Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

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Summary

Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, has been increasingly characterized by peaceful competition, as well as by attempts to form cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and factional infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting—and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities—has prevented agreement to date on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). A new government was expected immediately after the end of the Ramadan period on September 11, but deadlock continued. As of October 4, 2010, after receiving the backing of the faction of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki may be close to securing the COR votes for another term as Prime Minister.

Contributing to the difficulty in reaching agreement has been the close election results and distribution of seats in the COR. With the results certified, the cross-sectarian but Sunni-supported “Iraqiya” slate of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi unexpectedly gained a plurality of 91 of the 325 COR seats up for election. Maliki’s State of Law slate won 89, and a rival Shiite coalition was third with 70, of which about 40 seats are held by those supporting Moqtada Al Sadr. The main Kurdish parties, again allied, won 43 seats, with another 14 seats held by other Kurdish factions. On the basis of his first place showing, Allawi had demanded to be given the first opportunity to put together a majority coalition and form a government. Even as Al Sadr and some other Shiites have now dropped their opposition to Maliki, Allawi continues to oppose Maliki’s continuation as Prime Minister and is attempting to form a rival grouping along with the Kurds and Shiite figures, such as Adel Abdul Mahdi, who oppose Maliki.

Allawi, who is viewed as even-handed and not amenable to Iranian influence, was considered to be favored by the Obama Administration and by Sunni-dominated regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia. However, many expect that neither the United States nor these neighbors can or will intervene decisively to shape a new government led by Allawi. Iran, which exercises major influence over the Shiite factions in Iraq, has purportedly been working to ensure that pro-Iranian Shiites lead the next government, although it was not necessarily insisting that Maliki continue. U.S. officials are anticipating that a new government could overcome the roadblocks that have thus far prevented passage of key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as national hydrocarbon laws. U.S. officials and Iraqi citizens also hope that the new government can resolve the increasingly contentious shortages of electricity that have plagued Iraqi cities during 2010 and complicated citizen efforts to cope with the summer heat.

The long political vacuum, coupled with the drawdown of U.S. forces to 50,000 and the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, has contributed to major high profile attacks in Iraq and a sense of uncertainty and disillusionment on the part of the Iraqi public. Although it did not delay the ending of the U.S. combat mission, the continuing violence has caused some experts to question whether stability will continue after all U.S. forces are to depart at the end of 2011. Some believe that the reduction in U.S. leverage and influence in Iraq will cause the rifts among major ethnic and sectarian communities to widen to the point where Iraq could still become a “failed state” after 2011, unless some U.S. troops remain after that time. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Contents

Overview of the Political Transition ................................................................. 1
  January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections ........................ 1
  Permanent Constitution .............................................................................. 1
  December 15, 2005, Elections ................................................................... 2
Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections ........................................ 3
    January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications .......................... 4
  Maliki’s Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approached ........................ 6
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and Political Infighting ...... 7
  Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions .................................................. 8
    Election Parameters .................................................................................. 9
    Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis.............................. 10
    Election Unlikely to Resolve KRG-Central Government Disputes ............. 12
    The Sadr Faction Competes ..................................................................... 13
  Election Results .......................................................................................... 13
    Recount Requests ..................................................................................... 14
    Post-Election Government Formation Efforts ............................................ 14
    Implications for the United States ............................................................. 19
  Other Elections Possible ............................................................................ 19

Tables

Table 1. Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections ....................... 8
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province ........... 18
Table 3. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq .............................................. 20
Table 4. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) ............... 21
Table 5. Election Results (January and December 2005) .................................. 22
Table 6. Assessments of the Benchmarks ....................................................... 23

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................... 25
Overview of the Political Transition

Iraq has completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. However, disputes continue over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources. These disputes permeate almost every issue in Iraq, including security, the terms and framework for elections, economic decision making, and foreign policy.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. It was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi Arabia.

January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections

A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the “proportional representation/closed list” election system, voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.

Permanent Constitution

The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam as “a
main source” of legislation;¹ a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).

The major disputes—still to some extent unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds' peshmerga militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.

With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.

December 15, 2005, Elections

The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election, each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime minister.

On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud

¹ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; and one Christian. Four were women.

Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections

The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but did not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts said that the U.S. mission in Iraq was failing.

In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).

As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks—and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that the Administration attributed largely to the U.S. “troop surge”—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 6.


The passage of key legislation in 2008 (see chart below) and the continued reductions in violence enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the Knights”) succeeded in pacifying the city, and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed and less sectarian. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, essentially putting to rest indicators that major blocs might vote Maliki out of the prime ministership. (In 2007 the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet slots, severely weakening Maliki politically.)

Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. They saw him as increasingly building a following in the security forces and creating new security organs loyal to him and his faction. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he directly commands the National Counter-Terrorism Force (nearly 9,000 personnel) as
well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In 2008, the Kurds were highly critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other support councils were created in southern Iraq. As another example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the former governor of the province. A further February 2010 incident involved the government’s order to arrest a major Sunni leader south of Baghdad (Shaykh Turki Talal), an arrest that was later reversed after reported U.S. intervention.  

January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications

The political fears of some factions about Maliki’s intentions to consolidate power were evident in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. Under a 2008 law, provincial councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province, making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide provincial politics. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly powerful UIA. Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government; Maliki prefers centralization.

The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009 and putting off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.

In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province was about 30, down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.

The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties

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4 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the Sabean sect in Baghdad.
5 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province. This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.

About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names
were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were
unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.

The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
elected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.

Outcomes

The fears of Maliki’s opponents were realized when his list (“State of Law Coalition”) was the
clear winner of the provincial elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate
slates and fared generally poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained
effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also
emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won
an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).

The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI did not win in Najaf province, which it previously dominated
and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity
in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the Maliki slate.
ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held previously, and
only five in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only
of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran,
which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics.

The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close
to winning outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern
provinces to, through deal-making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The
showing of the Sadrists was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue
to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since
the fall of Saddam Hussein.

6 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
In Diyala Province, hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, the provincial version of the (Sunni Arab) Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for first place in the province, and subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration. There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.

The unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to Iraqi nationalism and strong central government. This trend was also reflected in the strong showing of a single candidate in Karbala province who was well thought of in the province for even-handedness.

Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape, mostly in line with set deadlines above, are in Table 6.

**Maliki’s Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approached**

Because of his slate’s strong showing in the provincial elections, Maliki was deemed throughout 2009 to be well positioned for the March 7, 2010, COR elections; the newly elected COR chooses the next full-term government, as discussed above. Perceiving Maliki as the likely winner, Maliki was able to include some political competitors in some provinces, including those dominated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribalists, into his State of Law coalition which would compete in the March 2010 COR vote. (However, Sunnis were not in high positions on his slate and only a few winners on his slate were not Shiite Arabs.)

Maliki derived further political strength from the U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” (sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), which passed the COR on November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition. The pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31, 2011, for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop drawdown plan that comports with the major provisions of the agreement. The President’s plan provided for a drawdown of U.S. combat troops by the end of August 2010 - a benchmark which was met - with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq Security Forces, to remain until the end of 2011.

Another interim benchmark in the winding down of U.S. military involvement was provided by the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where General Raymond Odierno (outgoing top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday.

As 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by the several high-profile attacks since June 2009, including several major multiple bombing attacks in central Baghdad. Additional bombings took place in Baghdad, Diyala Province, Anbar Province, and elsewhere as the election approached. Some believe that insurgents conducted these attacks with the intent of weakening Maliki’s image as a strong leader. Others saw these incidents as an effort
by Al Qaeda in Iraq or other unreconciled Sunni insurgent groups to reduce Sunni participation in the elections and/or reignite civil war.

Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. The makeshift new Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009. After this bombing, which also resulted in the parliament’s insistence that it hear Maliki’s explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also attempted to place substantial blame for the lapses on Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who headed a rival slate in the elections. (See Table 1 on major slates in the election.)

The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and Political Infighting

Politically, it became clear that the Shiite factions were divided over who would become the next national leader and would not rebuild their UIA alliance for the March 7 elections. Several Shiite factions unsuccessfully sought to persuade Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior clerical leader in Iraq, to use his influence to rebuild the UIA. A rival Shiite slate emerged as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law. Called the “Iraqi National Alliance (INA),” it was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.

About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170 total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual candidates as well as overall slates. Aside from that of Maliki, only a few of the coalitions were perceived as having major support, and those coalitions are depicted in Table 1. All blocs offered voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that campaigning was vibrant and vigorous.
### Table 1. Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of Law Coalition</td>
<td>Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shiite sectarianism during the campaign by backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was widely favored in the 2010 election because of strong showing in January 2009 provincial elections, but later perceived as likely to win a relatively narrow plurality, clouding Maliki’s prospects to continue as prime minister.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Alliance</td>
<td>Formed in August 2009, was initially considered the most formidable challenger to Maliki’s slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the Sadrist movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Prime ministerial candidate from this bloc is current deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate ISCI leader well respected by U.S. officials. However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to exclude candidates with Baathist ties—may try to become prime minister. This slate is considered closest to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not persuade him to make a formal endorsement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Movement</td>
<td>Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi (Iraq National Accord) who is Shiite but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. However, Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification Commission) disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate, Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed their disqualification.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance</td>
<td>Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran is running its own separate list for the March 2010 elections, and there has been some violence between PUK and Gorran supporters. PUK’s ebbing strength in the north not likely to jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis said to seek that position.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity Alliance of Iraq</td>
<td>Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list includes Sunni tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni Awakening movement in Anbar. The list includes first post-Saddam defense minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Accordance</td>
<td>A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak competitor for Sunni votes against Allawi slate, and was expected to draw very few Shiite votes.</td>
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**Sources:** Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.

## Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions

The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January 31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.

Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over the substance of the law. These differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system (which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election), despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote for candidates as well as coalition slates). Each province served as a single constituency and a fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, which includes number of COR seats per province).

There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Kirkuk province, where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented in the election. The version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005 voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.

However, this version left many Sunni Arabs upset because it guaranteed a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are displaced. The mechanism for that guarantee was to create a separate electoral constituency for Iraqis voting from outside Iraq—essentially, a “19th province” constituency. Sunni Iraqis felt that because it is mainly members of their sect who remain displaced, that election law version would under-represent them. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats, adopted a new law (December 6, 2009).

Election Parameters

It was not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, and provided for the following:

- Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 allocated by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 elected seats to Muthanna’s seven seats. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based on taking 2005 population figures and adding 2.8% per year growth.7 (A new census was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, although on October 2, 2010, Prime Minister Maliki postponed the census until December 2010. The

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move presumably was intended to allow time for a full term government to be put in place, which would oversee the census.)

- The remaining 15 seats are minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.

- No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.

- An open list election system.

- An election date set for March 7, 2010.

Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis

The electoral process since the end of 2005 has, to a large extent, been intended to bring Sunni Arabs ever further into the political structure and to turn them away from violence and insurgency. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, did participate in the December 2005 parliamentary elections. This represented an apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni interests to remain permanently alienated from the political process.

The 2009 provincial elections furthered the Sunni entry into the political process by attracting the new Sunni groups previously out of the process. These included the Sunni tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused primarily on the severe violence and instability in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures were, at the time of the December 2005 election, still intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which urged Sunnis to stay completely out of the political process.

In the 2009 provincial elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province, according to the final results. At the same time, the established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by the IIP, had been struggling in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the provincial elections, one of its component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates that competed with the IIP in several provinces.

In the March COR elections, the Iraq National Movement “Iraqiya” of Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal among Sunnis. There was an openly Sunni slate, leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures joined the predominantly Shiite slates as part of an effort by the leaders of those blocs to appear non-sectarian.

Disqualification Crisis

The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 7, 2010, elections. Although a Sunni
boycott of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be unfair because of this dispute.

The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when the Justice and Accountability Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many different slates, including some candidates of Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission is headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both are part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.

The Justice and Accountability Commission argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010. Disqualified candidates had three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy, Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in Iraq—all of which fear a return to instability that could result from the disqualifications—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.

However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on February 12, 2010, and announce that 145 candidates would be ineligible to run. Twenty-six candidates who had been barred were reinstated. The remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already accepted their disqualification and been replaced by other candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications is the Iraq National Movement slate, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running. This caused the slate to suspend its campaign for three days subsequent (Feb. 12-15).

The slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott and Mutlaq himself dropped his own calls for boycotting the election. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate campaigned vigorously, and many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order to achieve political results through the election process. It did not boycott even though, on the night before the election, the De-Baathification Commission disqualified an additional 55 candidates, mostly from the Allawi slate.

The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by outgoing General Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his deputy, General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close contact with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal al-Ibrahimi, is a member of the COR. Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a

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campaign centered on excluding ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—has caused particular alarm among experts.

This crisis added to already growing Sunni resentment because of the slow pace with which the Maliki government has implemented its pledge to fully integrate the “Sons of Iraq” fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). About 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. As of August 2010, only about 30,000 had been integrated into the ISF or given the civilian government jobs they were promised, to date. Others say they are being dropped from the payrolls, harassed, arrested, sidelined, and presented with indications that the Maliki government no longer views the Sons of Iraq program as useful. Attempting to reduce the potential for renewed sectarian violence as a result of the disqualifications, in late February 2010 the government reinstated to duty about 20,000 (most of them Sunni Arab) military officers who had served in the military during Saddam’s rule. The disqualifications issue continued after the election, as discussed below, but was resolved.

**Election Unlikely to Resolve KRG-Central Government Disputes**

The COR elections, by themselves, were not expected to heal KRG-central government disputes. KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010 and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the Kurds would cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election to form a new government. That was widely interpreted as an Administration admonition not to establish territorial-related preconditions to join a governing coalition after the elections. However, KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih said on June 15, 2010, that Kurdish leaders seek written guarantees from Iraq’s Arab leaders that key Kurdish issues will be addressed by the next government, as a condition of providing Kurdish votes for any new governing coalition. As of October 2010, this appears to remain the Kurdish position as Maliki seeks Kurdish support to obtain a second term as Prime Minister.

KRG-central government differences had been aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Ajil al-Nufaiji, is the governor, and the Kurds have prevented his visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.

Additional friction was created in the context of the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG backed down and did not hold the referendum.

In part to prevent outright violence, General Odierno, in August 2009, presented a plan to send U.S. forces to partner with peshmerga units (a development without precedent) and with ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab,
Turkomen, and other residents of the province. That plan began implementation in January 2010 and U.S. officials said on August 16, 2010, that the joint (ISF-U.S-Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of checkpoints and training would continue until the U.S. pullout at the end of 2011. Fifteen joint checkpoints were established, but, as of October 2010, the United States has ceased participating at four of them, in concert with the U.S. change of mission to a non-combat role (Operation New Dawn) on September 1, 2010. There has been some speculation that a United Nations force could take over this mediating and confidence-building role thereafter, although it is not clear that this idea is supported by the Iraqi factions involved.

**Intra-Kurdish Divisions**

Further complicating the post-COR election landscape have been widening divisions within the Kurdish community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010 elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 total Kurdish seats in the COR, 14 are held by Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, and other Kurdish groups outside the KDP-PUK alliance.

**The Sadr Faction Competes**

As noted above, Sadr joined the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary” election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above). About 800 total candidates competed for the slots.

As discussed further below, the Sadr faction has been extensively involved in bargaining over the next government and, for the first six months after the election, took the stance that Maliki should be replaced by another Shiite candidate. However, the apparent shift by the faction in late September 2010, including public outreach to its followers in Iraq as to what would be the implications of supporting Maliki’s re-selection, has placed Maliki in a relatively strong position to achieve another term as Prime Minister.

At the same time, there are reports that the Sadrist and offshoot Shiite militias—for now still disarmed—may be planning to reactivate. If these reports are accurate, it could suggest that the Shiite militias sense a power vacuum in top leadership and see militia activity as a means to ensure political influence.

**Election Results**

Table 2 depicts the certified results of the March 7, 2010, elections. Total turnout was about 62%, according to the IHEC. Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent bombings that took place there just as voting was starting, which may have scared some voters away.
With the final count announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC, the following timelines applied, although none of them has been met:

- The result was expected to be certified on/about April 22, following a complaint period. However, that certification was issued on June 1, following various recounts and disputes.

- Fifteen days after certification (by June 15), the new COR is to be seated and elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker.

- Subsequently (no deadline), the COR is to choose a president (by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the “presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of the Maliki government’s term.)

- Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a government.

- Within another 30 days, the presumptive prime minister presents a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).

**Recount Requests**

The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded that any recount decisions are under its purview and that such a comprehensive recount would take an extended period of time. Several international observers, including U.N. Special Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there was no cause, at that point, to suggest widespread fraud.

However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, an Iraqi court ordered a recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats, was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of the seat totals. This followed a few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any disqualifications of winning candidates by the Justice and Accountability Commission. With the seat count holding, the way was set for Iraq’s Supreme Court to certify the results, with the subsequent steps to form a government to follow. The certification came on June 1, 2010.

**Post-Election Government Formation Efforts**

On October 1, 2010, Iraq became a country with the distinction of going longer than any other country without an agreed government, following an election. Part of the difficulty forming a government has been the close result, and the dramatic implications of gaining or retaining power in Iraq, where politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition.

As noted in Table 2 below, the Iraqiyya slate of Iyad al-Allawi won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members gets the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s Supreme Court issued a preliminary
ruling that any group that forms after the election could be deemed to meet that requirement, potentially laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the first opportunity to form a government.

In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene on June 15, 2010. However, the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political deadlock among the various factions, it did not elect a COR leadership team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator Fouad Massoum) became (and remains in an acting capacity) COR speaker. Because no government has been formed, the COR has remained inactive, with most COR members in their home provinces, but still collecting their $10,000 per month salaries.

Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in late May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the “National Alliance.” This alliance appeared only four seats short of a majority that would be needed to form a government, a shortfall that would appear easy to erase. However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee, with Sadrist's and the ISCI faction opposed to Maliki’s continuation. As a possible sign that virtually any alignment is possible, as well as the depths of Sadrist distaste for Maliki, Moqtada Al Sadr met with Allawi in Syria on July 19, 2010. No deal was announced after that meeting. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, the deep disagreements among the Shiite factions broke up this putative alliance. The unraveling prompted Maliki to accuse his critics of supporting only a “weak leader” who would allow the various factions substantial input and influence over governance.

The various factions made little progress through August, as Maliki insisted to his Shiite potential allies and to Allawi that he should be renamed Prime Minister. Some observers believe that bilateral meetings among bloc leaders would not resolve the impasse and that only a broad meeting of the four major COR blocs—Maliki’s bloc; the INA, Allawi’s Iraqiyya, and the Kurdistan Alliance—and discussing all outstanding issues that face Iraq, would result in an agreement on a government.

With the end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States reportedly stepped up its involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between Maliki and Allawi’s bloc on a U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for supporting Maliki, would head a powerful new “council on national strategy” that might have broad powers to rival those of the Prime Minister. Some versions of the proposal also had Allawi being given the Presidency, although the Kurds were said to be consistent on retaining that post for one of their own as a guarantee of movement on their core territorial demands. This insistence was despite the fact that the President will not have an executive veto in the next government, the transitional provision for that power having expired after the first four year government ended. No agreement on the U.S.-backed proposals was announced, even though there was an expectation that the August 10-September 11, 2010, Ramadan period would give ample time for the blocs to reach an agreement.

With the factional disputes unresolved, Maliki has remained prime minister in a caretaker role. Some assert that he continues to govern beyond a caretaker mandate and has little incentive to see a new government formed. However, the COR is needed to pass the calendar year 2011 budget, and its inactivity could jeopardize that process.
Possible October Breakthrough?

On October 1, 2010, Maliki appeared to achieve a political breakthrough. That day, 59 members of the INA, including almost all the 40 Sadrists in that bloc, announced they would back Maliki for another term. That gave him 148 votes out of the 163 he needs to secure the position again. There was some unconfirmed speculation that Iran might have used its influence with Sadr to achieve that change of position. However, the announcement triggered a new round of meetings between Allawi’s bloc and anti-Maliki holdouts within the INA to put together a rival alliance that could form a government. The Kurds reportedly were leaning toward endorsing Maliki but were said to be insisting that, if they support him for another term, he offer solid guarantees to move on their key demands, including territorial disputes and oil sales from the KRG region. However, observers believed that Maliki is now close to locking up the votes he needs. The outstanding issues include who would obtain the Presidency, and how to allocate cabinet seats to satisfy all the rival blocs, as discussed above.

Several Alternatives Possible

If, even after securing additional support, Maliki is unable to form a government, and Allawi does not succeed in putting together his own coalition, there are several alternative Shiite fugures who are considered major contenders for Prime Minister. They include:

- Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. He has the support of the Sadrist, who are in a strong position, holding 40 seats in the COR. On April 2 and 3, the Sadrist held a “referendum” to determine who the group should support for prime minister; Jafari was the first choice. In addition, the brief Maliki-INa alliance discussed above was announced at Jafari’s home.

- Jafar al-Sadr. The 40-year-old member of the Sadr family is viewed as an up-and-coming politician. He ran on Maliki’s slate and won the most votes in Baghdad province after Maliki. Because he is a relative of Moqtada Al Sadr (Moqtada is married to Jafar’s sister) and the only son of the revered Da’wa Party founder Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, Jafar al-Sadr has a strong pedigree in Iraqi Shiite politics. He has studied Shiite theology but is not a practicing Shiite cleric. He came in second in the “Sadrist referendum” on the prime ministership, discussed above. Some observers say he may be acceptable to the Sunni Arabs, as well, because he supported their community during the “Disqualification Crisis” discussed above.

- ISCI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi. Abd al-Mahdi. He is perceived as a U.S. favorite because of his western education in economics and his relatively moderate positions and demeanor. However, his chances are reduced by the fact that ISCI candidates only won eight seats in the COR.

- “Dark Horse” Candidates. A scenario under which no compromise can be reached raises the potential for the emergence of less prominent prime ministerial candidates. Among the names widely mentioned are Ahmad Chalabi, discussed above, and Oil Minister Hussein Shahrustani. Both are Shiites.
Continued Violence

The delay in forming a new government has left a partial power vacuum in Iraq which insurgents have sought to use to their advantage. Although overall levels of violence are 90% lower than they were at the height of the sectarian conflict of 2006-2007, there have been politically motivated assassinations and other violence occurring. For example, a suicide bombing at an Iraqi Army recruiting station in Baghdad in August 2010 killed nearly 60 Iraqis; the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella group that includes Al Qaeda in Iraq, claimed responsibility. Motives and suspects of the continuing violence run the gamut, from Al Qaeda in Iraq seeking to provoke Sunnis from political participation, to Shiites seeking to assassinate any Sunnis who have political power. A tactic increasingly in use appears to be adhesive or magnetic bombs attached to officials’ vehicles.

Stalled Legislative Progress

The infighting between Maliki and his critics had the effect of stalling movement on remaining crucial legislation, such as that discussed in Table 6. Some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment, those governing other elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national flag. Moreover, many Iraqis blame the deadlock, in part, for the government’s inability to alleviate severe shortages of electricity during Iraq’s characteristically hot summer. Iraqis who cannot afford their own generators, or to share a generator with a few other homes, can count on only two hours of power per day.
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
(100% of the vote counted as of March 26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Elected Seats in COR</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority reserved: 2 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh (Mosul)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity (Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyah</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Maliki: 14; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk (Tamim)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maliki: 7; INA: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salahuddin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>325</strong></td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(310 elected + 8 minority reserved + 7 compensatory)

Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89  
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)  
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43  
Unity (Bolani): 4  
Accordance: 6  
other Kurdish: 14  
minority reserved: 8


Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact allocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi law. Total seat numbers include likely allocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.
Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Implications for the United States

The primary U.S. concerns are twofold: (1) that the political deadlock will not be resolved, and insurgents will take advantage of the political vacuum; and (2) that a deal among the factions might exclude Allawi’s Sunni-backed Iraqiyya bloc, alienating Sunnis and driving them back into large scale insurgency. Either scenario could complicate U.S. plans to complete its withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011. Still, most U.S. officials believe that the most dire consequences of any failure to form a government can be avoided, even if Maliki remains as a caretaker Prime Minister for many more months.

U.S. officials have been conducting constant discussions with the major political leaders in an effort to forge compromise. Vice President Biden, designated as the lead U.S. official on Iraq policy, last visited Iraq during the July 4, 2010, holiday period and again at the end of August 2010, where he presided over the change of U.S. command from Gen. Odierno to Gen. Austin. During these visits, he urged the Iraqi factions to compromise while stressing that the United States commitment to Iraq will endure long beyond the 2011 military pullout. In an August 23, 2010, speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Indianapolis, he said that the long negotiations among Iraqi leaders indicate that the factions are engaged in purely political competition, rather than violent contest. In between visits, he reportedly has been in frequent telephone contact with Iraqi faction leaders on progress toward government formation. Former Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill had reportedly hoped that a new government would be formed by the end of his term in late August 2010. The new Ambassador, James Jeffrey, who has vast experience in the region, arrived and presented his credentials to Iraqi leaders on August 18, 2010.

Whether or not Maliki stays as Prime Minister, virtually any alternative is familiar to and has worked well with U.S. officials. Of the major candidates for Prime Minister, all of them except Jafar Al Sadr have served either as Prime Minister, interim or transitional Prime Minister, or deputy President (Abd al-Mahdi). Jafar Al Sadr’s relatively moderate stands on Islam and governance make it unlikely that he would be highly deleterious to U.S. interests. Still, it is widely perceived that U.S. officials would prefer Allawi above all the major candidates because he is seen as non-sectarian, even-handed, and strongly opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq. Of the “dark horse” candidates, Ahmad Chalabi’s selection would be considered a setback to U.S. interests because he is viewed as a divisive figure by many Iraqi Sunnis.

Table 3 provides information on U.S. assistance to promote Iraqi democracy and peaceful political competition and consensus building. If Iraq’s major factions have permanently shifted away from supporting violence and toward peaceful political competition, some might argue that U.S. funding has contributed to that transition. Others might argue that the change was caused by numerous factors, such as the improvement of security and rejection of foreign terrorist influence, and that it is virtually impossible to assess the contribution made by U.S. assistance.

Other Elections Possible

There had been speculation that the March National Assembly elections would be held concurrently with a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31, 2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum.
vote by failing to act on legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the National Assembly elections.9

District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However, those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in 2010, after the National Assembly elections. No date for these elections has been announced, suggesting a delay beyond 2010.

Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. If there is a settlement between the KRG and Baghdad over Kirkuk and other territories, there could be a referendum to ratify any settlement that is reached. Under Article 140 of the Constitution, a referendum was to be held by December 31, 2007, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Because the three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009, elections are required in those provinces at some point, presumably subsequent to a settlement of the Kirkuk dispute. Absent such a settlement, observers believe these elections might be held in the fall of 2010. (For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.)

There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC). There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a referendum might be ready.

Table 3. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2009</th>
<th>FY2010 (est.)</th>
<th>FY2011 (req.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law and Human Rights</td>
<td>46.55</td>
<td>73.50</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>143.64</td>
<td>117.00</td>
<td>90.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition/Consensus-Building</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>50.50</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>322.31</td>
<td>326.50</td>
<td>175.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USAID Foreign Assistance Database, July 26, 2010.

### Table 4. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>State of Law (%)</th>
<th>ISCI (%)</th>
<th>Sadr (%)</th>
<th>Jafari (%)</th>
<th>Allawi (%)</th>
<th>Accord Front (%)</th>
<th>Fadhila (%)</th>
<th>New Governor</th>
<th>Council Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad—55</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>State of Law—37% (20)</td>
<td>Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabean and one</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State of Law—11.6% (5)</td>
<td>Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian set-aside seat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sadr—5% (2)</td>
<td>Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad—55</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sadr—5% (2)</td>
<td>Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Basra—34** regular seats, plus one Christian seat

- **State of Law**—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). New Governor: Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)

**Nineveh—34** regular seats, plus one set aside for Shabaks, Yazidis, and Christians

- Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa has taken control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor is Athheel al-Nujaifi of Hadbaa.

**Najaf—28** seats

- State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list

**Babil—30** seats

- State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid Tuman (Sadrist)

**Diyala—29** seats

- Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—6%. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.

**Muthanna—26** seats

- State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—3.7%.

**Anbar—29** seats

- Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering (established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Allawi—6.8%; Tribes of Iraq—4.5%.

**Maysan—27** seats

- State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%; Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair: Hezbollah Iraq

**Dhi Qar—31** seats

- State of Law—21.3% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4); Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. New governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist

**Karbala—27** seats

- List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5%; Fadhila—2.5%.

**Salah Ad Din—28** seats

- IIP-led list—14.5%; Allawi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%; ISCI—2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP

**Qadissiyah—28** seats

- State of Law—21.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Allawi—8%; Sadr—6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)

**Wasit—28** seats

- State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Allawi—4.6%; Fadhila—2.7%. New governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI

**Table 5. Election Results (January and December 2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc/Party</th>
<th>Seats (Jan. 05)</th>
<th>Seats (Dec. 05)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis Party (Yayar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).
## Table 6. Assessments of the Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and completing review</td>
<td>(S) satisfactory</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-Baathification</td>
<td>(U) unsatisf.</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions. Could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As noted, De-Baathification officials used this law to try to harm the prospects of rivals in March 2010 elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure equitable distribution of resources</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area. Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws in the near term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-autonomous regions</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial elections</td>
<td>S on (a) and U on the others</td>
<td>overall unmet; (a) met</td>
<td>S on (a) and (c)</td>
<td>Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as discussed above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty for former insurgents</td>
<td>no rating</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>Same as July</td>
<td>Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. have been transferred to Iraqi control under Security Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia disarmament</td>
<td>no rating</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>Same as July</td>
<td>Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Establishing political, media, economic, and services committee to support U.S. “surge”</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S. troop total in Iraq now about 50,000, down from about 170,000 at the 2008 height of the surge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support U.S. surge</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge when it was in operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to make decisions, without political intervention, to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S to pursue extremists on political interference</td>
<td>No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF—favoring Shiites. Some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago. Defense and Interior ministers filed candidacies for the March 2010 elections, involving them in national political contest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing even-handed enforcement of law</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S on military, U on police</td>
<td>U.S. interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed, and still widespread Iraqi public complaints of politically-motivated administration of justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not provide a safe haven for any outlaw, no matter the sect</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b) eliminating militia control of local security</td>
<td>Mixed. S on (a); U on (b)</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>same as July 12</td>
<td>Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated. Shiite militias weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating independently</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the Security Agreement, which requires U.S. troops to depart. Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the challenges. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by then and has requested advanced weaponry, including F-16s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not falsely accusing ISF members</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by CRS.
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kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612