Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress

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January 28, 2011
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Summary

Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro implemented limited economic policy changes in 2008 and 2009, and in September 2010 began a significant series of reforms to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, although it has reduced the number of political prisoners over the past several years, including the release of more than 50 since July 2010 after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a re-examination of policy. Two broad approaches toward Cuba have been at the center of debate. The first would maintain the dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people. The second is aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased engagement. The Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances; eased restrictions on telecommunications links with Cuba; restarted semi-annual migration talks; and recently announced further easing of restrictions on educational and religious travel and non-family remittances. The Administration has criticized the government’s repression of dissidents, but it welcomed Cuba’s July 2010 announcement of a prisoner release as a positive sign. The Administration also has called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor imprisoned since December 2009.

The 111th Congress took action on several measures that included provisions related to Cuba. In March 2009, Congress approved three provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased sanctions on family travel, travel for the marketing of agricultural and medical goods, and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports. In December 2009, Congress included a provision in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 111-117) that eased payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2010 by defining the term “payment of cash in advance” more broadly. While Congress did not complete action on any of the FY2011 appropriations measures, it did approve a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011 under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This extended the more restrictive “payment of cash in advance provision” and also continued Cuba broadcasting and democracy funding. Numerous other initiatives were introduced, but not considered, several of which would have eased sanctions on Cuba in various ways.

Congressional interest on Cuba is likely to continue in the 112th Congress, focused on a number of issues, including U.S. sanctions, the human rights situation, Cuba’s imprisonment of a U.S. government subcontractor, the status of Cuba’s economic reforms, and its offshore oil development. For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances and CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations.
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Introduction

Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many years. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both of these measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba that had first been imposed in the early 1960s, but the measures also provided roadmaps for a normalization of relations dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. A decade ago, Congress modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba somewhat when it enacted the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) allowing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that led to the United States becoming a major source for Cuba’s food imports.

Over the past decade, much of the debate over U.S. policy in Congress has focused on U.S. sanctions, especially over U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. The George W. Bush Administration initially liberalized U.S. family travel to Cuba in 2003, but subsequently tightened restrictions on family and other categories of travel in 2004 because of Cuba’s crackdown on political dissidents. In 2009, Congress took legislative action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions on family travel and travel for the marketing of agricultural exports, marking the first congressional action easing Cuba sanctions in almost a decade. The Obama Administration took further action in April 2009 by lifting all restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances by family members to their relatives in Cuba and re-starting semi-annual migration talks that had been curtailed in 2004. In January 2011, the Administration announced that it would be further easing restrictions on educational and religious travel to Cuba and on non-family remittances, and it would also expand the number of eligible airports in the United States authorized to serve licensed charter flights to and from Cuba.

This report is divided into three major sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic situation, U.S. policy toward Cuba, and selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. The first section on the political and economic situation includes a brief historical background, a discussion of the human rights situation and political prisoners, and an examination of economic policy changes that have occurred to date under Raúl Castro. The second section on U.S. policy provides a broad overview of U.S. policy historically through the George W. Bush Administration and then provides a brief discussion of the broad debate on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Policy under the Obama Administration is then examined in more detail. The third section analyzes many of the key issues in U.S.-Cuban relations that have been at the forefront of the U.S. policy debate on Cuba and have often been the subject of legislative initiatives. These include: U.S. restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural exports to Cuba; a sanction that denies protection for certain Cuban trademarks; the status of anti-drug cooperation with Cuba; the status of Cuba’s offshore development and implications for disaster response preparedness; terrorism issues, especially in consideration of Cuba remaining on the State Department’s state sponsors of terrorism list; U.S. funding for democracy and human rights projects; U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); and migration issues.
Figure 1. Map of Cuba

Source: CRS.
Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation

Brief Historical Background

Cuba did not become an independent nation until 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the country became a major sugar producer with slaves from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to work the sugar plantations. The drive for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second half of the 19th century, but it only came about after the United States entered the conflict when the USS Maine sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba was granted its independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States still retained the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the Platt Amendment that became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901. The United States subsequently intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in 1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed.

Cuba’s political system as an independent nation was often dominated by authoritarian figures. Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952 and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship. This fueled popular unrest and set the stage for Fidel Castro’s rise to power.

Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He was jailed, but subsequently freed and went into exile in Mexico where he formed the 26th of July Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra and joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the country on January 1, 1959, leading to more than 45 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped down from power provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health.

While Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took power, he instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute thousands of opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually displaced members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet Union while

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2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriation bill that was approved by both houses and enacted into law in 1901.
relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government expropriated U.S. properties (see “Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations” below). In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years, Cuba was a close ally of the Soviet Union and depended on it for significant assistance until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then, legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the president of the Council of State.

Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. While he had provisionally stepped down from power in July 2006 because of poor health, Fidel still officially retained his position as head of state and government. National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 and Fidel Castro was once again among the candidates elected to the now 614-member legislative body. (As in the past, voters were only offered a single slate of candidates.) On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State and its president. Many observers had speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would choose not to be re-elected as president of the Council of State, which would confirm his official departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would not accept the position as president of the Council of State, essentially confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.

**Political Conditions**

After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. After two and one half years of provisionally serving as president, Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s President on February 24, 2008 when Cuba’s legislature selected him as president of the 31-member Council of State.5

For many years, Raúl, as first vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become head of state with Fidel’s departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) since the beginning of the Cuban revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, he signed a proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl on a provisional basis, including the positions of first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, commander in chief of the FAR, and president of

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5 For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, *Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro*. For background discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios envisioned in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, *Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches*. 

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the Council of State. Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the official title of first secretary of the PCC, although Raúl as provisional first secretary is essentially leading the party.

While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel officially as head of government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s first vice president in February 2008 was a surprise. Born in 1930, Machado is a physician by training and is part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution along with the Castro brothers (Fidel Castro was born on August 13, 1926, while Raúl Castro was born on June 3, 1931). He has been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raúl for many years. Machado’s position is significant because it makes him the official successor to Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of five other vice presidents on the Council of State, would have been chose as first vice president. Born in 1951, Lage was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s and represented a younger generation of Cuban leaders.

Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council of State, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, who already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its extensive business operations.

In March 2009, Raúl orchestrated a government shake-up that combined four ministries into two and ousted a dozen high-ranking officials, most notably including Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, Council of Ministers Secretary Carlos Lage, and Minister of Economy and Planning José Luis Rodriguez García. The streamlining combined the portfolios of food and fishing into one ministry and the foreign investment and trade portfolios into another ministry. Changes in the bureaucracy had been anticipated since February 2008 when Raúl Castro vowed to make the government smaller and more efficient, but the ouster of both Felipe Pérez Roque and Carlos Lage, who lost all their government and party positions, caught many observers by surprise. Pérez Roque was replaced by career diplomat Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, who served for eight years (1995-2003) as Cuba’s U.N. Ambassador and most recently as vice foreign minister. Carlos Lage, who most significantly lost his position as a vice president of the Council of State, was replaced by military General José Amado Guerra, who had worked for Raúl Castro as secretary of the FAR.

What was unexpected about the simultaneous ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was that they represented different tendencies within Cuba’s communist political system. Pérez Roque, a former private secretary to Fidel, was known as a hardliner, while Carlos Lage, who was responsible for Cuba’s limited economic reforms in the 1990s, was viewed as a potential economic reformer. Some observers maintain that the ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was a move by Raúl to replace so-called Fidelistas with his own supporters. Fidel, however, wrote in one of his reflections in the Cuban press that both officials had been seduced by ambitions for

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power, and that a majority of the other officials who were replaced by Raúl had not originally been appointed by Fidel.⁶ Along these lines, a number of observers maintain that the ouster of Pérez Roque and Lage had more to do with removing potential contenders for power in a post-Castro Cuba. What appears clear from the government shake-up is that Raúl Castro began putting his mark on the Cuban government bureaucracy. Some observers contend that Raúl was moving forward with his pledge to make the government more efficient. According to this view, ideology did not play a role in the appointments, and several of those brought in as ministers were relatively unknown technocrats.⁷ The new appointments also continued the trend toward bringing more military officials into the government.

While Raúl began implementing some limited economic reforms in 2008 and announced more significant reforms in September 2010 (see “Economic Changes Under Raúl Castro” below), there has been no change to his government’s tight control over the political system and few observers expect there to be, with the government backed up by a strong security apparatus. Some observers point to the significantly reduced number of political prisoners over the past several years as evidence of a lessening of repression, but while human rights activists have welcomed the change, some maintain that the overall situation has not improved, with the government resorting to short term detentions and other forms of intimidation.

Originally, the Cuban Communist Party’s sixth congress was expected to be held at the end of 2009 (the last was held in 1997), but the party postponed it, with Raúl Castro maintaining that additional and extensive preparation was needed for the meeting. Observers maintain that Cuba’s poor economic situation prompted the postponement of the congress.

In early November 2010, however, Raúl Castro announced that the sixth party congress would be held in April 2011. The President maintained that the congress would concentrate on the economy, with decisions on updating the Cuban economic model, and outlining the economic and social policy of the party and the revolution. While some analysts had speculated that Fidel Castro would be officially replaced as head of the party during the congress, and that it was likely that some members of the PCC’s Political Bureau (Politburo) would be replaced, Raúl Castro maintained that decisions regarding the party’s leadership would be postponed until the end of 2011 when a separate party conference would be held.

**Human Rights**

Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since the early years of the Cuban revolution. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Some observers anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, but government attacks against human rights activists and other dissidents continued. (See the text box on “Human Rights Reporting on Cuba” for links to reports from Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the State Department.

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⁶ According to Fidel Castro, “The sweetness of power for which they had made no sacrifice awoke in them ambitions that led them to an unworthy role. The external enemy was filled with illusions about them.” See Reflections of Fidel, “Healthy Changes within the Council of Ministers,” from CubaDebate as translated by Granma Internacional, March 3, 2009.

Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties in 2008: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some considered this a positive step, but others maintain that the Cuban government has not taken any significant action to guarantee civil and political freedoms. In March 2008, the Cuban government did lift the ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be able to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move was symbolically significant and ended the practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”

While Cuban authorities have continued to stifle dissent and repress freedoms, Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists continue to call attention to the country’s poor human rights record and many have been recognized over the years by the international community for their efforts.

A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was formed in April 2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75” dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown. The group conducts peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s Church in Havana and then walk silently through the streets to a nearby park. In April 2008, 10 members of the Ladies in White were physically removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned. The group held protests during the third week of March 2010 to commemorate the March 2003 crackdown. Cuban security forces and government-orchestrated mobs forcefully broke up the protests on March 16 and 17, while protests on other days were subject to verbal abuse by mobs. In April, the Ladies in White were prevented from conducting their weekly protests by government-orchestrated mobs. Through the intercession of Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the Cuban government ended the harassment in early May 2010 and allowed the Ladies in White to continue with their weekly marches.

Cuban Internet blogger Yoani Sánchez has received considerable international attention since late 2007 for her website, Generación Y, which includes commentary critical of the Cuban government. In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital journalism, but the Cuban government did not provide her with an exit permit allowing her to travel to Spain to accept the award. (Sánchez’s website is available at http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/). On November 6, 2009, Sánchez and two other bloggers, Orlando Luis Pardo and Claudia Cadelo, were intercepted by state security agents while walking on a Havana street on their way to participate in a march against violence. Sánchez and Pardo were beaten in the assault. The Department of State issued a statement deploring the assault, and expressed its deep concern to the Cuban government for the incident.

**Political Prisoners**

The Cuban government conducted a severe crackdown in March 2003 (often referred to as the Primavera Negra, or Black Spring) and imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including

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8 The website of the Damas de Blanco is available at http://www.damasdeblanco.com/.
independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties. Until mid-2010, a majority of the “group of 75” political prisoners remained incarcerated, but the Cuban Catholic Church held talks with the Cuban government in July 2010 that led to the promise of their release. Since then, the government has released 57 political prisoners overall, with all but one traveling to exile in Spain; 11 of the “group of 75” remain imprisoned and upon their release want to stay in Cuba or travel to the United States. Human rights groups estimate that today there are about 100 political prisoners remaining – down from just over 200 at the beginning of 2010.

**Human Rights Reporting on Cuba**

Human Rights Watch issued a report in November 2009 criticizing Cuba’s human rights record under the government of Raúl Castro. According to the report, Raúl has kept Cuba’s repressive machinery in place, with scores of political prisoners languishing in jail and the use of “draconian laws and sham trials to incarcerate scores more who have dared to exercise their fundamental freedoms.” In particular, the report noted that the Cuban government has relied on a “dangerousness” provision of the Cuban criminal code that allows the state to imprison individuals before they have committed a crime. (“New Castro, Same Cuba: Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era,” Human Rights Watch, November 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/18/new-castro-same-cuba.)

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintained in its 2009 annual human rights report that “for decades, the restrictions to political rights, freedom of expression, and dissemination of thought have created a permanent and systematic situation whereby the human rights of Cuba’s inhabitants are infringed” and that “the lack of independence of the judiciary has further aggravated this situation.” (Annual Report of the IACHR 2009, December 30, 2009, Cuba section in Chapter IV available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.IV.b.eng.htm.)

According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2009, issued in March 2010, the Cuban government continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. Among the human rights problems cited in the State Department report were “beatings and abuse of prisoners and detainees, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including denial of medical care; harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-recruited mobs, police, and state security officials acting with impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights advocates and members of independent professional organizations; and denial of fair trial…” (See the report, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136108.htm.)

Amnesty International published a report in June 2010, which concluded that the Cuban government “continues to resort to repressive tactics and criminal proceedings to restrict and punish the free expression of opinions.” According to the report, Cuba’s laws severely restrict the legitimate exercise of free expression in violation of international human rights standards while the judiciary, which lacks impartiality and independence, is complicit in the repression of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The report called on Cuba to make changes to its laws and practices restricting freedom of expression, end the harassment of dissidents, ratify the U.N. human rights treaties that it signed in 2008, and allow U.N. and OAS human rights officials access to visit Cuba with unfettered access to all individuals and groups of civil society. (Amnesty International, Restrictions on Freedom of Expression in Cuba, June 2010, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR25/005/2010/en.)

The independent Havana-based Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) documented in a July 2010 report that Cuba held at least 167 political prisoners, down from the 201 prisoners documented in January 2010. The figures reflected a continuing decline from previous years when the commission estimated at least 205 prisoners at the beginning of 2009, 283 prisoners at the beginning of 2007, and 333 at the beginning of 2006. Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, the commission maintained in its report that the government has adopted lower-profile tactics of political repression against human rights activists over the past several years, including arbitrary short-term detentions and other forms of harassment or intimidation. The commission estimated that there were thousands of people imprisoned under the charge of “social dangerousness,” which allows detention of those who authorities think will commit a crime. (Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, “Informe Semestral (Enero-Junio de 2010), La Habana, ,” July 5, 2010, available at: http://cubadata.blogspot.com/2010/07/informe-sobre-la-situacion-de-derechos.html.)
The death of imprisoned Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo on February 23, 2010, after an 83-day hunger strike focused increased U.S. and world attention on the plight of Cuba’s political prisoners. Zapata, who was 42 years old at the time of his death, was arrested on March 20, 2003, while taking part in a hunger strike to demand the release of political prisoner Oscar Biscet. He was a member of the Alternative Republican Movement and the National Civic Resistance Committee. Zapata was not counted among the “group of 75” political prisoners arrested in 2003, but in January 2004, Amnesty International declared that he was a prisoner of conscience. In May 2004, Zapata was sentenced to three years in prison for “disrespect, public disorder, and resistance,” but he was subsequently tried on further charges and was serving a total sentence of 36 years.9

U.S. officials maintained that Zapata’s death highlighted the injustice of Cuba’s holding political prisoners and called for their immediate release.10 President Obama issued a statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, including the death of Zapata, the repression of the Ladies in White, and increased harassment of those who dare to express support for their fellow Cuban citizens. The President called for the end of repression, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of the Cuban people. On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, FL), which recognized Zapata’s life and called for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally recognized human rights in Cuba.

Zapata’s death also prompted considerable criticism from human rights organizations and other countries. Amnesty International expressed strong criticism of the death of Zapata, which it maintained was an “indictment of the continuing repression of political dissidents in Cuba.” It called for Cuba to invite international human rights experts to visit Cuba to verify respect for human rights.11 The European Parliament condemned the death of Zapata and called for the “immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners,” and even Spain, which had been lobbying the European Union for a relaxation of its common policy on Cuba, urged the release of Cuban political prisoners. Chile and Costa Rica also criticized Cuba for Zapata’s death, and Mexico expressed concern for the health of Cuban dissidents. President Raúl Castro said that he regretted Zapata’s death, but he also maintained that no one has been tortured or murdered in Cuba.12

Zapata’s death prompted protests by other dissidents, and several dissidents vowed to undertake hunger strikes. Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas began a hunger strike on February 24, 2010, calling for the release of 26 political prisoners who were reported to be in ill health. Fariñas had undertaken numerous other hunger strikes over the years, but he developed complications and a blood clot that drove him to near death before he ended the strike on July 8, 2010, when the Cuban government, after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church, announced that it would release 52 political prisoners.

The Cuban Catholic Church has played a key role in the release of political prisoners since May 2010. On May 19, 2010, Cardinal Jaime Ortega, Archbishop of Havana, and Archbishop Dionisio Garcia from Santiago met with President Castro, the first such meeting to take place since Raúl officially took over the presidency from his brother. The Church leaders described the meeting as positive, and said that discussion included the status of imprisoned dissidents. By the end of June 2010, the government released seven political prisoners and began transferring a number of other political prisoners to facilities closer to their homes.

On July 7, 2010, Cardinal Ortega met again with President Castro along with visiting Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez. After the meeting, Cuba’s Catholic Church announced that Cuban authorities would free 52 political prisoners within three to four months from those remaining of the “group of 75” imprisoned during Cuba’s Black Spring of March 2003. A press release from the Archdiocese of Havana announcing the release was printed in the Cuban daily Granma. Since October 2010, the Catholic Church has announced that additional prisoners were being released beyond the 52 announced in July. As noted above, by late December 2010, a total of 57 political prisoners had been released, with 56 agreeing to go to Spain and 1 released on humanitarian parole to remain in Cuba. This included 41 of the 52 prisoners that the government agreed in July to release.

According to Cardinal Ortega, some of the remaining 11 political prisoners want to stay in Cuba and some want to travel to the United States. In early January 2011, Cardinal Ortega maintained that he expected the remaining 11 would be released in the coming months.

While human rights organizations viewed positively the announcement in July that 52 political prisoners would be released, some qualified their statements. Amnesty International called for the dissidents’ immediate release instead of waiting three to four months. Human Rights Watch called for the release of all remaining political prisoners as well as the dismantling of Cuba’s authoritarian laws and practices.

Upon hearing of the Church’s announcement of the prisoner release, Secretary of State Clinton said that it was “a positive sign” and that the United States welcomed it. The State Department subsequently issued a statement welcoming the announcement by Cardinal Ortega that the prisoners would be released, and lauding the efforts of the Cuban Catholic Church, Spain, and others who have worked toward the release of Cuba’s prisoners of conscience. The State Department maintained that “this is a positive development that we hope will represent a step towards increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,” while also calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. The State Department also stated that “all those released from prison should be free to decide for themselves whether to remain in Cuba or travel to another country.” Some Members of Congress also expressed concern that the political prisoners were being exiled to Spain, and that

14 Arzobispado de La Habana, Nota de Prensa, December 23, 2010. This and previous press releases of the Archdiocese of Havana regarding the release of political prisoners are available at: http://www.palabranueva.net/.
17 “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Media Availability with Jordan Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, July 8, 2010.
there remained thousands of more prisoners in Cuba incarcerated on the charge of “dangerousness” before they committed any crime.

Economic Conditions

Cuba’s economy is largely state-controlled, with the government owning most means of production and employing about 82% of the labor force. Key sectors of the economy that generate foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel to Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with 2.42 million tourists visiting Cuba in 2009; nickel and cobalt mining, with the Canadian mining company Sherritt International involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector that supplies the domestic healthcare system and has fostered a significant export industry. Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, have also become a significant source of hard currency, with more than $1 billion reportedly sent to Cuba in 2009. The once-dominant sugar industry has declined significantly over the past 20 years; in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4 million tons of sugar while in 2009 it produced just 1.1 million tons, with the majority consumed domestically and most of the remainder exported to China. 19

As noted above, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically ended, and as a result, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline ranging from 35% to 50%. Since then, however, there has been considerable improvement. From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually. Economic growth was especially strong in the 2004-2008 period (see Figure 2) registering an impressive 11.2% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma), 12.1% in 2006, and 7.3% in 2007 before slowing to 4.1% in 2008. 20 The economy benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba also benefits from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. The market value of Venezuela’s oil to Cuba reportedly amounted to over $2 billion annually in 2006 and 2007, and over $3 billion in 2008, which Cuba pays for at least in part through medical and other services provided to Venezuela. 21

Since 2009, however, Cuba’s economic growth has slowed, to 1.4% in 2009 and an estimated 1.5% in 2010. 22 The global financial crisis has had a negative effect on the Cuban economy because of lower world prices for nickel and a reduction in tourism from Canada and Europe. Cuba was also still recovering from the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, particularly in the agricultural sector. As a result of the economic downturn, the


government announced austerity measures in 2009 that included energy rationing and cutbacks in transportation and some food programs.

Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and education. According to the U.N. Development Program’s 2010 Human Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba in 2007 was 78.8 years and adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%. Cuba has also boasted a 2010 infant mortality rate of 4.5 per 1,000 live births (compared to 7 per 1,000 in the United States). In terms of its per capita income level, the World Bank estimates that Cuba’s per capita income level is in the upper-middle-income range (between $3,856 - $11,905), higher than nine other countries in the Americas.

When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993, the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in 1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place, and approved a new foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In 1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such

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23 José A. De la Osa, “Cuba Reduces Infant Mortality Rate to 4.5,” Granma, January 1, 2011.
zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.

After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began to backtrack on some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants were forced to close because of the new regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures. Also in 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that at the time accepted dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged for “convertible pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange.

Economic Changes Under Raúl Castro

When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential economic reforms re-emerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase efficiency and production. In the aftermath of the speech, Cuban public expectations for economic reform increased as thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in workplaces and local PCC branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air their views and discuss the future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more private businesses.

After Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in 2008, his government announced a series of economic changes. In his first speech as president in February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential revaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity. In March, the government announced that it would lift restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players as well as on the use of cell phones.

The government also announced that it would begin revamping the state’s wage system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This was an effort to boost productivity and to deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic human needs can be satisfied. The promised revamp of the wage system, however, has been delayed. The problem of low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic challenge in Cuba: how to unify the two official currencies circulating in the country—the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban peso, which trade at about 24 to 1 CUC. Most people are paid in Cuban pesos, and the minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos (about $9 U.S.

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dollars), but for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans with access to foreign remittances or who work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those Cubans who do not have such access.

A significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agricultural sector, a vital issue because Cuba reportedly imports some two-thirds of its food needs. In an effort to boost food production, the government began in 2008 to give farmers more discretion over how to use their land and what supplies to buy. The government also began a program of turning idle land into productive use through a land grant program, whereby private farmers and cooperatives can apply for land. Despite these efforts, it has been reported in 2010 that overall food production is significantly below targets, and shortages of some basic agricultural products have been reported in Havana and elsewhere. Continued problems in the agricultural sector focus on an entrenched system whereby famers depend on the state for fuel, pesticides, fertilizers and other resources in exchange for 70%-80% of what they produce. The government’s inability to provide enough resources to farmers has hampered production, and its domination of the distribution process has hampered the delivery of products to market.

At the beginning of 2010, there was a hint of forthcoming changes when Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning Marino Murillo reportedly said in January 2010 that “the gigantic paternalist state can no longer be, because there is no longer any way to maintain it.” In April 2010, the Cuban government began a pilot project turning over some state-run barber shops and hair salons to their employees.

Since September 2010, the Cuban government has announced a series of potentially significant reforms designed to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. On September 13, 2010, the government announced that by the end of March 2011 it would identify half a million state workers that would be laid off, with most expected to find work in the expanding private sector. The layoffs, which began in early January 2011, reportedly will affect all public sector employees, including in the public service and state-owned enterprises. Over the next five years, a total of 1.2 million state employees would be cut (out of about 4.3 million state workers). On September 24, the government announced an expansion of self-employment, identifying 178 categories of work allowed with 83 of those allowing small businesses to hire non-family members. The self-employment categories cover a wide range of employment from “carpenters, gardeners, artisans, and animal trainers to small businesses such as home-based bed and breakfasts, rental property, restaurants, pizzerias, and snack shops.” New tax provisions would generate income for the government and include a new sales tax and social security tax. As noted above, Cuba’s Communist Party has plans to hold its sixth congress in April 2011, which will focus on making changes to Cuba’s economic model.

35 Ibid.
Cuba’s Foreign Relations

During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy system helped fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its revolutionary activities abroad.

As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was forced to open up its economy and economic relations with countries worldwide, and developed significant trade and investment linkages with Canada, Spain, other European countries, and China. In recent years, Venezuela—under populist President Hugo Chávez—has become a significant source of support for subsidized oil imports and investment for Cuba. In 2009, Cuba’s main trading partners included Venezuela, China, Spain, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Vietnam, and even the United States (for agricultural exports to Cuba). (See Figure 3 and Figure 4 for Cuba’s major trading partners in terms of exports and imports). Relations with Russia have also recently intensified, with the November 2008 visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Havana, the visit of several Russian warships to Cuba in December 2008, and Raúl Castro’s visit to Russia in January 2009. Chinese President Hu Jintao also visited Cuba in November 2008, signing a dozen agreements. China recently agreed to invest in upgrading an oil refinery. In Cuba’s offshore oil sector, a consortium led by the Spanish oil company Repsol is planning to drill an exploratory well in 2011 and a number of state-owned foreign oil companies have concessions to explore offshore for oil.

With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva visited Cuba twice in 2008, and Cuba seems especially interested in expanding relations with Brazil. Cuba became a full member of the 23 member Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean nations in November 2008. Raúl Castro made his first foreign trip as president in December 2008, when he traveled to Venezuela, and then to Bahia, Brazil, where he attended the Latin American and Caribbean Integration and Development Summit, a regional initiative of President Lula.36

Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the United Nations and the controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly has approved a resolution each year criticizing the U.S. economic embargo and urging the United States to lift it. Cuba also has received support over the years from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), both of which have offices in Havana. Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba hosted the 14th summit of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 2006, and held the Secretary Generalship of the NAM until its July 2009 summit in Egypt. Cuba is a member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, (ALBA), a Venezuelan-led integration and cooperation scheme founded as an alternative to U.S. efforts to negotiate a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2009

![Pie chart showing Cuban imports by country of origin, 2009](chart.png)


Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with Marxism-Leninism, but in early June 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move that could eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. While the Cuban government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS. (For further

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations

In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba, including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.

These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any sea-borne vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are met, although the CACR includes licensing authority that provides the executive branch with some administrative flexibility (e.g., travel-related restrictions in the CACR have been eased and tightened on numerous occasions). Another significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.

37 For further background on U.S. policy, see some of the archived CRS reports on Cuba listed in Appendix B of this report, including CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999.
property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama have suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.

In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with restrictions on financing such exports. This has led to the United States becoming Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products since 2002.

Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions

The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of Pope John Paul II’s 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.

In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports activities.

Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions

The George W. Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the Administration emphasized stronger enforcement of economic sanctions and further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. The Administration established an interagency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in late 2003 tasked with identifying means to help the Cuban people bring about an expeditious end of the dictatorship” and to consider “the requirements for United States assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba.” In issuing its first report in May 2004, the Commission made recommendations to tighten restrictions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. The Administration subsequently issued these tightened restrictions in June 2004, while in February

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Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress

2005, it tightened restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The Commission issued a second and final report in July 2006 that made recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition and led to a substantial increase in U.S. funding to support democracy and human rights efforts in Cuba.40

The Bush Administration continued to emphasize a continuation of the sanctions-based approach toward Cuba pending political change in Cuba. When Raúl Castro officially became head of state in February 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement urging “the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards free and fair elections.”41 In remarks on Cuba policy in March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to improve U.S.-Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to change is Cuba.” The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”42

Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy

Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Legislative initiatives introduced over the past decade have reflected these three policy approaches.

Dating back to 2000, there have been significant efforts in Congress to ease U.S. sanctions, with, one or both houses at times approving amendments to appropriations measures that would have eased U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Until March 2009, these provisions were stripped out of final enacted measures, in part because of presidential veto threats.

In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a re-examination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches have been advanced to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.

In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to

the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the
United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue
that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent, even without
Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to
induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support
for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the
unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of
the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam,
and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights.

On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without
concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and
facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba,
and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that
Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.

**Obama Administration Policy**

During its first two years, the Obama Administration lifted restrictions on travel and remittance to
Cuba for Cuban Americans, moved to re-engage Cuba on migration and other bilateral issues, and
more recently announced further steps to ease restrictions on purposeful travel and non-family
remittances. The Administration continued to express concern about the human rights situation in
Cuba, especially after the death of imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February
2010 and the harassment of the Ladies in White human rights organization, but the
Administration also welcomed the Cuban government’s release of political prisoners beginning in
mid-2010 after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church. A key impediment to improved relations
has been Cuba’s detention of U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor
Alan Gross since early December 2009.

During the 2008 electoral campaign, President Obama had pledged to lift restrictions on family
tavel to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba. At the
same time, he also pledged to maintain the embargo as a source of leverage to bring about change
in Cuba. However, Obama also asserted that if the Cuban government takes significant steps
toward democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, then the United States
would take steps to normalize relations and ease the embargo. He also maintained that, after
careful preparation, his Administration would pursue direct diplomacy with Cuba without
preconditions, but only when there is an opportunity to advance U.S. interests and advance the
cause of freedom for the Cuban people.\(^43\)

\(^43\) “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” May 23, 2008, and “Renewing
In April 2009, just before the fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. The President announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba would be lifted. This superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially reverted family travel restrictions to as they were in 2004 before they were tightened. The Administration also announced that measures would be taken to increase telecommunications links with Cuba and to expand the scope of eligible humanitarian donations through gift parcels.44 At the Summit of the Americas, President Obama maintained that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that it will take time to “overcome decades of mistrust,” the President said “there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” He stated that he was prepared to have his Administration “engage with the Cuban government on a wide range of issues—from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to human rights, free speech, and democratic reform.”45 The President maintained that he was “not interested in talking just for the sake of talking,” but said he believed that U.S.-Cuban relations could move in a new direction.

In the aftermath of the Summit, there appeared to be some momentum toward improved relations. In June 2009, the State Department turned off the electronic billboard at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana that had been had been set up in 2006 and had featured news and pro-democracy messages that irked the Cuban government. Earlier in the year, the Cuban government had taken down anti-U.S. billboards around the U.S. mission. In July 2009, Cuba and the United States also restarted the semi-annual migration talks that had been suspended by the United States in 2004. To date, four rounds of talks have been held and have included issues beyond migration issues (For more details, see “Migration Talks” below.) In September 2009, the United States and Cuba held talks in Havana on resuming direct mail service between the two countries that included discussion on issues related to the transportation, quality, and security of mail service.46

In late 2009, however, relations took a turn for the worse when Alan Gross, an American subcontractor working on USAID-funded Cuba democracy projects in Cuba was arrested in Havana in December. Members of Congress have raised considerable concern about Mr. Gross’s detention. State Department officials have continued to raise the issue with Cuban government and the State Department maintains that his continued detention is “a major impediment to advancing the dialogue between our two countries.”47 (For more details, see “December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor.”)

The Obama Administration expressed significant concern about the poor human rights situation in the first half of 2010. In the semi-annual migration talks in February, U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo with all necessary medical care. After Zapata’s death, U.S. officials called attention to the more than 200 political prisoners

45 White House, “Remarks by the President At the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
46 Since the early 1960s, mail to and from Cuba has arrived via third countries, which results in extensive delays in mail between the two countries. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII, Section 1705(f)) has a provision requiring the U.S. Postal Service to take necessary actions to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba, including, in the absence of common carrier service between the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers. Past U.S. attempts to negotiate such service were rejected by Cuba, reportedly because Cuba wanted the issue to be part of a larger normalization of commercial air traffic. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had called for negotiations to restore direct mail service.
held by Cuba and called for their immediate release. As noted above, President Obama issued a statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, including the death of Zapata, and the repression of the Ladies in White. He asserted that these events underscore that “Cuban authorities continue to respond to the aspirations of the Cuban people with a clenched fist.” The President called for the end of repression, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of the Cuban people. The President noted that he has taken steps during the year to reach out to the Cuban people and to signal his desire to seek a new era in relations with the government of Cuba. He asserted that he remains “committed to supporting the simple desire of the Cuban people to freely determine their future and to enjoy the rights and freedoms that define the Americas, and that should be universal to all human beings.”

In response to the Cuban Catholic Church’s July 7, 2010, announcement that 52 political prisoners would be released, Secretary of State Clinton said that it was “a positive sign” and that the United States welcomed it. A subsequent State Department statement maintained that “this is a positive development that we hope will represent a step towards increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.” In the same statement, the State Department called for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and maintained that those released should be able to “decide for themselves whether to remain in Cuba or travel to another country.”

There were numerous press reports in August 2010 maintaining that the Obama Administration would be taking action to ease travel restrictions further and allow all Americans to send remittances to Cuba. Various reports indicated that the relaxation of the travel regulations would involve looser restrictions on educational and religious travel as well as other types of people-to-people travel. The number of charter flights and U.S. cities (beyond Los Angeles, Miami, and New York) would also reportedly be expanded.

The Administration ultimately announced these policy changes on January 14, 2011. According to the White House statement, the measures will: 1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and journalistic activities; 2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and 3) allow all U.S. international airports to provide services to licensed charter flights to and from Cuba. In most respects, these new measures appear to be similar to policies that were undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003 and 2004. The policy changes were subsequently enacted through modifications to existing Department of Treasury and Department of Homeland Security regulations published in the Federal Register on January 28, 2011.

50 “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Media Availability with Jordan Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, July 8, 2010.
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations

U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances and gift parcels.

In March 2009, Congress included two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased sanctions on travel to Cuba. As implemented by the Treasury Department, family travel was allowed once every 12 months to visit a close relative for an unlimited length of stay, and the limit for daily expenditure allowed by family travelers became the same as for other authorized travelers to Cuba (State Department maximum per diem rate for Havana, currently $179 day). The definition of “close relative” was expanded to mean any individual related to the traveler by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from that person. The omnibus measure also included a provision requiring a general license for travel related to the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba.

Going even further, the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba in April 2009. Fulfilling a campaign pledge, President Obama announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba would be lifted. This significantly superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially reverted family travel restrictions to as they had been before they were tightened in 2004. Under the new policy announced by the Administration in April, there are no limitations on the frequency or duration of family visits, and the 44-pound limitation on accompanied baggage was removed. Family travelers are now able spend the same as allowed for other travelers, up to $179 per day. With regard to family remittances, the previous limitation of no more than $300 per quarter was removed with no restriction on the amount or frequency of the remittances. Authorized travelers are once again authorized to carry up to $3,000 in remittances. Regulations for the above policy changes were issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments on September 3, 2009.

On January 14, 2011, the Obama Administration announced a series of changes further easing restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba that had been rumored in the second half of 2010.

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The White House announced that President Obama had directed the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security to make changes to regulations and policies “in order to continue efforts reach out to the Cuban people in support of their desire to freely determine their country’s future.”\(^{54}\) According to the White House announcement, the policy changes would be enacted through modifications to existing regulations. This occurred on January 28, 2011, when the Departments of Treasury and Homeland Security published changes to regulations in the *Federal Register*.\(^{55}\)

The measures: 1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and journalistic activities; 2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and 3) allow all U.S. international airports to provide services to licensed charter flights to and from Cuba. In most respects, these new measures appear to be similar to policies that were undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003 and 2004. An exception is the expansion of airports to service licensed flights to and from Cuba.

Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it abridges the rights of ordinary Americans to travel; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.

In the 111\(^{th}\) Congress, two House hearings were held on the issue of restrictions on travel to Cuba. On November 19, 2009, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing entitled “Is it Time to Lift the Ban on Travel to Cuba?” that featured former U.S. government officials and other private witnesses. On April 29, 2010, the House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade, held a hearing on U.S.-Cuba policy that examined whether relaxing current Cuba travel and trade restrictions would advance U.S. economic objectives, as well as U.S. political and human rights goals in Cuba. In terms of legislative action beyond the March 2009 easing of family travel and travel for the marketing of U.S. agricultural and medical exports, the House Agriculture Committee reported out H.R. 4645 (Peterson) on June 30, 2010, a bill that would have lifted all restrictions on travel to Cuba (and also would have eased restrictions on payment mechanisms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba). The House Committee on Foreign Affairs was scheduled to hold a markup of the bill on September 29, 2010, but postponed its consideration, and in the aftermath of the November 2010 U.S. legislative elections no further action was taken. Several other legislative initiatives were introduced that would have eased Cuba travel restrictions, but no action was taken on any of the measures.

(For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, *Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.*)

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U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions

U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.

Since 2002, the United States has become Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products.56 Cuba has purchased over $3.5 billion in agricultural products from the United States since 2001. After the implementation of TSRA, overall U.S exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to $404 million in 2004 and to a high of $712 million in 2008, far higher than in previous years, in part because of the rise in food prices and because of Cuba’s increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that severely damaged the country’s agricultural sector. In 2009, U.S. exports to Cuba declined to $533 million, 25% lower than the previous year.57 (See Figure 5.) The decline was largely related to Cuba’s shortage of hard currency.58 In 2010, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba have continued to fall. From January through November 2010, U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to $347 million, down 29% from the same period in 2009. Analysts again cite Cuba’s shortage of hard currency as the main reason for the decline.59

In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment must be received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action constituted a new sanction that violated the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification “conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.”60 Facing congressional pressure, on July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005, amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, reportedly were pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February 2005 rule.61

57 Global Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
60 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before the House Committee on Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
61 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents on Nominees,” (continued...)
In December 2009, Congress took action in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-117) to define, during FY2010, “payment of cash in advance” as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser. This overturned OFAC’s February 2005 clarification that payment had to be received before vessels could leave U.S. ports. The Administration issued regulations implementing this provision in early March 2010. The regulations maintained that the definition applied to items delivered by September 30, 2010, or delivered pursuant to a contract entered into by September 30, 2010, and shipped within 12 months of the signing of the contract. For FY2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee had included a provision in a Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, S. 3677 (section 621) that would have continued to extend the provision, but Congress did not complete action on the measure. Nevertheless, Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended) the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011, under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This included continuation of the “payment of cash in advance” provision.

Several additional legislative initiatives introduced in the 111th Congress would have permanently made this change, but no action was completed on these measures. As noted, on June 30, 2010, the House Agriculture Committee reported out H.R. 4645 (Peterson). This legislation, in addition to addressing travel restrictions, would have permanently changed the definition of “payment of cash in advance” and would have allowed direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for payment for products sold to Cuba under TSRA.

Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. U.S. agribusiness companies

(...continued)


that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market so close to the United States. Some exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to Cuba.\(^63\) Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies increase their exports to Cuba more rapidly.\(^64\) On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the Senate Committee on Finance, concluding that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. (See the full report available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm.)

Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations. Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid.

**Trademark Sanction\(^65\)**

For over a decade, the United States has imposed a sanction that denies protection for trademarks connected with businesses confiscated from their owners by the Cuban government. A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture in 1993 with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum. Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name because in 1995 it entered into an agreement for the Havana Club trademark with the Arechabala family, who had originally produced the rum until its assets and property were confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the embargo be lifted.

The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of


Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.

On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.66 That deadline was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date, and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.67 On August 3, 2006, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was “cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.68

Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claim is based on a foreign compensation.”69 Others want Section 211 repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies registered in Cuba.70


Several legislative initiatives were introduced during the 111th Congress reflecting these two approaches to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling, but no action was taken on these measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, has reduced pressure on Congress to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.

Anti-Drug Cooperation

Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs, but its extensive shoreline and geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations. Drugs that enter the Cuban market are largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-speed boats

68 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,” International Trade Daily, August 10, 2006.
70 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
moving drugs from Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States or by small aircraft from clandestine airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. According to the State Department’s March 2010 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Cuba maintains that it has some 56 judicial assistance agreements and two memoranda of understanding with other countries related to anti-drug cooperation. For a decade, Cuba’s Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed up on Cuban shores. Since 2003, Cuba has aggressively pursued an internal enforcement and investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.

Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug efforts. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound *Limerick*, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.

In the March 2010 *INCSR*, the State Department reported that some of Cuba’s anti-drug operations were undertaken in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard DIS at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. It maintained that Cuban authorities have provided the DIS continued access to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including providing investigative criminal information, such as the names of suspects and vessels; debriefings on drug trafficking cases; visits to the Cuban national canine training center and antidoping laboratory in Havana; tours of Cuban Border Guard facilities and container x-ray equipment at the Port of Havana; and opportunities to meet with the chiefs of Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs offices.

Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United States.71 In its March 2010 *INCSR*, the State Department stated that “both nations may gain by pressing forward with expanded cooperation, especially considering Cuba’s location in the Caribbean, and the potential for the island and its territorial seas to be utilized for drug transshipments to the United States.”

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Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development

Cuba is moving toward development of its offshore oil resources. While the country has proven oil reserves of just 0.1 billion barrels, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that offshore reserves in the North Cuba Basin could contain an additional 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered technically recoverable crude oil. The Spanish oil company Repsol, in a consortium with Norway’s Statoil and India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, is expected to begin offshore exploratory drilling in 2011, and a number of other companies are considering exploratory drilling. At present, Cuba has six offshore projects with foreign oil companies while two more projects are being negotiated. If oil is found, some experts estimate that it would take at least three to five years before production would begin. While it is unclear whether offshore oil production could result in Cuba becoming a net oil exporter, it could reduce Cuba’s current dependence on Venezuela for oil supplies.

In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, some Members of Congress and others have expressed concern about Cuba’s development of its deepwater petroleum reserves so close to the United States. They are concerned about oil spill risks and about the status of disaster preparedness and coordination with the United States in the event of an oil spill. Dealing with these challenges is made more difficult because of the longstanding poor state of relations between Cuba and the United States. If an oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida, although a number of factors would determine the potential environmental impact. If significant amounts of oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at risk.

With regard to disaster response coordination, the United States and Cuba are not parties to a bilateral agreement on oil spills. While U.S. oil spill mitigation companies can be licensed by the Treasury and Commerce Departments to provide support and equipment in the event of an oil spill, some energy and policy analysts have called for the Administration to ease regulatory restrictions on the transfer of U.S. equipment and personnel to Cuba that would be needed to combat a spill. Some have also called for more formal U.S.-Cuban government cooperation and planning to minimize potential damage from an oil spill. Similar U.S. cooperation with Mexico could be a potential model for U.S.-Cuban cooperation, while two multilateral agreements on oil spills under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization also could provide a mechanism for some U.S.-Cuban engagement on oil pollution preparedness and response.

Beyond U.S.-Cuban cooperation in anticipation of an oil spill, some U.S. businesses and policy groups have called for Congress and the Administration to allow U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore oil sector, while others oppose any support for the development of Cuba’s offshore oil reserves. In the 111th Congress, legislative initiatives reflected two contrasting policy approaches toward Cuba’s development of its offshore oil reserves. One approach, as reflected in S. 774, H.R. 1918, and S. 1517, would allow for U.S. involvement in Cuba’s offshore oil sector, while a second approach, as reflected in H.R. 5620, would impose sanctions on foreign companies and individuals who assist the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources and would not affect current prohibitions on U.S. firms’ economic dealings with Cuba.

For further information, see CRS Report R41522, *Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations*, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.
Interest in Cuba’s offshore oil development may continue in the 112th Congress, especially if exploratory drilling begins as anticipated in 2011. To date, one legislative initiative has been introduced, H.R. 372 (Buchanan), that would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny leases and permits to persons who engage in activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any U.S. government sanction or embargo.

**Terrorism Issues**

Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982 (pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America, and it has remained on the list since that time. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.

Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats. Those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.

The State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009* report (issued August 5, 2010) maintained that the Cuban government and its official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, but at the same time remained critical of the U.S. approach to combating international terrorism. The report noted that while Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America or elsewhere, that it continued to provide physical safe haven and ideological support to members of three terrorist organizations—Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN). The report noted that Cuba cooperated with the United States on a limited number of law enforcement matters, but also pointed out that the Cuban government continued to permit U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba, including convicted murders and hijackers.

Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the

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73 For background information, see CRS Report RL32251, *Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List*, by Mark P. Sullivan.
preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could seek to block the rescission through legislation.

Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example, legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), included a provision that would have rescinded the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”

Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999 (although the sentences were commuted in 2010 to 30 years in prison), and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002 for plans to conduct bombings in 1998. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.

In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, is also alleged to be involved in the 1976 Cuban airline bombing and the series of bombings in Havana in 1997 noted above. The four stood trial in March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges to prison terms ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada reportedly traveled to another country.

Posada entered the United States illegally in 2005. In subsequent removal proceedings, an immigration judge found that Posada could not be removed to Cuba or Venezuela because of concerns that he would face torture, and he was thereafter permitted to remain in the United States pending such time as he could be transferred to a different country. Posada subsequently applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. This application was denied, and criminal charges were brought against him for allegedly false statements made in his naturalization application and interview. Although a federal district court dismissed the indictment in 2007, its ruling was reversed by an appellate court in 2008. In April 2009, the United States filed a superseding indictment, which included additional criminal charges based on allegedly false statements made by Posada in immigration removal proceedings concerning his involvement in the 1997 Havana bombings. His trial originally was set to begin in August 2009, but was rescheduled three times until it finally began on January 10, 2011.

On July 7, 2010, Venezuelan authorities extradited to Cuba an alleged Posada associate, Salvadoran citizen Francisco Chávez Abarca, who was charged with involvement in one of the 1997 bombings in Havana. Chávez Abarca had been imprisoned from 2005-2007 in El Salvador for running a car theft ring, but charges ultimately were dropped, reportedly because of a botched

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75 For additional information, see “Background on Luis Posada Carriles,” CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, December 8, 2010, prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney. Available from the authors.
investigation, and he was set free. On July 1, 2010, he was arrested in Venezuela upon entering the county and allegedly confessed to plans to organize protests in Venezuela around the time of the country’s legislative elections in September 2010. In late September 2010, the Cuban government released Chávez Abarca’s video confessions and reenactment of the bombings, as well as his alleged association with Luis Posada, in a public information campaign featured in the Cuban media as well as abroad on social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook. According to Chávez Abarca, Posada recruited him in El Salvador for the Cuba bombings, and paid him $2,000 for each bomb that went off. Only one of the bombs that Chávez Abarca planted actually detonated, on April 12, 2007 in the bathroom of a disco at the Melia Cohiba hotel in Havana. In late December 2011, Chávez Abarca was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the bombings.

**U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights**

Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.

USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists. These efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. From FY2001-FY2010, Congress appropriated almost $157 million in funding for Cuba democracy efforts. This included $45.3 million for FY2008, $20 million for FY2009, and $20 million for FY2010.

For FY2009, Congress fully funded the Administration’s $20 million request in ESF to continue to implement the program recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. According to the request, the funding was aimed at assisting human rights activists, independent journalists, Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student activists. The report to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425), recommended fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba, but also called for the State Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the programs. No final action on the appropriations measure was taken in the 110th Congress, but in the 111th Congress, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) funded overall foreign operations funding, including the $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. Two Members of Congress placed a hold on the assistance until the Administration provided more information on the proposed funding, but in early June 2010, the hold was lifted and $15 million of the $20 million was released. Subsequently in August 2010, USAID notified Congress that it would be obligating $620,000

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78 The Cuban government’s video series, entitled Path to Terror, is available on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kx7TptU3taQ.
more in FY2009 ESF for Cuba, bringing total FY2009 Cuba funding to $15.620 million. At the same time, the USAID shifted the remaining $4.380 million originally notified for Cuba to a humanitarian assistance program for Guatemala.

For FY2010, Congress once again fully funded the Administration’s $20 million ESF request for Cuba democracy programs in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117). According to the State Department’s FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, U.S. assistance programs focus on providing humanitarian assistance to victims of repression, strengthening civil society, weakening the information blockade, and helping Cubans to create space for dialogue about democratic change and reconciliation. Both House-passed H.R. 3081 and Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 1434, the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, recommended full funding of the Administration’s $20 million request.

For FY2011, the Administration once again requested $20 million in ESF to support democracy and human rights projects. According to the Administration’s request, the assistance focuses on providing humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families, strengthening civil society, supporting issue-based civic action movements and coalitions, and promoting fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The Senate version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), would have provided that $2 million of the ESF appropriated for Cuba be transferred and merged with funds for the National Endowment for Democracy for democracy programs in Cuba. The 111th Congress did not complete action on the FY2011 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure. Instead, it approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures.

Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost $1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For FY2007, NED funded 12 projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost $1.4 million funded by the State Department. For FY2008, NED funded 11 projects with over $1.4 million. In FY2009, NED funded 10 Cuba projects with about $1.5 million from the State Department.

Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba

In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance
with applicable law and regulations."81 Investigative news reports on the program maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight had diminished its effectiveness.82

GAO issued a second report examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program in November 2008.83 The report lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with its Cuba program and improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants competitively since 2006, hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008, and contracting for financial services in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report also noted that USAID had worked to strengthen program oversight through pre-award and follow-up reviews, improving grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing guidance and monitoring about permitted types of assistance and cost sharing.

The GAO report also maintained, however, that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the level needed for effective grant oversight. GAO also noted the difficulty of assessing USAID’s action to improve its Cuba program because most of its actions to improve the program were only taken recently. Procurement reviews completed in August 2008 by the new financial services contractor identified internal control, financial management, and procurement weaknesses at three grantees. GAO recommended that USAID (1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at the level that is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities; and (2) periodically assess the Cuba program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding internal controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.

December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor

On December 4, 2009, Cuban authorities arrested an American subcontractor, Alan Gross, working for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), a Bethesda-based company that had received a contract from USAID to help support Cuban civil society organizations. Gross was arrested at Jose Martí International Airport in Havana when he was planning to leave the country. He reportedly was distributing communications equipment in Cuba such as cell phones and laptop computers to Jewish organizations in Cuba.84

High-ranking Cuban official Ricardo Alarcon, the head of Cuba’s National Assembly, asserted on January 6, 2010, that the contractor was working for American intelligence, but U.S. officials strongly denied the accusation.85 A State Department spokesman maintained that the contractor “is not associated with our intelligence services” and noted that “Cuba has a history of mischaracterizing what Americans and NGOs in Cuba are doing.”86 According to a statement by

DAI, “the detained subcontractor was not working for any intelligence service … he was working with a peaceful, non-dissident civic group—a religious and cultural group recognized by the Cuban government—to improve its ability to communicate with its members across the island and overseas.”

Numerous U.S. officials have raised the issue of Alan Gross’s detention with the Cuban government, including at the semi-annual bilateral migration talks, and have called for his release. In March 2010, some 40 House Members called for Mr. Gross’s release in a letter to the Cuban government, warning that improved relations between the United States and Cuba will not be possible until he is released. The letter maintained that Mr. Gross’s work in Cuba with the Jewish community “emanated from his desire to make a positive impact for others of faith on the island.” It expressed concern for Mr. Gross’s health and the deteriorating health of his elderly mother. A number of other Members and Senators have also called for Mr. Gross’s immediate release. On June 17, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Mr. Gross, and issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare and poor health. The Secretary maintained that his continued detention “is harming U.S.-Cuba relations,” and that his release would be viewed favorably. In September 2010, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs met with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez in New York to encourage the release of Mr. Gross.

As noted above, in early December 2010, on the one-year anniversary of Mr. Gross’s detention, the State Department again issued a statement calling for his release, and maintaining that “the continued detention of Alan Gross is a major impediment to advancing the dialogue between our two countries.” At the fourth round of migration talks held on January 12, 2011 in Havana, the U.S. delegation again raised the issue and called for Mr. Gross’s immediate release. The head of the U.S. team at the talks, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Roberta Jacobson, subsequently met with Gross on January 13. Subsequent press reports maintained that a senior State Department official was “cautiously optimistic” that Gross would be released.

Radio and TV Marti

U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. According to the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2011 Budget Request, Radio and TV Martí are dedicated to providing a reliable source of news and information that is accurate, objective, and credible. The request maintains that the two programs

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support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers.

Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, FL, and operates under the BBG’s International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington, DC, to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.

Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per week, and for 18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, FL, and Greenville, NC, according to the BBG. It also transmits to Cuba 24 hours daily through Hispasat satellite television and the internet.

TV Martí programming has been broadcast through multiple transmission methods over the years. From its beginning in 1990 until July 2005, it was broadcast via an aerostat (blimp) from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostat was destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was transmitted for several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use contracted private aircraft to transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October 2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as AeroMartí with the capability of transmitting live broadcasts. OCB currently uses two privately contracted airplanes for AeroMartí to transmit broadcasts two and one-half hours for five days weekly. Broadcasts are also transmitted via the internet and satellite television.

From FY1984 through FY2010, about $660 million was spent for broadcasting to Cuba. In recent years, funding amounted to $33.4 million in FY2008, an estimated $34.8 million in FY2009, and an estimated $30.5 million in FY2010.

For FY2011, the BBG requested $29.179 million for Cuba broadcasting, about $1 million less than that appropriated in FY2010. Staffing would remain the same at 136 positions. The Senate version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), recommended $28.789 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($390,000 less than the request of $29.179 million). In the report to the bill, the committee also stated that it did not support closing the Greenville Station in North Carolina that transmits the Cuba broadcasts, expanding TV Martí’s transmission on DirecTV, or expanding and renovating the TV Martí studio until the Broadcasting Board of Governors submits a multi-year strategic plan for broadcasting to Cuba. The 111th Congress did not complete action on the FY2011 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure. Instead, it approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures.
Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage. In February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving OCB contracts.

Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of the OCB, including investigations by the GAO, by a 1994 congressionally-established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Martí, by the State Department Office Inspector General (OIG) in 1999, and by the combined State Department/BBG Office Inspector General in 2003 and 2007.

In July 2008, GAO issued a report that criticized the IBB’s and OCB’s practices in awarding two contracts to Radio Mambí and TV Azteca as lacking discipline required to ensure transparency and accountability. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the Radio Mambí and TV Azteca contracts did not reflect sound business practices.

In January 2009, GAO issued a report asserting that the best available research suggests that Radio and TV Martí’s audience is small, and cited telephone surveys since 2003 showing that less than 2% of respondents reported tuning in to Radio or TV Martí during the past week. With regard to TV Martí viewership, according to the report, all of the IBB’s telephone surveys since 2003 show that less than 1% of respondents said that they had watched TV Martí during the past week. According to the GAO report, the IBB surveys show that there was no increase in reported TV Martí viewership following the beginning of AeroMartí and DirecTV satellite broadcasting in 2006. The GAO report also cited concerns with adherence to relevant domestic laws and international standards, including the domestic dissemination of OCB programming, inappropriate advertisements during OCB programming, and TV Martí’s interference with Cuban broadcasts. GAO testified on its report in a hearing held by the House Subcommittee on


International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 17, 2009.

In April 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority issued a staff report that concluded that Radio and TV Martí “continue to fail in their efforts to influence Cuban society, politics, and policy.” The report cited problems with adherence to broadcast standards, audience size, and Cuban government jamming. Among its recommendation, the report called for the IBB to move the Office of Cuba Broadcasting back to Washington and integrate it fully into the Voice of America.98

**Migration Issues**

**1994 and 1995 Migration Accords**

Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Fidel Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.

As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a September 9, 1994, bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.

In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.

Coast Guard Interdictions

Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). In short, most interdictions, even in U.S. coastal waters, results in a return to Cuba, while those Cubans who touch shore are allowed to stay in the United States. This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it to land.

Figure 6. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2010

In recent years, the number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard rose from 666 in FY2002 to a high of 2,868 in FY2007. In subsequent years, maritime interdictions declined significantly to 422 by FY2010.99 (See Figure 6.) Major reasons for the decline in migrant interdictions from Cuba are reported to include the U.S. economic downturn, more efficient coastal patrolling, and more aggressive prosecution of migrant smugglers.100 In October 2008, Mexico and Cuba negotiated a migration accord in an attempt to curb the irregular flow of migrants through Mexico.101

U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are leading to more deaths at sea. In July 2010, three Cuban nationals (two living in Florida and one in Mexico) were charged in a U.S. federal court in Tampa with conspiracy, kidnapping, and extortion involving the abduction of Cuban migrants in Mexico. The Cuban government also has taken forceful action, including prison sentences of up to three years against those engaging in alien smuggling.

Migration Talks

Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords until they were suspended after the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January 2004. At the time, the State Department maintained that Cuba refused to discuss five issues identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States. In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by the United States.

Under the Obama Administration, Cuba and the United States agreed to restart the biannual migration talks (in addition to talks on direct mail service), and since mid-2009, there have been four rounds of talks. For the first three rounds, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Craig Kelly headed the U.S. team while Deputy Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodriguez led the Cuba team. The first round was held on July 14, 2009, in New York City. The State Department outlined its four objectives in the talks: ensuring that the U.S. Interests Section in Havana is able to operate effectively; gaining access to a deep-water port for the safe return of Cuban migrants picked up at sea; ensuring that U.S. diplomats are able to monitor the welfare of those Cubans who are sent back to the island; and gaining Cuban government acceptance of Cubans who are excluded from the United States because they have committed crimes. Cuba reportedly proposed a new immigration agreement and more effective cooperation to combat alien smuggling, and also made known its opposition to the so-called “wet foot/dry foot policy.”

The second round of talks were held on February 19, 2010, in Havana. According to the Department of State, “engaging in these talks underscores our interest in pursuing constructive discussions with the government of Cuba to advance U.S. interests of mutual concern.” It maintained that the United States views the talks “as an avenue to achieve practical, positive results that contribute to the full implementation of the [Migration] Accords and to the safety of citizens of both countries.”

Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of respect and included discussion of some aspects of a new draft migration accord proposed by Cuba at the in the July 2009 round of talks. Cuba also reportedly raised the issue of improving and expanding the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. During the talks, U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo all necessary medical care, and also raised the case of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross detained in Cuba since early December 2009 and called for his release.

The third round of talks was held on June 18, 2010, in Washington, DC. In addition to migration issues, the U.S. team separately raised the case of Alan Gross and called for his immediate release. A day before the meeting, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Alan Gross and issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare and poor health and maintaining that his “continued detention … is harming U.S.-Cuba relations.”

A fourth round of migration talks took place in Havana on January 12, 2011, with the U.S. side led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Roberta Jacobson and the Cuban side again led by Deputy Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodríguez. The State Department maintained that the talks were productive covering a broad range of topics of mutual interest, including the importance of continued U.S. commitment to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration. The Cuban delegation maintained the meeting recognized the significant reduction in risky illegal departures from Cuba because of efforts by both countries to deal with migrant smuggling and illegal migration. Dagoberto Rodríguez maintained that “it was a fruitful exchange aimed at moving on to the establishment of more effective mechanisms of cooperation to combat illegal migrant smuggling.” The U.S. delegation again raised the issue of the continued detention of Alan Gross and called for his immediate release. Roberta Jacobson subsequently met with Gross on January 13. As noted above, subsequent press reports maintained that a senior State Department official was “cautiously optimistic” that Gross would be released.

For additional information on migration issues, see CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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112 Cuban Interest Section, “Press Release Issued by the Cuban Delegation to the Round of Migration Talks Between Cuba and the United States,” Havana, January 12, 2011.
Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress


H.R. 256 (Serrano). Would waive certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball. Introduced January 7, 2011; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.

H.R. 372 (Buchanan). Would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny leases and permits to persons who engage in activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo established by the U.S. government. Introduced January 20, 2011; referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.

H.R. 380 (Lee.) Would provide that no funds made available to the Department of the Treasury may be used to implement, administer, or enforce regulations to require specific licenses for travel-related transactions directly related to educational activities in Cuba; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Legislation in the 111th Congress

Approved Measures

P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105). Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Introduced February 23, 2009; House passed (245-178) February 25, 2009; Senate passed (voice vote) March 10, 2009; signed into law March 11, 2009. Division D, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, has three provisions intended to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. These three provisions, explained below, were identical to provisions in the S. 3260, the Senate version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, in the 110th Congress. In addition, the Joint Explanatory Statement to the bill requires the Department of the Treasury to prepare a report within 90 days on the steps that it is taking to assess OFAC’s allocation of resources for investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with respect to the numerous other sanctions programs it administers. As part of the report, the Treasury Department is directed to provide detailed information on OFAC’s Cuba-related licensing on its enforcement of the Cuba embargo.

Section 620 of Division D amends the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations for travel to, from, or within Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods, meaning that there would be no requirement to obtain special permission from OFAC. Such travel currently requires a specific license from OFAC, issued on a case by case basis.

Section 621 of Division D prohibits funds from being used to administer, implement, or enforce family travel restrictions that were imposed by the Bush Administration in June 2004. Those 2004 restrictions allowed family travel only to visit immediate family (grandparents, grandchildren,
parents, siblings, spouses, and children) once every three years for a period not to exceed 14 days. Under the 2004 restrictions, a specific license was required from OFAC for such travel, and the authorized amount that family travelers could spend while in Cuba was limited to $50 a day.

Section 622 of Division D prohibits funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations on February 25, 2005, requiring that U.S. agricultural exporters using the “payment of cash in advance” payment mechanism for selling their goods to Cuba must be paid in cash for their goods before the goods leave U.S. ports. Prior to the February 2005 change, the practice was for U.S. agricultural exporters to be paid in cash for their goods (as required under the TSRA), but before the actual delivery of the goods to Cuba.

Division H (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009) has two provisions related to Cuba. Section 7005 prohibits foreign assistance to the government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) provides that no funds appropriated for foreign assistance shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.


As signed into law, the measure has several Cuba provisions. Division C, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2010, has a clarifying provision in section 619 relating to the issue of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. exports to Cuba during FY2010 under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The provision defines the term to mean “payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser.”

Division F, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, has several Cuba provisions. Section 7007 continues the general prohibition against foreign assistance to the government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) continues the requirement that no funds for foreign assistance shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. With regard to Cuba broadcasting, the conference report provides $30.474 million for Radio and TV Martí (almost $2 million less than the Administration’s request) with not more than $5.5 million for non-salary and benefits expenses for TV Martí. The conference report also has two reporting requirements on Cuba broadcasting: the first from the BBG within 90 days providing a multi-year strategic plan for broadcasting to Cuba; and the second, from the GAO within 90 days of the submission of the BBG report, providing an assessment of the strategic plan. With regard to Cuba democracy programs, the conference report fully funds the Administration’s request for $20 million in ESF.

S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, Bill). Recognizes the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Cuban government, and calls for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally recognized human rights in Cuba. Introduced March 10, 2010. S.Amdt. 3552 (Nelson, Bill), which noted that the Department of State reports that the Cuban government has not granted prison visits to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch since 1988, was agreed to by Unanimous Consent on March 18, 2010. S.Con.Res. 54 subsequently agreed to by Unanimous Consent on March 18, 2010.

Additional Considered Measures with Cuba Provisions

The following measures that received consideration, but were not enacted, contained various provisions on Cuba. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 111th Congress, see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress.


H.R. 2647 (Skelton)/S. 1390 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. House passed June 25, 2009. Senate passed July 23, 2009, with an amendment substituting the language of S. 1390. During July 22, 2009, consideration of S. 1390, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1535 (Martinez), which required a report from the Director of National Intelligence on potential Cuban activities related to drug trafficking, clandestine activities in the United States, research and development for biological weapons production, and Cuba’s relations with Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and several other countries. That provision became Section 1222 of the Senate version of H.R. 2647. The House version of the bill did not include a similar provision, and the provision was not included in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) filed on October 7, 2009.

H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy). FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations. H.R. 3081 Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-187) June 26, 2009. House approved July 9, 2009, by a vote of 318-106. S. 1434 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 111-44) July 9, 2009. In both bills, section 7007 would continue the prohibition against direct funding for the government of Cuba, and section 7015(f) would continue the requirement that no assistance shall be obligated or expended for assistance for Cuba except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The reports to both bills would also fully fund the Administration’s request of $20 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.

With regard to Cuba broadcasting, H.R. 3081 would fully fund the Administration’s request for $32.474 million, while S. 1434 would prohibit funding for TV Martí broadcasts to Cuba and provide just $17.474 million for Cuba broadcasting, $15 million less than the request. The Senate bill, in section 7092(c), would require a report from the Secretary of State within 90 days on various aspects of Cuba broadcasting.
With regard to anti-drug cooperation with Cuba, S. 1434 would, in section 7092, provide $1 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance for preliminary work by the State Department or other entity designated by the Secretary of State to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the government of Cuba on counternarcotics matters, including matters relating to cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance in the interdiction of illicit drugs being transported through Cuban airspace or over Cuba waters. The amount shall not be available if the Secretary of State certifies that Cuba does not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs, and there is credible evidence of involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years. H.R. 3081 does not have a similar provision.

For final action, see Division F of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, described above, which included provisions on foreign aid, Cuba broadcasting, and Cuba democracy funding. The omnibus measure did not include any language on drug cooperation with Cuba.

H.R. 3170 (Serrano)/S. 1432 (Durbin). FY2010 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations. H.R. 3170 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-202) July 10, 2009. House approved (219-208) July 16, 2009. S. 1432 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 111-43) July 9, 2009. Both bills have a provision (section 618 in the House bill and section 617 in the Senate bill) that provides that the term “payment of cash in advance” as used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser.

For final action, see Division C of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, described above, which included the “payment of cash in advance” provision in section 619.

H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/S. 3112 (Klobuchar). Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act. Removes obstacles to legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba and ends travel restrictions on all Americans to Cuba. Section 2 would lift all restrictions on travel to Cuba and prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting such travel except under certain circumstances. Section 3 would define the term “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) as the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment by the seller prior to transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser. Section 4 would authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions executed in payment for a product authorized for sale under TSRA. H.R. 4645 introduced February 23, 2010; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Agriculture and Financial Services. House Agriculture Committee ordered reported (25-20) June 30, 2010; reported September 29, 2010 (H.Rept. 111-653, Part I). S. 3112 introduced March 15, 2010; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

S. 3454 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011. Introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on June 4, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-201). Section 1236 would require a report (in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex) within 180 days from the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, on: a description of any connections between the government of Cuba and drug trafficking organizations in the Western Hemisphere; a description of any economic, intelligence or other support provided to Cuba by the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, or
Venezuela; a description of any agreements or other arrangements between Cuba and the governments currently on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and a description of any activities by Cuba to develop any biological or cyber warfare capabilities, including any collaboration with other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Senate did not complete action on the bill. The House-passed version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 5136 (Skelton), did not include a similar provision.

**S. 3676 (Leahy).** FY2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237). Section 7007 would continue a general prohibition against direct assistance for Cuba. Section 7015(f) would continue the requirement that no funds for foreign assistance shall be obligated or expended for assistance to Cuba except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Section 7034(g)(6) provides that of the ESF appropriated for several countries including Cuba, $12.5 million shall be transferred and merged with funds for the National Endowment for Democracy to be allocated for democracy programs. The committee report clarifies that $2 million in ESF appropriated for Cuba would be transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy. In the report to the bill, the committee also recommends $28.789 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($390,000 less than the request of $29.179 million). In the report, the committee also states that it does not support closing the Greenville Station, expanding TV Martí’s transmission on DirecTV, or the request to expand and renovate the TV Martí studio until the Broadcasting Board of Governors submits a multi-year strategic plan for broadcasting to Cuba. The Senate did not complete action on the measure, but the 111th Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures.

**S. 3677 (Durbin).** FY2011 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-238). Section 621 would continue to define during fiscal year 2011 “payment of cash in advance” under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser. This would extend a similar provision for fiscal year 2010 that appeared in the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117, Division C, Section 619). The Senate did not complete action on the measure, but the 111th Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures.
Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports and WebPages

**Background Note, Cuba**, State Department  
*Date:* March 25, 2010, State Department  
*Full Text:* [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm)

**Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011, Annex: Regional Perspectives (pp. 687-688 of pdf),** State Department  
*Date:* March 10, 2010  

**Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009, Cuba,** State Department  
*Date:* March 11, 2010  

**Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 (State Sponsors of Terrorism chapter),** State Department  
*Date:* August 5, 2010  

**Cuba Country Page,** State Department  

**Cuba Country Page,** U.S Agency for International Development  

**Cuba Sanctions,** Treasury Department  

**Cuba: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba,** Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control  
*Date:* September 3, 2009  

**International Religious Freedom Report 2010, Cuba,** State Department  
*Date:* November 17, 2010  
*Full Text:* [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148748.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148748.htm)

*Date:* March 1, 2010  

**Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (Cuba, pp. 127-128 of pdf),** State Department  
*Date:* June 2010  
Appendix B. CRS and GAO Reports

Active CRS Reports Discussing Cuba


CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John Garcia et al.


CRS Report RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare Ribando Seelke.


Archived CRS Reports

CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.

CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.


**Selected GAO Reports**


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Acknowledgments

Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist, produced the statistical figures presented in this report, and contributed to the appendices.