos Castaño, remains at large. Vicente Castaño is under investigation by Colombian authorities for ordering the 2004 murder of his brother who reportedly planned to turn paramilitary leaders over for extradition to the United States as part of peace negotiations.

government’s efforts were insufficient. Some observers attribute a recent increase in violence in Colombia (following years of decline) in part to the growing prevalence of the new criminal groups and competition between them. In Medellín, for example, where some of the new criminal groups operate, the number of murders doubled from 1,045 in 2008 to 2,189 in 2009. The homicide rate in Medellín, Colombia’s second-largest city, continued to rise in 2010 and reportedly matched the murder levels of 2003. According to the Annual Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia published in February 2011, the new illegal groups commit murders, threats, extortion, acts of sexual violence and cause individual and collective forced displacement. The report notes with concern the sharp rise in massacres linked to violent disputes among and within these groups.

Remaining Political Challenges

Para-political Scandal

A scandal alleging paramilitary ties to politicians, especially members of the Colombian Congress, erupted in November 2006. On November 9, 2006, the Colombian Supreme Court ordered the arrest of three congressmen for their alleged role in establishing paramilitary groups in the department of Sucre on the Caribbean coast. Since the scandal broke, numerous Colombian politicians have been charged with ties to paramilitary groups. Former Foreign Minister Maria Consuelo Araujo was forced to resign due to the investigation into her brother’s and father’s connections to the paramilitaries and their involvement in the kidnapping of Álvaro Araujo’s opponent in a Senate election. In December 2007, Congressman Erik Morris was sentenced to six years in prison for his ties to the paramilitaries, the first member of Congress sentenced in the ongoing scandal. In February 2008, the former head of Colombia’s Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Jorge Noguera, was formally charged with collaborating with paramilitaries, including giving paramilitaries the names of union activists, some of whom were then murdered by the paramilitaries.

In April 2008, Mario Uribe, a former senator, second cousin, and close ally of former President Álvaro Uribe, was arrested for colluding with the paramilitaries. On February 21, 2011, Mario Uribe was convicted of aggravated conspiracy to commit a crime and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. Suggesting the widespread fallout from the para-political scandal, the State Department has reported that of Colombia’s 2006-2010 Congress, 128 former representatives (out

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of the 268 total) were accused of having paramilitary ties. Of those representatives newly elected to the 2010-2014 Congress, 13 who were re-elected are under investigation by the Supreme Court.

The para-political scandal increased tensions between former President Uribe and the Supreme Court, which is charged with investigating the politicians accused of having paramilitary ties, many of whom are from pro-UrIBE parties. In July 2008, representatives from the two branches met to discuss President Uribe’s concern that the paramilitary investigations were advancing too quickly. Despite those meetings, the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Senator Carlos Garcia, head of Uribe’s main coalition party, in late July. Government critics questioned President Uribe’s motivation in May 2008 to extradite key paramilitary figures to the United States as intended, in part, to thwart investigations into government-paramilitary ties. They also questioned the motives behind a judicial reform package submitted by Uribe to the Congress that would remove the Supreme Court’s power to investigate legislators. The judicial reform bill was withdrawn by the government after it received strong criticism from the courts and from members of Colombia’s Congress. In October 2008, Human Rights Watch released a report that examined the government’s efforts to investigate and prosecute paramilitaries and those who collaborated with them. It warned that the former Uribe administration had harassed the Supreme Court as it attempted to carry out prosecutions of politicians, security forces and others with alleged paramilitary ties.

The new Santos administration has moved quickly to repair relations between the Executive and the judiciary. The improved relations may have been evident in the election of a new Prosecutor General in December 2010, after an impasse of 16 months when the Supreme Court would not give its approval to anyone proposed by former President Uribe.

The Justice and Peace Law and Demobilization

As part of the paramilitary demobilization process, President Uribe introduced a Justice and Peace Law granting conditional amnesties to illegal combatants. The law would also apply to FARC and ELN fighters if they entered into negotiations with the government. Colombia’s Congress approved the legislation in 2005. The Justice and Peace Law called on demobilized fighters to provide an account of their crimes and to forfeit illegally acquired assets in exchange for an alternative penalty of up to eight years’ imprisonment. If the accused was found to have intentionally failed to admit to a crime, the alternative penalty could be revoked and the full sentence for the concealed crime would be imposed. Critics contended that the penalties were too lenient and amounted to impunity. The Uribe Administration argued that without the inducement

64 Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Rights group rips government; Colombia hinders paramilitary prosecutions, a human rights group said,” The Miami Herald, September 17, 2008.
65 Human Rights Watch, Breaking the Grip?: Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia, October 2008.
of the new law, paramilitary leaders and fighters would be unwilling to demobilize and violence would continue.

In July 2006, Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the law. In the ruling, however, the Constitutional Court limited the scope under which demobilizing paramilitaries can benefit from the reduced sentences. Paramilitaries who commit crimes or fail to fully comply with the law will have to serve full sentences. The law affirmed that paramilitaries must confess all crimes and make reparations to victims using both their legally and illegally obtained assets. Paramilitary leaders reacted by stating that they would not comply with the law. In response, President Uribe ordered paramilitary leaders to turn themselves in. By October 2006 all but 11 paramilitary leaders had complied with this order.66

The merits of the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) have been fiercely debated both in Colombia and the United States. Supporters believe it has been an effective means to end paramilitary activities. The Bush Administration expressed support for the law noting that it facilitated the demobilization of more than 31,000 paramilitary members. Other supporters of the law observe that paramilitaries must act in good faith and stop further participation in illegal activities in order to benefit from the peace process. The Uribe Administration removed some demobilized paramilitaries, including Carlos Mario “Macaco” Jiménez, from the Justice and Peace process due to their continued participation in illegal activities. In May 2008, Uribe extradited Jiménez, Salvatore Mancuso, and 13 other paramilitary leaders who had violated the terms of the law to the United States to stand trial on drug trafficking charges.

Nevertheless, the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia and other observers have expressed concern about the institutional frailty of the Justice and Peace process. In a 2008 report, the International Crisis Group describes its implementation as “lagging.” The report cited lack of interest in victim’s rights by the Uribe government, inadequate support for the implementing institutions, and the persistence of armed conflict and threatening presence of new illegal armed groups.67 With more than 280,000 victims registered under the JPL through December 2009, many observers have expressed reservations about the Colombian government’s efforts to provide reparations to victims effectively. Human rights organizations are concerned that the paramilitaries have not been held accountable for their crimes and, that by under-reporting illegally obtained assets, have failed to provide adequate reparation to their victims.68

Other observers are concerned that many paramilitaries have not participated in the Justice and Peace process. Of the more than 31,000 paramilitary members that had demobilized, only 4,162 had been found potentially eligible to receive benefits under the Justice and Peace Law’s framework.69 In response to concerns that the Justice and Peace Unit investigating and prosecuting the paramilitaries was severely understaffed, the Uribe government in spring 2008...

68 See for example, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, The Other Half of the Truth, June 2008.
authorized a tripling of its staff.70 The International Criminal Court is monitoring the investigations and prosecutions of former paramilitaries to ensure that those who are guilty of human rights abuses are held accountable for their crimes.71 In August 2009, the Colombian Supreme Court suspended further extraditions of paramilitary leaders to the United States because the crimes for which they stand accused in the United States such as drug trafficking were not nearly as heinous as the atrocities they had allegedly committed in Colombia.72 In response to concerns raised by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that extradited former paramilitaries would stop cooperating in the JPL process and victims would be unable to participate, the U.S. and Colombian governments have collaborated to facilitate the continued participation of extradited individuals through technological hook ups. According to the State Department, several extradited former paramilitaries have continued to participate by providing their confessions through teleconferencing.73 Still, in his March 2010 report, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, observed “the Justice and Peace Law...has not achieved the transitional justice intended for paramilitary crimes.”74

Human Rights Violations by Colombian Security Forces

For several years, human rights organizations have raised serious concerns about the extrajudicial execution of civilians by the Colombian military. This issue received prominent attention when more than a dozen young men from the impoverished community of Soacha were lured to another part of the country with a promise of jobs and then murdered. In October 2008, the armed forces were linked to the murders of civilians whose bodies had been disguised as guerrillas in order to inflate military body counts. As a result, the government fired 27 soldiers and officers (including three generals), and the commander of the Colombian army, General Mario Montoya, resigned on November 4, 2008.75 Named the “false positives” scandal by the Colombian press, there have been continuing revelations about this problem as the Colombian military has worked to revise a policy that rewarded high guerrilla body counts. Many observers believe that justice in the Soacha murder cases, and in other cases, has lagged.76 In January 2010, more than 20 soldiers accused of carrying out the Soacha murders (of the more than 40 implicated in the case) were released from protective detention by a judge who ruled that the pre-trial procedures had taken too long.77 The representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia expressed concern about the negative repercussions of the ruling on the more than 1,200 cases of

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77 “Uribe at odds with judiciary over human rights,” Latin America Weekly Report, January 14, 2010. According to this report, 17 soldiers were released on January 8 and another 6 were released on January 12, 2010.
extrajudicial executions being investigated by the Prosecutor General’s human rights team. Victims’ families announced they would pursue the case in the International Criminal Court.

The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Colombia covering 2009 stated that “political and unlawful killings remained an extremely serious problem,” and that “there were periodic reports that members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings during the internal armed conflict,” although the number had decreased since the prior year. In its 2009 State of the World Human Rights report, Amnesty International asserted that between June 2007 and June 2008, at least 296 civilians were extrajudicially killed by Colombian security forces and many were disguised as guerillas who had been killed in combat (“false positives”). In June 2009, on a 10-day mission to Colombia, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Philip Alston found that the killings were not a result of official government policy. Nevertheless, according to the Special Rapporteur, “the sheer number of cases, their geographic spread, and the diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killings were carried out in a more or less systematic fashion by significant elements within the military.”

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Colombia has one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world—more than 3 million IDPs— with indigenous and Afro-Colombians disproportionately represented among those displaced. There is some disagreement over the current rate of displacement. The Colombian government registered over 250,000 IDPs in 2007, a decline of about 8,000 from 2006. Some IDPs do not register with the Colombian government out of fear and procedural barriers. Therefore, estimates of new displacements put forth by NGOs tend to be higher than government figures. For example, the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a Colombian NGO, estimated that some 305,000 people were displaced in 2007, about 27% more than the number CODHES recorded in 2006. Although still concerned by the numbers of individuals displaced, international NGOs found that the rate of mass displacements decreased in 2007.

In 2008, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed particular concern about new displacements occurring along southern Colombia’s Pacific Coast. In 2008, both the Colombian government and CODHES reported more than 300,000 new IDPS, with CODHES estimating there were 380,000 newly displaced. In 2009, CODHES estimated that 286,389 people were displaced, a 24% reduction below the CODHES estimate for 2008. The government projected an even greater drop in the number displaced in 2009, from 307,223 to 142,299, a 54% decrease compared to their prior year estimate. CODHES and the government also differ on the total number displaced. The government has registered 3.3 million people as IDPs since 1995, while CODHES estimates as many as 4.9 million have been displaced since 1985. However, there is consensus that the rate of mass displacements decreased in 2009.

80 CODHES bases its estimates on fieldwork, and from information gathered from the media and civil society. The government bases its figures on registered IDPs whose applications for recognition have been accepted. For more discussion, see U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009, February 2010.
81 Ibid.
Landmines

The use of landmines by Colombian guerrilla groups is an ongoing problem in the country. Although Afghanistan and Cambodia continue to have higher rates of landmine casualties (per capita) than Colombia, the International Committee to Ban Landmines reported that Colombia had the highest number of landmine casualties in the world in 2006, with 1,106 casualties. Both Human Rights Watch and the International Committee to Ban Landmines report that the vast majority of landmines are laid by the FARC and ELN. In 2007, Landmine Monitor cited a decline in landmine casualties to 895, the first decline since 2002. The change was attributed to setbacks suffered by the FARC. Landmine casualties in Colombia declined further in 2008 to 777.

Colombia and Global Drug Trends

Colombia’s prominence in the global production of cocaine and heroin has resulted in a U.S. focus on anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean region. According to various sources, Colombia produces 60% of the world’s cocaine. It is the source of almost 90% of cocaine consumed in the United States and 60% of the heroin seized in this country, according to the State Department’s 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).

The world’s supply of cocaine is produced by just three countries: Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Until the mid-1990s, Peru and Bolivia were the two major producers. Colombia eclipsed Bolivia in 1995 and Peru in 1997, the result of increased eradication programs in those two countries and the displacement of coca cultivation to Colombia. Cocaine production in Colombia increased fivefold between 1993 and 1999.

However, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported for 2008 an 18% decrease in coca cultivation in Colombia from 2007 and reported a rise of 4.5% and 5.5% in Peru and Bolivia respectively. UNODC’s Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey notes the 2008 coca cultivation, reported at 81,000 hectares, approximated the levels reported in the 2004 to 2006 period. In 2007, the U.N. reported an unusual rise of 27% in coca growing in Colombia. According to UNODC’s 2010 World Drug Report, coca cultivation in Colombia dropped further in 2009 to 68,000 hectares. (See Table 1). In the same U.N. report, estimates of Colombia’s potential production of pure cocaine dropped dramatically from 630 metric tons in 2007 to 450 metric tons in 2008 and decreased further to 410 metric tons in 2009.
The area under coca leaf cultivation and the volume of potential production of cocaine are estimates that depend upon making the best assumptions from limited data. The UNODC and the U.S. government have developed varying estimates that are the midpoints of a range of likely cultivation and production, but U.S. and U.N. data often differ considerably. Also, the organizations sometimes modify their estimates after more data is collected. For example, UNODC modified its 2008 calculation upward for production of pure cocaine from 430 metric tons to 450 metric tons. On the other hand, the U.S. government changed its estimate of production of pure cocaine for 2008 downward from 295 metric tons to 280 metric tons. In 2009, the U.S. government found that Colombia’s production of pure cocaine declined to 270 metric tons, a 4% decline from 2008. The estimate is in line with a trend of a sharp decline in the amount of pure cocaine produced in Colombia over time, and is a 61% drop in comparison with the 2001 production figure by the U.S. government.90

Most heroin consumed in the United States comes from Mexico and Colombia. In an October 2008 report on Plan Colombia, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that opium poppy cultivation and heroin production had declined in Colombia by about 50% between 2000-2006.91 In 2008, the U.N. found that opium production dropped to 394 hectares, the lowest figure in the last 14 years of reporting.92

In recent years, the Colombian government, with significant U.S. assistance, has stepped up its eradication efforts. In 2007, the Colombian government eradicated over 219,529 hectares of illicit coca crops, up from 215,421 hectares eradicated the previous year. Aerial eradication accounted for 70% of the coca crops destroyed in 2007.93 But manual eradication accounts for an increasing percentage of total eradication efforts. ONDCP has credited ongoing aerial spraying and manual eradication programs with recent declines in the cocaine productivity of the coca currently cultivated in Colombia.94 The U.N. reported in 2008 that the Colombian government eradicated 133,496 hectares through aerial spraying and 96,115 hectares through manual eradication for a total of 229,611 hectares of coca eradicated.95 In 2009, the U.N. reported a drop to 104,772 hectares eradicated through aerial spraying and 60,557 hectares eradicated manually.96 In the 2011 INCSR, the State Department notes that the eradication efforts goals were set lower based on what was accomplished in 2009. Manual eradication in 2010 declined considerably lower than its goal of 70,000 hectares, when the government managed to manually eradicated about 45,000 hectares of coca “due to budgetary disbursement delays, security concerns, and the dispersion of

95 UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2009. The manual eradication figures reported for 2008 were slightly higher than the U.S. Department of State in its INCSR Report published in February 2009. The U.N. reported 96,115 hectares and the INCSR Report stated 95,732 hectares were eradicated manually, a difference of 383 hectares.
Colombia and Regional Security

Another U.S. policy focus in the Andean region is helping Colombia deal with armed insurgencies that are involved in drug trafficking and have a destabilizing effect on regional security. Colombia shares a 1,367-mile border with Venezuela, approximately 1,000 miles each with Peru and Brazil, and much smaller borders with Ecuador and Panama. With porous borders amid rugged territory and an inconsistent state presence, all the border regions have been particularly problematic. The conflict in Colombia and its associated drug trafficking have led to spillover effects in Colombia’s neighboring countries, especially Venezuela and Ecuador.

97 In 2010, the government eradicated nearly 101,000 hectares, slightly above its stated target.98

98 Ibid.
Relations with Venezuela and Ecuador

Colombia’s relations with its neighbors have been strained by the spillover from Colombia’s counter-insurgency operations, including cross-border military activity. Colombia has asked both Venezuela and Ecuador for assistance in patrolling border areas where the FARC and in some cases the ELN are strong. The State Department’s 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism report, issued in August 2010, states that Venezuelan territory is regularly used for rest, resupply and the venue for crimes to finance Colombia’s FARC and ELN, although the degree to which the Venezuelan government provides support to these groups remains unclear. According to the State Department report, Ecuador’s territory is also used for rest, resupply, and training, as well as some coca processing and the Colombia-Ecuador border region is subject to “narco-terrorist influence.” The report notes “Ecuador’s greatest counterterrorism and security challenge remained the presence of Colombian narcotics, criminal and terrorist groups in the extremely difficult terrain along the porous 450-miles border with Colombia.”

Following the March 2008 raid on a FARC camp inside Ecuador by Colombian military forces, Ecuador broke off diplomatic ties with Colombia. In a show of solidarity, Venezuela broke diplomatic and trade ties with Colombia and sent 10 battalions of troops to Venezuela’s border with Colombia. After a diplomatic intervention, Venezuela restored diplomatic relations with Colombia although Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa remained angered by the affair and did not until late 2010.

Ties between Venezuela and Colombia were severed again in July 2009 when it was reported that Swedish-made military equipment—sold to the Venezuelan government in the 1980s—had been found in a FARC camp. In late July 2009, Venezuela temporarily withdrew its Ambassador from Colombia and cut off trade resulting in trade dropping by one-third between the two countries by the year’s end. The Colombian-Venezuelan relationship deteriorated further in the fall of 2009. The signing of a new base agreement with the United States on October 30, 2009, permitting the use by U.S. troops of seven military facilities in Colombia and “use of other facilities and locations” as mutually agreed, further aggravated President Chávez. Tensions escalated as President Uribe and President Chávez accused one another of efforts to destabilize their regimes.

However, after his landslide victory in the June 20, 2010, runoff election, president-elect Santos made several conciliatory moves toward Venezuela and invited President Chávez to his inauguration. In early July 2010, Santos appointed María Ángela Holguín, a former ambassador to Venezuela with whom Chávez is known to have good relations, to be his new foreign minister. Before he left office in a much discussed counter-move, President Uribe released new information that demonstrated FARC and ELN forces had been harbored by the Venezuelan government. On July 15, Uribe’s defense minister Gabriel Silva showed the media (in a session closed to the public) evidence that reportedly showed that senior members of the FARC and ELN had been hiding in Venezuela. On July 22, 2010, the Colombian government presented evidence at a special meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) that the government of Venezuela was harboring some 1,500 members of both guerrilla groups in several camps located inside its territory. President Chávez vigorously denied the allegations and broke off diplomatic

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relations with Colombia (again), and Chávez did not attend the August 2010 inauguration despite President Santos’s invitation.104

Colombia is also concerned that the FARC is using Ecuadorian territory to launch attacks. Leftist Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa opposes U.S. involvement in Colombia, and he did not renew the United States’ 10-year lease on the Manta air base for regional counternarcotics operations that expired in 2009.105 Ecuador is also concerned that aerial spraying of coca crops in southern Colombia is reaching into Ecuador potentially damaging licit Ecuadorian crops. Other concerns between the countries relate to high numbers of refugees from Colombia’s conflict.106 However, relations between Colombia and Ecuador have steadily improved under the Santos Administration, a process that began in the later months of the Uribe administration.

In the first six months of the Santos Administration, both Venezuela and Ecuador re-established full diplomatic ties with Colombia. Shortly after his inauguration, President Santos met with President Chávez and relations were normalized in August 2010. On November 26, 2010, Ecuador and Colombia announced the restoration of full diplomatic relations after a 33-month hiatus.107 Many analysts see this regional diplomacy as an effort by President Santos to build a more balanced approach to neighboring countries and to end Colombia’s relative isolation in the region that had grown during the Uribe administration. Others maintain that future relations with Venezuela are uncertain, given the unpredictability of President Chávez. Full economic ties between Colombia and Venezuela—previously Colombia’s second largest export market after the United States—are expected to be restored in early 2011.108

U.S. Policy Focus

Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP)

Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a plan to end the country’s 40-year-old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development. The initial plan was a $7.5 billion six-year plan, with Colombia providing $4 billion of the funding and requesting $3.5 billion from the international community.109 The U.S. Congress approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-246) providing $1.3 billion for counternarcotics and related efforts in Colombia and neighboring countries. Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress.

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105 For ten years (1999-2009), the United States had troops stationed at an air base in Manta, Ecuador, which served as one of three forward operating locations for regional counterdrug activities. President Correa kept a campaign promise not to renew the Manta base lease, and the last counterdrug flight flown from Manta took place in July 2009.


and subsequent funding has been approved for Plan Colombia and follow on plans annually. President Bush continued support for the plan under the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) aid account. The ACP account funded counternarcotics programs in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and, until FY2008, Venezuela. Because narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency had become intertwined problems, in 2002 Congress granted the Administration flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{110}

Formerly, the ACP and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) accounts supported the eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, the interdiction of narcotics shipments, and the protection of infrastructure through training and material support for Colombia’s security forces. U.S. assistance supports alternative crop development and infrastructure development to give coca and opium poppy farmers alternative sources of income, and institution building programs to strengthen democracy. In FY2008, alternative development (AD) programs were shifted from the ACP account to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. U.S. assistance includes human rights training programs for security personnel in response to Congressional concern about human rights abuses committed by Colombian security forces. Congress has prohibited U.S. personnel from directly participating in combat missions and has capped the number of U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel that can be stationed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia at 800 and 600 respectively.\textsuperscript{111}

The United States also supports the interdiction of drug shipments through the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program. The Air Bridge Denial program began as a joint interdiction effort between the United States, Peru, and Colombia to identify drug flights from Peru to Colombia and to interdict them by forcing them to land, or, if necessary, by shooting down suspect aircraft. The program was suspended in 2001 after a flight carrying American missionaries was mistakenly shot down over Peru. Following the establishment of new safeguards against accidental shootdowns, the program was renewed in Colombia in 2003. The State Department credits the ABD program with reducing the number of illegal flights over Colombia by some 73% since 2003.\textsuperscript{112}

Beginning in 2008, the U.S. government began working closely with Colombia to turn over operation and funding for selected counternarcotics programs to Colombian control in a process of nationalization.\textsuperscript{113} Since that time, Colombia has nationalized several programs including the ABD program. Nationalization plans are to turn over all Department of State counternarcotics programs with the Colombian army aviation and counternarcotics brigade by 2012. FMF programs, however, would continue and planning would continue for the turn over of additional aviation programs to the Colombian National Police.

\textsuperscript{110} The State Department and the Department of Defense explain expanded authority as providing them with flexibility in situations where there is no clear line between drug and terrorist activity.

\textsuperscript{111} The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200; P.L. 108-375) raised the military cap from 400 to 800 and the civilian cap from 400 to 600. The cap does not apply to personnel conducting search and rescue operations, or to U.S. personnel assigned as part of their regular duties to the U.S. embassy. According to the State Department, military personnel levels between 2005-2008 have ranged from 136 to 563 military and 173 to 454 civilian contractors, averaging 250 of each.

\textsuperscript{112} U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2008.

\textsuperscript{113} U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2011.
Aerial Eradication, Coca Cultivation, and Alternative Development \(^{114}\)

Upon taking office, President Uribe announced that aerial eradication, along with alternative crop development, would form a significant basis of the government’s efforts to reduce cocaine production. The Plan Colombia eradication spraying program began in December 2000 with the U.S.-funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo. It should be noted, however, that spraying does not prevent, although it may discourage, the replanting of illicit crops. During 2008, the Colombian government sprayed 133,496 hectares of coca and manually eradicated 95,732 hectares of coca.\(^{115}\) In 2009, aerial eradication declined to 104,772 hectares and to 101,939 hectares in 2010. Manual eradication has also been on a downward trend. In 2009, the Colombian government manually eradicated slightly under 70,000 hectares of coca, and set its target for manual eradication at 70,000 hectares for 2010. According to the 2011 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, manual eradication in Colombia fell to 45,000 hectares in 2010 because of “budgetary disbursement delays, security concerns, and the dispersion of coca to smaller fields.” The report notes that 32 manual eradicators (including Colombian police, military and civilian contractors) were killed in manual eradication operations in 2010 down from 40 deaths in 2009.\(^{116}\)

| Table 1. UNODC Estimate of Coca Cultivation in Colombia (in hectares) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Year             | 2000             | 2001             | 2002             | 2003             | 2004             | 2005             | 2006             | 2007             | 2008             | 2009             |
| Area             | 163,000          | 145,000          | 102,000          | 86,000           | 80,000           | 86,000           | 78,000           | 99,000           | 81,000           | 68,000           |
| % change         | —                | -11%             | -30%             | -16%             | -7%              | 8%               | -9%              | 27%              | -18%             | -16%             |

| Table 2. U.S. ONDCP Estimate of Coca Cultivation in Colombia (in hectares) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Year             | 2000             | 2001             | 2002             | 2003             | 2004             | 2005             | 2006             | 2007             | 2008             | 2009             |
| Area             | 136,200          | 169,800          | 144,450          | 113,850          | 114,100          | 144,000          | 157,200          | 167,000          | 119,000          | 116,000          |
| % change         | —                | 25%              | -15%             | -21%             | 0.2%             | 26%              | 9%               | 6.2%             | -29%             | -3%              |

The United Nations and United States use different methodologies to estimate annual coca cultivation levels in Colombia. The different methodologies yield results that not only show different levels of cultivation, but sometimes different trends as well. Table 1 and Table 2 provide U.N. and U.S. data on coca cultivation in Colombia since 2000. The area of cultivation is measured in hectares.\(^{117}\) For 2007, the United Nations reported a 27% increase in coca cultivation to 99,000 hectares.\(^{118}\) U.S. data from the ONDCP showed a 6.2% increase in coca cultivation in

\(^{114}\) Also see CRS Report RL33163, *Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes*, by Connie Veillette and Carolina Navarrete-Frias.

\(^{115}\) U.S. Department of State, *INCSR 2011*.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) A hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres.

2007. Some of the 9% increase in cultivation that ONDCP reported for 2006 may be attributed to the fact that the area surveyed increased significantly from the previous year.

In 2008, both the United Nations and the United States showed a decline in coca cultivation (they each measured a downward trend but their estimates of hectares cultivated differed). The 2008 estimates in each case approximated the cultivation levels of 2004. Analysts have attributed the decline to greater eradication pressure. Some observers say the relative reduction in aerial spraying compared with the more labor-intensive manual eradication in 2008 caused coca cultivation in Colombia to decline.\(^{119}\) In 2008, the area sprayed declined by 13% from the prior year and the area manually eradicated increased by 43% compared with 2007.\(^{120}\) Others speculate that another factor resulting in the positive reduction in Colombia’s coca crop was the success of Colombian security forces in gaining control of territory from the FARC which could discourage farmers from replanting.\(^{121}\) As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, both the U.N. and the U.S. government showed declining trends in coca cultivation in Colombia in 2009.

Aerial eradication has been controversial both in Colombia and the United States. Critics charge that it has unknown environmental and health effects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood, particularly in light of a lack of coordination with alternative development programs.\(^{122}\) With regard to environmental and health consequences, the Secretary of State, as required by Congress, has reported that the herbicide, glyphosate, does not pose unreasonable health or safety risks to humans or the environment. In consultation for the certification, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that application rates of the aerial spray program in Colombia are within the parameters listed on U.S. glyphosate labels. However, press reports indicate that many Colombians believe the health consequences of aerial fumigation are grave, and many international non-governmental organizations criticize the certification for being analytically inadequate.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds alternative development programs to assist farmers of illicit crops in the switch from illicit to licit crops, and provides assistance with infrastructure and marketing. The approach includes job creation for rural families in coca-growing and conflict-prone areas with economic development potential. From 2002 through September 2009, the United States completed 1,290 social and productive infrastructure projects with communities that agreed to remain illicit crop free according to the Department of State.\(^{123}\) The USAID Mission in Colombia reports significant progress since funding started flowing for alternative development through Plan Colombia. By the end of FY2010, alternative development programs had benefitted 479,221 families and supported 476,215 hectares of licit crops (cumulative totals) in both coca and poppy areas.\(^{124}\)

The success of alternative development in Colombia has been limited both by security concerns and the limited scope of the program. The 2008 GAO report, among others, that examined the

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120 “Mixed Signals Among the Coca Bushes,” The Economist, June 27, 2009.
121 Ibid.
123 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2010.
124 USAID/Colombia provided information to CRS on March 15, 2011.
progress of Plan Colombia have identified weaknesses in the program such as a majority of the USAID alternative development projects were not located in areas where the majority of coca is grown in Colombia and they have not been evaluated regarding drug reduction goals or sustainability. Security concerns were blamed for the proposed withdrawal of USAID assistance from five departments where coca production was increasing, according to a USAID memo leaked to the press in October 2006. UNODC reported in June 2006 that alternative development programs have been successful, but only reach 9% of Colombian coca growers. The organization called for a tenfold increase in international donor support for alternative development programs.

In 2006, USAID redesigned its strategy to lure coca growers to geographic zones that offered economic opportunities from zones where coca had been grown. The two core projects of the current USAID strategy are More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS) and Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development (ADAM). As noted, both projects have generated thousands of hectares of licit crops and jobs, but the USAID projects have been criticized for not reaching those most vulnerable to coca cultivation nor providing adequate income substitution during the comparatively long time needed for alternative crops to mature and generate sufficient and sustainable income. Several assessments of USAID’s alternative development program under Plan Colombia cite the “zero coca” policy of the Colombian government as actually a barrier to reaching those impoverished farmers most vulnerable to coca growing. For example, in one 2009 assessment, researchers conducted interviews with USAID’s ADAM and MIDAS project staff and with Colombian government staff implementing a Forest Warden program, and they were told “alternative livelihoods assistance reaches only a small segment of the population in need, i.e. either cultivating coca or vulnerable to coca cultivation.”

Proponents of U.S. policy argue that both eradication and alternative development programs need time to work and that alternative development programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own. The Colombia program was designed to support the aerial and manual eradication programs. In FY2009, USAID reported it had targeted communities “vulnerable to coca production,” and created nearly 110,000 jobs benefiting over 80,000 families. In FY2010, USAID said it helped rural families produce more than 95,000 hectares of licit agricultural products and to create more than 150,000 jobs. Further, there have been recent reports that


126 The Uribe government policy conditioned all assistance on total eradication of coca crops from a particular area; even one violation by a single family disqualified a locality from receiving government assistance or assistance from international partners such as USAID. See U.S. GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance; Vanda Felbab-Brown et al, Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government’s Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components, April 17, 2009.


U.S.-funded programs have had some success in assisting communities with development projects located in key priority zones under the National Consolidation Plan (NCP) launched in Colombia in 2009. Increasingly, alternative development efforts support municipalities identified as priorities under the NCP. One pilot project in the Macarena region located in the department of Meta—a key cultivation zone—reduced coca growing by 85% between 2005-2009, compared to a 9.5% reduction during the same time period in other regions of Colombia.

National Consolidation Plan

In early 2007, the Colombian Ministry of Defense announced a “Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security” to guide security policy for the Uribe administration’s second term (2006-2010). The new strategy was intended to consolidate the gains of the Democratic Security policies that were successful in reducing violence in the first term and to consolidate state presence in marginal areas where insurgent activity by illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, and violence converged. Led by civilian and defense officials in the Ministry of Defense, this major shift in approach was based on an “integrated action doctrine” and was declared to be a “strategic leap” forward by then-Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos in March 2009.

Integrated action combines security, counternarcotics, and development in a sequenced approach targeting remote, but strategically important, areas. First, security forces enter a contested zone to stabilize and hold the area so that civilian state institutions can come in to provide social services such as justice, education, health, and housing to assert a positive state presence. The doctrine is based on the premise that all military and social actions are interdependent and no efforts can be successful if the others are not.

At the national level, the Colombian presidency’s Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI) directs the integrated action programs. Launched in 2009, the “National Consolidation Plan” applies this comprehensive approach nationally to build a positive state presence in the highest priority areas seen as strategic to the FARC. At the local level, application of this strategy is carried out at regional consolidation centers staffed by civilian, police, and military personnel. The two best-known examples, which have each received U.S. and international support, are the regional coordination centers established in the Macarena in the Meta department and Montes de María near the central Caribbean coast. Both are intended to function as models for CCAI efforts in other municipalities and regions in Colombia. Critics argue that the blurring of lines between military and civilian activities poses some dangers and that there is a need for increased civilian leadership and greater representation of local interests.

131 Rafael Romo, "Colombia Farmers Find Safety, Success in Growing Alternatives to Coca," CNN Broadcast, January 20, 2011.
134 CCAI is an interagency group that works out of the President’s office bringing together members from 15 government ministries and other state agencies for the purpose of coordinating government efforts to introduce state presence to priority areas where it had not existed or was weak. See Peter DeShazo, Phillip Mclean, Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Colombia’s Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena: An Assessment,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 2009.
135 For a thorough analysis of the strategy based on visits to the regional coordination centers in La Macarena and (continued...
USAID programs and the U.S. Department of Defense have strongly supported this approach and provided funding to CCAI programs since 2007. The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative aligns U.S. assistance with the new strategy. According to the State Department, the U.S. government collaborated with Colombia in 2008 to pilot integrated counternarcotics initiatives in three regions that combined security, eradication and development. According to the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in September 2010 President Santos “relaunched” the National Consolidation Plan (NCP) so it dovetails with Colombia’s development plans and targets zones that can become the source of new economic growth in Colombia. The report notes that the goals of the NCP are “to establish a more comprehensive government presence in former conflict and rural areas, deter coca replanting after eradication, improve interdiction along Colombia’s Pacific coastline, and provide alternative livelihoods for those currently engaged in the drug trade.”

Funding for Plan Colombia

From FY2000 through FY2010, U.S. funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies totaled over $7 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs. From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), and other aid accounts. In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds back into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. In addition, support for aerial eradication programs is provided from the State Department’s Air Wing account. The Defense Department requests a lump sum for all counternarcotics programs worldwide under Sections 1004 and 1033, and under Section 124, of the National Defense Authorization Act. DOD can reallocate these funds throughout the year in accordance with changing needs. While not considered a formal component of the ACP Program, the Defense Department has provided Colombia with additional funding for training and equipment for a number of years, as well as the deployment of personnel in support of Plan Colombia.

In 2008, there was significant debate in Congress about the proper balance between so-called “hard-side” security assistance (i.e., equipment and training to the Colombian military and police) and “soft-side” traditional development and rule of law programs. In its October 2008 report, the GAO stated that Plan Colombia had only partially fulfilled its drug reduction goals. In the years 2000-2006 coca cultivation and production of cocaine had actually increased by about 15% and 4%, respectively. The report concluded that while significant security gains were achieved by the Colombian government with U.S. assistance, coca farmers had taken effective countermeasures against eradications, and alternative development programs had not been implemented where the

(...continued)


137 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2011.
majority of coca is grown.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover, the report criticized the “nationalization” of Plan Colombia programs—the transfer of U.S.-administered programs to the Colombians—as too slow and lacking coordination.\textsuperscript{139}

While some Members supported the Bush Administration’s emphasis on security-related assistance to Colombia, others expressed concerns that the Administration put too much of an emphasis on the security assistance component. Many Members have expressed a desire to see a more rapid transfer of responsibility for the military operations associated with Plan Colombia from the United States to Colombia. Since FY2008, Congress has reduced and rebalanced assistance between security-related programs and economic and social aid in the annual foreign assistance appropriations legislation. In the Administration’s FY2011 budget request for foreign operations, aid to Colombia is proposed to decline from an estimated $507 million appropriated in FY2010 (not including DOD assistance) to $465 million requested for FY2011, with the balance between “soft-side” development assistance and “hard-side” security and counterdrug assistance moving closer to 50/50. The Obama Administration FY2011 request for foreign operations would reduce overall funding to Colombia by about 8% as Plan Colombia program management and funding is gradually turned over to Colombia. The FY2012 budget request for foreign operations would further decrease funding by approximately 14% below the level of the FY2011 request. \textbf{Table 3} provides a more detailed breakdown of U.S. assistance to Colombia from FY2000 through the FY2012 request.

\textsuperscript{138} According to the report: “… alternative development is not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not assess how such programs relate to strategic goals of reducing the production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results.”

Table 3. U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia, FY2000-FY2012
(in millions $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ACI/ACP</th>
<th>ESF</th>
<th>FMF</th>
<th>IMET</th>
<th>INCLE</th>
<th>NADR</th>
<th>Air Wing</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2000</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>128.5</td>
<td>226.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 106-246</td>
<td>832.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>932.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2001</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>190.2</td>
<td>276.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2002</td>
<td>379.9+</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>178.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2003</td>
<td>580.2+</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>164.8</td>
<td>808.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2004</td>
<td>473.9</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>178.2</td>
<td>797.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2005</td>
<td>462.8</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>769.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2006</td>
<td>464.8</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2007</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>244.6</td>
<td>194.4</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>700.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>230.1</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>127.9</td>
<td>669.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2010 (est)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>201.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>243.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>630.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2011 (req)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>202.9</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>204.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2012 (req)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>160.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>400.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,241.4</td>
<td>984.7</td>
<td>648.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>695.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>379.1</td>
<td>1,675.5</td>
<td>8,699.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Notes: For FY2000 and thereafter, Plan Colombia funds are assigned to the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) or the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The State Department transfers funds to other agencies carrying out programs in Colombia, of which USAID has received the largest portion. Defense Department data reflects non-budget quality estimates of DOD counternarcotics support provided. DOD requests one sum for programs around the world and adjusts its regional allocations as needed. Table 3 does not include P.L. 480 (Food Aid). Air Wing figures for FY2009 and FY2010 are estimates provided by the State Department. Accounts as follows: ACI/ACP=Andean Counterdrug Initiative/Andean Counterdrug Program; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs.

a. Includes $6 million appropriated to FMF but transferred to the ACI account.

b. Includes $93 million in FMF regular appropriations and $20 million in FMF supplemental funds that were transferred to the ACI account.

c. U.S. Department of State has subsequently reallocated sums to different accounts in the FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. In the FY2010 request, funds previously shown in the Andean Counterdrug Program moved to the State Department’s INCLE account.

U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement

On October 30, 2009, the United States and Colombia signed an agreement to provide the United States access to seven military facilities in Colombia to conduct joint counternarcotics and anti-terrorism operations over a 10-year period. The seven facilities include three Colombian air force...
bases at Palanquero, Apiay, and Malambo; two naval bases; and two army installations (see Figure 2 for base locations). The U.S. Congress authorized $46 million for construction at the Palanquero air base in Central Colombia in the defense authorization for FY2010 signed into law in October 2009 (P.L. 111-84). However, on August 17, 2010, the Colombian Constitutional Court declared the agreement unconstitutional because it had not been submitted to the Colombian Congress for approval. Since then, the Santos administration has not submitted the agreement to Congress, dampening the hostility to the agreement by Colombia’s neighbors, Venezuela and Ecuador, and other countries.

The disclosure regarding the negotiations and elements of the base agreement in mid-July 2009 resulted in a strong reaction from countries in the region led by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who claimed that he saw the placement of U.S. troops in Colombia as a threat and described the base agreement as fanning “the winds of war” across the region. Colombian President Uribe toured seven Latin American countries in early August 2009 to meet with heads of state in an effort to diffuse opposition to the agreement and allay concerns. Following this outreach effort, Brazil and Chile toned down their opposition to the agreement and cited Colombia’s sovereignty in the matter, but only Peru’s President, Alan Garcia, expressed outright support for the pending agreement.140

On August 18, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Colombia’s Foreign Minister Jaime Bermúdez to discuss the base deal.141 The same day, the U.S. State Department released a press announcement naming the pending agreement the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Through the announcement and at the meeting, officials noted that the DCA did not establish any new U.S. bases in Colombia, but would provide access or continue to provide use of seven Colombian military facilities to deepen existing security cooperation and that the agreement harmonizes and updates existing agreements. Negotiations for the agreement concluded August 14, 2009, followed by a review of the provisional agreement by both countries.142

Some observers believe the agreement was precipitated by the closing of a U.S. forward operating location (FOL)143 at a coastal air base in Manta, Ecuador, used for regional counterdrug operations. The FOL at Manta allowed U.S. forces to patrol the Pacific. The 10-year lease (1999-2009) was not renewed by Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa following up on his campaign promise to decrease U.S. presence in the region. The final U.S. mission from Manta was flown in July and the U.S. forces left Manta in September 2009.144

143 The term “forward operating location” or “FOL” has been replaced by “cooperative security location.” However, because Manta was called a FOL until the time it was closed the term is retained here.
According to the U.S. Department of State, the agreement with Colombia was not a replacement for the Manta FOL. The new agreement provided for U.S. and Colombian security cooperation including counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and other “mutually agreed upon activities” within Colombia. The radar-equipped aircraft based at Manta (including P-3 Orions and E-3 AWACS) used for anti-drug surveillance missions over multiple countries had been relocated to other locations in the Western Hemisphere including the United States and other FOLs based in El

145 Communication with State Department Desk Officer on October 9, 2009.
Salvador and Curacao. The DCA also did not change the cap on the number of U.S. personnel deployed in Colombia which remains the same as set by Congress in 2004 (P.L. 108-375)—800 military personnel and 600 contractors. U.S. personnel presence in recent years has declined to less than half of the authorized 1,400-person cap, which is a trend that is expected to continue.

**Additional Congressional Concerns**

**Paramilitary Demobilization**

In the 111th Congress, some Members expressed continued concern over the ongoing scandal involving paramilitary ties to Colombian politicians, the AUC demobilization process, and the overall demobilization framework under the Justice and Peace Law approved by the Colombian Congress in 2005. (For background, see “Para-political Scandal” and “The Justice and Peace Law and Demobilization.”)

The FY2006 Foreign Operations Act (P.L. 109-102) provided $20 million to assist in the demobilization of former members of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), provided that the Secretary of State certified that the assistance only went to individuals who had verifiably renounced and terminated membership in the FTO; that the Colombian government was cooperating with the United States on extradition; that the Colombian government was working to dismantle FTO structures; and that the funds would not be used to make cash payments to individuals. The FY2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act (111-117) provided $18.6 million to assist in the demobilization of former members of foreign terrorist organizations, pending a certification from the Secretary of State that was issued on August 31, 2010. In that certification, Secretary of State Clinton certified to Congress:

- That assistance will be provided only for individuals who have verifiably renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement with FTOs or other illegal armed groups, and are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia demobilization program, including disclosure of past crimes; the location of kidnapped victims and bodies of the disappeared; knowledge of FTO structure, financing, and assets; and are not involved in criminal activity.
- That the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United States to prosecute the extradited leaders and members of FTOs who have been indicted in the United States for murder, torture, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, or other violations of United States law.
- That the Colombian government is not knowingly taking steps to legalize titles of land or other assets illegally obtained by FTOs, their associates, or their successors; that the Colombian government has established effective procedures to identify such land and assets; and is seizing and returning such land and assets to their rightful owners and occupants.

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147 Interview with Department of Defense official on November 9, 2009.
• That the Colombian government is dismantling the organizational structures of FTOs and successor armed groups.

• That funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals, and funds will only be available for any of the following activities: verification, reintegration (including training and education), vetting, recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations and prosecutions.

Human Rights

Debate in the U.S. Congress has continued to focus on allegations of human rights abuses by the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces. The State Department’s February 2010 human rights report states that the Prosecutor General’s Office in Colombia has been assigned 1,302 cases concerning extrajudicial killings by the armed forces allegedly taking place between 1985 and 2009. Reportedly, progress in addressing the backlog of cases concerning extrajudicial killings has proceeded slowly. In June 2009, on a 10-day mission to Colombia, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions found the killings were not a result of official government policy. Nevertheless, according to the U.N. official, “the sheer number of cases, their geographic spread, and the diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killings were carried out in a more or less systematic fashion by significant elements within the military.”

Since 2002, Congress has required that the Secretary of State certify annually to Congress that the Colombian military and police forces are severing their links to the paramilitaries, investigating complaints of human rights abuses, and prosecuting those who have had credible charges made against them. Congress has made funding to the Colombian military contingent on these certifications which has been made since 2002. In the latest certification, issued on September 9, 2010, Secretary Clinton reported again that the Colombian government and armed forces are meeting the statutory requirements with regard to human rights. The Secretary noted that “Colombia’s security situation continues to improve, and years of reforms and training are leading to an increased respect for and understanding of human rights by most members of the Armed Forces...At the same time, however, impunity remains a concern, despite years of improvements to Colombia’s judicial system.”


150 This is one finding in U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces,” September 8, 2009. Available at http://justf.org/files/primarydocs/090908cert.pdf. For example in the continuing investigations of the Soacha murders, the report notes that family members of the victims have been threatened while 75 members of the armed forces were being investigated in connection with the murders.


152 Today certification is required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military can be released. In prior years, 25% of funds was held back and released upon certification by the Secretary of State. CRS communication with State Department, March 18, 2011.

Congress has also regularly included another mechanism to prevent human rights abuses: the so-called Leahy Amendment in foreign operations appropriations legislation that denies funds to any security force unit for which the Secretary of State has credible evidence that it has committed gross human rights violations. (The restriction was codified as Section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, (P.L. 110-161).) The Secretary may continue funding if she determines and reports to Congress that the foreign government is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of these security forces to justice. There have been Colombian units that have been disqualified or “not vetted for cause.” Despite these measures, human rights organizations claim that the U.S. government often turns a blind eye to questionable activities of Colombian security forces.

**U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement**

In 2003, the Bush Administration announced its intention to begin negotiating an Andean region free trade agreement (FTA) with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In its announcement, the Administration asserted that an FTA would reduce and eliminate barriers to trade and investment, support democracy, and fight drug activity. After regional talks broke down, the United States separately pursued bilateral trade agreements with Colombia and Peru. The United States and Colombia signed the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement on November 22, 2006, now called the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia had benefitted from the Andean Trade-Promotion and Drug-Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which in 2002 replaced the former Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The law provides eligible countries with unilateral preferential access to the U.S. market for certain products in order to encourage legitimate economic activity in place of a dependence on the illegal narcotics trade. In the case of Bolivia, the Bush administration suspended its designation in November 2008, stating that Bolivia had failed to meet eligibility criteria requiring cooperation with U.S. counterdrug efforts. In December 2009, the 111th Congress extended ATPDEA trade preferences to Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador through December 31, 2010 (P.L. 111-124), and late in the second session provided a six-week extension (P.L. 111-344) for Colombia and Ecuador until February 12, 2011, when it expired. If the CFTA is not approved this year, Congress could take action to renew the ATPDEA benefits for Colombia.

Critics of the free trade agreement are concerned about the status of labor rights in Colombia and the ongoing para-political scandal. Critics argue that violence against labor activists in Colombia is excessive and inadequately addressed by the Colombian government. Labor activist killings declined during President Uribe’s first term, but increased in 2006. Data on the number of labor leaders murdered in any given year vary by source. In 2006, the Colombian government estimated that 60 labor activists were killed, while the National Labor School (ENS, a Colombian NGO) estimated that 72 labor activists were killed. In 2007, both groups reported a drop, with the Colombian government reporting 26 labor activists killed and ENS estimating 39 labor activists killed. In 2008, the Colombian government reported 38 murders and ENS reported 49 murders.

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156 Ibid.

157 U.S. Department of State, “Charting Colombia’s Progress,” November 5, 2008. Another possible reason for the decline in murders is the overall decline in labor union membership in Colombia. Unions have dwindled from 13% of the formal labor force in 1965 to 4.4% of the 18.4 million workforce currently. For further discussion of labor violence and trends, see CRS Report RL34759, *Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues*, by Mary Jane (continued...)
In 2009, the government reported a decline to 28 murders and ENS reported a slight decline to 47 murders of labor activists.\(^{158}\) For more information about the reasons for the discrepancy between government and nongovernmental organizations’ tallies, see CRS Report RL34759, *Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues*, by Mary Jane Bolle.

Another area of concern is whether labor activists were killed because of their union activity. Very few investigations have been completed. More than 2,000 incidents of violence involving killings and threats between 1991 and 2006 have been alleged. A Special Labor Sub-Unit of the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office, set up in 2006, now employs 19 prosecutors and 76 investigators assigned 1,387 labor-related cases to investigate and process, including 185 priority cases. According to the State Department, the Labor Sub-Unit has achieved 344 convictions, including 76 in 2010, involving 392 individuals who committed violent acts against trade unionists.\(^{159}\) A vast majority of the 1,387 cases are either under investigation or in preliminary phases of the prosecutorial process. With regard to the 185 priority cases, as of June 15, 2010, the Sub-Unit achieved 83 convictions in 56 of those cases, convicting a total of 100 individuals.\(^{160}\) Labor groups argue much more needs to be done to end impunity for crimes targeting trade unionists.\(^{161}\)

On April 8, 2008, President Bush submitted implementing legislation to Congress for the CFTA. The 2002 Trade Promotion Authority procedures stipulated that Congress must vote on that implementing legislation within 90 legislative days of its introduction. But on April 10, 2008, the House voted 224-195 in favor of changing those procedures, effectively putting congressional consideration of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement on hold. It is unclear whether and how the 112\(^{th}\) Congress will consider implementing legislation for the pending CFTA. It could be considered pursuant to the usual rules or the House could restore TPA-like “fast track” procedures.\(^{162}\)

The intent and role of the Obama Administration regarding reintroduction and passage of the CFTA is also unclear. During his campaign, President Obama favored delaying consideration of the trade agreement in order to pressure the Colombian government to further reduce labor violence.\(^{163}\) In June 2009, President Obama met with President Uribe at the White House and


\(^{159}\) Communications from the U.S. Department of State to CRS on March 17, 2011.


\(^{162}\) For more information on procedures, see CRS Report RL34470, *The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement*, by M. Angeles Villarreal.

afterward told reporters that he had asked the U.S. Trade Representative to work closely with the Colombian government to see how the two countries could proceed on the pending FTA. President Obama praised President Uribe for progress in addressing trade union violence. Colombia has recently negotiated free trade agreements with Canada and the European Union, which, when they take effect, could increase competitiveness with the United States in various sectors. In December 2010, the Obama Administration announced the successful completion of negotiations to modify a free trade agreement with South Korea, originally signed in 2007.\(^\text{164}\) In early 2011, some Members of Congress have urged the Obama Administration to bundle the pending CFTA, the pending Panama free trade agreement, and the pending South Korea free trade agreement for passage.\(^\text{165}\)


Appendix. Key Developments in 2010

On June 20, 2010, former defense minister Juan Manuel Santos won in a landslide victory a runoff election to become president of Colombia against former two-time Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus.

On May 30, 2010, Juan Manuel Santos and Antanas Mockus came in first and second in the presidential election. Because neither candidate won a majority, the vote required a runoff.

On March 30, 2010, the FARC released Sergeant Pablo Emilio Moncayo, thought to be the insurgents’ longest held hostage who spent over 12 years in captivity. A few days before, another soldier who had been held for 11 months was released.

On March 14, 2010, congressional elections took place in advance of the May 2010 presidential election. Indicating strong popular support for continuity with the policies of the Uribe administration, the two parties in the ruling coalition, the National Unity Party (also known as the Partido de la U or the U Party) and the Conservative Party, won the most seats. Together with other parties in Uribe’s center-right coalition, they secured a majority in both houses of Congress. (For more, see “2010 Congressional and Presidential Elections.”)

On February 26, 2010, the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled by a 7 to 2 majority to deny a referendum to allow President Uribe to run for a third term. This ended months of speculation that had frozen the campaign for president for the elections scheduled for May 30, 2010.

On January 8, 2010, 17 soldiers, accused of the extrajudicial executions of young men from the Bogota slum of Soacha, were released from protective detention by a Colombian judge because the pre-trial procedures had taken too long. Six additional soldiers, of the more than 40 implicated in the Soacha murder case, were released on January 12. The representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia expressed concern that these rulings would adversely effect the investigation of extrajudicial executions involving at least 1,200 cases by the Prosecutor General’s human rights team.

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