Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

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Summary

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, has been increasingly characterized by peaceful competition, as well as by attempts to form cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and factional infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This was in evidence in the successful efforts by Shiite Arab political leaders to disqualify some prominent Sunni Arab candidates in the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament), which will form the next government. Election-related violence occurred before and during the election, although not at levels of earlier years.

With the results of the March 7, 2010, election certified, the cross-sectarian but Sunni-supported “Iraqiya” slate of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi unexpectedly gained a plurality of 91 of the 325 COR seats up for election. Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s State of Law slate won 89, and a rival Shiite coalition was third with 70. The main Kurdish parties, again allied, won 43. Allawi’s slate had been expected to receive the first opportunity to put together a majority coalition to form a government. Maliki and the other main Shiite coalition, opposing what they claim is the mostly Sunni Arab base of the Allawi slate, have forged a tenuous alliance to form the next government. However, differences over who this Shiite bloc would select as prime minister could cause it to fragment, leaving the issue of who might emerge as prime minister still open. Jalal Talabani appears likely to retain the post of president, although this, too, is not certain. No posts were agreed upon when the COR convened for the first time post-election (June 14, 2010).

Allawi, who is viewed as even-handed and not amenable to Iranian influence, was considered to be favored by the Obama Administration and by Sunni-dominated regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia. However, many expect that neither the United States nor these neighbors can or will intervene decisively to shape a new government led by Allawi. The domestic tensions over the election result have not substantially altered the Obama Administration’s planned reduction of the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. The current U.S. troop level is about 83,000, and a reduction to 50,000 is to be completed by September 1, 2010. The outgoing top U.S. commander in Iraq, General Raymond Odierno, says that U.S. drawdown plans would change substantially only if the post-election political process turns highly violent—a development that is not widely expected. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, and which President Obama has said would be followed, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. U.S. officials are hoping that a new government might be able to overcome the roadblocks that have thus far prevented passage of key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as national hydrocarbon laws. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Overview of the Political Transition

Iraq has completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. However, disputes continue over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources. These disputes permeate and complicate almost every issue in Iraq, including security, the terms and framework for elections, economic decision making, and foreign policy.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. It was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi Arabia.

January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections

A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the “proportional representation/closed list” election system, voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.

Permanent Constitution

The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam as “a
main source” of legislation;\(^1\) a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).

The major disputes—still to some extent unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.

With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.

**December 15, 2005, Elections**

The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election, each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 4, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime minister.

On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud

\(^1\) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; and one Christian. Four were women.

Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections

The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but did not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts said that the U.S. mission in Iraq was failing.

In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).

As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks—and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that the Administration attributed largely to the U.S. “troop surge”—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 5.


The passage of key legislation in 2008 (see chart below) and the continued calming of the security situation enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the Knights”) succeeded in pacifying the city, and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed and less sectarian. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, essentially putting to rest indicators that major blocs might vote Maliki out of the prime ministership. (In 2007 the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet slots, severely weakening Maliki politically.)

Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. They saw him as increasingly building a following in the security forces and creating new security organs loyal to him and his faction. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he directly commands the National Counter-Terrorism Force (nearly 9,000 personnel) as
well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In 2008, the Kurds were highly critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other support councils were created in southern Iraq. As another example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the former governor of the province. A further February 2010 incident involved the government’s order to arrest a major Sunni leader south of Baghdad (Shaykh Turki Talal), an arrest that was later reversed after reported U.S. intervention.

January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications

The political fears of some factions about Maliki’s intentions to consolidate power were evident in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. Under a 2008 law, provincial councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province, making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide provincial politics. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly powerful UIA. Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government; centralization is Maliki’s preferred power structure.

The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009 and putting off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.

In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province was about 30,\textsuperscript{5} down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.

The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties


\textsuperscript{4} The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the Sabean sect in Baghdad.

\textsuperscript{5} Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province. This was seen as likely to set back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.

About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal, although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.

The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009. Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils elected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.

Outcomes

The fears of Maliki’s opponents were realized when his list (“State of Law Coalition”) was the clear winner of the provincial elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate slates and fared generally poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).

The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well organized and well funded. ISCI did not win in Najaf province, which it previously dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held previously, and only five in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics.

The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close to winning outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern provinces to, through deal-making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The showing of the Sadrist was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue to field militias— which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

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6 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
The unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to strong central government, as well as to the concept of Iraqi nationalism. This trend was also reflected in the strong showing of a single candidate in Karbala province who was well thought of in the province for even-handedness.

Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape, mostly in line with set deadlines above, are in Table 5.

Diyala Province was hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, reflecting the character of the province as a front line between the Kurds and the central government. The provincial version of the Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for first place in the province, and subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration. There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.

Maliki’s Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approached

Because of his slate’s showing in the provincial elections, Maliki was deemed throughout 2009 to be well positioned for the March 7, 2010, COR elections; the new COR chooses the next full-term government. However, his vulnerabilities led many observers to expect his slate to win a plurality in the elections, but not a majority that would ensure his continuation as prime minister. Maliki derived political strength from the U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” (sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), which passed the COR on November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition. The pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31, 2011, for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop drawdown plan that comports with the major provisions of the agreement.

The first major milestone of the U.S.-Iraq Agreement was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where General Raymond Odierno (top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday. Because of these achievements, Maliki was able to include some political competitors in some provinces, including those dominated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribalists into his State of Law coalition which competed in the March 2010 COR vote.

As 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was shaken by the several high-profile attacks since June 2009, including several major multiple bombing attacks in central Baghdad. Additional bombings took place in Baghdad, Diyala Province, Anbar Province, and elsewhere as the election approached. Some believe that insurgents conducted these attacks with the intent of weakening Maliki’s image as a strong leader. Others saw these incidents as an effort by Al Qaeda in Iraq or other un-reconciled Sunni insurgent groups to reduce Sunni participation in the elections and/or reignite civil war.
Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. The makeshift new Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009. After this bombing, which also resulted in the parliament’s insistence that it hear Maliki’s explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also attempted to place substantial blame for the lapses on Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, who headed a rival slate in the elections. (See Table 1 on major slates in the election.)

The infighting between Maliki and his critics has also had the effect of stalling movement on remaining crucial legislation, such as that discussed in Table 5. Some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment, those governing other elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national flag.

The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and Political Infighting

The election period took an unexpected turn when it became clear that the Shiite factions were divided and would not compete as a unified bloc. In the runup to the March 7 elections, several Shiite factions unsuccessfully sought to persuade Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior clerical leader in Iraq, to call for reconstituting the UIA. A rival Shiite slate emerged as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law: the “Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA coalition believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.

About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170 total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual candidates as well as overall slates. Aside from that of Maliki, only a few of the coalitions were perceived as having major support, and those coalitions are depicted in Table 1. All blocs offered voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that campaigning was vibrant and vigorous.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State of Law Coalition</strong> (slate no. 337)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shiite sectarianism during the campaign by backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was widely favored in the 2010 election because of strong showing in January 2009 provincial elections, but later perceived as likely to win a relatively narrow plurality, clouding Maliki’s prospects to continue as prime minister.</td>
</tr>
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| **Iraqi National Alliance** (slate no. 316)         |
| Formed in August 2009, was initially considered the most formidable challenger to Maliki’s slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the Sadrist movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Prime ministerial candidate from this bloc is current deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate ISCI leader well respected by U.S. officials. However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to exclude candidates with Baathist ties—may try to become prime minister. This slate is considered closest to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not persuade him to make a formal endorsement. |

| **Iraqi National Movement** (”Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333) |

| **Kurdistan Alliance** (slate no. 372)              |
| Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran is running its own separate list for the March 2010 elections, and there has been some violence between PUK and Gorran supporters. PUK’s ebbing strength in the north not likely to jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis said to seek that position. |

| **Unity Alliance of Iraq** (slate no. 348)         |
| Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list includes Sunni tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni Awakening movement in Anbar. The list includes first post-Saddam defense minister Sadun al-Dulaymi. |

| **Iraqi Accordance** (slate no. 338)                |
| A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak competitor for Sunni votes against Allawi slate, and was expected to draw very few Shiite votes. |

**Sources:** Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions

The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to be held by January 31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term. Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.

Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) had the potential to shape the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over the substance of the law. These differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system (which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election), despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote for candidates as well as coalition slates). The final law, passed on December 6, 2009, provided for an open list. Each province served as a single constituency and a fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, which includes number of COR seats per province).

There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Kirkuk province, where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented in the election. The version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005 voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.

However, this version left many Sunni Arabs angry because it guaranteed a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are displaced. The mechanism for that guarantee was to create a separate electoral constituency for Iraqis voting from outside Iraq—essentially, a “19th province” constituency. Sunni Iraqis felt that because it is mainly members of their sect who remain displaced, that election law version would under-represent them. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats, adopted a new law (December 6, 2009). It was not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, and provided for the following:

- Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 are allocated by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 elected seats to Muthanna’s seven seats. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was

- The remaining 15 seats are minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory seats” (7) — seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
- There is no separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
- The election date was set for March 7, 2010.

**Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis**

The electoral process since the end of 2005 has, to a large extent, furthered U.S. goals to bring Sunni Muslims ever further into the political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in all governing bodies. However, Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, participated in the December 2005 parliamentary elections.

The 2009 provincial elections furthered the Sunni entry into the political process by attracting the participation of Sunni tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who recruited the Sons of Iraq fighters. These Sunnis had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused primarily on the severe violence and instability in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures were intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which urged Sunnis to stay completely out of what Al Qaeda in Iraq asserted was a U.S. dominated political process.

In the 2009 provincial elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province, according to the final results. At the same time, the established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by the IIP, had been struggling in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the provincial elections, one of its component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates that competed with the IIP in several provinces.

As noted, in the March 7, 2010, COR election, the Iraq National Movement “Iraqiyya” of Iyad al-Allawi was expected to have strong appeal among Sunnis. There was an openly Sunni slate, leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures joined the predominantly Shiite slates as part of an effort by the leaders of those blocs to appear non-sectarian.

**Disqualification Crisis**

The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 7, 2010, elections. Although a Sunni
boycott of the elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be unfair because of this dispute.

The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when the Justice and Accountability Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many different slates, including some candidates of Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission is headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both are part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.

The Justice and Accountability Commission argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010. Disqualified candidates had three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy, Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in Iraq—all of which fear a return to instability that could result from the disqualifications—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.

However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on February 12, 2010, and announce that 145 candidates would be ineligible to run. Twenty-six candidates who had been barred were reinstated. The remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already accepted their disqualification and been replaced by other candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications is the Iraq National Movement slate, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running. This caused the slate to suspend its campaign for three days subsequent to the beginning of campaigning on February 12 (which was a one-week postponement from the original date set for the start of the campaign).

The slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott and Mutlaq himself dropped his own calls for boycotting the election. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate campaigned vigorously, and many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout among their community, in order to achieve political results through the election process. It did not boycott even though, on the night before the election, the De-Baathification Commission disqualified an additional 55 candidates, mostly from the Allawi slate.

The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by outgoing General Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq (but soon to be replaced by his deputy, General Lloyd Austin), that Iran is working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close contact with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal al-Ibrahimi, is a member of the COR. Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding...
ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—has caused particular alarm among experts.

This crisis added to already growing Sunni resentment because of the slow pace with which the Maliki government has implemented its pledge to fully integrate the “Sons of Iraq” fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). About 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. Only about 30,000 have been integrated into the ISF or given the civilian government jobs they were promised, to date. Attempting to reduce the potential for renewed sectarian violence as a result of the disqualifications, in late February 2010 the government reinstated to duty about 20,000 (most of them Sunni Arab) military officers who had served in the military during Saddam’s rule. The disqualifications issue continued after the election, as discussed below, but was resolved.

**Election Unlikely to Resolve KRG-Central Government Disputes**

The March 7, 2010, COR elections were not expected to heal KRG-central government disputes. KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010 and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the Kurds would cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election to form a new government. That was widely interpreted as an Administration admonition not to establish Kirkuk-related preconditions to join a governing coalition after the elections. However, KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih said on June 15, 2010, that Kurdish leaders seek written guarantees from Iraq’s Arab leaders that key Kurdish issues will be addressed by the next government, as a condition of providing Kurdish votes for any new governing coalition.

KRG-central government differences had been aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the “Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Ajil al-Nufaiji, is the governor, and the Kurds have prevented his visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.

In part to prevent outright violence, General Odierno, in August 2009, proposed to send U.S. forces to partner with peshmerga units (a development without precedent) and with ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab, Turkomen, and other residents of the province. That plan began implementation in January 2010. Nineveh has seen several high-profile attacks since the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009.

Additional friction surrounded the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG backed down and did not hold the referendum.

The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an unexpectedly high 25 seats (out
of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the PUK and weakening it relative to
the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, easily won reelection against weak
opposition. Maliki met with Barzani in the Kurdish region on August 2, 2009, the first direct
meeting between the two in a year, signaling Maliki’s inclination to appear magnanimous and
open to compromise. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010 elections and constituted a
significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyyah Province, according to election
results.

The Sadr Faction Competes

As noted above, Sadr joined the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the
March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary”
election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr
movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above).
About 800 total candidates competed for the slots.

The Sadr faction is extensively involved in bargaining over the next government. At the same
time, there are reports that the Sadrist and offshoot Shiite militias—for now still disarmed—may
be planning to reactivate. If these reports are accurate, it could suggest that the Shiite militias
sense a power vacuum in top leadership and see militia activity as a means to ensure political
influence.

Election Results

Table 2 depicts the certified results of the March 7, 2010, elections. Total turnout was about 62%,
according to the IHEC. Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent
bombings that took place there just as voting was starting, which may have scared some voters
away.

With the final count announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC, the following timelines apply:

- The result was expected to be certified on/about April 22, following a complaint
  period. However, that certification was issued on June 1, following various
  recounts and disputes.

- Fifteen days after certification (by June 15), the new COR is to be seated and
elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. The newly elected COR did convene on
June 15, 2010, in line with the requirements. However, the session ended after
only 18 minutes and did not elect a COR leadership team. Disputes among major
factions over time allotted for each faction to speak led to a breakdown of the
session.

- Subsequently (no deadline), the COR is to choose a president (by a two-thirds
  vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after this election, Iraq
  is to have a president and at least one vice president—the “presidency council”
  concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of the Maliki
government’s term.)
• Within another 15 days, the bloc with the “largest share” is tapped by the president to form a government.

• Within another 30 days, the presumptive prime minister presents a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).

Post-Election Disputes and Government Formation Efforts

The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded that any recount decisions are under its purview and that such a comprehensive recount would take an extended period of time. Several international observers, including U.N. Special Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert, have indicated that there is no cause, at this point, to suggest widespread fraud.

However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, an Iraqi court ordered a recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats, was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of the seat totals. This followed a few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any disqualifications of winning candidates by the Justice and Accountability Commission. With the seat count holding, the way was set for Iraq’s Supreme Court to certify the results, with the subsequent steps to form a government to follow. The certification came on June 1, 2010.

The Political Landscape

As noted in Table 2 below, the Iraqiyya slate of Iyad al-Allawi won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over Maliki’s State of Law slate. The Iraqi constitution mandates that the slate with “the largest share” of votes gets the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling that any group that forms after the election could be deemed to meet that requirement, potentially laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the first opportunity to form a government.

Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government were set back in late May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the INA coalition agreed to an alliance called the “National Alliance.” This alliance, if it holds together, would be only four seats short of a majority that would be needed to form a government, a shortfall that would appear easy to erase. However, the alliance has not been able to agree to a prime minister selectee, with Sadrists and the ISCI faction opposed to Maliki’s continuation. This disagreement has threatened to break up this new alliance to the point where Allawi, were he to apportion cabinet seats effectively, could still become prime minister.

The choice of president might also determine who gets the chance to form a government, because it is the role of the president to tap a faction leader to assemble the new government. President Talabani had been widely expected to retain the presidency but it is possible that a Sunni Arab might take that post if Maliki and Allawi reach a broader power-sharing deal.

Allawi and Maliki have met on two occasions, most recently June 29, although without agreement on which of their blocs would be able to form a government and both suggesting that the government formation process might go into the fall of 2010. Meanwhile, Maliki remains...
prime minister in a caretaker role, although some assert that he continues to govern beyond a
caretaker mandate and has little incentive to see a new government formed.

If the Shiite blocs do outmaneuver Allawi, there are several Shiite prime ministerial candidacies
other than Maliki who are under discussion, although State of Law is insisting on Maliki. The
alternatives include:

- Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. He has the support of the Sadrist, who
  are in a strong position, holding 40 seats in the COR. On April 2 and 3, the
  Sadrist held a “referendum” to determine who the group should support for
  prime minister; Jafari was the first choice. In addition, the Maliki-INA alliance
discussed above was announced at Jafari’s home.

- Jafar al-Sadr. The 40-year-old member of the Sadr family is viewed as an up-and-
  coming politician. He ran on Maliki’s slate and won the most votes in Baghdad
  province after Maliki. Because he is a relative of Moqtada Al Sadr (Moqtada is
  married to Jafari’s sister) and the only son of the revered Da’wa Party founder
  Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, Jafar al-Sadr has a strong pedigree in Iraqi Shiite
  politics. He has studied Shiite theology but is not a practicing Shiite cleric. He
  came in second in the “Sadrist referendum” on the prime ministership, discussed
  above.

- ISCI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi. Abd al-Mahdi’s chances are reduced by the fact that
  ISCI candidates only won eight seats in the COR.

Any of the Shiite candidates would satisfy those Iraqi Shiites who want to block the path to
power of Iyad al-Allawi, who is viewed as too close to Iraq’s Sunnis. In the days and weeks
following the election, representatives of all the major slates, except those of Iraqiyya, visited
Iran to consult on the formation of a new government.

On April 10, 2010, following the visits, Iran—echoed by ISCI—appeared to shift position by
asserting that any new governing coalition should include Iraqiyya. For his part, Allawi sent an
emissary, current Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, to Iran for consultations on April 14,
2010; several high-level Iranian leaders met with him. The shift has been widely viewed as an
attempt by Iran and its Iraqi allies to placate the Sunni voters in Iraq that strongly support
Iraqiyya and who might inspire renewed violence if Iraqiyya is not given a prominent role in the
new government. The apparent Iranian shift could represent an Iranian calculation that its
interests are best served by a stable Iraq and inter-sect harmony rather than Shiite dominance.
Some factions also visited Saudi Arabia to elicit its views; the kingdom is viewed as the principal
regional backer of Allawi’s attempts to become prime minister. However, the subsequent
reconstruction of a Shiite governing alliance, which could marginalize or exclude Allawi’s bloc
entirely, suggests that Iran and Iraq’s Shiites might not have been completely sincere in
advocating a more inclusive governing alliance.

There have been other significant results, aside from the unexpectedly strong showing of Allawi’s
slate. The Kurds appear to be suffering a major setback in their effort to gain control of Kirkuk
because Allawi’s slate won the same number of seats as the Kurdistan Alliance in that province.

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(six seats each). The Kurdistan Alliance has been further shaken by the strong showing of the Gorran list in Sulaymaniyah Province, running very close to the Alliance’s vote total there.

**New Violence**

The continued delay in forming a new government has left a partial power vacuum in Iraq. Although overall levels of violence are 90% lower than they were at the height of the sectarian conflict of 2006-2007, there have been politically motivated assassinations and other violence occurring. A COR member of Allawi’s bloc has been assassinated, and other attempts have been reported on other members of the bloc. Motives and suspects of such attacks run the gamut, from Al Qaeda in Iraq seeking to provoke Sunnis from political participation, to Shiites seeking to assassinate any Sunnis who have political power. A tactic increasingly in use appears to be adhesive or magnetic bombs attached to officials’ vehicles.
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province  
(100% of the vote counted as of March 26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Elected Seats in COR</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority reserved: 2 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh (Mosul)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity (Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyah</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Maliki: 14; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk (Tamim)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maliki: 7; INA: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyalal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salahuddin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maliki: 4; INA: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>325</strong></td>
<td>Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(310 elected + 8 minority reserved + 7 compensatory)

Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89  
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)  
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43  
Unity (Bolani): 4  
Accordance: 6  
other Kurdish: 14  
minority reserved: 8


*Notes:* Seat totals are approximate and their exact allocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi law. Total seat numbers include likely allocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.
Implications for the United States

As discussed above, the primary U.S. concern is that the post-election period is generating new tensions that might reignite sectarian conflict and cause reevaluation of U.S. troop drawdown plans. Several major bombings in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq in April and May 2010 have fed the concerns, although the bombings have not, to date, set off broader sectarian violence. Reflecting the concern for the election challenges to inspire violent reactions, on April 27, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton said

The United States respects the legal avenues that Iraq has set up for challenges to candidates and to electoral results. However, for challenges to be credible and legitimate they must also be transparent and must accord with the laws and mechanism established for the conduct of the elections.

The United States has worked successfully with both Allawi and Maliki during their terms as prime ministers of post-Saddam Iraqi governments, and the Administration is believed to view either of them, and most other potential candidates, as acceptable to U.S. interests. Still, although the United States is expected not to intervene directly in the inter-bloc bargaining, U.S. officials have tended to prefer Allawi because he is seen as non-sectarian, even-handed, and strongly opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq. Although U.S. officials are not likely to actively push for Allawi, U.S. officials might become concerned if there is a perception of extensive Iranian input into the formation of the new government. Still, the apparent U.S. satisfaction with the easing of the post-election recount and de-Baathification disputes was reflected by a U.S. Embassy statement on May 15, 2010, that the Iraqi elections were “the most successful and credible elections in the history of any Arab country.”

As testified by outgoing top commander General Odierno on June 24, 2010 (Senate Armed Services Committee), the violence is not at a level to derail or delay the planned reduction of U.S. forces to 50,000 by September 1, 2010. The Administration reportedly has not held any broad, high-level meetings on Iraq.

Other Elections Possible

There had been speculation that the March National Assembly elections would be held concurrently with a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31, 2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum vote by failing to act on legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the National Assembly elections.

District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However, those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in 2010, after the National Assembly elections.

Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. If there is a settlement between the KRG and Baghdad over Kirkuk and other territories, there could be a referendum to ratify any settlement that is reached. Under Article 140 of the Constitution, a referendum was to be held by December 31, 2007, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Because the three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009, elections are required in those provinces at some point, presumably subsequent to a settlement of the Kirkuk dispute. Absent such a settlement, observers believe these elections might be held in the fall of 2010. (For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, *The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq*, by Kenneth Katzman.)

There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC). There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a referendum might be ready.

**Table 3. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Regular Seats</th>
<th>Proportion of Seats</th>
<th>Major Slates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>38% (28)</td>
<td>State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9% (5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Allawi)—8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats); National Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37% (20)</td>
<td>State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). New Governor: Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; ILPI—6.7%; Hadbaa has taken control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi of Hadbaa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.2% (7)</td>
<td>State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.5% (8)</td>
<td>State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid Tuman (Sadrist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—6%. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10.9% (5)</td>
<td>State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—3.7%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering (established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Allawi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—4.5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.7% (8)</td>
<td>State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%; Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair: Hezbollah Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23.1% (13)</td>
<td>State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4); Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. New governor: Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.3% (1)</td>
<td>List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5%; Fadhila—2.5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Ad Din</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>IIP-led list—14.5%; Allawi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%; ISCI—2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadissiyah</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23.1% (11)</td>
<td>State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Allawi—8%; Sadr—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)

Wasit—28 seats

State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Allawi—4.6%; Fadhila—2.7%. New governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI


Table 4. Election Results (January and December 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc/Party</th>
<th>Seats (Jan. 05)</th>
<th>Seats (Dec. 05)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadlalah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis Party (Yayar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/December: 75% (12 million).
### Table 5. Assessments of the Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and completing review</td>
<td>(S) satisfactory</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-Baathification</td>
<td>(U) unsatisf.</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions. Could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As noted, De-Baathification officials have used the new law to try to harm the prospects of their rivals in March 2010 elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure equitable distribution of resources</td>
<td>U unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area. Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws in the near term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-autonomous regions</td>
<td>S partly met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial elections</td>
<td>S on (a) and U on the others</td>
<td>overall unmet; (a) met</td>
<td>S on (a) and (c) met</td>
<td>Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as discussed above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty for former insurgents</td>
<td>no rating</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>Same as July</td>
<td>Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. being transferred to Iraqi control under SOFA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia disarmament</td>
<td>no rating</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>Same as July</td>
<td>Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Establishing political, media, economic, and services committee to support U.S. ‘surge’</td>
<td>S met</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to make decisions, without political intervention, to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S to pursue extremists U on political interference</td>
<td>No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF—favoring Shiites. Still, some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago. Defense and Interior ministers filed candidacies for the March 2010 elections, involving them in national political contest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing even-handed enforcement of law</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>S on military, U on police</td>
<td>U.S. interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not provide a safe haven for any outlaw, no matter the sect</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No change. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b) eliminating militia control of local security</td>
<td>Mixed, S on (a); U on (b)</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>same as July 12</td>
<td>Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated. Shiite militias weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating independently</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the SOFA, which requires U.S. troops to be out by then. Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the challenges, although some decrease in U.S. confidence in light of high profile attacks. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by then and has requested advanced weaponry, including F-16s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>met</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>partly met S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not falsely accusing ISF members</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>unmet</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by CRS.
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kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612